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EVELYN HOLST CLIFT

The *American Journal of Philology* announces with profound regret the death on October 9, 1986, of Evelyn H. Clift, who had been its Secretary for many years.

Eve, after graduating from Vassar College, had come to the Johns Hopkins University in 1930 as a graduate student in the Department of Latin, and after an absence caused by reasons of health had returned and had received her doctorate in 1936. In 1937 she was appointed research assistant to Professor Tenney Frank and departmental secretary. At this time she began to learn the duties connected with the editing of a scholarly journal, so that, although it was not until 1946 that she was formally appointed Secretary of the Editorial Board, she was in fact deeply involved with the *AJP* until her retirement in 1973. During most of the time of her service as Secretary, the Editor of the journal was the late Professor Henry T. Rowell, and in the 1973 spring issue he paid an eloquent tribute to the outstanding quality of her work on the journal's behalf, from which editors, contributors and readers all benefitted to an inestimable degree.

As Secretary, Eve not only prepared manuscripts for the printer and read the proofs with meticulous care but also listed books received and prepared a twenty-year index in the 1939 issue and fifteen-year indices in the 1954 and 1969 issues, not to mention the indices to each annual volume. Her philological and linguistic knowledge, her extreme care and industry, and her devotion to the highest ideals of classical scholarship all contributed toward the perfection of each issue. Her devoted and thoroughly competent service to the journal is all the more remarkable when one considers that during most of the time of her service as Secretary she held two other very time-consuming positions involving great responsibility: her position on the faculty of the University of Delaware, to which she had been appointed in 1942 and where her excellent teaching received high recognition; and the Secretary-Treasurership of the Classical Association of the Atlantic States from 1963 to 1982, which enjoyed in a remarkable degree the advantages resulting from her hard work and financial good management.

All who have been associated in any way with the *American Journal of Philology* will appreciate her many years of faithful devotion to it, and all who were privileged to know her either in or outside of academic life will continue to miss her.

JAMES W. POULTNEY

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

DAEDALUS, VIRGIL AND THE END OF ART

My text is Virgil's version of the story of Daedalus, from the opening of *Aeneid* 6.¹ Aeneas confronts this tale on reaching Cumae in search of the Sibyl. It is told in a series of tableaux on the doors of a temple dedicated to Apollo by the artisan-sculptor himself after his safe arrival in Italy. This is the only occasion in ancient literature where an

¹The most recent discussions of the Daedalus episode are by V. Pöschl ("Die Tempeltüren des Dädalus in der Aeneis [6.14-33]," *WJA* n. f. 1 [1975] 119-33) who sees it as exemplifying the failure of art when the artist confronts the truth of his suffering; C. Weber ("Gallus' Gynium and Virgil's Cumae," *ARCM* 1 [1978] 45-76) for whom the sequence serves as model for a miniature epyllion; and W. Fitzgerald ("Aeneas, Daedalus and the Labyrinth," *Arethusa* 17 [1984] 51-65). Fitzgerald's important essay views the two major segments of the tale as illustrating the change from "a finished work of art" to "the narrative of Daedalus, unfrozen and released into history" (54). In his earlier discussion (*Die Dichtkunst Virgils* [Innsbruck 1950] 244-46 = *The Art of Vergil*, trans. G. Seligson [Ann Arbor 1962] 149-50), Pöschl draws analogies between Aeneas and Daedalus. Both are exiles, both offer pity at crucial moments (Daedalus for Ariadne, Aeneas for Dido), both exemplify *pietas* (Daedalus' love for Icarus is parallel, according to Pöschl, to Aeneas' yearning for Anchises with whom he is soon to be reunited). See also Weber, *op. cit.*, 40, n. 33.

Such analogies are further developed by C. P. Segal in his sympathetic analysis of these lines ("Aeternum per saecula nomen, the golden bough and the tragedy of history: Part I," *Arion* 4 [1965] 617-57, especially 642-45). For Segal Daedalus "foreshadows the sufferings of the individual in the mythical, not the historical world, sufferings which lead to no lasting fruition in history, hence no transcendence of death."

The legend of Daedalus has been treated in depth by F. Frontisi-Ducroux (*Dédale: mythologie de l'artisan en grèce ancienne* [Paris 1975]) and by J. K. Koerner (*Die Suche nach dem Labyrinth* [Frankfurt 1983]) who draws analogies between Daedalus and the modern mind dealing with its labyrinthine past while at the same time drawn toward self-sufficient flights into the a-historical and the novel. Cf. also the remarks on Daedalus as typifying "the artist as magician" by E. Kris and O. Kurz in *Legend, Myth, and Magic in the Image of the Artist* [New Haven 1979] 66-71.

artist is described as constructing his literal, which in this case is also to say his spiritual, or psychic, biography. As such I take it as a metaphor for the progress of any artist, for his imaginative diary, as it were. My thesis will be that in certain essential ways the tale of Daedalus, crafted by himself, sets up a typology that is mirrored in the ethical artistry practised by Aeneas from standards set him by his father toward the end of the same book. After parading before his son a host of future Roman heroes, most of them distinguished for their military prowess, Anchises summarizes what he foresees as Rome's special genius. It will not lie in any unique brilliance as sculptors in bronze or stone, or as orators or astronomers, but in their accomplishment as governing warriors, in their moral usage of political power:

"tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento
(hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere morem,
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos."²

This is the Roman "artistry" set up for Aeneas to model himself against in the epic's second half.

But I would go still further in drawing analogies from the *vita* of Daedalus and suggest that it reveals something, first, of the narrator's spirit as he outlines Aeneas' progress, and then also of the intelligence of the poet Virgil working within the demands of a strict generic tradition. Aeneas who has himself, like Daedalus, just completed an extraordinary journey, is not allowed by the Sibyl to meditate on even the most simplistic parallels between himself and the Cretan inventor. She briskly whisks her charge away from what she styles *spectacula*, sights presumably purveying only aesthetic delight. But Virgil's reader, with his privileged, unheroic leisure for contemplation, is under the obligation to respond not only—as Aeneas might have—to the sculptored encapsulation of an artist's life but to what Aeneas does not know, to the emotions of the artist in the crafting and of the narrator in the telling.

Here is the story as told by Virgil at *Aeneid* 6.14-37:

Daedalus, ut fama est, fugiens Minoia regna
praeperibus pennis ausus se credere caelo
insuetum per iter gelidas enauit ad Arctos,
Chalcidicaque leuis tandem super astitit arce.
redditus his primum terris tibi, Phoebe, sacrauit
remigium alarum posuitque immania tempa.

in foribus letum Androgeo; tum pendere poenas	20
Cecropidae iussi (miserum!) septena quotannis	
corpora natorum; stat ductis sortibus urna.	
contra elata mari respondet Cnosia tellus:	
hic crudelis amor tauri suppostaque furto	
Pasiphae mixtumque genus prolesque biformis	25
Minotaurus inest, Veneris monimenta nefandae,	
hic labor ille domus et inextricabilis error;	
magnum reginae sed enim miseratus amorem	
Daedalus ipse dolos tecti ambagesque resoluit,	
caeca regens filo uestigia. tu quoque magnam	30
partem opere in tanto, sineret dolor, Icare, haberet.	
bis conatus erat casus effingere in auro,	
bis patriae cecidere manus. quin protinus omnia	
perlegerent oculis, ni iam praemissus Achates	
adforet atque una Phoebi Triuiaeque sacerdos,	35
Deiphobe Glauci, fatur quae talia regi:	
"non hoc ista sibi tempus spectacula poscit; . . ."	

The story divides itself into five parts: introduction (Daedalus' arrival in Italy), first segment of sculpture devoted to events at Athens, counterbalancing Cretan exploits, the story of Ariadne and the address to Icarus. There is a climactic heightening of emotion on the part of both artist and the narrator of his tale as the story progresses, leading in the final episode to the artist's inability to create. Let us watch this happening by examining each section in more detail.

At the start, through the phrase *ut fama est*, the narrator seems hyperconscious of putting things before us. By recreating someone else's report and not, it would seem, inventing his own version of the Daedalus story, he distances us in time while apparently disclaiming any direct involvement on his part in the telling.³ Yet even in this introduction the narrator betrays a certain empathy with his version of Daedalus which

³The authoritative discussion of the phrase *ut fama est* is by Norden (*P. Vergilius Maro: Aeneis Buch VI* [repr. Stuttgart 1957] *ad loc.*). The variations on tradition which it implies are numerous. Foremost is the connection of Daedalus with Italy. Writers of the generation before Virgil return Daedalus to earth either in Sicily (Dio. Sic. 4.78) or Sardinia (Sall. *Hist. fr. 2.7* [Maurenbrecher] from, among others, Servius on 1.14). By having him aim directly for Cumae, Virgil emphasizes the parallel with Aeneas which will gradually grow clearer as the ecphrasis evolves.

By feigning to repeat tradition unemotionally and then significantly varying it, the narrator claims control over the history of his subject. The poet does the same generically. Virgil's model for Aeneas' arrival at Cumae as prelude to his visit to the underworld is the opening of book 11 of the *Odyssey* where Odysseus reaches the land of the Cimmerians and immediately conjures up the spirits of the dead. No ecphrasis intervenes (re. G.

suggests a deep understanding of his subject's imaginative ways. Daedalus, as the Cretan vignette makes clear, is a dealer in duplicity, an inventor of hybrid objects that cater to the furtive in their recipients and in their turn create further hybrids—a fake beast enclosing a true human (Pasiphae inside the replica of a cow) that begets a man-animal, the Minotaur. The narrator anticipates this proclivity even now in his own poetic inventiveness. He replaces visual duplicity with verbal contrivance, exchanging the craftsman's dualistic artifact with the poet's ambiguous metaphor by seeing Daedalus, the human aviator, as swimmer through the heavens. The terrestrial creature, though airborne, is made poetically to deal (like Aeneas for much of the preceding story of his epic) with a watery element, and dedicate on return to earth the courage of his wings.⁴

The narrator is a discerning critic of Daedalus' adventures in two other ways. One is a simple matter of rhetoric. By apostrophizing Apollo he, as it were, mimics Daedalus, claiming himself to share the

Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer* [Hypommata 9: Göttingen 1979] 130, n. 1). Therefore, even where Daedalus seems as yet indifferent to, or even unaware of, his loss, the narrator-poet is very involved with the tale so as to mould Daedalus, to make the sculptor his own artifact, to impress his stamp of originality on his artisan-hero. If Daedalus deepens his emotional involvement in his subjects over time, as he sets about the crafting of his psychic biography, the narrator has a deep imaginative commitment from the start.

⁴According to R. G. Austin (ed., *P. Vergili Maronis: Aeneidos Liber Sextus*. [Oxford 1977] on 18, following Norden on 18f.) the dedication to Apollo "marks his gratitude for a safe landing and also his retirement from air-travel, in the manner of many Greek dedicatory epigrams . . ." But these strange oar-wings are also an offering for passing safely through the god's province in which men do not ordinarily trespass. (Virgil's only other use of the phrase *remigium/remigio alarum* is to describe the means of Mercury's descent from heaven at *Aen.* 1.301. The repetition here suggests a momentary equivalence between god and mortal who ascribes to the supernatural.) The over-reacher might be expected to pay a penalty for challenging Apollo in his territory. The passive *redditus* implies that throughout this stage of his adventures Daedalus has in fact been the god's subject. Virgil may portray him as flying *praepetibus pinnis*, but Horace, in an ode of which Servius twice reminds us (on 15 and 18), sees the means of his journey as *pinnis non homini datis* (c. 1.3.35). Perhaps the implication is that Phoebus Apollo does claim recompense, in the form of Icarus, for earth-bound man's sally into the skies, for momentary human arrogation of divinity. As god-man, the ultimate in spiritual hybridization, the Orphic artist, fulfilling for an instant his imagination's divine claims, suffers a profound human loss.

By forcing us even here to meditate on the negative demands of progress, Virgil reminds us that, in the unfolding epic story, it has not been long since Neptune exacted *unum caput* (5.815), one life for the safe completion of Aeneas' journey to Italy through the god's watery element.

emotion Daedalus felt on safe return to earth and voiced in gesture of thanks to Phoebus Apollo. But address to the god as Phoebus proves the narrator privy to the myth of Daedalus on a deeper level. Daedalus ends his adventuring on a spot sacred to Apollo, where Aeneas will hear prophecy of his, and Rome's, future through the god's mouthpiece, Deiphobe, the Sibyl. But Apollo the sun god played an important role in Daedalus' recent life. By steering a course toward the chill Bears, Daedalus saved himself from the fate of Icarus whose wings melted as he drew too near the sun's heat. The artisan of hybrids, who turns himself and his offspring into men-birds, loses his son in the process of artistic experimentation.

But there is also a hint, in the verb *enavit* and the very phrase *gelidas Arctos*, of a certain insouciance on the part of Daedalus. By swimming free of danger toward northern cold he followed the proper procedures for survival, but his child Icarus either was not taught, or at least was not able to practise, them.⁵ To put it another way, both Daedalus within this initial segment of the narrative and the narrator expounding his tale, seem in different senses careless—and leave the reader thus far unaware—that more than one person was involved in this strange itinerary. Because there is no mention of Icarus and no hint of Daedalus' role as father, the reader remains with the impression,

⁵OLD (s.v. 1b) would translate *enavit* here as "to fly forth," but it is more enriching within the context to take the meaning as a metaphorical example of the dictionary's first definition: "to swim out or forth; (esp.) to escape by swimming; swim to safety." But, since Daedalus escaped the danger and the (pointedly) unnamed Icarus did not, the reader should rightly sense ambiguities in *praepetibus* and *levis*.

The first is an augural word, discussed in detail in relation to these lines by Aulus Gellius (*N.A.* 7.6). It appears four times in Ennius (Gellius mentions two instances) and lends a tone of majesty to the description of the artisan's epic accomplishment. As a term in augury it means "propitious," the opposite (according to Gellius' source, Figulus' *Augurii Privati*) of *infera* which he defines as a low-flying, less auspicious appearance. Its etymology is from *prae-peto*, "forward-seeking." As Gellius (followed closely by Servius on 6.15) expounds the meaning, the word becomes closely complementary to *enavit*:

idcirco Daedali pennas "praepetes" dixit, quoniam ex locis in quibus
periculum metuebat in loca tutiora pervenerat.

The reader, wondering why the narrator does not have Daedalus here include Icarus in his daring, sees *praepetes* as "well-omened" (at least for Daedalus!), as "flying directly ahead" (without a concern for the tragic events occurring behind?), and as "lofty" (unlike Icarus who, after rising too high, fell into the sea?). *Levis*, then, while primarily defining Daedalus' nimbleness, hints at a certain fickleness as well. Physical dexterity (or artistic talent, for that matter) does not necessarily ally itself with stability of mind.

which the narrator's metaphors abet, that Daedalus thinks largely of his invention and the clever manipulation of it, not of its human consequences.

The narrator therefore gives us a foretaste of circularity in his rendering of the tale, preparing us for the address to Icarus at the end. But neither at the start nor at the conclusion of the episode is the actual death of Icarus mentioned, a fact which invites the reader to fill in the text, to exercise his own imagination recreating and contemplating the most poignant incident in Daedalus' biography. In his role as father Daedalus is a double artistic failure, first incapable of completely imitating nature, then unable to mime the disastrous results of this inadequacy.

Though they now forthrightly continue the theme of sons killed or sacrificed, the initial sculptures proper, devoted to events in Athens, are treated as matters of fact, save in one respect. There is no word for the act of crafting and the only object mentioned, the urn, was not of Daedalus' making. The exception is the exclamation *miserum* (alas! dreadful!). From its placement in the middle of line 21 and therefore at the center of the three lines, it serves as emotional commentary on the whole segment. But to whom the emotion is imputed remains ambiguous. Is it that experienced by the suffering Athenians? Is it Daedalus' response as he contemplates the results of his handiwork (or, in his mind's eye, the events themselves), or Aeneas', examining the sculpture? Is it the reaction of the narrator sharing the same sensations, or of the reader being taught them in his turn? For one verbal moment, even in the most "detached" segment of Daedalus' tale, narrator, characters and audience are united in empathy.⁶

The first Cretan segment is even more nominal, but now the list of characters and emotions concentrates specifically on Daedalus' art. His is an inventiveness which articulates subterfuge and doubleness, that tangibly fosters sexual perversity, and harbors its results, a man-bull, in a labyrinthine dwelling that is both *labor* and *error*.⁷ It exemplifies the intensity of craftsmanship that imprisons the misformed product of hu-

⁶Even here Virgil may possibly be alluding to Aeneas' tale. The seven bodies (*septena corpora*) of sons sent to Crete each year by the Athenians are reviewed shortly later in the *septem iuvencos* (38), the seven bullocks and the same number of heifers which Aeneas must now present to Apollo and Trivia. As the two myths follow their parallel progress, human offering is replaced by animal but in each case sacrifice is essential.

⁷The standard article on Daedalus' labyrinth and its resonances for Virgil is by P. J. Enk, "De Labyrinthi Imagine in Foribus Templi Cumani Inscripta," *Mnemosyne*, ser. 4.11 (1958) 322-30.

man-animal passion in a maze symbolizing, like its contents, the troubling results of a "wandering" of the emotions. Pasiphae's double "error" receives its artistic complement from Daedalus' tricky fabrication.⁸ Thus far in his tale Daedalus' art is dangerous only for its receivers.

The second Cretan scene brings a series of abrupt changes. Though the labyrinth remains an essential part of the plot, we turn from one queen, Pasiphae, to another, her unnamed daughter, Ariadne, and from a cruel love to another labelled simply "mighty." But the viewer-reader is also appropriately disoriented. We know from what follows that the Ariadne episode is part of the tableaux of sculptural reliefs. But Daedalus has suddenly, and Virgil brilliantly, led us from his *curriculum vitae* as guileful artisan to his role as apparently dispassionate reappraiser of the effects of that art. He becomes the undoer of his own trickery, an undoing we can hear in the sound of line 29:

Daedalus ipse dolos tecti ambagesque resolvit, . . .

Daedalus, who reprojects his artistic self through *se dolos*, the labyrinth's wiliness, now straightens its windings and lightens its darkening ways. But dispassionate is far too mild a word. Through poetry's magic

⁸The language is close to *Aen.* 7.282-83 where the horses given by Latinus to Aeneas are described as coming

illorum de gente patris quos daedala Circe
supposita de matre nothos furata creavit.

Aen. 6.24 and 7.283 document Virgil's only uses of the perfect participle of *suppono* in a sexual sense, and *furata* (7.283) echoes *furo* (6.24). The connection is further secured by Circe's epithet *daedala*. Circe is prone to the same erotic supposititiousness and "thievery" as the Athenian artificer. This supposititiousness is both literal and figurative. To "put under" sexually is fraudulently to replace the usual with the unexpected. The resulting miscegenation is, in book 7, between mortal and immortal (in the animal kingdom), in book 6, between human and animal. In each case generic mixing, as performed by Circe and Daedalus and recreated by the latter in sculpture, is typically Daedalian. Circe's hybrid horses anticipate the figures on the armor of Turnus: a Chimaera on his helmet (7.783-84) which, like Circe's horses (*spirantis naribus ignem*, 281), spouts fire (*efflantem faucibus ignis*), and Io in the process of metamorphosis from human into animal, *iam saetis obsita, iam bos*. Hybridization and metamorphosis complement each other in both instances. The latter, especially metamorphosis down from a higher to a lower sensibility, typifies book 7 as a whole (lines 660-61, e.g., offer an example of the furtive "mixing" of god and mortal). I trace the book's patterns of metamorphosis in further detail in "Aeneid 7 and the Aeneid," *AJP* 91 (1970) 408-30 = *Essays on Latin Lyric, Elegy, and Epic* (Princeton 1982). On the association of Turnus and the Minotaur see P. duBois, *History, Rhetorical Description and the Epic* (Cambridge, England 1982) 39f., part of a thoughtful discussion of Daedalus' sculptures.

Daedalus actually becomes Ariadne. She is the *regina* and she it was who, through Daedalus' gift of thread, directed the steps of Theseus out from the maze after killing the Minotaur.⁹ Yet, according to Virgil-Daedalus, we find him *regens*, taking her emotional and physical role by linguistic sleight of hand. The reason for this empathy, as the artist unwinds his own artistry and foregoes his own self-made heritage of deception, is pity. Pity is the response that transforms the apparently aloof artistic deceiver into the emotional resolver of his own deceits. It is this response in himself that he would now monumentalize.¹⁰

His own poet-monumentalizer is equally forward. He puts no word of crafting into his own presentation. Nothing intervenes to prevent the reader from the stated actuality of Daedalus' experience.¹¹ By contrast

⁹It remains deliberately ambiguous whether *caeca vestigia* refer to the unseeing steps of Theseus or to the Labyrinth's dark path. Support for the former proposition comes from Catullus' reference to Theseus' *errabunda vestigia* (64.113) and from later imitations (re. Austin on 30), for the latter from Virgil's earlier description of the Labyrinth with its dark walls (*caecis parietibus*, *Aen.* 5.589) and from the sentence structure whose logic suggests a sequence from *ambages* to *caeca vestigia*. In either case the artisan is directly involved though his duplex activity lends different shades of meaning to *regens*. He becomes Ariadne and empathetically "leads" her lover to safety, or "straightens" the windings of his Labyrinth, unravelling the unravellable out of pity. *Inextricabilis* (27), Varro's coinage to describe Porsena's Etruscan labyrinth (Pliny *H. N.* 36.91), helps define the Labyrinth's puzzlement and toils, and adds a further dimension to Catullus' parallel, *inobservabilis* (64.115, itself a coinage), whose point is absorbed into Virgil's *caeca*. Virgil's Daedalus first creates, and then solves, the problems of his "text."

The influence of Catullus 64 on the Daedalus episode as a whole, most recently treated by Weber (op. cit. 47, 50-51), deserves still further study. It begins with similarities between the Argonauts and Daedalus through the primacy of their daring (there is a common emphasis on nimbleness, oarage and swimming in both initial episodes), develops in close parallels between the poets' treatments of Androgeos (64.77-83; *Aen.* 6.20-22) and the Labyrinth (64.113-15; *Aen.* 6.28-30), and concludes with loss. In Catullus the loss is double. Ariadne loses Theseus, Theseus Aegeus. In Virgil Daedalus misses Icarus alone.

¹⁰Perhaps the artist unravels his artistry, out of manifest pity, to abet the love of others for fear that it might bring doom on himself. At the least his uniting of two other lovers anticipates the loss of love in his own life. (For the relation of pity and fear, see P. Pucci, *The Violence of Pity* [Cornell 1980] especially 169-74.)

¹¹This point is valid for the ecphrasis as a whole. We are earlier made aware of the placement of the sculptures (*in foribus*), of the dynamic interrelationship between episodes (*respondet*), of the specifics of location within a scene (*hic . . . hic*). The absence of a word for crafting in the Ariadne vignette is particularly telling. Because the Icarus scene could not be started we assume that Ariadne's story, which precedes it, was brought to completion, but nothing in the narrative attends to this. Instead, while Daedalus implements the penultimate, and the second most emotional, episode in his

to the preceding episode, then, this tableau is *vivant*. Frozen re-presentation yields to active experience, as we are made to share directly in the artist's suffering. We are Daedalus but, because he is one with his protagonist, we are Virgil as well, uttering through the power of words what cannot be expressed in sculpture.

Finally, we leave the triply fictive world of poet imagining artist crafting himself in art to look more simply at the artist's inability to create. We find him unable to bring to aesthetic completion the delineation in sculpture of an event which in itself, to the artist as experiencer, remained a subject of sorrow, rousing emotion unsatisfied and therefore incomplete. As an interested third party, Daedalus could be shown to share in Ariadne's feelings, ruling with her out of pity her lover's steps. The death of Icarus is a deeper matter. It is the death of a son from the misuse of his father's artistry and for which the father's artistic but duplicitous heroizing must bear some responsibility. As he did in the case of Ariadne, the narrator draws a lexical connection between artist and subject. But the artist who there rules the queen he depicts (*regina-regens*) now fails in his vocation. Because of Icarus' attempt to emulate his father as man-bird, he suffered a mortal fall, and the contemplation of this mischance (the Latin *casus* plays on both literal and figurative senses) caused his father's hands twice to fall as he attempted to monumentalize it.¹²

artistic biography, the narrator of his tale shows him in the emotional act of unravelling his past art, not in the dispassionate formation of it. Even here, though we are led to presume one act of artistic fulfillment, emotion directly undoes the mind's creation.

¹²Though Virgil on three other occasions repeats *bis* in a line or between adjacent lines (*Aen.* 2.218; 6.134; 9.799–800), only once elsewhere does he employ it in anaphora at the opening of contiguous verses, 11.629–30, which is also the only instance where the two uses of *bis* contrast with rather than reinforce each other. The context is the ebb and flow of war which in turn, if we look at the last four books as a whole, analogizes its futility.

The parallel with 6.134–35, where the Sibyl remarks on Aeneas' *cupido*

bis Stygios innare lacus, bis nigra videre
Tartara . . .

no doubt strengthens the bond between Daedalus and Aeneas. Though Aeneas does in fact complete his underworld journey, where Daedalus fails to finish his sculpture, the verbal interconnection may be one of Virgil's several subtle ways in book 6 of questioning the success of Aeneas', or Rome's, enterprise. There is, however, a later moment in book 6 with an even richer correlation to lines 32–33. When Aeneas finally reaches Anchises, son tries to embrace father (6.700–701):

Here the empathy of the narrator, which has been building from the opening segment, is most fully expressed. As in the initial apostrophe to Phoebus Apollo, he seems to adopt the voice of Daedalus. There his cry was in thanksgiving. Here his words are uttered in sorrow. But in fact so strong is the narrator's involvement that he replaces Daedalus entirely so as to address Icarus directly in explanation of his father's artistic failure. In so doing, in replacing the sculptor-father, the poet's narrator becomes a Daedalian figure, bringing Icarus and his father's frustrating grief before us in the permanence of words.

We have therefore, in one of Virgil's richest poetic moments, a study in artistic incompleteness that is extraordinarily complete as a poetic act. The incompleteness, the tale within the tale, is Daedalus' and it results from a gradual heightening of his emotional participation. In the last three episodes of Daedalus' story as Virgil tells it, the only ones where the artisan is directly involved, we watch him first as aloof artificer of duplicity, constructing monsters to create further monsters. His empathy grows, and his characterization as artist disappears, as he shows himself (and is shown) pitying Ariadne and as a result unravelling his own artistic strategems (which, I take it, is not only to show himself powerful over his own art but also, perhaps, even to admit fallibilities in that art). Finally he becomes the victim of *dolor*, of the spasm of grief for his lost son, and this distress results in his inability to create at all.

ter conatus ibi collo dare bracchia circum;
ter frustra comprensa manus effugit imago . . .

The lines are repeated from book 2 (792-93) where Aeneas fails in his attempt to clasp the ghost of Creusa. Both events document the hero's inability throughout the epic to achieve emotional fulfillment (he does embrace his mother at 8.615 but at her insistence, not his). As critics note, Daedalus' inability to sculpt Icarus after two attempts may be modelled on Odysseus' triple attempt, and triple failure (*Od.* 11.206-208) to embrace the spirit of his mother (re. Pöschl, "Die Tempeltüren," 121; Fitzgerald, 63, n. 18). This, of course, was Virgil's model in the episodes of book 2 and 6 (the imitation, in the case of the latter, has most recently been noted by Austin *ad loc.*). But further potential meanings of this last anticipation in the Daedalus story of the later narrative of book 6 must not be overlooked. If Daedalus cannot perfect the loss of his son in art, can Aeneas finally fulfill the *pietas* owed to Anchises, especially given the strong need for *clementia* with which his father overlays his future loyalty?

It is noteworthy that the fall of Icarus is alluded to only by paronomasia in the word *casus*. The fall of Daedalus' hands, however, suggests that now, finally, the artisan experiences a version of his son's misfortune. Father becomes son. The son's physical fall is reiterated in the father's emotional collapse. Empathetically, literal death is the death of art.

Death renders this artist artless. Daedalus' final honesty, his deepest response to natural feelings, brings artistic barrenness as well as a final powerlessness. But this very gesture of unfulfillment becomes, through Virgil's narration of it, the perfecting element of a poet's holistic enterprise. One artist's failure through passion is the subject of another's successful finishing of his art.

My thesis is that this treatment by one artist of the spiritual biography of another serves as paradigm of the Virgilian career and of the equally tripartite division of the *Aeneid* as a poetic entity, and that it is particularly enlightening for the reader probing the meaning of the epic's conclusion. It is important for my argument to remember that the *Aeneid* begins and ends with acts sparked by *dolor*. At line 9 of the first book we find Juno, Aeneas' divine arch enemy and emblem of irrationality, *dolens*, aggrieved, as she launches this hero, noteworthy for his *pietas*, into a sea of troubles. Sixteen lines later we are told in greater detail of the *causae irarum saevique dolores*, the sources of her wrath and fierce anguish that now spur her on to violence. In balance, eight lines from the epic's conclusion we learn of the *saevus dolor*, the fierce anguish which Aeneas experienced at the death of Pallas. Recollection of this event, aroused by sight of the belt Pallas had worn, now on the suppliant Turnus, who had killed him earlier in battle, drives Aeneas to a frenzy of rage (he is described as "set afame by furies and terrible in his wrath"). In this paroxysm he slays his antagonist whose soul flees under the shades as the epic comes to its abrupt end. I have proposed elsewhere, from several angles, that Aeneas' final deed turns him into a Juno figure, in other words that he becomes a personification, not of his much touted *pietas* based on his father's injunction to *clementia* for the beaten down, but of its opposite, Junonian anger.¹³ The subsequent pages will further defend this contention.

First, Daedalus and the Virgilian career, and Daedalus and the structure of the *Aeneid*. In two cryptic lines near the start of the second book of his *Georgics* Virgil in his own voice addresses his patron Maecenas:

. . . non hic te carmine ficto
atque per ambages et longa exorsa tenebo.¹⁴

¹³I examine the reasoning behind Aeneas' actions at this crucial moment in "The Hesitation of Aeneas," *Atti del Convegno mondiale scientifico di studi su Virgilio* (Milan 1984) 2.233-52.

¹⁴*Geo.* 2.45-46.

This definition of casuistic poetry may apply to work Virgil anticipates for his later career, but more likely it is his way of looking back to his first work, the *Eclogues*. Certainly no other poems in Latin, with their many layers of symbolism and multivalent masquerades, could more justly claim the epithets fictive and ambiguous. The rich later history of pastoral poetry as a vehicle for necessary indirection of statement looks back in honor to its primarily Virgilian source.

As Virgil, Daedalus-like, leads his poetry out of the *ambages* of pastoral and into the greater openness and availability of didactic, his poetic voice moves from playful to serious and he from poet as implicit deceiver to poet as explicit pitier. His opening prayer to Augustus asks Caesar to nod approval to his bold beginnings

ignarosque viae mecum miseratus agrestis
ingredere . . .¹⁵

Pity creates poetry with the Daedalian power of Ariadne's thread, capable, through teaching, of directing those unsure of the path they tread. The immediate result, as the poet and his farmer set out on their interactive labors, is that new spring arrives, snow melts and "the crumbling clod has broken itself up" (*resolvit*) under the power of the west wind.¹⁶ Pity's poetry has also Daedalus' power to resolve nature's seasonal dilemmas and set the farmer firmly on his arduous road.

Last in the Virgilian career comes the poetry of *dolor*. The *Aeneid* seems the impersonal epic of one man's pious journey toward accomplishment, mirroring *in parvo* the future achievements of imperial Rome as it rises to unparalleled greatness under Augustus. But it is also, as we have seen and will further observe, a passion-ridden poem whose final deed of violence stemming from anguish and anger leaves open as many questions as it answers. It leaves dissatisfied the reader's expectations of praise for Aeneas' most memorable action as model for Rome's glorious enterprise to come, and instead completes a cycle based on *dolor*, that is, on an emotion founded in discontent and battening on deprivation. Like Virgil's history of Daedalus it is a brilliantly complete poem ending on premonitions of artistic incompletion.

For the *Aeneid* itself also has the rhythms of a Daedalian undertaking. As one of the most highly ordered of poems, the possibilities for imaginative structuring it offers to the reader are numerous. We gain pleasure, as we approach the epic in linear fashion, from sensing books

¹⁵*Geo.* 1.41-42.

¹⁶*Geo.* 1.44.

grouped as pairs or trios, or from savoring a balance between the epic's halves, as they open out in clear echoes of book 1 in book 7. We may also acknowledge Virgil's grand chiasmus, where opening anticipates closure. We then focus centrally on the powerful linkage between books 6 and 7 which begins with address to Caieta, Aeneas' nurse, another in the host of those, especially prominent in the preceding book, who gain real death and dubious immortality for being in Aeneas' entourage.

I would like here to reconsider what has long been observed as the *Aeneid*'s tri-partite division.¹⁷ We could distinguish the three movements as follows: books 1-4, which take us topographically and temporally from Troy to Carthage and revolve on Aeneas' meeting with Dido; books 5-8, as we move from Sicily, to Cumae, to Tiber-mouth, which contain Aeneas' two great revelations of the future, from his father in the Underworld and on the shield of Vulcan; books 9-12, which deal primarily with the war for supremacy in Latium and, in particular, with Aeneas' confrontation with Turnus.

After the pattern Virgil has Daedalus establish for himself, the first segment of the *Aeneid* is rich with exemplification of deceit. As recreated for us in Aeneas' words, the wooden horse, Troy's equivalent of Pasiphae's cow, is, save for the shield of Aeneas, the single most memorable artifact in the *Aeneid*, notable for its Daedalian duplicity and duality.¹⁸ (It is at once alive and dead, a wooden object, fashioned as an animal, pregnant with a human brood. As objects both cow and horse are marvelous on the outside, deceptive on the inside. They can, even should, be viewed as Virgil's epic can be read. Past a veneer of artificial charm—in regard to the *Aeneid* the veneer is partially manufactured of our idealizing expectations—lie, in all cases, terrible truths). The sec-

¹⁷See especially G. Duckworth, "The *Aeneid* as a Trilogy," *TAPA* 88 (1957) 1-10, revised and expanded in *Structural Patterns and Proportions in Vergil's Aeneid* (Ann Arbor 1962) 11-13.

¹⁸The parallels between the wooden horse and Daedalus' cow and Labyrinth are noteworthy. In each case they include *doli* (2.44), accompanied by the supportive wiles of Thymoetes, Sinon, Epeos—the Daedalian *doli fabricator* (264)—and the Greeks (34, 62, 152, 196, 252), trickery (18, 258), and *error* (48). In both instances a hybrid animal produces a monstrous birth. Both the cow and horse are mounted on wheels as they implement their subterfuge (Dio. Sic. 4.77, Apollodorus 3.1.4, for the cow; *Aen.* 2.235-36, for the horse). Daedalus' gift to Pasiphae therefore resembles the Greeks' gift to Minerva, the *innuptae donum exitiale Minervae* (2.31), which the art of the goddess has helped produce (*divina Palladis arte*, 15). At this stage of his career and in this particular instance, Daedalus anticipates both duplicitous Greeks and crafty Minerva as they bring into being the *machina . . . feta armis* (2.237-38), the horse and its destructive brood.

ond part of Aeneas' narrative is also riddled with the monstrous and the bifrom, with a plant that drips with human blood, Harpies who are at once birds or maidens or goddesses, Scylla (part human, part fish, part wolf), the man-mountain Etna and the mountain-man Polyphemus.

But it is the story of Aeneas, especially as it merges with Dido's, to which I want to call attention.¹⁹ Venus, divinity of love and mother of Aeneas, arrives on the scene in the disguise of the virgin-goddess Diana. She soon hides her son in a cloud, as he makes his way into Carthage, and his beauty is said to be his mother's artifice (grace added by craftsmen to ivory is the poet's simile, gold embellishing silver or marble) as he bursts from its enclosure. But counterfeiting is once again her province, her "new arts" (*novas artis*) in the narrator's words, as she replaces Ascanius with Cupid in preparation for the temptation of Dido.

The pretensions of Aeneas, as orchestrated by Virgil, are more elaborate. The most patent example is his gift-giving. He offers to Dido Helen's cloak and the scepter of Ilione, which is to say his presence brings her, from Helen, illicit love leading to her city's symbolic razing by fire, from Ilione, suicide. His relation to the sculptures on Juno's temple which he sees in Carthage's midst is more subtle. They depict scenes from Troy's fall which summarize Homer or intervene between the story line of the *Iliad* and Aeneas' own tale. Aeneas and Achates take them as evidence of Dido's sympathy for human suffering. The reader, aware of their connection with Juno and her vengeful proclivities, looks at them in other ways. Their great figure is Achilles. He appears directly in three of their episodes, indirectly in three others, primarily as a killer, of Troilus, Hector, Memnon and Penthesilea. By the end of the epic, Aeneas will become in part an Achilles, pitilessly killing his Latin Hector, Turnus. The equation here is more understated. By continuing on the tale of Troy in his narrative to Dido, Aeneas becomes active as well as passive, participant in events but their passionate recaller as well. His verbal artisanship, in other words, takes up where the sculptures left off yet also becomes part of the seduction of Dido.²⁰ The

¹⁹Allusions to deceit begin, in book 1, at 130 where Neptune becomes aware of the *doli* and *ira* of his sister Juno. Out of 18 uses of *dolus* in the *Aeneid*, 10 are in books 1-4.

²⁰Dido, in this matter as in others, is an accomplice in her own downfall, asking, at the end of book 1 (750-52), for Aeneas to retell the known as well as the novel in Troy's demise, and reiterating the request as her tragic love deepens (4.77-79).

Yet, whereas the sculptures of book 1 lead diachronically toward Aeneas' narrative, as he "sculpts" Troy's fall and manages Dido's death, and the shield of book 8 details Rome's future in linear progression, Daedalus' artistry analogizes the whole of the epic on several levels, offering a series of synchronic paradigms. The two longer ecphraseis, by

destruction of Troy, which he suffers as a character within his narrative, leads inevitably to the destruction of Dido which his very act of narration helps to cause.

The lexical, symbolic or imagistic continuum from the end of book 1, through Aeneas' narrative, to the masterful delineation of Dido's downfall in the fourth book needs only brief documentation. Cupid's fake words (*simulata verba*, 1.710) lead directly to the faking of the wooden horse (*simulant*, 2.17), which in turn anticipates Aeneas' attempts at dissimulation (*dissimulant*, 4.291) which Dido unmasks in her first words addressed to him after his decision to depart:

"dissimulare etiam sperasti, perfide, tantum
posse nefas . . . ?"²¹

It is an easy transition from the *doli*, the wiles of Venus and Cupid, in book 1, to the deceits of the Greeks in book 2 as executed by Sinon and the horse, to the deception of Aeneas which Dido uncloaks. The symbolic flames with which Venus plans to gird Dido become the destructive arson of Troy and then the triple fires of book 4—the metaphoric ardor of her love, her literal burning on the pyre which, as we have seen, is visualized as the burning of Carthage, the queen as city demolished by a concatenation of circumstances.

dwelling, in the first instance, on Aeneas' response, in the second, on Vulcan's craftsmanship, retain a strong specific point of focus that the Daedalian sculptures, with their lack of concern with the crafter at work or the viewer reacting, carefully forego.

Aeneas' perception of the sculptures on Juno's temple is discussed, with great sensitivity, by W. R. Johnson (*Darkness Visible* [Berkeley 1976] 99–105). By contrast with the earlier episode, the narrator does not allow us to learn how far in his examination of Daedalus' sculptures Aeneas had proceeded (*quin protinus omnia perlegerent oculis, ni . . . , 33–34*), though we presume that his "reading" was near to completion. In any case only narrator and reader, not the poem's protagonists, know of Daedalus' final suffering (see p. 180 above). But perhaps a similar event will occur in Aeneas' life. At the moment in book 8 when Aeneas is about to set out from Pallanteum, taking himself and Pallas to war, we find him "pondering many hardships in his sad heart" (*multa . . . dura suo tristum corde putabant*, 8.522). To break his spell of contemplation Venus sends as sign a lightning-bolt and resounding thunder (*iterum atque iterum fragor increpat ingens*, 527). Aeneas will not explain what *casus* (533) this betokens, only that he must go into battle. But he may already sense the loss of Pallas with its many ramifications of incompleteness in his life. It is a *fragor* (493), three times heard in Avernus, which, in the fourth *Georgic*, signals Eurydice's death caused by the *furor* (495) of Orpheus. The reader schooled in Virgil's symbolic modes is prepared to await a parallel misfortune as the *Aeneid* draws to a close and Aeneas, potential artist of Rome, undoes his work by his own version of madness.

²¹4.305–306.

It is not necessary to argue yet again the moral fine-points of a tragic adventure where ignorance and knowledge play intermeshed roles, and human weaknesses make its characters easy prey for divine machinations as well as self-deceptions. I want only to suggest that in detail and in general the constancy of deceit in the story-line of *Aeneid* 1-4 finds its parallel in the exploits of Daedalus as artificer. The particularities and their consequences press the connection between Pasiphae and Dido. Pasiphae's love is *crudelis* and this is the adjective Dido twice applies to her absconding lover. Just as the Cretan queen's erotic adventure is based on a strategem which is also a hiding (*furto*), so also, in the narrator's words, Dido ponders a furtive love (*furtivum amorem*), and it is against accusations of trickery (*furto*) from her that Aeneas must defend himself. Finally, the Minotaur, symbol of Pasiphae's "unspeakable passion" (*Veneris monumenta nefandae*) has its more tangible counterpart in Aeneas' trappings and their marriage, "all the reminders of that unspeakable man" (*nefandi/cuncta viri monumenta*) which Dido will set aflame along with herself.

The generalities, on the other hand, center as we have seen on the artificers rather than on their products. They define Aeneas, and the narrator of his tale, as Daedalus figures. Both particular points of contact and more broad equations persist in the second segment of Virgil's scheme. Critics have remarked on the abruptness with which Ariadne is introduced into the narrative at line 28. She is not named and, though she was a princess, she was certainly not, at least not at that moment in her eventful life, a *regina*. This apparent discontinuity, however, is actually a brilliant transition when we pursue our projection of the plot of Daedalus' psychological progress on to the *Aeneid*'s triple divisions. For, if in the life of Daedalus we move from Pasiphae to Ariadne, in the artistic development of the *Aeneid* we stay with Dido, who need not be renamed and who remains the poem's great *regina*.²² The difference is that, in the second movement of the *Aeneid*, her *crudelis amor* (now become *magnum amorem*) is resolved. When Aeneas sees her in the Underworld, in the company of those "whom harsh love has gnawed

²²Looked at within the bounds of books 1-4, the story of Dido shares common ground with that of Daedalus and, partially, of Aeneas. It begins with double artistic accomplishment—an extraordinary city being built with a magnificent temple at its heart, a disciplined civilization arising to bring order to the territory around it—and ends with a series of *dolores* (419, 474, 547, 679, and the death agony at 693; cf. the uses of *doleo* at 393 and 434). These destroy, literally, the queen and, symbolically, the city she had founded. Pöschl (*Die Dichtkunst*, 246 and note = *The Art of Vergil*, 150 and 207, n. 17) recognizes the parallel between Ariadne and Dido *regina*. See n. 1 above.

through with cruel wasting" (*quos durus amor crudeli tibe peredit*), she scorns him, fleeing into a shady grove:

. . . coniunx ubi pristinus illi
respondit curis aequatque Sychaeus amorem.²³

Differentiation leading to suicide has yielded, in book 6, to reciprocation and balance.

Yet we have been readied for this denouement earlier. At the conclusion of book 4, as we prepare to leave the epic's initial third for its central articulation, we have Virgil's first, enormously moving example of pity for suffering leading to its resolution. The moment is Dido's death:

Tum Iuno omnipotens longum miserata dolorem
difficilisque obitus Irim demisit Olympo
quae luctantem animam nexosque resolveret artus.²⁴

At the end pity releases the troubled queen from her enmeshed body, which is to say from the deceits of what Anchises is soon to call the blind prison which confines us within the toils of our destructive emotions.²⁵

There is another Daedalian resolution, centering on book 6, that belongs more exactly to Aeneas. The literal labyrinth of Daedalus' manufacture (*hic labor ille domus*) becomes now symbolic, but equally present, in the hero's effortful life as he faces the prospect of descending, alive into the world of the dead and returning whence he came. *Hoc opus, hic labor est* "this the task, this the effort," says the Sibyl.²⁶ As

²³6.473-74.

²⁴4.693-95.

²⁵The complex *resolveret* is simplified shortly later in *solvo* (703). For Dido here, as for Pasiphae, passion creates the need for subterfuge, for *doli* (663) which only augment and finalize the *doli* of Venus and Juno which initiate her tragedy (95, 128) and of Aeneas who furthers it (296, the narrator's word). In Daedalus' artistic, which is to say psychic, life, *doli* precede *dolor*. For Dido *dolor* both anticipates and is precipitated by her resort to *doli* (see n. 22 above). The release of Dido from her entrapment, cares and body unmeshed at once (*me . . . his exsolvite curis* she cries to Aeneas' *dulces exuviae*, at 652) is the reader's release into the second third of the epic. Aeneas is the major Daedalian figure in Dido's life, but it is Virgil who frees her from his text.

²⁶Fitzgerald (63, n. 13) sees a probable connection between Labyrinth and underworld. The link is strengthened by appeal to the Sibyl's definition of Aeneas' *labor* (128):

sed revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras . . .

Though Aeneas' "mad enterprise" (*insano . . . labori*, 135) works on the vertical plane while the Labyrinth presents a horizontal complexity, the parallels between the two ad-

preparation for this undertaking, Aeneas must attend to the *horrendas ambages*, the fearful enigmas of the seeress' utterances which correspond to the palpable but no less devious windings (*ambages*) of the Minotaur's dwelling. The Daedalian "threads" that bring resolutions to Aeneas' quandary are manifold. They consist not only in a growing clarity to the Sibyl's words but in the person of the Sibyl herself who will serve as guide through the Underworld's paths. He is, however, given further assistance by a series of talismans, first, the birds of his mother, then the golden bough—a very Daedalian object, serving now to open out rather than close in, to undeceive instead of dupe—his chief passport, to which the birds direct his traces. Finally we have the words of the poet Musaeus to whom the priestess turns for help in the search for Anchises.

If deceit is the chief impulse behind Daedalus' initial fabrications, pity rules him in their undoing. Though Aeneas does address Dido in his first words to her as the only person to have taken pity on the Trojans' sufferings, it is a virtue noticeably absent from the first four books. Yet here once more it is our changing viewpoint on the figure of Dido that helps us make the transition from segment to segment. At 4.369-70 she speaks to her former lover as if he were already absent:

num fletu ingemuit nostro? num lumina flexit?
num lacrimas victus dedit aut miseratus amantem est?²⁷

This, we remember, is exactly what Aeneas does do here in the Underworld, though she refuses to respond to his plea for words:

prosequitur lacrimis longe et miseratur euntem.²⁸

ventures, where the hero must enter treacherous territory, engage in an arduous challenge or challenges, and return out alive, are suggestive. They are supported by the narrator's striking, ironic designation—and presumably Daedalus' depiction—of the Labyrinth as a *domus*. It will not be long before Aeneas will cross the *atri ianua Ditis* (127) and enter the *vestibulum* (273) in order to make his way *per . . . domos Ditis* (269).

Among the monsters Aeneas must soon thereafter pass by are *Scyllae biformes* (286). (Virgil's only two uses of the word are at 25 and here.) It will not be long before he crosses the *inremovable unda* of the Styx (425), an adjective used of the *error* of the Labyrinth at 5.591 and akin to the rare *inextricable* at 6.27. These difficulties past, Aeneas, as we shall see, continues his Daedalian enterprise with his pity for Dido and with his manifold inability to embrace his father.

²⁷Cf. also Dido's plea to Aeneas at 4.318—*miserere domus labentis*—and her later command to Anna, *miserere sororis* (435).

²⁸6.476.

Aeneas has now performed the great act of which Dido had earlier found him negligent. He himself has—at last, and too late—also pitied the queen's love (*reginae . . . miseratus amorem*).

He had come to this emotion, for the first time in the epic, in the fifth book, which opens the *Aeneid*'s second of three divisions. There, at the end of the footrace, Aeneas pitied the unfortunate Salius who had slipped during the competition.²⁹ It is an emotion that he must receive as much as offer during this middle segment of the epic. He pitied the unburied who are forced to wait at length before crossing the Styx. Yet he is also himself subject to three notable acts of pity during these books, from Jupiter, who saves his fleet, from the Sibyl and her inspirer, to both of whom he must pray, and from the Tiber in book 8. For this reach of the epic is Aeneas' most extended period of dependence which proves at the same time to initiate him, and the reader of his saga, into the most elaborate revelations of the future. Pity of Sibyl and of river god lead him, one, to his father, the other, to the site of future Rome. Anchises parades before him future Roman heroic greats and gives him his ethical commission. Evander's tour of Pallanteum anticipates the grand city to come, and the shield, which Venus brings to Aeneas at Caere, concludes book 8 with another series of visions into heroic action, the *ennarrabile textum* of Roman history.

In details, then, and from a larger viewpoint, during the second segment of the epic Virgil has his hero put behind him the deceitful, artifice-ridden atmosphere of the initial quartet of books. He replaces it with a portrait of the artisan-hero as pitier. Aeneas undoes his own dis-simulations, or those thrust upon him, while the mazey mysteries that lead him to Rome's future are tantalizingly unravelled for him by others who offer him their rich solace in turn.

The last third of the epic can be treated more briefly. Its plot is the war in Latium, but the narrator tells a singularly purposeless tale. The omniscient reader knows from occasional prophecies that Aeneas will become overlord of Latium and marry Lavinia. But the fullness of the narrative dwells on the relentless futility and unceasing loss that war engenders. It furnishes a catalogue of deaths, especially those of the young whose lives have been cut off near their starts. We think immediately of Nisus and Euryalus, of Pallas and Lausus, of Camilla and finally of Turnus. The rampage of slaughter that Aeneas embarks on after Pallas' death, in which he kills with equal indiscrimination suppliant

²⁹5.350-54.

and priest, takes its last victim in his primary antagonist who is wearing Pallas' belt. Yet for all his *violentia* and pride our sympathies lie at the end with Turnus, not with the titular hero, with Turnus beaten down by Jupiter's minion Fury and by the inner furies which set Aeneas at the last ablaze.

One of the framing emotions of this last quartet of books, as it is of the epic as a whole, is *dolor*. We find it in Turnus near the opening of book 9 as he casts a greedy eye on the leaderless Trojans penned within their camp:

ignescunt irae, duris dolor ossibus ardet.³⁰

Or, soon again, in a speech of exhortation to his colleagues:

"sunt et mea contra
fata mihi, ferro sceleratam excindere gentem
coniuge praerepta; nec solos tangit Atrides
iste dolor, solisque licet capere arma Mycenis . . ."³¹

It is remarkable how much of the same language recurs in the counter-balancing moment of anger with which the epic concludes. Aeneas, in his final words, accuses Turnus of possessing *scelerato sanguine*, criminal blood. The reader could presume that a variation of the reason Turnus gives for his own *dolor*—that Lavinia, his Helen, has been torn from him—is applicable also now to Aeneas, poised to kill because of the *dolor* aroused by the death of Pallas. In any case, though the last appearance of *dolor* doubly rounds out the epic to a splendid rhetorical and psychological moment of closure, it is, in senses that transcend mere personal feelings, an extraordinarily unfulfilling, not to say devastating, emotion. Turnus asks for pity and Aeneas does hesitate, as if he were preparing to respond with sympathy and practise *clementia*.³² For Aeneas to grant pity through clemency, though it might appear an unheroic act by Homeric standards, would be for Virgil to round out the poem spiritually. He does not—cannot, perhaps—allow himself the luxury.³³

³⁰9.66.

³¹9.136–39.

³²See n. 13 above.

³³If we pursue the analogy between Daedalus and Aeneas as we reach the poem's conclusion, we could say that in terms of life's terminations the two are successful. Each has reached a goal. Daedalus gains Cumae and constructs a notable artifact (*immania tempa*), an awesome temple to Apollo. Aeneas, too, has come to Italy and defeated the enemy who, presumably, has stood in the way of his founding the Roman race. But to

I would like, in conclusion, to look in more detail at reasons why *dolor* leaves Aeneas-Daedalus-Virgil with his (their, if you prefer) heroic-artistic-poetic fabrication unfinished. First Aeneas-Daedalus. The ethical artistry imposed on Roman might, pursuing its political ends, was summarized, as we have seen, by Anchises to his son near the end of their meeting in the Underworld. The nub of his command, which he addresses to Aeneas as *Romane*, ancestor of and paradigm for his distinguished race, is to remember to spare the suppliant and war down the proud. By the end of the poem proud Turnus has been battled into abject submission, but, for whatever deep-seated reason, Aeneas does not spare him. He does not, finally, recall his father's admonition. Instead, in the narrator's words, he drank in the reminders of his fierce grief (*saevi monimenta doloris*) and, in an access of fury and rage, buries his sword in his opponent's chest. *Dolor* initiates Aeneas' final act. In so doing it gives the lie to Roman pretensions toward clemency, toward an artistic morality that reincorporates an antagonist, abased but living, into the civic community. Aeneas' attack of *dolor* proves the impossibility of realizing in fact Anchises' exhortation. In this case to complete is to idealize, to idealize is to dream untruths.³⁴

turn biographical completions into art, to make them appear as art, is for each a different; highly inconclusive matter.

³⁴By the end of his epic Aeneas could also be seen as an Icarus figure, the most palpable sign of his father's failed artistry, realistic proof of how idealizing are Anchises' notions of *clementia*. (We remember that it is Anchises, not Aeneas, who initiates the sparing of Achaemenides in the epic's third book.) Daedalus' *dolor*, yearning for his lost son which may well include resentment and self-hatred also, results only in artistic incompleteness. Aeneas' *dolor*, where loss is directly linked to the Furies' fires, to *saevitia* and *ira*, leads to a resentful, passionate killing with far more complex intimations of failure.

Forgetful Aeneas is made to mimic careless Icarus with the forceful difference, of course, that Aeneas lives on. For him, in Virgil's richly ironic narrative, survival is the equivalent of over-reaching Icarus' plummeting into the sea, and this survival means the end of his father's art.

The "celestial" plot of the *Aeneid* concludes with Jupiter yielding to Juno's demand that all things Trojan submerge their identity in the Latin present and future. What follows, therefore, up to the epic's last lines, is in fact the intellectual birth of Rome, as Aeneas becomes, according to his father's definition, *Romanus* (6.851). Two actions are paramount. First, Jupiter coopts the Dirae to warn Juturna and her brother of the latter's impending death. Second, Aeneas kills Turnus. In the first deed heaven summons hell to motivate earthly doings for the last time in the epic but for the first, one could surmise, in Virgil's Roman history, as history's cycle starts anew. The second, Aeneas' concluding deed, becomes the initial Roman action. Motivated by inner furies, it betokens a continuum of passion and anger, portending the impossibility of any new aesthetic or ethical wholeness.

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Secondly we must pursue the analogy of Virgil, the creator of the *Aeneid*, and Daedalus. We are not now concerned with Aeneas' emotions as they undermine Roman political artisanship but with the imagination that shapes such an ending. My thesis is that Virgil deliberately leaves his poem incomplete, vis-à-vis the epic genre as he inherited it, as if the *Aeneid* were to serve as one final, magnificent metaphor—one masterful artistic symbol—for the incompletions in Roman, which is to say human, life. Let me illustrate my point with brief reminders of the plot endings of four other epics of which three (the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey* and the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius) precede the *Aeneid*, while the other, Statius' *Thebaid*, follows.

First the *Iliad*. The bulk of its last book is taken up with the reconciliation scene between Priam and Achilles, but its last moments are devoted to the aftermath of the burning of Hector's body:

And when they [the people of Troy] were assembled together, first they quenched with flaming wine all the pyre, so far as the fire's might had come upon it, and thereafter his brethren and his comrades gathered the white bones, mourning, and big tears flowed over down their cheeks. The bones they took and placed in a golden urn, covering them over with soft purple robes, and quickly laid the urn in a hollow grave, and covered it over with great close-set stones. Then with speed heaped they the mound, and round about were watchers set on every side, lest the well-greaved Achaeans should set upon them before the time. And when they had piled the barrow they went back, and gathering together duly feasted a glorious feast in the palace of Priam, the king fostered of Zeus. On this wise held they funeral for horse-taming Hector.

The completion of a life demarcates the completion of a poem. The careful rituals of burial and feast, that bring the funeral of Hector to conclusion with communal ceremony, are complemented by the perfection of the epic that describes them, by poetry's own exacting ritual.

The twenty-fourth book of the *Odyssey* finds its hero taking revenge with bloody slaughter on the suitors of Penelope. But the ending turns this thirst for vengeance around. Zeus says to Athene in heaven:

"Now that goodly Odysseus has taken vengeance on the wooers, let them swear a solemn oath, and let him be king all his days, and let us on our part bring about a forgetting of the slaying of their sons and brothers; and let them love one another as before, and let wealth and peace abound."

Thus, as Odysseus is preparing to kill the suitors' relatives bent, in their turn, on revenge, Athene speaks to him, bringing the epic to end:

"Son of Laertes, sprung from Zeus, Odysseus of many devices, stay your hand, and make the strife of equal war to cease, lest haply the son of Cronos be wroth with you, even Zeus, whose voice is borne afar."

So spoke Athena, and he obeyed, and was glad at heart. Then for all time to come a solemn covenant betwixt the twain was made by Pallas Athene, daughter of Zeus, who bears the aegis, in the likeness of Mentor both in form and in voice.

Forgiveness, reconciliation, a commitment to peace and a statement by the narrator of an eternal pact to assure it—these are the gestures with which the *Odyssey* ends. Reintegration of society betokens poetic wholeness, and vice versa. Content and imagination are one.³⁵

The ending of the *Argonautica* is simpler still as the singer speaks in his own voice:

For now I have come to the glorious end of your toils; for no adventure befell you as you came home from Aegina, and no tempest of wind opposed you; but quietly did you skirt the Cecropian land and Aulis inside of Euboea and the Opuntian cities of the Locrians, and gladly did you step forth upon the beach of Pagasae.

Just as the argonauts bring their journey to completion by returning whence they started, so the singer, proclaiming direct control over the matter of his verse, brings his own poetic voyage to a parallel stop.

Unfortunately we lack the final lines of any pre-Virgilian Latin epics. We must therefore jump in our survey to silver Latin and in particular to Statius who, at the end of his only completed epic, the *Thebaid*, directly acknowledges his indebtedness to Virgil. He finishes with an address to his own book:

vive, precor; nec tu divinam Aeneida tempta,
sed longe sequere et vestigia semper adora.
mox, tibi si quis adhuc praetendit nubila livor,
occidet, et meriti post me referentur honores.

The ending of the narrative proper, which precedes the speaker's *sphragis*, is equally important for our purposes. After the hideous carnage of civil strife and Theseus' killing of Creon (the equivalent moment to the end of the *Aeneid*), who had refused to allow the dead to be buried, the warring factions forge a treaty as the women rejoice in the Athenian leader's calming presence. The epic's plot ends with due display of mourning for the fallen and with some of Statius' most beautiful (and

³⁵The case for the authenticity of the *Odyssey* from 23.297 to the end is argued persuasively by C. Moulton, "The End of the *Odyssey*," *GRBS* 15 (1974) 153–69.

most Virgilian) lines. I could not tell, says the speaker, even if I had a hundred voices, of all the cries of grief:

Arcada quo planctu genetrix Erymanthia clamet,
Arcada, consumpto servantem sanguine vultus,
Arcada, quem geminae pariter flevere cohortes.
vix novus ista furor veniensque implesset Apollo,
et mea iam longo meruit ratis aequore portum.³⁶

Though he gives them new turns, especially in his elaboration of the autobiographical “seal,” Statius essentially clings to the closure patterns of his generic inheritance. In fact he combines elements from the endings of all three Greek epics—ceremonies of lamentation from the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*’s call for forgiveness and reconciliation, and Apollonius Rhodius’ self-projection as traveller, appropriately completing at once his poetic journey and the heroic voyage it had sung.

It is important to notice not so much how influential Greek epic remains upon Statius’ conclusion but how clearly the *Aeneid*’s finale is absent as an imaginative force on this most Virgilian of poets while he wrote his *envoi*. Hence to my point. In terms of its Greek epic past and its Roman poetic progeny, Virgil’s *Aeneid* is a strikingly incomplete poem.³⁷ Its ending is equivalent to Achilles’ killing of Hector, to the death of the suitors in the *Odyssey* or of Creon in the *Thebiad*. No Iliadic mourning breaks the spell of Aeneas’ inexorable blood-lust.³⁸ Reconciliations akin to the *Odyssey*’s are mouthed in heaven but form no part in human action, as victor kills suppliant. Turning to the end of the *Argonautica*, which has its spiritual kinship to the *Odyssey*’s conclusion, we do not find in the *Aeneid* any equivalent satisfactions. No wife is

³⁶12.803–808. His beloved Virgil is here on Statius’ mind, but the Virgil not of the *Aeneid* but of *Georgic* 4 (525–27).

³⁷The abrupt conclusion of *De Rerum Natura* offers the closest parallel in earlier literature to the end of the *Aeneid*. I strongly support the view of Diskin Clay (*Lucretius and Epicurus* [Ithaca 1983] 251) that Virgil’s “grim and unresolved” finale deliberately echoes both the style and tone of his great predecessor.

³⁸The reversals of the *Iliad* in the *Aeneid* deserve separate study. The *Aeneid* ends in one respect where the *Iliad* begins. Achilles’ anger at the start of the *Iliad* turns to forgiveness at the end. The story of Aeneas, on the other hand, begins with the hero’s suppression of *dolor* (1.209), for hardships experienced in the past, and ends with his outburst of *dolor* over the loss of Pallas. In at least one episode of the *Aeneid* the reversal directly concerns Achilles. In Pyrrhus’ vengeful killing of Priam, Achilles’ anger lives on. It too, of course, is an emotion that spurs on Aeneas to his final deed (*ira terribilis* is the narrator’s characterization of Aeneas immediately before his final speech, 12.946–47). Is it mere coincidence that Helenus bestows the *arma Neoptolemi* (3.469) on Aeneas as his parting gift?

given Aeneas in a marriage ceremony that might give the epic's quasi-tragic ending a comic twist. Nor is there a speaking "I," proud of his accomplishment, who could at least abstract us at the end from the lived experience of the violence his story tells into the imagination that fostered it.

We will never know what Daedalian *dolor* within Virgil caused him to leave his epic so generically incomplete. (The ancient lives tell us that at his death Virgil had failed only to apply his *ultima manus*, his finishing touch, to the poem, not that it remained deficient in any substantial way.) But I have a suggestion. Critics have long since, and quite correctly, sensed a parallel between Icarus and the many people who die as they follow in the wake of Aeneas. I listed earlier the most prominent losses in the last quartet of books and it is well to remember that books 2 through 5 all end with deaths, of Creusa, Anchises, Dido, and Palinurus. The clearest parallel structurally, however, is with the death of Marcellus, the son of Augustus' sister and his adopted heir, whose funeral is described at the end of the sixth book.³⁹ It is as if the poet were saying that the Roman mission cannot go forward without loss of life, that the reality of death ever looms as a counterbalance to progress.

What critics have not stressed is the concomitant parallel between Aeneas and Daedalus. To do so is to turn from deaths suffered as the price of empire to placing responsibility for those deaths.⁴⁰ The artisan loses his son from his overreaching. Aeneas loses Pallas but he also kills Turnus. These deaths receive the final emphasis which is on causes as much as on results, on the perpetrator as much as on its victims.

The conclusion of the *Aeneid*, then, doubly uncloaks the deceptiveness of art. Aeneas cannot fulfil his father's idealizing, and therefore deceptive, vision of Rome, and Virgil, the artisan of his tale, cannot show him as so doing. Aeneas' final killing of Turnus differs from Daedalus' loss of Icarus essentially for being active instead of passive. Each demonstrates nature's final, Pyrrhic, triumph over art.

We may be meant to think that, as he crafted the *Aeneid*, in the process of writing, of practising his own art, Virgil followed his own voy-

³⁹The parallel is developed with sensitivity by C. P. Segal ("Aeternum per saecula nomen, the golden bough and the tragedy of history: Part II," *Arion* 5 [1966] 34-72, especially 50-52). Cf. also H. Rutledge ("Vergil's Daedalus," *CJ* 62 [1967] 311) and Pöschl ("Die Tempeltüren," 120).

⁴⁰Fitzgerald (note 1 above, 54) rightly notes that Daedalus' tale delivers him "from the past [that his artwork first encapsulated] into the painful and unfinished world of history." He pursues his insight by concluding that Aeneas, as Daedalus, is forced into a tragic history "that forfeits the comfort of closure."

age of self-discovery and came with full assurance to see *dolor*, the immediacy of suffering, frustration, resentment, as an overriding presence in human life and therefore in his creative life. His plot-line, which mimes and reproduces the artist's growing inwardness, suggests a paradox: when, in the course of his experience an artist foregoes his natural role as trickster, and relieves his art of duplicity, in favor of truth of expression, his artifact, as his life's work, is an apparent failure. To idealize is to envision wholeness in self and society, to claim consistency in their patterning. It is to twist the tragic divisiveness of life's irrationality into comic returns, reconciliations, renewals. But Virgil, by ending his epic with two consequential acts of resentment, the one resulting in violence, the other from having to accept that violence, does not finally idealize. His final artifice is the sham of foregoing art.

In sum, Virgil does, idiosyncratically, complete the *Aeneid* just as he completes with growing emotion the tale of Daedalus' inability to create. This carefully, brilliantly flawed wholeness is perhaps his passionate way of saying that art's feigned orderings do not, cannot, claim to control the uncontrollable. For a poet of consummate honesty the truths of nature, Virgil would seem to say, are ever triumphant over the soothing trickery of art, however seductively its practitioners pattern their wares. For the art that supplants deceit with honesty, that composes life's imperfections, that unthreads its own labyrinthine text, not piety, or even pity, is possible, only the final, perfecting deficiencies of anger and sorrow.⁴¹

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⁴¹The truth of Aeneas' emotions at the end of book 12, as in the Helen episode in book 2, leads to artistic inconclusions, in the first instance because the text (2.567-88) would be expunged by, and nearly lost because of, Varius and Tucca, in the second because it leads not to potential elimination but to aspects of incompleteness. The first episode suggests, too early and too strongly, it might have been said, the truth of the hero's emotionality. The second cannot be argued away, though its author sought to destroy it as part of his whole epic. It forms a special complement to the first. Virgil stops at a moment of the greatest honesty which demonstrates Anchises' model to be one based on wishful thinking while Aeneas' violent response to Turnus and the emotional thrust behind it speak the truth. This truth brings about, literally and splendidly, the end of art.

THAMYRIS AND THE MUSES

(An Unrecognized Oedipal Myth)

The Thamyris¹ myth has so many variants that one cannot help thinking that the latent content of this myth's nucleus is so anxiety-arousing that each group of its variants seeks to obliterate it in its own way.

I note, to begin with, a striking difference between the two principal groups of variants:

1) In the versions in which Thamyris is the son of a Muse, the stake of the musical contest between Thamyris and the Muses is either not mentioned or *not sexual*.

2) In the versions in which Thamyris could, if he won the contest, cohabit either with one of the Muses or with all nine of them,² Thamyris is *not* the son of a Muse.

3) The specific penalty—the blinding of the loser Thamyris—is mentioned only in the versions in which, if he won the contest, his reward would be cohabitation with *one* muse only who, I note, *is never named*. In other versions the Muses can deal with the loser Thamyris as they please. But, in *all* versions which mention a musical contest, it is Thamyris himself who determines both the reward of the winner and the punishment of the loser.

Of course, the pious Homer (*Il.* 2.594) mentions neither the musical contest nor its stake. In the *Iliad*, Thamyris is punished simply for asserting that he is a better musician than the Muses. The bashfulness of so excellent a Hellenist as Höfer³ is equally great: Thamyris' wish to cohabit with the Muses shocks him as much as the participation in the torturing of Thamyris by the Muse who is his mother. In fact, Höfer even insists that there is no resemblance whatever between the torturing of Thamyris by his mother, the Muse, and the slaying of Pentheus by his mother, in Euripides' *Bacchae*.

¹Son of Melpomene: Apollod. ap. sch. E. *Rh.* 346; son of Erato: sch. Ven. A. Hom. *Il.* 10.435; Eustath. *ad Hom. Il.* p. 817-31; Hes. *Op.* 1, p. 25-28 Gaisf.

²With *one* Muse (who is never named): sch. Ven. Hom. *Il.* p. 298-43; with *all* the nine Muses: Asclepiad. ap. sch. E. *Rh.* 916; Apollod. 1.3.3; Zenob. *Cent.* 4.27; sch. Hom. *Il.* 2.595.

³S. v. Thamyris, Röscher, *Lex.*, col. 468.

Now, paradoxical as this may seem, the fact that Pentheus had brought charges of sexual misconduct against the Mainades—including, it goes without saying, his mother and his maternal aunts (*E. Ba.* 223-25)—had scandalized another great Hellenist.⁴

The fact is that neither Höfer nor Grube understood that “all the Muses” and “all the Mainades” are simply smoke screens that disguise the son’s incestuous desire for his mother *only*—or his pathological curiosity and jealousy as regards the sexual behavior of his mother *only*.

This interest—too shameful to be put in words—that concerns one person *only*, is masked by an avowable interest in the “crowd” to which that person happens to belong. Hence, even in those versions in which Thamyris could, if he won, cohabit with *one* muse *only*, that Muse is *never named*. One encounters this kind of anonymity also in dreams, in the memory gaps of patients⁵ and, of course, also in myths and tales that happen to concern precisely incest.

It is, likewise, interesting that the absence of an umpire in this contest had worried Höfer (in Röscher, *s.v.* Thamyris, col. 468), no doubt because the tradition concerning the contest between the flautist Marsyas and the kitharode and singer Apollon did name the umpires of *that* contest—the Muses.⁶

In the case of the contest between Thamyris and the Muses it is precisely the (sexual) nature of the stake which justifies the lack of an impartial umpire. The situation is fairly simple. The best proof of Thamyris’ superiority as a musician would have been the capacity of his music to *seduce*, either one Muse or else all nine of them, so completely that they would have desired his amorous embraces. By contrast, had an umpire decided the outcome of the contest, without the Muses themselves admitting that they had been vanquished (= seduced), the winning Thamyris’ reward would have been only a quasi-rape.

In short, this contest tests not only Thamyris’ musical genius but also—and perhaps even mainly—his (sexual) irresistibility: his capacity to seduce even his own mother.

⁴G.M.A. Grube, *The Drama of Euripides* (London 1941) 403, n. 1.

⁵I am thinking here of a concrete incident in the analysis of one of my patients, who unequivocally designated a certain person by a series of allusions of the kind one encounters in Lykophron. Yet the patient was never “able” to remember that person’s name. I cannot, unfortunately, publish the details of this extraordinary psychoanalytic session, for that would oblige me to name the person whom my patient was “unable” to name.

⁶Jessen, *s.v.* Marsyas ap. Röscher, *Lex.* col. 2443.

Now, one tradition records that Thamyris' two eyes were not the same color.⁷ This, according to Höfer, is a token not only of irresistibility but also of inconstancy.⁸

From the psychiatric point of view, the presence of incestuous motives is strongly, though indirectly, confirmed by the tradition that Thamyris was a homosexual.⁹ Strong incestuous fixations on the mother are common in homosexuals.

Last but not least, I recall here a copiously documented fact.¹⁰ In innumerable cases sexual misconduct is punished by blindness. The most striking case is that of Aigypios,¹¹ whom his mother—with whom he had cohabited without knowing the true identity of his bed-fellow—tried to blind when she discovered that her lover was her own son.¹²

All things considered, the Thamyris myth does not really need an "interpretation." It suffices to arrange the data furnished by the variants in a manner that fits a meaningful psychological scheme. As soon as this is done, one discerns at once that the diverse variants of this myth are simply attempts to "bowdlerize" a myth which, in its initial form, must have been one of the many Greek incest myths. It is therefore disappointing to note that even in the long passage which Carl Robert devoted to Thamyris, *precisely* in his great monograph on *Oidipous*, one finds no trace of an awareness of the Thamyris myth's original sense.¹³

I cannot conclude without mentioning, at least in passing, the view that the winning Thamyris' right "to marry" (*sic!* Höfer) is a reflection of Thracian polygamy. Though unsophisticated, this sociological interpretation is not necessarily false. But it can at most reveal the manner in which a tale of incestuous ambitions could, *in Thrace, assume the guise* of a tale of polygamous ambitions fitting Thracian customs. A purely sociological interpretation of the Thamyris' myth cannot yield more than this inference.

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⁷ One black eye, one "white" (blind ?) eye: Asclepiad. ap. sch., E. *Rh.* 916. One black eye, one pale sea-green eye: sch. Ven. B. *Hom. Il.* 2.595; *Pollux* 4.141.

⁸ It suffices to recall here his polygamous ambitions.

⁹ Apollod. 1.3.3; sch. Ven. A. *Hom. Il.* 2.595; Zenob. *Cent.* 4.27, p. 91-10; Eustath. *ad Hom. Il.* p. 298-40; cp. Arnob. *adv. nat.* 4.26; Suid. s.v. Θάμυρις p. 1108.1.

¹⁰ G. Devereux, "The Self-Blinding of Oidipous," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (Festschrift E. R. Dodds) 93 (1973) 36-49.

¹¹ Ant. *Lib.* 5.

¹² I note, in passing, that in S. *OT.*, Oedipus pierces his eyes with his mother's brooches.

¹³ C. Robert, *Oidipus* (1915) 2.92, n. 179.

THE λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως

Among the materials in the Homeric scholia¹ is a note by the scholar and philosopher Porphyry on *Iliad* 9.356 telling us that in the Museum at Alexandria it was the custom to propose questions (ζητήματα) and to record solutions (λύσεις).² The questions reported in the scholia are of two types. Some involve criticism of contradictions, inconsistencies, or other seeming defects in the poems. These questions sometimes recall the quibbles of nineteenth-century Analysts. The answers to the criticisms such as these sometimes recall the defenses of Homer produced by modern Unitarians. But in many questions preserved in the scholia no criticism of the poet is expressed or implied. Some are questions that might be asked in a modern class. There is as it happens a string of such noncritical questions on the first fifty lines of the *Iliad*. Why does Homer begin with the wrath? Why does he begin his narrative near the end of the war? Why does the plague strike the mules and the dogs before the men are affected? The scholia have answers to these questions and to hundreds of others.

Many of the problems raised by the ancient Homerists and many of the solutions were trivial. Dindorf properly describes them as “*questiones raro fructuosam prodentes doctrinam, saepissime vero ad ostendandam inutilem ingenii subtilitatem excogitatae*” (Vol. III, p. xiii).³

¹The standard editions of the Homeric scholia have long been those of W. Dindorf, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Odysseam*, 2 vols., (Oxford 1855); *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*, 6 vols. (Oxford 1875-88). Volumes I and II contain Scholia A; III and IV, Scholia B; V and VI (edited by E. Maass), Scholia T. To some degree these have now been replaced by the magnificent new work by H. Erbse, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem (scholia vetera)*, 5 vols. (Berlin 1969-77). Most of the materials that concern me here, however, come from Porphyry; so they rarely appear in Erbse's edition of the *scholia vetera*. Occasionally Erbse quotes later scholia in footnotes. The standard edition of Porphyry's Homeric scholarship is that by H. Schrader. I have only his edition dealing with the *Iliad*: *Porphyrii Quaestiorum Homericarum ad Iliadem Pertinentium Reliquias* (Leipzig 1880). For Porphyry's remarks on the *Odyssey*, I use Dindorf's edition of the *Odyssey* scholia. (A. R. Sodano's *Porphyrii Quaestiorum Homericarum Liber I* [Naples 1970] has nothing relevant to my present purpose).

²This scholium was, according to Dindorf, transposed to verse 688 by Villoison (*Homeri Ilias*, Venice 1788) and is attached to that verse by Dindorf. Actually, it appears in Villoison at verse 684. Schrader prints it at verse 682.

³A number of similar unkind remarks about these scholia are scattered through C. G. Heyne's vast commentary (*Homeri Ilias*, 8 vols., Leipzig & London 1802).

From time to time, however, a mildly ingenious point was made in question or answer, and in any case these approaches to Homer have some historical interest,⁴ and they have the value of reminding us that foolish remarks about Homer are not the invention of our twentieth-century contemporaries. Much of this scholarly activity has disappeared, and there is little reason to regret the loss. But a part has survived, and what we now have may well be a reasonably fair sample of a kind of approach to Homer that once attracted scholars. We should remember, too, that not only minor, and often late, persons were interested in these kinds of problems. Among the compilations made by Aristotle were his ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά, and the solutions he preferred are occasionally mentioned in the scholia. (Cf. too, *Poetics*, chapter 25.)

The greatest source of information about this aspect of ancient Homeric scholarship is the collection of scholia on the eleventh-century manuscript Venetus B. Most of the relevant scholia come from Porphyry. It is apparent that by Porphyry's time (A.D. 232-c. 305), and probably long before him, many of the various kinds of problems had been classified by types, and a number of technical terms had been invented to characterize the various kinds of solutions that had been developed. There was, for instance, the λύσις ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου: a difficulty can be solved by pointing out the kind of character or characters involved. This technical term appears first in a note on *Iliad* 1.42. Problem: why does Chryses curse the Danaans instead of just Agamemnon? Solution: as a barbarian, Chryses is the enemy of all Greeks. Another solution for this problem was that ἐκ τῆς λέξεως, here a solution based on the proper understanding of the word "Danaans": the word "Danaans" includes Agamemnon. Then there is the λύσις ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ, the solution based on the occasion or situation. In the notes on *Iliad* 11.624, we read of the vast and varied criticism of the cocktail given to the wounded Machaon. Among the solutions is that ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ: the drink is not intended as a medicine, but is a social drink naturally offered to the weary—and shared by Nestor. Another solution offered for this problematical cocktail is ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους, the solution based on custom: the heroes are accustomed to a different method of healing, because doctors do not always use the same regimen.

⁴Cf. E. Fitzgerald on some Sanscrit writings sent to him by his old friend E. B. Cowell: "No doubt this most ancient and once important literature (nay, now important as showing the Nature of the People's mind we have to deal with) . . ." *The Letters of Edward Fitzgerald*, ed. A. K. and A. B. Terhune, Vol. 2 (Princeton 1980) 465.

Here I shall be concerned with those passages in which the solution of a difficulty is explicitly connected with the term λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως (or its variants),⁵ but a few general preliminary observations will be in order.

As the above examples make clear, often more than one technical term will be applied to a single problem. On the other hand, the scholia frequently deal with problems and solutions without using any of these technical terms. The T Scholia on *Iliad* 1.3, for example, have on the problems of this line a longish note without any technical terms,⁶ and both the A and B Scholia on *Iliad* 12.10–12 deal at length with Homer's saying that the wall was ἔμπεδον when it had suffered great damage. The long notes make it clear that, although the phrase does not occur, a popular solution was the λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως, in this instance a careful analysis of the meaning of the word ἔμπεδον. Cf. Schol. B on *Iliad* 6.488.

The scholia dealing with these problems and solutions vary greatly in length and complexity. At one extreme we have scholia that state in a few words the question and the answer. Others may run on for pages and offer a great variety of solutions. Some of these may be relevant only to the one problem involved and will not fall under any of the technical terms. Others will have solutions appropriate to one or more of the four technical terms I have mentioned. Among these some will be introduced by the proper technical term, while others will describe the solution without using such a term. A good illustration of this complex type of scholia is the treatment in the B Scholia of an episode in the sixth book of the *Iliad* 251–68:

When Hector leaves the battlefield and reaches Priam's palace, he is greeted by his mother, who suggests that she bring him some wine so that he may first pour a libation to Zeus and the other gods and then strengthen himself with a drink. "Wine," she says, "greatly increases the μένος of a weary man." Hector replies, "Don't offer me wine, mother, lest you weaken my μένος. And I am afraid to pour a libation to Zeus when I am so dirty."

Problem: why does the poet contradict himself? Hecabe says that wine increases the μένος, while Hector says that it may enfeeble his μένος. The B Scholia offer many solutions for this contradiction,

⁵This *lusis* also appears with a number of variants: διὰ τῆς λέξεως κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν λέξιν, κατὰ λέξιν, ἐν τῇ λέξει, τῇ λέξι, λέξει. The phrases seem to be identical in meaning, and they are treated together here. It should be noted that the phrase κατὰ λέξιν in Scholia A at *Iliad* 2.111 has nothing to do with this *lusis*. It indicates that the author is going to quote Aristarchus "word for word."

⁶For the B Scholia on this line, see p. 211 below.

among them four solutions that might have been labeled with the corresponding four technical terms. On line 261 we are given two solutions, both set forth succinctly: the problem could be solved προσώπῳ, all persons do not have the same views. Or λέξει, 'hyperbatonly'. This second solution is not explained, and at this point the scholium becomes incoherent, because a note on a different problem has intruded here. (See Schrader, note on pp. 99–100.)

The problem is dealt with again and at much greater length in a note on line 265. Various solutions are suggested, two of which might have been accompanied by the term ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ or the term ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους but are not. But we also have longish discussions of the two solutions mentioned briefly in the note on line 261. Here we are told that the solution advocated by many is that there are two different characters involved. This idea is developed in a number of lines, but the technical term used at 261 does not occur. Moreover, in this scholium we hear no more about hyperbaton. Instead, the point is made that the word μένος has two meanings, one referring to emotions and one referring to physical strength — obviously what we shall see is the most common type of the λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως, that based on a proper understanding of the meaning of a word. But the technical term is not used.

The B Scholium at 261 that solves the problem with the technical term λέξει and the adverb "hyperbatonly" leaves the reader wondering how hyperbaton provides a solution. Some light is shed by a note on line 260 in scholia T. After the technical term ἐν ὑπερβάτῳ, the scholium quotes Hector's words in this order: "I'm afraid to pour libation to Zeus with unwashed hands, lest you weaken me." For full clarity we must turn to Schrader's edition of Porphyry. Schrader inserts into the B Scholia note on line 265 a passage of seven lines that occur only in the manuscript that Schrader labels L (Leidensis Vossianus 64, described by Schrader on p. viii): "There is also another solution of the problem, some persons explaining it by hyperbaton in this way: the L scholium then quotes the relevant lines of Hector's speech in this order: 264, 266, 267, 268, 265:

μή μοι οίνον ἀειρε μελίφρονα, πότνια μῆτερ,
χεροί δ' ἀνίπτοισιν Διὶ λειβειν αἴθοπα οίνον
ἄζομαι, ούδέ πη ἔστι κελαινεφέϊ Κρονίωνι
αἴματι καὶ λύθρῳ πεπαλαγμένον εύχετάσθαι,
μή μ' ἀπογυιώσῃς μένεος ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι.

Finally, the scholium explains why Hector feels that Hecabe's offer of wine might be dangerous and weaken his μένος: "so that he may not when his hands are dirty be asked to pour a libation to the gods and may

not incur some anger from the gods thereby." It is unlikely that anyone nowadays will prefer this complex ingenuity to the simple suggestion that the word *μένος* has two different connotations.

I turn now from these general preliminary observations to a consideration of the type of *lusis* that is most often met with in the scholia, the *λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως*, which appears more than fifty times in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* scholia. Comments by modern scholars have revealed some misunderstanding of the meaning of this technical term. In 1969, A. C. Watts called the phrase "a modern scholar's finest rule" and translated it "literally, 'freeing from the reading,'" an English phrase whose meaning escapes me.⁷ Some decades earlier, and at the other extreme of Homeric scholarship, Milman Parry, translating the phrase in a note of Porphyry on *Iliad* 8.555, rendered it "la solution du passage est fournit par le contexte."⁸ Since both Watts' and Parry's interpretations are, I think, wrong,⁹ it may be well to consider the matter again in the hope of determining what the phrase means and what sorts of problems this *lusis* was meant to treat.¹⁰ The obvious way to proceed is to examine the problematical Homeric passages which the scholia explain by the *λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως*. In collecting the passages, I have used Barr's index for the *Iliad*¹¹ and Dindorf's index to his edition of the *Odyssey* scholia.¹²

⁷*The Lyre and the Harp* (New Haven and London 1969) 9.

⁸*L'Épithète traditionnelle dans Homère* (Paris 1928) 150. This appears in Adam Parry's translation of his father's thesis as "the solution of the passage is found in its context." *The Making of Homeric Verse* (Oxford 1971) 121. Since the translation is much more readily available, my page references to Parry's work will be to the translation, and the work will be cited only as Parry.

⁹I mean that context is not involved in the solution of the problem at *Iliad* 8.555, where Porphyry's comment is incorrectly translated by Parry. (This passage is discussed, p. 207 below.) It will appear later, however, that this *λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως* is at times a solution based on context.

¹⁰I have a German dissertation dealing with the *λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου* by Hans Dachs (Erlangen 1913) and, German nineteenth-century scholarship having been what it was, it seems virtually certain that at least one dissertation must have appeared dealing with the *λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως*. I have not, however, seen any.

¹¹J. Barr, *Index zu den Ilias-Scholien* (Baden-Baden 1961). Barr does not include the word *λύσις* in his index, but under *λέξις* he lists between 200 and 300 passages and shows which scholia classes (A, B, T, etc.) contain which instances. The list is very useful, but anyone using it should be warned that it is not free from errors. Three or four lists of citations should have a scholia class added and in another three or four a class should be deleted, but these errors are not likely to have serious results. E414 under BT should be deleted. The word *λέξει* there is not the dative of the noun but the future of the verb. Under B, E6 should be 7 and Δ468 should be 491. Under D, Π16 should be 161.

¹²It seems odd that all of Dindorf's examples of the *λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως* come from the first half of the poem. But scholiasts ancient and modern do tend to become

One does not proceed far in reading these scholia before realizing that the λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως is the term used to characterize a rather miscellaneous group of solutions that might in the broadest sense be called "literary" explanations, that is, explanations based on almost any aspect of language or style. Consequently, the various kinds of explanation offered under this rubric are much more varied than those we find dealt with under other technical terms.

The most common type is that in which the problem is solved by careful attention to the meaning of a word. (Indeed, the most common meaning of the word λέξις in the scholia is "word," a meaning that must occur two or three hundred times.) For the modern reader, much the most interesting of the solutions based on a proper understanding of the meaning of a word is that on *Iliad* 8.555, the passage that produced Porphyry's comment and Parry's incorrect translation of it. It will be well, therefore, to begin our investigation of this *lusis* with the scholia's treatment of this passage.

Line 855 of Book 8 occurs in the famous simile with which Book 8 ends: the numerous Trojan fires out on the plain are compared to the conspicuous stars about the bright moon:

ώς δ' ὅτ' ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀστρα φαεινήν ἀμφὶ σελήνην
φαίνετ' ἀριπρεπέα, ὅτε τ' ἔπλετο νήνεμος αἰθήρ

555-56

Problem: it is impossible for the stars to be conspicuous when the moon is bright. The solution here is based on a proper understanding of the word φαεινήν, but in this passage the proper understanding is not obtained by finding a suitable definition of the word. Here we can understand the meaning of φαεινήν if we understand a marked feature of Homeric style. This feature is the one in which Aristarchus modestly anticipated Milman Parry. As Porphyry says, λύεται ἐκ τῆς λέξεως. τὸ φαεινήν οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς τότε ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς φύσει. Parry was wrong, I think, in translating Porphyry's statement, "the solution of the passage is found in its context." The phrase λύεται ἐκ τῆς λέξεως here means "the solution based on (or derived from) style," and the particular characteristic of Homeric style that Aristarchus acutely noted was Homer's use of adjectives that were not appropriate at the moment but did suit the "natural" characteristics of the person or phenomenon involved. As Aristarchus neatly formulated it, οὐ τότε ἀλλὰ φύσει.

more terse as they proceed (the scholia on the first twelve books fill some 550 pages in Dindorf, those on the second half about 175). I have gone rather hastily through the scholia on Books 13-24 and have not noticed any instances of this *lusis*.

The scholium goes on to note other passages that show this stylistic feature: Nausicaa's bright (φαεινήν) clothes that she is taking to the laundry (*Od.* 6.74) and the lovely (έρατεινά) streams of the river that is full of corpses (*Iliad* 21.218). We might expect the scholia on these cited parallels to contain the technical term λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως. Actually, they do not. The *Odyssey* scholia remark of Nausicaa's dirty bright clothes, οὐ τὸν τότε ούσαν φαεινήν· ρέρύπωται γάρ· ἀλλὰ τὴν φύσει καθαράν, and compare the bright moon of *Iliad* 8.555. Eustathius¹³ agrees: τὴν φύσει τοιαύτην. The BT Scholia on the *Iliad*'s corpse-choked lovely streams argue that the epithet is καλός but the A Scholia find it untimely (ἄκαιρον) and compare it to the bright clothes and the bright moon. One other parallel is noted in the BT Scholia on *Iliad* 18.349 (the line also appears at *Od.* 10.360), where a cauldron is being heated over a fire:

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ ζέσσεν ὅδωρ ἐνὶ ἥνοπι χαλκῷ.

The scholia comment: ἔστιν οὖν ώς τὸ φαεινήν ἀμφὶ σελήνην.

Of these alleged parallels, the best is the lovely streams. One might maintain that the streams of a river are naturally lovely, though they might not be on a particular occasion. I am not sure that Nausicaa's laundry and the bright cauldron also belong under this rubric, οὐ τότε ἀλλὰ φύσει, since I am not sure that textiles and bronze cauldrons are bright by nature. These two parallels seem to me to be similar to, but different from, the bright moon. They belong in a class noted by the BT Scholia at *Iliad* 2.467:

ἔσταν δ' ἐν λειμῶνι Σκαμανδρίῳ ἀνθεμόεντι.

¹³G. Stallbaum, ed., *Eustathii Commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam*, I (Leipzig 1825) 239. Earlier in Book 6, Athena has twice used the epithet σιγαλόεντα of this same dirty laundry: εἵματα... σιγαλόεντα (26), ρήγεσι σιγαλόεντα (38). On line 26 the scholar comments, τὰ φύσει λαμπρά. In a number of other passages in the *Odyssey* the word σιγαλόεντα is applied to textiles, but the textiles in those passages are in fine condition, notably Odysseus' χιτώνα σιγαλόεντα, that was like the skin of a dry onion. In Book 22 of the *Iliad*, the racing Hector and Achilles reach the stone washing-troughs where in time of peace the Trojan women used to wash their εἵματα σιγαλόεντα (154), but the *Iliad* scholia have no comments on this shining laundry. Leaf suggests, "It is an *epitheton ornans* expressing probably the natural sheen of linen (Studnička, 50)." (In the cited passage S. discusses the use of linen textiles in Homer and notes σιγαλόεις as an epithet appropriate to that kind of cloth.) But it seems unlikely that all the Trojan and Phaeacian laundry was made of linen.

The flowery Scamander meadow trampled by the soldiers presented a problem. As the scholia say, πῶς ἀνθεῖ πατούμενα;

This problem is ingeniously solved by the formula, τῷ πρώην ἀνθη ἔχοντι, and the scholia list three parallels: ἔυμπελίω Πριάμοιο (*Iliad* 4.47, 165; 6.449); ἥρως Αἰγύπτιος (*Od.* 2.15); ἥγκομος Νιόβη (*Iliad* 24.602). The same solution is offered for Antilochus' swift-footed horses (*Iliad* 23.304) soon to be described by Nestor as very slow. The B Scholia explain that the adjective refers to the horses in their youth and compare well-ashed Priam. The T Scholia also add the flowery Scamander. And the *Odyssey* scholia on 1.28 offer as one explanation for "blameless Aegisthus" that the adjective refers to his character before he seduced Clytemnestra. These are clear parallels, and they are clearly different from the bright moon of Book 8. The bright moon is bright by nature. The Scamander meadow was flowery before it was trampled by soldiers; Priam was previously well-ashed; the aged Aegyptius was previously a heroic figure; Niobe previously had lovely hair; Antilochus' horses were previously good runners; and Aegisthus was previously a fine fellow. I should myself put here the shining cauldron and the Phaeacian laundry. The cauldron was shining before it was blackened by the fire; the clothes were bright before they became dirty.

The lovely streams filled with corpses are, perhaps, a borderline case. However that may be, we have in these passages two different types of ornamental epithet. The proper formula for one type is οὐ τότε ἀλλὰ φύσει; the proper formula for the other is οὐ τότε ἀλλὰ πρώην. There is no way to know if Aristarchus himself confused the types.¹⁴

The application of the λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως to the bright moon of 8.555 might be classified among those in which the solution is based on a proper understanding of a word, but from another point of view it might better be classified among those in which the solution is based on style. I shall come to these later.

The comment on *Iliad* 8.555 is unique in its relevance to modern Homeric studies, but one or two instances of the λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως based on the understanding of a word may deserve some discussion. These will not impress us by their anticipation of modern theories, but rather as examples of explanations thought out to display a uselessly ingenious subtlety.

¹⁴There is good discussion of many of these matters from a different point of view in Parry, 120-23.

First, *Iliad* 9.452. Problem: it was improper for Phoenix to relate this sordid tale about his intercourse with his father's concubine, when there was need for him to do so. Solution: προμιγῆναι οὐδεμίαν ἔχει ἀτοπίαν. It is not immediately clear why this rather startling moral judgment, "προμιγῆναι involves no wickedness," should qualify as a λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως. I think, however, that the technical term is correct, and that we have here another instance of a *lusis* based on the correct interpretation of a word. The scholiasts discuss at length this episode of the poem and raise a variety of points, only one of which concerns us here. While some scholars maintained that προμιγῆναι meant the same thing as μιγῆναι, others put great emphasis on the importance of the prefix, indeed spinning from it the whole background of the story: Phoenix' father had not yet slept with the concubine, but he was raising her with that in mind, as Phoenix' mother knew. Phoenix did not, therefore, share the concubine with his father, as it were, but anticipated him. There is no way to know how many persons agreed that the use of the compound verb meant a great difference in the morality of Phoenix' conduct. According to the advocates of this *lusis*, however, if we understand the meaning of the compound verb, we see that Phoenix was not guilty of a wicked act, and we can see that there was nothing improper in his telling the story. (The scholars who used the λύσις ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ to defend Phoenix' telling of the story make an ingenious point: in his talk about a concubine, Phoenix is criticizing Achilles—who is angry because of his concubine Briseis.)

Another passage showing how ingenious the users of this *lusis* can be is a note dealing with a problem raised by the Circe episode in the *Odyssey*: 10.240 and 329. Problem: we are told in line 240 that when Circe turned some of Odysseus' men into pigs, their mind (*νοῦς*) was unchanged (*ἔμπεδος*), just as before. Why then does Circe say to Odysseus in line 329, "Your *νοῦς* is beyond enchantment," implying that her magic can also change the *νοῦς*? Solution: the whole *νοῦς* does not remain *ἔμπεδος*; only that part that likes human beings remains so. Consequently, the changed animals whom the men meet on their arrival at Circe's palace fawn upon them like dogs around their master. The same solution appears in the note on 329: "When he says that their mind remained *ἔμπεδος* just as before, he does not mean the whole mind, but only the gentleness."

The remaining examples of this *lusis* based on a proper understanding of the meaning of a word may be summarized briefly.

The *Iliad*

1.3 This first instance is not very illuminating. Problem: an apparent contradiction between Ἀϊδι προίσψεν and the statement in 6.488 that no man has escaped his fate. Porphyry said, λύεται δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν λέξιν, but just how he solved the problem by this “literary” explanation we cannot now tell, because nearly everything in this scholium that follows the technical term is illegible. Points made before the technical term appears are: it is not Fate acting here, but the wrath of Achilles; the prefix πρό is important (or is redundant).

1.31 Problem: it is improper for Agamemnon to use the phrase ἐμὸν λέχος ἀντιόωσαν about the captive girl when he is married to Clytemnestra and has children by her. Solution: the phrase does not always mean sleeping together, but can also mean performing the services connected with the bed, like a chambermaid’s work.

1.42 Problem: why does Chryses curse the Danaans instead of Agamemnon? Solution: the word Danaans includes Agamemnon.

1.62 Problem: it is irrational to ask a priest (ἱερεύς) about the future; priests are not diviners. Solution: what we now call θύτης [a diviner] people long ago called a priest (ἱερεύς).

1.211 Problem: it is improper for Athena to urge Achilles to revile Agamemnon. Solution: ὀνείδισον is used in the sense of “remind him of your benefactions.”

2.2 Problem: an apparent contradiction between “sweet sleep did not hold Zeus” and ἔνθα καθεῦδ’ ἀναβάς at the end of Book 1. Solution: καθεύδειν does not necessarily mean being asleep.

2.12 Problem: it is wrong for Zeus to lie in telling Agamemnon that he will take Troy today. Solutions: 1) νῦν does not necessarily mean “today.” 2) πανσυδίη means “with everyone,” and Agamemnon made the mistake of leaving Achilles behind. (The advocates of the solution ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους are much more persuasive here: generals and kings are allowed to lie for what is to their advantage, and Homer has represented Zeus like this, τῷ ἔθει ἐπόμενον.)

3.61 Problem: an axe cannot use τέχνη. Solution: τέχνη is for ὑπὸ τέχνης. (This is today a non-problem, because everybody now assumes [as some ancient Homerists did] that the antecedent of ὅς is not the axe but the man.)

3.65 Problem: a contradiction between saying that the glorious gifts of the gods are not to be thrown away and saying, ἐκών δ’ οὐκ ἔν

τις ἔλοιτο. Solution: ἔκών, used instead of βουληθείς, means that the gifts are beautiful, but they are not easy for a person who wants them to get them.

3.144 Problem: how could Theseus' mother be Helen's servant when Theseus himself is ἀρχαῖος? Solutions: 1) homonymy, and this is another Aethra. 2) a servant need not be young.

3.275 (really about 277) Problem: we are told here that the sun sees and hears everything. Yet in *Odyssey* 12.374-75 Lampetie runs to tell him that the Ithacans have killed some of his cattle. Solution: πάντα means τὰ πλεῖστα. (The same problem and the same solution appear in the *Odyssey* scholia at 12.374.)

4.109 Problem: how could the horn of Pandarus' bow be four feet long? Solution: Homer is not referring to one of the horns but to both.

4.491 Problem: how could a spear thrown at Aias hit a ἔταῖρος of Odysseus? Solution: the word ἔταῖρος does not always mean fellow-citizen; it may mean a friend or an associate in a piece of work.

5.7 Problem: there could not be a fire on Diomedes or he would burn up. (According to the A Scholia, the point was made by Zoilus.) Solution: the word πῦρ does not mean "fire" but "brightness." For other solutions, see the solution based on style, pp. 216 below, and the solution based on context, pp. 218 below.

5.576 Problem: Pylaimenes is killed here, and in 13.658 he follows in tears the body of his dead son. Solutions: 1) homonymy; maybe there is more than one Pylaimenes. 2) maybe ἐλέτην here does not mean "kill." There is a long scholium on the problem in Book 13, though the technical term does not appear. The solution urged is homonymy, and many examples of this phenomenon in Homer are listed. (For a solution based on style, see pp. 216 below.)

6.234 (Glaucus gives Diomedes gold armor in exchange for bronze.) Problem: it seems unsuitable to call such splendid men foolish and to disregard the greatness of soul in these guest-friends. Solution: Φρένας ἐξέλετο does not mean "took his wits away," but means "made choice or select." The T Scholia say that ἐξέλετο is used in place of ὑπερηρύξησε τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ and cite γέρας ἐξελον in 16.56 as a parallel. The proper parallel is 19.137, where Agamemnon uses the same phrase, Φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς, and it clearly means what these scholiasts do not want it to mean here in 6.

7.9 Problem: Homer says here that Nestor was the oldest man in the Greek army at Troy. But if you collect what he says elsewhere, you

find that Menesthius must be two generations older. Solution: homonymy.

9.203 Problem: it was improper for Achilles to order Patroclus to mix the drinks stronger (*ζωρότερον*) as if the guests had come for a κῶμος. Solution: *ζωρότερον* means *τάχιον*. (Various aspects of this problem are treated at length by Plutarch, *Quaestiones conviviales*, V. 4. 677c [Loeb ed. Vol. 8, 400–404], and the word in question is also discussed by Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*, X. 424 [Loeb ed. Vol. 4, 416–18]).

11.405 Problem: it is unsuitable to persuade oneself that death is more terrible than running away.¹⁵ Solution: ἀλώω can mean being taken alive. Odysseus says that this is more terrible than anything else, for no Greek has suffered this.

12.25 Problem: why did Apollo and Poseidon take nine days to break down a wall that the Greeks had built in one? Solutions: 1) Homer easily falls into (*εὔεπιπτώτως*) using the word ἐννῆμαρ. (Cf. Schol. T: *εὔεπίφορός ἐστιν εἰς τὰ ἐννέα*.) 2) read ἐν ἡμαρ.

14.434 Problem: the statement here that Zeus begot Xanthus contradicts the statement in 21.196 that all rivers are from Oceanus. Solutions: 1) πάντες in Book 21 can mean “most.” 2) ποταμός can mean both the stream and the god of the stream; so the god Xanthus is from Zeus, but the stream is from Oceanus. The same problem and the same solutions appear in the scholium on 21.194.

15.189 Problem: τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται here contradicts the statement a few lines later (193) that earth and Olympus are shared by all three gods. Solutions: 1) maybe πάντα is redundant as in δέκα πάντα τάλαντα in 24.232. 2) maybe πάντα is used instead of πλεῖστα. Cf. solution (1) in 14.434 above.

18.489 Problem: the unbathed Bear. Homer says that the Bear is the only star that is not bathed in Oceanus. This is not true. Solution: if you change οἴη and read οἴ ἡ, κατὰ λέξιν ἡ λύσις ὑπάρχει. The scholars who explained difficulties in Homer were most reluctant to admit that Homer may have been careless or may have just made a mistake. They come somewhat close here by suggesting that Homer may not have known that his astronomical information was wrong. For an-

¹⁵I adopt the correction in the text made by Ribbeck. See Erbse, III, 200, note on 405–406.

other solution of this problem see the “context” passage under *Iliad* 18.489, p. 218 below.

20.268 (Much discussion here of just what Aeneas’ spear did to Achilles’ shield and how this shield was made.) Problem: the statement in 267–68 that Aeneas’ spear did not break the shield is inconsistent with 269, where we are told that it drove through two layers. Solutions: 1) if the spear did not go all the way through, then it did not break the shield. 2) ξλασσε does not mean that it broke the shield, but means διέθλασε. This word cannot have meant to the scholiast what it means to LSJ: “break in pieces.” I think it does not have that meaning in Aelian or Nonnus; cited by LSJ, but something like “thoroughly crush.” I am not sure what the word meant to the scholiast. There is a good note on the passage and the scholia in Leaf’s edition of the *Iliad*.

21.389 (Zeus laughed when he saw the gods coming together to fight.) Problem: this is inconsistent with his telling Ares in 5.890–91 that he finds Ares the most hateful of all the gods in Olympus because Ares always likes strife, war, and battles. Solution: the word “always” in 5.891 removes the inconsistency.

The *Odyssey*

1.33 Problem: Zeus’ statement that men bring misfortunes upon themselves by their own blind folly is inconsistent with the whole story, in which he brings in the gods as responsible for many misfortunes. Solution: although the solution here is a verbal one, it is not based on analysis of a single word, but on Zeus’ words in lines 33–34, which the scholiast quotes: οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίησιν. I assume he means to draw special attention to καὶ αὐτοί, “also themselves.” His solution of the problem is that Zeus’ remarks leave the gods responsible for human misfortunes, but not for all of them, as human beings believe.

2.165 Problem: why say of Odysseus ἐγγὺς ἐών when he is at this point on Ogygia? Solution: the word ἐγγύς can refer to time as well as to place. Here it is used of time.

3.147 Problem: the statement here that the purpose of the gods is not quickly changed is inconsistent with *Iliad* 9.497, where we are told that the gods themselves are στρεπτοί. Solution: the vital difference here is in the word “quickly.”

4.1 Problem: how can Homer say that Telemachus has now arrived in Lacedaemon when Pherae, where Telemachus spent last night,

is also in this territory? Solution: “Lacedaemon” can be used to mean the town of Sparta as well as the territory of Lāconia.

6.221 Problem: Odysseus’ modesty here is at odds with other passages describing men being bathed by girls. Solution: Odysseus here adds μετελθών as being a ξένος. Stanford’s solution seems better: “probably on account of his filthy condition.” *Odyssey of Homer* I, 2nd ed. (London 1959) 316.

7.54 Problem: saying that Arete comes from the same τοκήων as Alcinous is inconsistent with the later statement that her father was Rhexenor, his Nausithous. Solution: τοκήων also means προγόνων.

7.64 Problem: saying that Rhexenor was killed ἄκουρον ἐόντα is inconsistent with saying that he left a daughter. Solution: ἄκουρον does not mean “with no children,” but “with no male child.”

8.77 Problem: it is improper for Agamemnon to rejoice because his friends are fighting. Solution: men do not fight only “in unfriendly enmity” (ἀφιλέχθως) but also in rivalry over καλοῦ καὶ ἀρετῆς. (For a solution based on context, see p. 218 below.)

9.5 Problem: Some find fault with Odysseus’ remarks at the Phaeacian banquet, accusing him of maintaining that pleasure is the τέλος of life. Solution: Odysseus does not use the word τέλος in a philosophical or general sense, but in a restricted one. He does not say that pleasure is the τέλος of all life, but of a party (συμποσίου). (As Eustathius says, Odysseus has used the word “more sympathetically.”)

11.239 Problem: here the Enipeus is called the most beautiful river by far, but in the *Iliad* we are told that the Axius pours the fairest water over the earth (21.158) and that its most beautiful water spreads over the earth (2.850). Solutions: 1) The word κάλλιστον has more than one meaning. The scholiast compares Priam’s two daughters each of whom is called most beautiful. 2) The word αἰλαν does not mean γῆν but the name of a spring; so the word κάλλιστον does not refer to the river but to the spring. This second explanation is also dealt with by Strabo, Loeb. ed. Vol. III, 342–46.

The difficulty presented by the stars around the bright moon was considered above as an example of this *lusis* based on the proper understanding of a word. As was noted there, it might also be considered as a *lusis* based on style. There are a few other passages in which style is involved. In these the scholia usually refer to a particular trope. None of these instances require more than summary treatment.

The Solution Based on Style
The *Iliad*

2.827 Problem: the statement here that Apollo himself gave Pandarus his bow seems to contradict the description of the making of the bow in 4.110-11. Solution: the phrase in 827 can be used metaphorically for the art of archery.

5.7 Problem: there could not be fire on Diomedes or he would burn up. Solution: Homer is using metonymy here, "applying to the things surrounded what really applies to the surrounding things." (For the solution based on the word πῦρ, see p. 212 above, and for the solution based on context see p. 218 below.)

5.576 Problem: Pylaimenes is killed here, and in 13.658 he follows in tears the body of his dead son. Solution: maybe in 13.658 we have metonymy: the father's memory followed him. (For a solution based on the meaning of the words, see p. 212 above.)

6.261 (and 265) Problem: why does Homer contradict himself? Hecabe says that wine may increase Hector's μένος; Hector answers that it may weaken his μένος. Solution: "hyperbatonly." This passage is discussed pp. 000 above.

9.4 Problem: it is uninformed (ἀνιστόρητον) to say that both winds, Boreas and Zephyrus, blow from Thrace. Solution: this is the trope syllepsis, for what fits one has been assigned to both. For some moderns, the solution is that for a person living on or near the coast of Asia Minor the two winds do blow from Thrace. See W. Leaf *The Iliad* I, 2nd ed. (London 1900) 372. Homer's accuracy was also defended by Strabo, *Geography* I, 2. 20, Loeb ed. I, 102.

20.67 Problem: the stories about the gods are improper. Solution: the stories are allegorical. A bit later the scholium goes on to say that this form of defense of the passage is very old and comes from Theagenes of Rhegium, "who was the first to write about Homer."

The *Odyssey*

9.229 Problem: it is irrational for Odysseus to anticipate presents when he has said (215) he expects that the one who will come would be a savage. Solution: Odysseus is using the trope prolepsis, having put at the beginning what he knew later.

10.329 Problem: if the mind of Odysseus' companions remained unchanged, why is Circe puzzled because Odysseus' mind has not changed? Solution: Homer speaks "paraphrastically," and in saying

"your mind is beyond enchantment" he means "you are beyond enchantment." Is this synecdoche? (I notice that the OED says of this word, "Formerly sometimes used loosely or vaguely, and not infrequently misexplained.") The scholium here also suggests the solution based on the meaning of the word ἔμπεδος. This is discussed above, p. 210, in connection with 10.240.

The Solution Based on Context

Although Parry was wrong in translating Porphyry's λύεται ἐκ τῆς λέξεως applied to *Iliad* 8.555 as "the solution of the passage is found in its context," there is a group of problems in which the solution is based, not on a particular word, but on what the poet has said in adjacent lines. In two passages this importance of context is specifically stated. First, *Iliad* 3.740, where λύεται καὶ ἐκ τῆς λέξεως is immediately followed by λέγει γάρ. Problem: why did Menelaus not take Paris' own sword and kill him with it? Solution: Homer says that Aphrodite helped Paris; so she would be helping him in a situation such as this. Earlier in the scholium, where the technical term is not used, we are told, "He does not kill him with his own sword . . . because he was baffled by Aphrodite."

The same combination of technical term immediately followed by "he says" also appears in *Odyssey* 5.333: Problem: why does Ino alone help Odysseus? Solution: λύεται ἐκ τῆς λέξεως. φησὶ γάρ. "Homer says that she used to be a human being; so she shares human qualities and naturally pities Odysseus."

In one passage the importance of context is shown by a specific reference to what was not said: *Iliad* 2.82. Problem: it is improper for Nestor to fawn upon Agamemnon in this way, saying that other persons' dreams are false and only Agamemnon's true. Solution: Nestor does not say that, if anyone else saw this dream, the one he saw was false. What he says is "If anyone else said that he saw it." Such another person might make this up to curry favor, but Agamemnon would not do so.

The following are the other passages in which the λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως might properly be translated "the solution based on context."

The *Iliad*

2.73 Problem: testing the army was irrational. Solution: Agamemnon secured himself in advance by saying in line 75, "You, from this side and from that, restrain them by talking to them."

2.266 Problem: why does Odysseus threaten Thersites with a beating if he catches him acting this way again and then proceed to beat him at once? Solution: in the threat he strips him of his clothes; in the immediate beating he does not. A further suggestion is that the actual beating is less severe than the threatened one.

2.482 Problem: it seems improper to compare to a bull a man who has just been compared to gods. Solution: the details of the comparison to the gods concern aspects of Agamemnon's personal appearance. The remaining aspect is Agamemnon's leadership, his command over others. And it is this that is compared to a bull, the leader of a herd.

2.844 Problem: the leaders of the Thracians here seem inconsistent with 11.221, where Iphidamas is said to be king of the Thracians. Solution: the men mentioned in 844 do not lead all of the Thracians, especially since Homer adds in 845 "all whom the Hellespont encloses."

5.7 Problem: there could not be fire on Diomedes or he would burn up. Solution: he said earlier [line 4] that the fire blazed from the helmet and shield.

11.624 Problem: the ingredients in the drink offered to the wounded Machaon, dark wine, cheese, and barley meal, are all inflammatory and harmful to wounded men. Solution: mixing all the ingredients together changes the effect of them taken individually.

13.3 Problem: if Zeus turned his eyes from Troy to Mysia, he could not look upon Thrace, which is in Europe. Solution: Homer does not say that Zeus was looking at Thrace but at the land of the Thracians; and the Bithynians and the Thynians, colonists of the Thracians, live in Asia.

18.489 Problem: Homer says that the Bear alone has no part in the baths of Ocean. This is false. Solution: the statement refers only to the stars mentioned in line 486. Another slightly different solution is that the reference is only to the stars represented on the shield. (For a "verbal" solution, see p. 214 above.)

20.234 Problem: Homer says that the gods snatched up Ganymede to be a wine pourer, but Hephaestus and Hebe serve the drinks in Homer. Solution: Homer does not say here that Ganymede was brought to Olympus to be a wine pourer for the gods but for Zeus.

The Odyssey

8.77 Problem: it is improper for Agamemnon to rejoice at the fighting of his friends. Solution: Homer has mentioned an oracle given

to Agamemnon concerning the quarreling of his best men (79-80). It is because Agamemnon recalls this oracle that he rejoices at this quarrel between Achilles and Odysseus. (For a solution based on the word χαῖρε, see p. 215 above.)

10.35 Problem: why would Odysseus' men imagine that the bag contained gold and silver? It had winds in it, and it must have been light. *Solution:* in line 23 we were told that Aeolus tied the bag with a silver cord; so they were envious, and the silver cord made them suspicious.

There are three rather odd passages involving the λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως where the solution is based, not on what the poet has said, but on what must be understood or assumed. This solution here has some similarity to the solution *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον*.

Iliad 5.341 Problem: Homer says that the gods do not eat grain or drink wine and therefore (342) they are bloodless and immortal. But many other creatures which eat no grain and drink no wine are not bloodless and immortal. *Solution:* with "do not eat grain" we must assume "but ambrosia," and with "do not drink wine" we must assume "but nectar."

Odyssey 5.385 Problem: the statement, "Athena broke the wave before him" is inconsistent with saying three lines later that he roamed for three days on a big wave. *Solution:* Athena stopped the waves produced by the other winds and sent Boreas alone to blow.

Odyssey 11.286 Problem: here we are told that Chloris bore three sons to Neleus. Elsewhere we are told that Neleus had twelve sons. *Solution:* Neleus must have had more than one wife.

We have now reviewed some fifty Homeric problems that ancient scholars solved with the λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως. The most striking feature of this *lusis*, as emerges from the examination, is the variety of ways in which it can be used to solve problems. Yet all of the solutions are literary ones, all connected with language or the ways in which the language is used. One result of this variety is that probably no single translation of the phrase will adequately describe its function. But at least it should be clear that neither "freeing from the reading" nor "the solution of the passage is found in its context" will serve. If we must have a single translation, "the solution based on language" is perhaps best.

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THE WRATH OF PARIS:
ETHICAL VOCABULARY AND ETHICAL TYPE IN THE *ILIAS*

I

Having found Paris in the chamber where Aphrodite hid him after his duel with Menelaus, Hector rebukes him for withdrawing from battle when so many of his people are dying on his account:

τὸν δὲ Ἐκτωρ νείκεσσεν ἵδων αἰσχροῖς ἐπέεσσιν·
“δαιμόνι”, οὐ μὲν καλὰ χόλον τόνδε ἐνθεο θυμῷ.
λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι περὶ πτόλιν αἰπύ τε τεῖχος
μαρνάμενοι· σέο δὲ εἰνέκει ὀὕτη τε πτόλεμός τε
ἄστυ τόδε ἀμφιδέδης· σὺ δὲ ἂν μαχέσαι καὶ ἄλλω,
ὅν τινά που μεθιέντα ἵδοις στυγεροῦ πολέμοιο.
ἄλλ’ ἄνα, μὴ τάχα ἄστυ πυρὸς δητοίο θέρηται.”

6.325-31

Hector's attribution of *kholos*, or "wrath," to Paris as the reason for his withdrawal has occasioned much controversy. There seem to be no obvious grounds for Hector to assume such a thing; and we know that Paris has been occupied with Helen rather than a wrath.

Paris' response suggests that the brothers both understand the frame of reference for Hector's allegation to be Paris' recent loss to Menelaus (*nikē d' epameibetai andras*: 339), but otherwise Paris' words seem to pose more questions than they answer:

τὸν δὲ αὗτε προσέειπεν Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδῆς·
“Ἐκτορ, ἐπει με κατ' αἰσαν ἐνείκεσας οὐδὲ ὑπέρ αἰσαν,
τοῦνεκά τοι ἐρέω· σὺ δὲ σύνθεο καὶ μευ ἄκουσον.
οὐ τοι ἐγώ Τρώων τόσσον χόλῳ οὐδὲ νεμέσσι
ῆμην ἐν θαλάμῳ, ἔθελον δὲ ἄχει προτραπέσθαι.
νῦν δέ με παρειποῦσ’ ἄλοχος μαλακοῖς ἐπέεσσιν
ώρμησ’ ἐς πόλεμον, δοκέει δέ μοι ὡδε καὶ αὐτῷ
λώιον ἐσσεσθαι· νίκη δὲ ἐπαμείβεται ἄνδρας.”

6.332-39

That Hector's remark is meant as a *neikos* (325) might allow us to understand it as sarcastic, but Paris seems to take it seriously. Although he does not take issue with Hector's right to rebuke him (333), he does take some pains to correct him. Paris denies that he is lingering in his chamber out of any *kholos* against the Trojans, but rather in order to yield

himself up *akhos* 'grief' (336).¹ Yet the point of the distinction which Paris is making is not clear. We have hardly been led to expect grief on his part any more than a wrath. Besides, Paris seems to categorize *kholos* with another term, *nemesis*, and to oppose them both generically to *akhos*; but we have no access to his logic. In short, the brothers' exchange over why Paris is in his chamber rather than on the battlefield seems puzzling and obscure.

Both Schadewaldt and Kakridis attempted to make sense of this *kholos*—which analyst critics had long found unmotivated²—by relating the scene to the embassies sent to appease the wraths of Achilles and Meleager. Both scholars implied that the *kholos* is incorporated into Hector's visit to recall Paris through the influence of what is a typical scene within a typical epic story-pattern—the embassy to the withdrawn and wrathful warrior—in which certain details are traditionally embedded. Indeed, it is characteristic of traditional epic poetry to yield first allegiance to such architectonic patterns, rather than to the unique requirements of the narrative moment.³

The notion that, in Homer, traditional narrative patterns ordain the selection of details, is indeed indispensable to the understanding of this scene. Yet Schadewaldt and Kakridis never move far away from the analyst view that the *kholos* at 6.326 is otiose; they do not develop the

¹I translate *akhos* as "grief" in this paper, or else leave it untranslated, even though grief is not necessarily the meaning suggested by the lexicographers for every passage I discuss (e.g., Ebeling, *Lex. Hom.*, s.v. *akhos*). These lexicographical subcategories of meaning, necessary for translating Homer, are nevertheless not distinguished by the term *akhos* itself as independent connotations within Homeric language or thought: in other words, *akhos* is used both for lamentation (24.773) and regret (3.176). Rather, as I will be arguing, nuances in meaning are suggested by the term's deployment in respect to other terms.

²In fact, this *kholos* was one cause of analyst discomfort with Book 6 generally: see A. Heubeck, *Die Homerische Frage* (Darmstadt 1974) 65–68; and G. Broccia, *La questione omerica* (Firenze 1979) 103–106. For more detailed discussions of the debate see J. T. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* (Lund 1949) 43–40 and E. Heitsch, "Der Zorn des Paris," *Festschrift für Joseph Klein zum 70. Geburtstag* (Göttingen 1967) 216–47. Of course, the passage occasioned some comment long before analyst criticism (see Heitsch 222–26).

³W. Schadewaldt, *Iliasstudien* (Leipzig 1943) 142–43; Kakridis (note 2 above) 47–49. See also M. M. Willcock, *A Commentary on Homer's Iliad I–VI* (London 1970) 218. However divergent their respective approaches to the Homeric poems, Kakridis and Schadewaldt are united on this question by their agreement on the traditional nature of the poetry. On the pull of the scene-type in introducing narrative awkwardness, see M. Edwards, "Type-Scenes and Homeric Hospitality," *TAPA* 105 (1975) 72 and A. B. Lord, *The Singer of Tales* (New York 1960) 93–97.

possibility, which they indeed suggest, that Hector's remark expresses a comparison between Paris and an Achilles or Meleager.⁴ Their solution, however, invites a consideration of wrath and grief as ethical concepts in Iliadic diction, and of the way such terms are related to an ethical type, specifically, to the "heroic ethos" exemplified by an Achilles or Meleager.⁵ Such an examination will lay the foundation for our discussion of this scene. In particular it will lead us to suggest that this exchange between Hector and Paris is animated, not only by the story-pattern of the withdrawn and wrathful warrior, but by a character typology which, as though overlying the narrative pattern, also governs the deployment of certain details, in particular, the terms *akhos*, *kholos*, and *nemesis*. Moreover, we shall be able to show how the appearance of these terms in this scene, far from being gratuitous, helps to express Paris' distance from the warrior ethos, and suggests the way he is conceived by this poem whose interest is centered on the warrior Achilles.

II

Comparison with the example of Achilles suggests immediately another problem with our scene besides its apparent lack of motivation. When Achilles' wrath—which is called a *kholos* at its advent and the

⁴Schadewaldt (note 3 above) and, even more, Kakridis (note 2 above) 46 seem to want to see the *kholos* both as an idle motif generated by a narrative pattern and, paradoxically, as playing a meaningful role in this scene by advancing some kind of ethical contrast between Paris and Hector. This paper will attempt to clarify the problem which leads to this confusion: that is, the relationship between narrative pattern and character type. Other critics, even when they have noted the heroic connotations of a withdrawal in *kholos*, have offered what seem to me to be unsatisfactory readings of this scene because they have not rigorously considered this issue. For instance, it cannot simply be assumed that Paris' answer is unproblematic because *akhos* is unheroic and suited to him, as the example of Achilles' *akhos* makes clear (B. L. Hijmans, "Alexandros and His Grief," *Grazer Beitr.* 3 [1975] 180; W. Bergold, *Der Zweikampf des Paris und Menelaos* [Bonn 1977] 176-83; and G. Jachmann, *Homeric Einzellieder* [Darmstadt 1968] 13).

⁵It should be clear that I view Achilles' withdrawal as representing the heroic ideal for behavior under the circumstances which inspire it, i.e., an assault on his honor and a violation of etiquette (e.g., 1.126, 214, 275-76). Perhaps the most succinct evidence for my view is Phoenix' introduction of the Meleager story as a precedent for Achilles (9.523-25); but see D. Claus, "Aidōs in the Language of Achilles," *TAPA* 105 (1975), and J. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago 1975) 103-106 for more detailed arguments. Indeed, Achilles' position in respect to the heroic ideal becomes more problematic and paradoxical with his refusal of the Embassy in 9; but this is a matter beyond the scope of this paper.

majority of times thereafter⁶—descends upon him, so does an *akhos* (1.188, 192). In fact, the *akhos* descends first, and seems to cause and even complement the *kholos*. Paris, by contrast, uses the terms as though they are opposed.

The case of Achilles, who suffers wrath and grief together, seems to be merely an enlargement of the regular patterning of the terms generally in the *Iliad*: that is, *akhos* is closely bound up with *kholos*, describing a related reaction to the same kinds of events.⁷ As in the case of Achilles' *akhos* and *kholos* over Agamemnon's treatment of him, *kholos* and *akhos* are regularly inspired by unjust blame, dishonor, or injury directed at oneself or at a *philos*.⁸ Thus, for example, Agamemnon's *akhos* at being blamed for the plague which afflicts the Achaeans leads him to conceive a *kholos* at his blamers, Calchas and then Achilles (1.78, 103, 387). *Akhos* and *kholos* are also aroused by the death or endangerment of a *philos*, or by one's own endangerment; in this context, the *kholos* is usually directed toward an enemy, and usually on the battlefield.⁹ Thus, for example, Achilles' *akhos* over Patroclus inspires his *kholos* at Hector, Patroclus' slayer; and Priam's *akhos* at the sight of his son's corpse threatens to inspire his *kholos* at Achilles (18.320, 322, 337; 24.584).

Kholos and *akhos*, of course, do not necessarily appear together, but each term appears exclusively in the contexts outlined above. Both

⁶*Kholos* seems to be a rough equivalent of *ménis*. Achilles' *ménis*: 1.1, 488; 2.772, etc. His *kholos*: 1.283; 4.513; 9.260, etc. *Kholos* and *ménis* are also paired at 16.61–62, 202–203; 15.122; cf. *h. Dem.* 410. On their denotative distinctions, see P. Considine, "Some Homeric Terms for Anger," *Acta Classica* 9 (1966) 15–25 Schol. *Od.* 2.315 (ed. Dindorf) and G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans* [Baltimore 1979] 72ff. In addition, *kholos* seems to be replaced at times by forms of *khóomai* and *kotos* (1.78–82; 1.9, 476; 2.689, 694; 9.534, 538; 16.660, 662, etc.). On synonymy as an artifice to aid composition see J. B. Hainsworth, *The Flexibility of the Homeric Formula* (Oxford 1968) 82–83, 124, 128.

⁷This relationship of *akhos* to *kholos* is noted by Nagy (note 6 above) 79–80, and by E. M. Voigt in the *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*, ed. B. Snell, *s.v. akhos*, 1776, 16–27 and 1777, 25–40. Indeed, Paris' wrath is singled out as mystifying (1778, 24–27).

⁸1.78, 80, 81, 103, 247 (*ménis*), 387, etc.; also see 18.111–12; 23.566–67; 15.208, 217; 19.125–27. Cf. 2.171, 195, where the *akhos* and *kholos* are split between two *philoī* over an insult to one.

⁹17.710; 18.322, 320, 337; 19.8, 16; 24.584. Cf. 16.581, 585; 23.566–67; 23.23, 37, 47; 13.658, 660; 1.241, 244; 14.39, 50 (which shows a conflation of the two contexts). The gods behave similarly in respect to *kholos* and *akhos*: see, e.g., 20.293–308. Other terms for grief can behave similarly: see, e.g., 16.548, 553; 15.138, 110; 8.460, 464, 478. See also *h. Dem.* 77, 83, 90–91.

terms denote complementary and regular reactions to the same stimulus, which we might summarize as an inimical action perpetrated against oneself or one's *philos*; most commonly, this is physical or verbal assault, on the battlefield or in council. Such an act is the source of grief in its object and/or inspires *kholos* against its perpetrator: where one appears, so would the other be appropriate. There are in fact no other passages in which the terms are explicitly opposed as Paris opposes them.

Paris' claim, that he has an *akhos* but not a *kholos*, appears therefore to be idiosyncratic. However, an examination of the term *nemesis*, which Paris relates to *kholos* in his answer, will shed light on Paris' meaning. First, *nemesis* has a function within the very pattern of usage we have just sketched, denoting a reaction which overlaps and is aligned with *kholos*. The close connection of *nemesis* with *aidōs*—both function as sanctions against unheroic behavior—helps to locate *akhos* and *kholos* within a group of terms which describe heroic etiquette. Second, definition of the broader connotation of *kholos*—its evocation of the heroic ideal—brings into view several passages which yield parallels to Paris' usage of the terms.

Nemesis and its forms denote both righteous indignation and the verbal expression of that indignation, or blame. It is provoked by conduct which does not respect the norms of the warrior dominated community. On the battlefield, it is *nemesis* which along with *aidōs* functions as the sanction against unwarriorlike behavior.¹⁰ The denotative meaning of *nemesis* of course does not duplicate that of *kholos*—it is not appropriate against an enemy who has killed a *philos*—but the semantic fields of the two terms do overlap. For *nemesis*, like *kholos*, denotes a reaction to blame which is felt to be unjust, and to other violations of propriety. Indeed, the terms complement each other elsewhere in Homeric phraseology, just as Paris uses them (8.407 = 421); and *nemesis* appears as a correlate to *kholos*, both inspired by grief (16.544, 553).

¹⁰ Much has been written on *nemesis* in Homer. See, e.g., J. C. Riedinger, "Les deux *aidōs* chez Homère," *RPh* 54 (1980) 69–74; J. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago 1975) 113–19; H. North, *Sophrosyne* (Ithaca 1966) 6–8; A. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960) 42–46; C. von Erffa, "Aidōs und verwandte Begriffe in ihrer Entwicklung von Homer bis Demokrit," *Phil. Supp.* 30 (1937) 35–36. Behavior which endangers one's companions and aids one's enemy is that which arouses *nemesis*, as at 16.544; 17.93, 100, 254; 13.293; etc. *Aidōs* is that sense which anticipates and avoids *nemesis*, as at 24.44, 53.

Paris' pairing of *nemesis* with *kholos* is, then, conventional; his opposition of it to *akhos* appears not to be. However, Helen at one point seems to use *akhos* and *nemesis* as Paris does:

κεῖσε δ' ἐγὼν οὐκ εἴμι, νεμεσητὸν δέ κεν εἴη,
κείνου πορσανέουσα λέχος· Τρωαὶ δέ μ' ὄπισσω
πᾶσαι μωμήσονται, ἔχω δ' ἄχε' ἄκριτα θυμῷ.

3.410-12

Helen is here angrily refusing Aphrodite's summons to her to go to Paris, who has just disgraced himself in his duel with Menelaus. Helen recognizes that her association with Paris will provoke the *nemesis* of the Trojan women. Although the prospect of being blamed by the community causes her *akhea*, Helen seems with *nemessēton* to assert the verity of this criticism of herself. Indeed, that this is Helen's attitude is suggested by the words with which she leads up to her refusal (399-409): she denigrates her marriage to Paris, Aphrodite its patroness, even herself (404). Her words inspire a *kholos* in Aphrodite (413), but it is safe to say that when Helen suffers *akhea* from the Trojan blame, *kholos* and *nemesis* on Helen's part will be distinctly inappropriate. Significantly, Helen is fond of saying that she lives her life to constant execration (6.351; 24.767-75; 3.242); that she regrets the acts which inspire this blame (3.173-76; 6.344-48; 24.764); that she as a consequence—of the blame or of the regret which it evokes in her—weeps and grieves (3.176; 24.773-75). The *Iliad*'s Helen espouses every conservative values, blaming herself as well as Paris, another ethical aberrant, for his disregard for *nemesis* (6.351), while she extols the warrior (3.428-29, 179-80). Helen's *akhea*, like her self-blame, seem to indicate her ethical posture, expressing her endorsement of the values which condemn her. Her capacity for nursing *akhea* devoid of *kholos* or *nemesis* appears to express her attitude just as does her sensitivity to *nemesis* itself. Such details identify her relation to the poem's values: condemned by them as a transgressor, she embraces them.¹¹

We might infer from the above that Paris' *akhos* is his way of trying to position himself on the side of those orthodox warrior values which drive Hector repeatedly to condemn him (6.325-31; 3.38-57; 13.768-73). In fact, Hector, who is Paris' most frequent critic, will claim to suffer *akhea* himself at the community's continual blame of

¹¹J. Griffin sees Helen's grief and self-condemnation as part of her general self-consciousness (*Homer on Life and Death* [Oxford 1980] 96-98).

Paris (6.524). His grief likewise seems to grow out of his acknowledgement of the basic justice of this criticism (523–25).¹²

Thetis' perpetual grief, like Helen's, seems to reflect her ethical status. Summoned to Olympus on account of Achilles' mistreatment of Hector's corpse, Thetis demurs, claiming to have *aidós* at the thought of mixing with the immortals:

“τίπτε με κεῖνος ἄνωγε μέγας θεός; αἰδέομαι δὲ
μίσγεσθ' ἀθανάτοισιν, ἔχω δ' ἄχε' ἄκριτα θυμῷ.
εἴμι μέν, οὐδὲ ἄλιον ἐπος ἔσσεται, ὅτι κεν εἴπη.”

24.90–92

Her grief, although certainly appropriate to the death of Patroclus and the imminent mortality of her son, seems specifically in this passage to be connected with her ambiguous status in the divine community, whose *nemesis* at her appearance she anticipates,¹³ and which causes her grief. Elsewhere, Thetis raises the issue of her ambiguous status among the gods (*atimotatē*, 1.514–16); and inasmuch as this status is embodied in her marriage to a mortal, identifies it as the source of her grief (18.429–41).

In a fashion parallel on the divine level to Helen's elicitation of blame for her transgression against the ethical standards of the warrior community, Thetis' appearance on Olympus betokens a violation of the divine community's etiquette, insofar as it is evidently seen as a threat to the other gods' domains of influence and *timē* (1.518–23; 24.111). Thetis' attitude of wrathless grief, like Helen's over her status in the Trojan community, helps to express her marginal and subordinate status in the divine community, as well as her obeisance to its ethical standards. Those who would blame her, besides their higher social status, possess also the weight of moral authority to sanction their positions.

We might compare the Achaean reaction to Odysseus' abuse of Thersites. By way of introduction to Thersites' speech, the Achaeans have already been described as feeling *nemesis* and anger toward Aga-

¹²The evidence suggests that, as is true of his denial of *kholos*, when Paris denies having *nemesis* he is defining the attitude of those who blame him as correct. See, for example, Diomedes' attitude toward Agamemnon's rebuke of him (4.401–18): even though it might contain inaccuracies, it is made in the course of a parainesis and in the interest of leadership, and thus should arouse no *nemesis*. S. Schein, however, sees Paris' acceptance of Hector's rebuke as mocking and ironic (*The Mortal Hero: An Introduction to Homer's Iliad* [Berkeley 1984] 21 f.).

¹³*aideomai*: see note 10 above.

memnon,¹⁴ of which Thersites' speech is presumably an expression. Yet Odysseus' reprimand of Thersites provokes in his companions not *kholos* nor *nemesis*, but only an *akhos* accompanied by, of all things, laughter.¹⁵ That Odysseus' reprimand has dissipated any *kholos* or *nemesis* is further suggested by the fact that, as they grieve, they explicitly endorse Odysseus' authority and the intention of his criticism:

οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡδὺ γέλασσαν·
 ὥδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ίδών ἐξ πλησίον ἄλλον·
 “ὦ πόποι, ἡ δὴ μυρί’ Ὁδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔσοργεν
 βουλάς τ’ ἔξαρχων ἀγαθὰς πόλεμόν τε κορύσσων·
 νῦν δὲ τόδε μέγ’ ἄριστον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρεξεν,
 ὃς τὸν λωβητῆρα ἐπεσβόλον ἔσχ’ ἀγοράων.
 οὐ θήν μιν πάλιν αὔτις ἀνήσει θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ
 νεικείειν βασιλῆας ὄνειδείοις ἐπέεσσιν.”

2.270-77

Odysseus has done many good things as a leader in council and war (272-73), but the stifling of the loudmouth Thersites was the best (*ariston*, 274-75), because it reinforced the authority of kings (the implication of 276-77). The ethical significance of their *akhos* and their failure to conceive any anger at this attack on their comrade becomes clearer in light of the fact that Odysseus' blame of Thersites only recapitulates his blame of the fleeing *laoi* themselves (200-206).¹⁶ Thus their grief expresses their assent to the authority of the aristocratic heroic ethic.

What Thetis, the Achaean *laos*, Helen and Paris have in common is their ambiguous and subordinate status within their respective communities.¹⁷ In the latter three cases, this is a community dominated by the aristocratic warrior, and their status reflects or is caused by their transgression against an ethical system, or deviance from an ethical norm, constructed around this warrior. In the passages we have examined, characters inspire blame which claims the ethical authority of the

¹⁴On *tōi* at 2.222 as Agamemnon, see, e.g.; Leaf (London 1886) ad loc.

¹⁵I agree with Leaf that the *laoi* are grieved (270) over the treatment of Thersites in particular, although, I would argue, this is not unconnected to their grief over the blame they have just received from Odysseus speaking on Agamemnon's behalf.

¹⁶Odysseus calls the *laoi* unwarlike (201), superfluous to heroic endeavors (202), and thus justly subordinate to their betters (200-201), to whom have been entrusted traditional rules of conduct (205-206).

¹⁷I am of course not levelling all of these to one character type; rather, I am arguing that their respective ethical qualities include this shared feature, and that their portraits reflect the fact.

heroic code, and is even motivated by the sentiments of *aidōs*, or *nemesis*. The denial of *kholos* or *nemesis* to these objects of blame seems to help to characterize them as ethically deviant, yet also as remorseful, supportive of the ethic which condemns them.

The scene in which Hector imputes to Paris a withdrawal in wrath thus embodies an ethical comparison between Paris and an Achilles or Meleager. Paris' denial of *kholos* opposes him to these figures and assimilates him to the pattern of Helen, the Achaean *laos*, and Thetis. The subtle contrast in this particular scene between the warrior whose *kholos* justifies and ennobles his withdrawal, and the lesser warrior who must apologetically abjure *kholos* in withdrawal is, we have suggested, generated by the *Iliad*'s ethical hierarchy which has at its top the preeminent warrior with whom it identifies its positive ethical characteristics, such as *kholos*. Thus Achilles' withdrawal because of *akhos* and *kholos* (1.188–92) seems to express that he is a man with a particular capacity for *aidōs* and *nemesis* (e.g., 1.149; 11.649–54). Such a capacity defines him as a man of preeminent heroism: Phoenix' narration of the Meleager story, in which wrath is the centerpiece of heroic action, not only instructs Achilles in heroic etiquette, but is founded on a comparison with these greatest of heroes based on wrath:

πρὶν δ' οὐ τι νεμεσοστὴν κεχολῶσθαι.
οὕτω καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν ἐπευθόμεθα κλέα ἀνδρῶν
ἥρωών, ὅτε κέν τιν' ἐπιζάφελος χόλος ἵκοι·

9.523–25¹⁸

Likewise, Paris' motivation for withdrawing from battle—*akhos* without *kholos*—seems consistent with his characteristic disinclination to *nemesis* (6.351). Just as Achilles' repeated identification with this structure of ethical terms (cf. 23.23, 47) expresses his heroism, so also Paris'

¹⁸ Likewise Patroclus, supplicating Achilles to give up his wrath, implies its heroism—however ambivalent its effects—with the adjective *ainaretēs* (16.31). Relevant also is 2.241–42, where Thersites claims that the fact that Agamemnon is still around is proof that Achilles has no *kholos*, but is *methēmōn*, “remissive.” The related *methēmosune* and *methiēmi* are applied to the faint-hearted warrior, such as Paris (6.523), Menelaus (10.121), and others (4.516; 13.929; 20.361, etc.); it is explained as a lack of *aidōs* and *nemesis* (13.108, 121–22). Thersites is clearly wrong about Achilles (e.g., 1.224), but his words corroborate the heroic connotations of Achilles' *kholos*.

D. Claus (note 5 above) 24 argues in detail that Achilles' preeminent heroism—not a rejection of heroism—is expressed through the values he espouses in the Quarrel. Needless to say, to call a characteristic or value heroic is not to assert that it is one-dimensionally positive. The *Iliad* certainly recognizes the ambivalence of some of its cherished values, as, for example, 16.31 suggests (cf. 24.45).

distance from the heroic ethos is conveyed by his different relation to these terms. Yet, as the parallels have suggested, this is an apologetic distance, which does not challenge but rather flatters the *Iliad*'s heroism. Moreover, the apologetic aspect to Paris' ethical posture unifies a character some critics have seen as irreconcilably dichotomous: on the one hand, Paris departs from the warrior type, yet his behavior on the battlefield is generally adequate.¹⁹

III

In other terms, Paris' withdrawal from battle shows that he values eros over *nike* (3.439–46); it is as a figure of eros that Paris apologizes (3.59; 6.333) to the demands and reproaches of a *polemos*-oriented value system and is assigned an ethical attitude of inattention to *nemesis* and *aidos*. This opposition between eros and *polemos*, as well as their respective ethical identities, are larger than the characterization of Paris and run throughout the *Iliad*. This section will briefly sketch out the relation of heroic ethics to this thematic opposition which organizes Paris' characterization and, specifically, the exchange between him and Hector. We thereby hope to show that because the association between ethical vocabulary and ethical type is prominent and familiar in the *Iliad*—which is, after all, about Achilles' withdrawal in *kholos*—such an ethical contrast as we are imputing to this scene could be communicated from what may appear to us to be minute detail.

The *Iliad*'s martial imagery borrows from erotic and other non-martial pursuits (e.g., *melpesthai Arēi*, 7.241),²⁰ and the erotic relationship is likewise expressed as a battle fought between weaklings (e.g., 5.348–51). Yet the poem conceives of eros and *polemos* as defining separate and opposing spheres, as is most explicit in the *Iliad*'s evaluation of Aphrodite.²¹ Zeus explicitly defines Aphrodite's expertise as the *erga gamoio* and opposes these to the *polemēia erga* which are, he says, the

¹⁹13.765–87, 660–72; 8.81–82; 11.505–507, 581–83; 12.93; 15.341; cf. also 6.521–23. That these scenes are vestiges of an earlier, heroic Paris was, of course, an analyst view; see, e.g., E. Bethe, *Homer: Dichtung und Sage* (Leipzig 1914) 1.248. Of course, Paris generally fights as a Bowman: while spearmanship seems to imply strength and courage (1.290; 3.49; 5.197; 7.280–81, 287–89, etc.), faint-hearted warriors are reproached as *iomōroi* (4.242; 14.479).

²⁰See E. Vermeule, *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* (Berkeley 1979) 101–103; and L. Rissman, *Love as War: Homeric Allusion in The Poetry of Sappho* (Meisenheim 1983) 66–188.

²¹See D. Boedeker, *Aphrodite's Entry into Greek Epic* (Leiden 1974) 43–63.

province of Ares and Athena (5.427–29). Diomedes, facing Aphrodite on the battlefield, implies that Aphrodite, being an *analkis theos*, has dim prospects against him, while she will do well if she is happy to overcome *analkides* women by seduction (5.348–51). This is the way Helen also describes Aphrodite's technique and orientation, when she reproaches her for intervening on Paris' behalf in the duel: Aphrodite, *dolophroneousa*, is out to seduce (*éperopeuein*) Helen, sabotaging Menelaus' right to her by *nikē* (3.399, 404–405).

Paris and Helen are said to be Aphrodite's *phili* (3.402; 415). Paris, moreover, is endowed with her gifts, which seem to summarize his ethos.²² His *areta*, as we see from the *neikea* made against him, are all to be identified with her.²³ With no *biē* (11.390; 3.45), he must occupy himself with overcoming women by seduction (*éperopeuta*, 3.39; 13.769). He is, like a woman, *eidos aristos*, *promos* for beauty rather than strength (3.43–45; 3.39; cf. 3.124, etc.). As a lyrist and a dancer (24.261; 3.54; 11.385), he is preferred by Aphrodite to the warrior (3.392–94). His erotic orientation is conceived as a contradiction of his manhood and sanity: he is afflicted with the weak wits of a child or woman (11.389); susceptible to delusion or madness which, in the form of *atē*, made him praise Aphrodite and pursue Helen (6.356; 24.28–30); his valorization of sex over warfare is a kind of madness (3.39). Paradoxically, his unwarlike erotic ethic is the cause of the war (3.46 ff.; 22.114–16) and as such has earned for Paris his value, in the *Iliad*'s warrior ethical system, of *lōbē*, outrage (3.42).²⁴

Throughout the *Iliad* the nexus of themes with which Paris is identified is associated with the erotic or otherwise opposed to the martial. They are, as in Paris, periodically invested by this poem focused on

²²See 3.64–66. The gifts of the gods seem to define the salient features of the receiver. Zeus gave Agamemnon his scepter (9.37–39) but not the *alkē* of a warrior; Pandaros was given his bow by Apollo (2.827); Achilles' ash spear, which only he can wield, was a divine gift to Peleus, along with the immortal wife and horses: all seem to summarize the dilemma of Achilles (24.534–42; 16.140–54; 19.387–417; 17.194–97, 443–47; 18.429–43. Cf. 23.281 and 11.830–32; 13.727, 7.288–89). See 10.243–47; 2.196–97; 14.490–91; 5.59–61; and 23.306–308, where the *philotes* of a god seems to endow one with some feature of that god.

²³*Neikea* draw, of course, hostile and one-sided portraits. Yet they are not haphazard, but are distortions organized by and reflecting Homeric ethical typology. I argue this point in detail in my forthcoming booklength study on characterization in Homer, with special reference to Achilles' attack on Agamemnon the king.

²⁴7.93–97 illustrates the relationship of *anaideiē* to *lōbē*; see also, e.g., 1.149, 232. However, Menelaus likens the *lōbē* of the rape of Helen to the Trojans' excessive love for war (13.622–39).

war with an according ethical value of *anaideiē* or indifference to *nemesis*. Priam, grieving for the death of Hector and his other warrior sons (*tous men apôles' Arês*), reproaches those remaining as “things of shame” (*elenkhea*), liars and dancers, *aristoi* at dance-rhythms (*pseustai te orkhéstai te, khoroitupiéisin aristoi*, 24.260–61). Elsewhere hesitant warriors are instilled with *aidós* by the taunt that they face “not a dance, but a battle” (15.502, 508; cf. 16.617). The dance appears in a positive light on Achilles’ shield, but there it is emblematic of a world at peace and far removed from that of the *Iliad* (18.590–606). On the shield, the dance has sexual associations: it appears in the context of a marriage (18.491–96) and as part of a harvest celebration by young men and women (567).²⁵ Through their epithets *himeroeis* and *poikilos*, dance and the lyre are categorized with the feminine and the erotic.²⁶

Like dance, physical beauty can connote effeminacy and cowardice. Although beauty is an attribute of preeminent warriors (e.g., 21.108), they strive only to be *aristoi* in battle and council; when they fall short at these, their beauty may be tauntingly praised as they are reproached for their lack of *aidós* (5.787; 8.228; 17.142).

It is the failure to attain manhood, as measured by expertise in the *poleméia erga*, which creates the personality which is most conducive to the ascendance of eros: as it does in the character of Paris, the *Iliad* tends to link together eros, femininity, delusion, and *anaideiē*. Accordingly, while martial encounters proceed by *biē*, erotic encounters do so by trickery: throughout the poem, eros overcomes the deluded.²⁷ Those either unskilled or showing momentary uncertainty in warfare are *nēpioi*—children or women, metaphorically or literally.²⁸ And besides promoting eros, as it does in Paris’ case, delusion, *atē*, might cause a warrior to lose his strategic sense (e.g., 8.237); and it plays its most prominent role in Agamemnon’s attack on Achilles (1.412, 2; 111, etc.) and other lapses from *aidós* (8.228, 237; 24.480).

We have argued that Paris’ exchange with Hector in Book 6 might be best understood in light of the larger patterns of usage governing the

²⁵ See O. Taplin’s rich discussion of the Shield, “The Shield of Achilles Within the *Iliad*,” *C&R* 28 (1981) 1–21.

²⁶ 5.429; 3.397; 14.198, 216, 328, 163; 3.139, 446. Cf. Od. 8.246–55, and *Il.* 13.620–39, where dance is also linked with sex and opposed to war.

²⁷ 14.217. Cf. 14.329; 3.405; 15.31–33; 19.97; 24.28–30.

²⁸ 2.337–38; 9.440; 11.784; 7.235–41; 2.872–75. E. Vermeule (note 20 above) 157 points out that the loser in a battle is sometimes imagined as female (e.g., 22.124–28). Of course, the battlefield parainesis often combines a call to *aidós* with an exhortation to “be men” (e.g., 6.112; 8.174; 15.561–62, 661, etc.)

deployment of those ethical terms which are the subject of the brothers' exchange. As is exemplified by Paris' characterization in the *Iliad*, which is built out of themes which the *Iliad* assigns a value in heroic ethical terms, the deployment of ethical terms expresses the *Iliad*'s ethical hierarchy by which the warrior is elevated above the lover.²⁹ At 6.325 ff., the ethical vocabulary helps to distinguish Paris from the heroic type represented by an Achilles, and also identifies him with unheroic ethical figures who are marginal to or deviate from the heroic ethical code. Moreover, Paris' denial of a *kholos* not only expresses his nonheroism but also his submission to the ethical authority of the warrior. Thus he cooperatively arms for battle (6.503-19); he even conceives a *kholos* at the death of a *xeinos* (13.660-72). Sporadic attempts at living up to the warrior ideal are certainly in keeping with Paris' ethical value in this poem which celebrates the warrior.³⁰

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²⁹The erotic ethos is not the only nonwarrior ethos the *Iliad* comprehends, of course. For instance, it seems to me that Achilles maligns Agamemnon in relation to his deviation from not only the heroic code (*lóbē*, 1.232; *anaideiē*, 1.149; 9.372), but from the warrior ethos in general. Agamemnon, says Achilles, relies on the authority of the kingship to arrogate *timē* to himself that has been earned by warrior prowess (1.225-30); thus the abusive epithets he hurl's at Agamemnon emphasize greed and cowardice, and make specific reference to his kingship (e.g., *démoboros basileus*, 1.231; cf. 1.122, 149, 225). Indeed, in many respects the crime of Agamemnon is made parallel to that of Paris, not the least of which is that both are identified as the cause of suffering for which the warrior's *bîē* is required as remedy (6.327-31; 1.240-44). Of course, that the ethical distance between king and warrior is shorter than that between lover and warrior is reflected in the fact that what Achilles wants most is that very *timē* from Zeus which empowers Agamemnon (1.407-12, 506-10, 277-79); while nobody seems to covet the gifts of Aphrodite. Moreover, the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles (which features a *kholos* on both sides) is obviously more central and elaborate than the comparison between the lover and the warrior: see W. Donlan, "The Structure of Authority in the *Iliad*," *Arethusa* 11 (1979), 51-70. See also J. T. Marry, "Eros and the Heroic Ideal," *Arethusa* 12 (1979) 71-92, for a discussion of a contrast between the warrior and eros ethics in Sappho.

³⁰See also in this connection the discussion of 11.369-79 by L. Muellner (*The Meaning of Homeric Eukhomai through its Formulas* [Innsbruck 1976] 90-91), who argues that Paris there misuses an introductory speech formula in a way which reflects his ineptitude as a hero.

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THE ARISTOPHANIC CLEON'S 'DISTURBANCE' OF ATHENS

The question of Aristophanes' politics comes and goes. Whatever the answer to this question, the fact remains that the comedies are intensely political. Many politicians and generals are lampooned, and some appear as comic characters. Of these, the most prominent in the plays, and, for the last decade of his life, in Athenian politics, is Cleon. In his case, Aristophanic opposition and its source seem clear. Cleon, as Aristophanes saw him, was an upstart, a vulgarian, a demagogue, and a crook, and he was also a personal enemy.¹ It seems completely unnecessary to ask why Aristophanes disliked and opposed Cleon.

If, however, "why" includes the presuppositions, the pre-judgements, or, more broadly, the cast of thought on which that dislike and that opposition rest, then the Cleon-portrait does not seem so transparent. I propose to start with a single puzzling element in Aristophanes' diagnosis of Cleon's demagoguery in *Knights* and to pursue it in directions to be indicated shortly.

This element appears for the first time in the passage in which the allegory of the household is established (40–73). We find that a slave, Paphlagon/Cleon (hereafter Cleon) has gained complete control of his master, Demos, through flattery and indulgence. Cleon is thus free to engage in activities described as follows (65–66):

περιθέων τοὺς οἰκέτας
αἴτει ταράττει δωροδοκεῖ

Running from one servant to the next,
he importunes them, he disturbs them, he takes bribes.

Of the three verbs, the first and the third indicate particular, definable activities. The second or central—and it will prove to be central in a broader sense—is vaguer, and, at the same time, as an item of diction, more pervasive in the play. The verb *ταράττειν* 'disturb' and its synonyms, especially *κυκᾶν*, are often used of Cleon in *Knights*. Some statistics will suggest the importance of 'disturbance' in this play: the sim-

¹See D. Welsh, *The Development of the Relation Between Aristophanes and Cleon to 424 B.C.* (Diss. King's College, University of London 1978); Alan H. Sommerstein, *Acharnians* (The Comedies of Aristophanes, vol. 1: Warminster 1980) 2–3.

plex, *tarattein*, occurs nine times in *Knights*² as against a total of seven times in the other extant plays.³ Aristophanes also uses images of disturbance. In *Knights*, Cleon is a 'pestle' and 'stirring spoon' (984 δοῖδυξ, τορύνη) and a 'mud-stirrer' (307 βορβοροτάραξι). In the similarity of the Sausage-seller's trade to the activities of Cleon the Knights find grounds for encouraging the Sausage-seller. When he expresses diffidence, the Knights tell him: "Keep doing what you're doing" (213), which means (214–15):

τάραττε καὶ χόρδευ' ὁμοῦ τὰ πράγματα
Disturb and make mincemeat of (the city's) affairs.⁴

'Disturbance' is exactly the thing that qualifies him to be the successor of Cleon.

To return to line 66 ("he importunes them, he disturbs them, he takes bribes") the question that immediately arises is what 'disturbance' has to do with the bribe-taking and peculation of which Aristophanes accuses Cleon both here and in many other places. What is this 'disturbance' that epitomizes the political style of Cleon?

The rest of this paper pursues the answer to this question in two directions. First, in the direction of tradition, where the notion of 'disturbance' will be found to be already well established in archaic poetry. Second, in the direction of fifth-century ideology contemporary with *Knights*. Here 'disturbance' will be found to belong to one side of an ideological opposition the other side of which is formed by such principles as ἡσυχία and minding one's own business.

Each of these two directions requires some preliminary discussion. An example of 'tradition' is the relationship of Thucydides' account of stasis (3.82–83) to Hesiod's description of the Iron Race (*OD* 174–201). The historian's analysis discovers exactly the same pattern of behavior that Hesiod had found in the Iron Race: ethical norms are not only sub-

²66, 214, 251, 358, 431, 692, 840, 867, 902.

³In these other plays, the compound with συν- occurs twice (*Nub.* 1037, *Pax* 319) and with ύπο- once (*Vesp.* 1285). *Knights* contains two compound nouns that contain the base *tarakh-* (247, 306). Furthermore, in *Peace*, Cleon is called a κύκηθρον καὶ τάρακτρον (654; both words mean something like 'stirring ladle' and are here used metaphorically) and is remembered as a 'pestle' (ἀλετρίβανος *Pax* 269) that 'stirred up' (έκυκα 270) Greece.

⁴I doubt, *pace* R. A. Neil, *The Knights of Aristophanes* (Cambridge 1901) ad loc. that *tarattō* was a "cook's word," though its synonym, *kukaō*, was. The point is that the Sausage-seller qua sausage-seller can overcome Cleon, who is thus shown to be a sausage-seller qua politician.

verted, they are inverted, as wrong becomes right.⁵ This example is useful for defining my claim concerning the relationship between *Knights* and archaic poetry. First, the relationship between Hesiod and Thucydides is conceived diachronically but not historically. Although from the historical point of view there are many differences between the two texts, e.g., in diction and style, and some innovations in Thucydides, e.g., in the attaching of the analysis to a particular historical event, the passages possess basic similarities of structure. Second, the relationship between Hesiod and Thucydides is not conceived as a matter for the history of ideas or the history of literature. Thucydides is not reflecting on and modifying an idea that he found in Hesiod (though I see no reason to doubt that he knew the *Works and Days*), nor is his treatment of the idea (i.e. of ethical inversion) continuous with Hesiod's in any aspect that would be the proper concern of literary history. The relationship between the two should thus be called traditional. The notion of 'disturbance' in *Knights* will be found to bear this sort of relationship to archaic poetry.

'Ideology' as used in the programmatic paragraph above also requires some discussion. Forty years ago, a classical scholar could use this term casually, without definition, on the apparent assumption that everyone would know what he meant.⁶ Even within the field of classics, however, the term has acquired a wide variety of senses. These can be divided into the pejorative and the non-pejorative. The pejorative rest on or ultimately derive from one form of Marxism or another.⁷ In general, according to the Marxist view, the beliefs of the dominant class constitute an ideology that reflects, without their knowing it, their material interests and is thus a "false consciousness." Texts will embody, usually unconsciously on the part of the author, the ideology of the dominant class, by which it seeks to maintain its advantage in the class struggle. 'Ideology' in the non-pejorative or neutral sense usually refers to a cohesive complex of ideas, beliefs, and values. This is the sense in which 'ideology' is used in this paper, and the term looks, furthermore, primarily to groups of persons, not to any individual (in which case it would be better to speak of an idea, a philosophy, a position, or the like).

⁵Lowell Edmunds, "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)," *HSCP* 79 (1975) 73-92.

⁶Gregory Vlastos, "Solonian Justice," *CP* 41 (1946) 66; cf. "set of ideas" on the preceding page.

⁷See Ch. 6.3 ("Marxism and the Dominant Ideology") in Christopher Butler, *Interpretation, Deconstruction and Ideology* (Oxford 1984).

and to the political goals of these persons (since ideology, unlike philosophy, is typically oriented to action).⁸ In this sense of the word, there can be more than one ideology at a given time, and thus a text may contain more than one, as *Knights* will be seen to do. For this reason, *Knights* is not here treated as in itself an ideological text. In my opinion, it is impossible to show that Aristophanes is governed by any ideology, either by the ones to be discussed or by any other, including "the ideology of the city."⁹ Indeed, Aristophanes seems to enjoy caricaturing ideologies, and it is in this form that they appear in his comedies.¹⁰ At the same time, as caricatures, these ideologies belong to social reality, and *Knights* can thus be read, at least to some extent, as a source for the history of Athenian social and political attitudes.

'Disturbance' in Tradition

To work toward a sense of the meaning of 'disturbance' in tradition, I begin with a brief review of the semantics of *tarattein*. Its etymology has not been established, and we depend entirely upon usage. From the time of epic, a clear semantic differentiation manifests itself. Four main uses, which will persist down into Hellenistic times, are already apparent, and it is impossible to say that any of the four is derived from or is metaphoric of another. The uses are: 1. of horses; 2. of the person (either the mind or the body); 3. of bodies of water; 4. of groups of persons. The following thumbnail sketches of the four include the earliest references, in each case epic, a few illustrative examples, and the occurrences in *Knights*.

⁸Maurice Cranston, *s.v.* "Ideology," in *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Macropaedia, vol. 9 (1975) 194-98. An example of "ideology" applied in classics in something like this sense is Nicole Loraux, "'Marathon' ou l'histoire idéologique," *REA* 75 (1973) 13-42. She describes an ideological division within Athenian recollection of the Persian Wars—oligarchic emphasis on Marathon, the hoplite battle, and democratic emphasis on Salamis, the naval battle.

⁹On which see Diego Lanza and Mario Vegetti, *L'ideologia della città* (Naples 1977) 12-27. The interpretation of texts on the basis of ideology in a Marxist sense is, of course, obliged to proceed from Marxist premisses. Therefore an author's ideology, whether or not unconscious, is determined by historical, material conditions. In a book like Diego Lanza's *Il tiranno e suo pubblico* (Turin 1977), otherwise enlightening, the premisses return like a litany: for example, "sistema ideologico come problema di produzione sociale, risultato storicamente necessario di una specifica condizione materiale" (p. 186).

¹⁰To this extent I agree with Lanza, *Il tiranno* (n. 9 above) x, that ideology is mediated in texts and cannot be taken as a direct reflection of social reality.

1. 'Disturbance' of horses. One of Nestor's horses, struck by an arrow, 'disturbed' (έταραξε) the rest of the team and the chariot (*Il.* 8.86). The verb is, in fact, *vox propria* for the startling of horses and is so used by that master equestrian, Xenophon (*Eq.* 9.4). Taraxippus 'Disturber of Horses' was a demon that inhabited racecourses (Paus. 6.20.15-19; *Anth. Pal.* 14.4). In allusion to this demon, Cleon in *Knights* is called Taraxippostratus 'Disturber of the Horse Troops' (247). The scholiast on line 246 cites Theopomitus (*FGrH* 115F93) for the Knights' (unspecified) provocation of Cleon and his attempt at retaliation.¹¹ The conflict between the Knights and Cleon was probably the immediate cause of Aristophanes' writing the play, as a remark in *Acharnians* (301-302) suggests.¹²

2. *Tarattein* refers to personal disturbance, mental or physical.¹³ In *Batrachomyomachia*, the effect on the Frogs of Cheesecarver's declaration is: έταραξε φρένας (*Batr.* 145). The φρένες (Aesch. *Ch.* 1056; Pind. *Ol.* 7.30; Eur. *Herc.* 1091), the γνώμη (Theog. 1222 W), the ψύχη (Dem. B297-98a; Gorg. B11) are places that may be affected (cf. Archil. frag. 128.1 W). *Tarattein* describes Croesus' grief at the death of his son (Hdt. 1.44.1).

The state of non-disturbance, ἀταραξία, would become the Epicurean ideal. In its negative form, then, the concept of 'disturbance' found its way into the history of philosophy—at least of moral philosophy. It did not, however, enter into the history of political philosophy, even if it was the main concept in Aristophanes' diagnosis of the problems of Athenian democracy under Cleon and even if it was squarely situated in fifth-century ideology as one side of a fundamental antithesis, that between 'disturbance' on the one hand and calmness and minding one's own business on the other. One could say that after the time of Aristophanes this antithesis lost its analytic or descriptive force. While

¹¹For an excellent emendation in the Theopomitus fragment see C. W. Fornara, "Cleon's Attack Against the Cavalry," *CQ* NS 23 (1973) 24.

¹²The Aristophanic allusions to the conflict are to the Knights as a group. In reality, whereas Cleon could attack them as a group (e.g., by imposing an *eisphora* or by diminishing the *katasasis*), they would have responded not as a group but through the actions of individual Knights. See Glenn R. Bugh, *The Athenian Cavalry from the Sixth to the Fourth Century B.C.* (Diss. University of Maryland 1979) 184-85, who traces the stages in the relations between Cleon and the Knights.

¹³On ταραχή in the Hippocratic corpus, see Vlastos (n. 6 above) 68 and n. 36; Diskin Clay, "Epicurus' *Kupía Dóξa XVII*," *GRBS* 13 (1972) 65 and n. 19. Cf. Hdt. 7.46.3; Solon frag. 13.61 W. Cf. θράσσω 'trouble, disquiet,' formed on the intransitive perfect of ταράττω, τέτρηχα.

the issue of the internal harmony of the polis did not go away, but remained a dominant concern of Greek political thought, this harmony and its opposite were conceived in other terms.¹⁴

To continue with this second usage, the verb can also refer to personal harassment. In *Knights*, the Sausage-seller, in emulation of Cleon, boasts that he will 'disturb' Nicias (358). One of the two slaves in the prologue of the play, who are persecuted by Paphlagon/Cleon, may have been the impersonation of Nicias.¹⁵ This slave does not reappear after his exit at line 154. Whatever his identity, we know that what Cleon is said to do in the prologue of the play, Cleon did in real life—he was the enemy of Nicias (Thuc. 4.27.5)—and it is appropriate that, as the worthy successor of Cleon, the Sausage-seller should continue the harassment of Nicias. Furthermore, he turns this Cleontic form of intimidation on Cleon himself (902). In the protracted dispute between Aristophanes and Cleon, the latter 'stirred up' (verb ὑποταράττω) the poet (*Vesp.* 1285).

3. *Tarattein* refers to the stirring up of bodies of water.¹⁶ A camel will not drink from a river until he has riled it up (verb συνταράττειν Arist. *HA* 595^b30–596^a1). The storm in Book 5 of the *Odyssey* arose when Poseidon 'disturbed the sea' (285; same phrase at 304) with his trident. The sea remains a locus of this 'disturbance' (Aesch. *Pr.* 1089; Pind. *Ol.* 2.63; Eur. *Tr.* 88, 692; Dem. B14.7; Arist. *Prob.* 944^b22–23).

¹⁴Roughly speaking, the antithesis between 'disturbance' and calmness or tranquillity (ἡσυχία) was replaced by the antithesis between stasis and ὁμόνοια (e.g., Isoc. 18.44 [402/401 B.C.]). It is significant that in the earliest epigraphic attestation of a word formed on the ὁμόνοιο- base, this word is modified by the adverb ἡσυχά (IG I²120). On *homonoia*, which seems to have come into use after 411 B.C. and which became a standard term in Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, and Plato, see J. de Romilly, "Le mot ὁμόνοιο: Vocabulaire et propagande," in *Études et Commentaires* 79 (Mélanges de linguistique et de philologie grecques offerts à Pierre Chantraine, Lille 1972) 199–209 and A. Moulakis, *Homonoia: Eintracht und die Entwicklung eines politischen Bewusstseins* (Munich 1973) 107–13, who provides a list of occurrences in inscriptions and literature. Both de Romilly and Moulakis take the two occurrences of a word on the ὁμόνοιο- base in Thuc. (8.75.2, 93.3), which refer to events of 411 B.C., as a rough *terminus post quem*.

¹⁵Contra: K. J. Dover, "Aristophanes, *Knights* 11–20," *CR* 73=NS 9 (1959) 196–99. Pro: A. H. Sommerstein, "Notes on Aristophanes' *Knights*," *CQ* NS 30 (1980) 46–56.

¹⁶Frederich Bechtel, *Lexilogus zu Homer* (Halle 1914) 308 called attention to a group of apparent cognates in Baltic languages that have to do with bad weather. Further references in H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1960) s.v. θράσσω.

The calmness of the sea, on the other hand, would become the "dominant metaphor in Epicurus' moral thought"¹⁷ for the state of non-disturbance, *ataraxia*.

This use of *tarattein* is very productive of metaphors in *Knights*. Cleon is a wind that 'disturbs' land and sea (431), and the Sausage-seller is a boat tossed by this storm (430-41). In particular, Cleon blows συκοφαντίας 'dishonest prosecutions' (437). The passage can be read as a comic adaptation of the traditional ship-of-state metaphor.¹⁸ Stormy Cleon is a recurring image. He is 'the typhoon'¹⁹ and the whirlwind' (511). When he appears on stage, he seems to the Sausage-seller to be driving a surge before him and 'disturbing and stirring up' things (692 ταράττων καὶ κυκῶν). At the beginning of the contest before Demos, the Sausage-seller again becomes a boat buffeted by Cleon (756-57; cf. 761-62, where the metaphor changes slightly to a sea-battle). Later in the play, Cleon is beating the sea with his oar (830), but, as the Sausage-seller begins definitely to get the upperhand, the Knights felicitate him on his prospects. As the successor to Cleon, he will rule the allies with the trident (like Poseidon)²⁰ and will extort a great deal of money σείων, which at first seems to mean 'brandishing', i.e. the trident, but

¹⁷Clay (n. 13 above) 65.

¹⁸Bruno Gentili, *Poesia e pubblico nella grecia antica da Omero al V secolo* (Rome 1984) 322-23 provides a chart of the conventional elements of diction in nine examples of the ship-of-state metaphor. These elements are divided into fifteen categories, which appear in horizontal columns. The diction of *Knights* 430-41 and 756-57 corresponds to these categories as follows: 431 ~ col. 2; 434 ~ col. 5; 436 ~ col. 6; 757 ~ col. 9; 433 ~ col. 13. Cf. also μέγας (430) with Alcaeus 326.8 L-P. Cf. A.M. Kornicka, *Métaphores, Personnifications et Comparaisons dans l'œuvre d'Aristophane* (Komitet Nauk Kulturze Antycznej Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Archiwum Filologiczne 10, Wroclaw-Warszawa-Kraków 1964) 53-54, who speaks of "la bataille navale, la navigation, les tempêtes sur mer" in this passage but does not speak of the ship-of-state metaphor. J. Taillardat, *Les images d'Aristophane; Études de langue et de style*² (Paris 1962) 180-84 discusses the passage in *Eq.* (i.e. 430-41) but sees only metaphors for anger. At the same time, he shrewdly calls attention (p. 183, n. 4) to the resemblance of *Eq.* 691-92 to a line (680) in Theognis' ship-of-state metaphor, which is discussed in this paper below.

¹⁹Or perhaps Typhon. So Neil (n. 4 above) ad loc. For Cleon as Typhon/Typhoeus, cf. M. Platnauer, *Aristophanes: Peace* (Oxford 1964) on 756 and D. M. Macdowell *Aristophanes: Wasps* (Oxford 1971) on *Vesp.* 1033.

²⁰The picture of Poseidon at *Od.* 5.291-97 contributes not only to *Eq.* 839-40 but also to 431 and 692 (with which cf. also Alcaeus 326.2 L-P, quoted below in the text of this article).

with the addition of *ταράττων* 'disturbing' acquires its metaphorical sense, which refers to the activity of sycophancy.²¹

Of the other examples only one will be discussed here. It is a rather fully developed simile in which Cleon's activities in politics are compared to the methods of eel-fishers (864-67):

ὅπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰς ἐγχέλεις Θηρώμενοι πέπονθας
ὅταν μὲν ἡ λίμνη καταστῇ, λαμβάνουσιν οὐδέν·
ἔὰν δ' ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω τὸν βόρβορον κυκῶσιν,
αἱροῦσι· καὶ σὺ λαμβάνεις, ἦν τὴν πόλιν ταράττησ.

You've come to be exactly like the eel-fishers.
When the pond is calm, they get nothing,
but if they stir the mud up and down,
they make their catch. You too get something, if you disturb the city.

Cleon, then, who has already been called the 'mud-stirrer' (307 *βορβοτάραξι*) uses this 'disturbing' of the city as a means of enriching himself. The connection with line 66, quoted at the beginning of this paper ("he importunes them, he disturbs them, he takes bribes") is obvious, and makes it clear that 'disturbance' is the necessary precondition for Cleon's peculation.

4. *Taratttein* refers to the disturbance of groups of persons. In the first book of the *Iliad*, Hephaestus urges Hera to acquiesce to Zeus, that Zeus may not "disturb the feast" (579).²² An epic assembly may be 'disturbed' (*Il.* 2.95; 7.345-46). When armies and navies are thrown into confusion they may also be so described. In Thucydides, words formed on the *tarakh-* base occur, for example, thrice in the description of the sea battle off Naupactus (2.84.2-3), thrice in that of the night battle at Syracuse (7.44), and thrice in that of the Athenian retreat (7.80.3, 81.2, 84.4). Such words are powerfully expressive of disorder in Thucydides (note especially 4.96.3, where Athenians mistakenly kill one another). 'Disturbance' afflicts armies and navies in Herodotus and Xenophon, too.²³

²¹ Aristoph. *Dait.* frag. 219 K; Dicaearchus *FHG* 2.2551). Cf. *Pax* 653-54; the sycophant as a vessel in which to 'stir up' ἐγκυκᾶσθαι the affairs of the city in *Ach.* 936-40; and the connection of 'stirring' and peculation at *Lys.* 489-91.

²² A feast should take place in 'tranquillity': Solon frag. 4.9-10 W (ἡσυχία); Hipp. frag. 26.1-3 W.

²³ Navies: Hdt. 8.16.2, cf. 8.12.1; armies: Hdt. 4.129.2-3 (*bis*), 134.1; 9.50, 51.3; Xen. *Oec.* 4.8.4; *Anab.* 1.8.2. 'Disturbance' can affect also larger groups—Ionia (Hdt. 5.124.1) or all of Greece (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.35; *Vect.* 8.5.8; Hdt. 3.138; Thuc. 5.25.1).

Words formed on the *tarakh-* base also refer to 'disturbance' within the polis. Citizens are 'disturbed' (Theog. 219 W). In Aeschylus' *Septem*, Amphiaraus calls Tydeus a "disturber of the city" (τῆς πόλεως ταράκτορα 572). In fifth-century literature, the noun *ταραχή* is the standard way to designate civic discord.²⁴

From this survey of the semantics, it is obvious that the metaphorical application of the third usage, that is, of the 'disturbance' of bodies of water, is the one that has most affected the characterization of Cleon in *Knights*. And it is in fact this metaphor, this stormy Cleon, that leads directly to the next stage of this paper, which is the traditional background of 'disturbance' in politics. Cleon's very name, Paphlagon, reminds of παφλάζειν 'bluster,'²⁵ a word that was used of the waves (*Il.* 13.798). It will be seen that Aristophanes' diagnosis of Cleon's demagoguery as 'disturbance' and his description of this 'disturbance' as a storm arise out of an old tradition of Greek thought about the polis. In this tradition, civil disorder is conceived in terms of meteorological phenomena—winds and storms—and especially in terms of storm-driven water. An oracle of Musaeus predicted that a 'wild rain' (ἄγριος ὄμβρος) would come upon the Athenians through the baseness of their leaders (Paus. 10.9.11). In the constitutional debate in Herodotus, the oligarch Megabuxus compares the demos to a storm-swollen river (3.81.2).²⁶ In the *Republic*, Socrates, or his argument, must swim through what he calls three waves if the *kallipolis*, the ideal city, is to be founded.²⁷ The tradition is so pervasive that further examples are unnecessary. In connection with *Knights*, however, one particular metaphor in which this tradition expressed itself, namely, the ship-of-state metaphor, deserves fuller discussion.²⁸

In discussing the components of this metaphor, I shall use the terminology of I. A. Richards.²⁹ Richards called the subject of the meta-

²⁴Hdt. 3.126.2, 150.1; 6.5.1; Thuc. 3.79.3; 4.75.1; 7.86.4; 8.79.1; Thrasymachus B1 (D-K II.323.4 and 324.1).

²⁵Cf. 919, where the word is used in the image of Cleon as a pot boiling over.

²⁶Cf. the *hapax* ρυάχετος 'rabble' at Aristoph. *Lys.* 170. With ώθέει in the Herodotean context cf. *Eq.* 692 ὥθων (of Cleon). In *Ach.* 381 and *Eq.* 137, Cleon is compared to the Cycloborus ("a stream in Attica . . . notorious for its volume and its roar when in spate": Alan H. Sommerstein, *Knights* (The Comedies of Aristophanes, vol. 2: Warminster 1981) 61 and to a torrent in *Vesp.* 1034).

²⁷For references and discussion, see James Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, vol. 1 (Cambridge 1920) on 449aff.

²⁸For an analysis of the metaphor in Aeschylus, especially in *Sept.*, see D. Van Nes, *Die maritime Bildersprache des Aischylos* (Groningen 1963) 71-92.

²⁹*The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York 1965) 96-97.

phor the "tenor." The tenor is what the metaphor is about. He called that to which the tenor is likened the "vehicle." If a poet says the eye is a gazelle, eye is the tenor, gazelle the vehicle. Richards held that metaphor was impossible unless tenor and vehicle shared some characteristic, and he called this third component of metaphor the "ground" of the metaphor.³⁰ The ground of the metaphor is whatever the tenor and vehicle have in common. Eye and gazelle both have, for example, the capacity for quick movement.

In the ship-of-state metaphor, the tenor is internal discord in the polis and the vehicle is a ship tossed by a storm. The metaphor is complex. Ship corresponds to polis; storm corresponds to internal discord in the polis. The complexity can be increased by, for example, the addition of a helmsman who corresponds to the chief of state. The ground of this metaphor is the common characteristics of polis and ship and of discord and storm. The common characteristics of discord and storm appear in the first stanza of Alcaeus 326 L-P:

ἀσυννέτημμι τῶν ἀνέμων στάσιν,
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐνθεν κῦμα κυλίνδεται,
τὸ δ' ἐνθεν, ἄμμες δ' ὃν τὸ μέσσον
νᾶι φορήμεθα σὺν μελαίναι

I do not understand the lie of the winds;
the waves roll on this side
and on that, while we down the middle
are borne in our dark ship.

The very first line, in the phrase "the lie (*stasis*) of the winds" establishes the ground shared by discord and storm.³¹ *Stasis* is the normal word for the setting of the wind from a quarter (LSJ⁹ s.v. B.1.2.b)³² and is thus a proper element in the vehicle of the metaphor, but it is also a word for civil discord (B.3.2), which is the tenor of this metaphor. If the very same word applies to both the tenor and the vehicle, then the ground of the metaphor, that which tenor and vehicle have in common, is given in this word. We can state the ground by generalizing the notion of stasis in such a way that stasis will cover both tenor and vehicle: stasis is a

³⁰Richards (n. 29 above) 117.

³¹Michael Silk, *Interaction in Poetic Imagery* (Cambridge 1974) 123.

³²R. Kassel, "Kritische und exegetische Kleinigkeiten IV," *RM* 116 (1973) 102-104 has a good collection of passages illustrating this meaning. For the expression used by LSJ, viz., the 'setting' of the wind, see *OED* s.v. *set v.* VIII.107.a: "Of a current, wind: to take or have a certain direction or course."

standing apart (deverbative noun from the middle ἴσταμαι), a going apart (cf. Lat. *seditio*), as perceived from a stable point. This standing or going apart is the ground of the negative component of the ship-of-state metaphor. Furthermore, if one compares the third and fourth of the semantic categories of *tarattein* set out above, it would seem that 'disturbance' is a given similar potentiality of the sea and the city, i.e. that the ship-of-state metaphor has a given plausibility in the notion of 'disturbance'.

As for the positive component (polis/ship etc.), one of its several aspects calls for discussion here as defining the opposite of *stasis*. Alcaeus said, "We [i.e. the poet and his faction] are borne down the middle (μέσοον)." The word used by Alcaeus for 'middle' is ambiguous in just the same way as *stasis*: it can be used literally of the path of a ship through the sea;³³ it also indicates a fundamental political concept. Certain French scholars have found in the 'middle' various aspects of the origin of the polis—centrality, publicity, equality, commonality—which they regard as the socio-political basis for the history of Greek thought.³⁴ Although within the evidence assembled by this school, certain distinctions should have been made,³⁵ and it should not have been assumed that the 'middle' always refers to a particular place or a particular procedure,³⁶ the political importance of the 'middle' can hardly be denied.

³³E.g., *Od.* 14.300: *per medium mari*s in van Leeuwen's note ad loc.

³⁴P. Lévéque and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Clisthène l'Athénien* (Paris 1964) 21–22; J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, vol. 1 (Paris 1971) 185–87; cf. *id.*, *Les origines de la pensée grecque* (Paris 1969) 46; M. Detienne, *Les maîtres de vérité dans la grèce archaïque*, 2nd ed. (Paris 1973) 81–92. A useful corrective, stated apropos Solon frag. 37.9–10 W, can be found in: N. Loraux, "Solon au milieu de la lice," in *Aux origines de l'Hellenisme, la Crète et la Grèce: Hommage à Henri van Effenterre* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, Histoire Ancienne et Médiévale 15, 1984) 199–214 and in her "Repolitisier la cité," *L'Homme* 26 (1986) 239–55.

³⁵For example, Detienne (n. 34 above) 83–84 does not recognize that "to place something in the middle" (e.g., *Il.* 23.204 and *Xen. Anab.* 3.1.21, which he cites) is idiomatic for "to offer something as a prize to be competed for" (as opposed to "to offer something as common property to be distributed") and therefore looks to a procedure that cannot be homologized with distribution. τίθημι τι εἰς (τὸ) μέσον is a variant of the idiom τίθημι τι "I offer something as a prize" (see LSJ⁹ s.v. τίθημι III) of which the passive is τι κεῖται (see LSJ⁹ s.v. κεῖμαι 4.2).

³⁶For example, Detienne (n. 34 above) 85, believes that Theognis 678 refers to a distribution of booty; but, in the context of the Theognidea, this interpretation is impossible. As in the translation of this line offered below in the text of this paper, the phrase *es to meson* must be adverbial. See T. Figueira, "The Theognidea and Megarian Society," in T. Figueira and G. Nagy, edd. *Theognis of Megara* (Baltimore and London 1985)

Given this ambiguity of the 'middle,' its appearance in the ship-of-state metaphor in *Theognis* (667-82) is not surprising. The lines relevant to the present discussion are the following (675-78):

κυβερνήτην μὲν ἔπαυσαν
 ἐσθλόν, διὶ φυλακὴν εἶχεν ἐπισταμένως·
 χρήματα δ' ἀρπάζουσι βίηι, κόσμος δ' ἀπόλωλεν,
 δασμὸς δ' οὐκέτ' ἵσος γίνεται ἐς τὸ μέσον·

They have deposed the helmsman,
 the noble one, who stood guard with his understanding.
 They seize possessions by force, and order has perished.
 There is no longer an equitable division (made) publicly.

Whereas in *Alcaeus* *mesos* belonged to the vehicle of the metaphor, i.e. it referred to the ship and the sea, in *Theognis* it belongs to the tenor, i.e. it refers to the *polis*. But this variation between the two poems, which have several elements of diction in common, is owing to the ambiguity of *mesos*, which, like *stasis*, can appear in either component of the metaphor and is thus especially revealing of the ground of the metaphor.

For a clearer sense of the 'middle' as the ground, two couplets of *Theognis* are useful:

ἥσυχος ὥσπερ ἐγώ μεσσὴν ὁδὸν ἔρχεο πόσσιν,
 μηδετέροισι διδοὺς Κύρνε τὰ τῶν ἐτέρων.

Calm like me, set your feet upon the middle path,
 Cyrus, giving neither [group] the possessions of the other. (331-32 W)

μηδὲν ἄγαν ἄσχαλλε ταρασσομένων πολιητέων
 Κύρνε, μέσην δ' ἔρχευ τὴν ὁδὸν ὥσπερ ἐγώ.

Do not be overly grieved at the citizens' state of disturbance,
 Cyrus, but take the middle path like me. (219-20 W)

The first of these couplets can serve as a gloss on ἐς τὸ μέσον in 678. The couplet says, in effect, that, if you take the middle path, you provide a fair distribution of property, viz., everyone keeps his own belongings. In 678, then, ἐς τὸ μέσον must reinforce ἵσος and must be ad-

149-50: the only "real" *dasmos* would be one believed to have been made by the Dorian conquerors of the Megarid, which would thus have determined the social and political order (in the view of the aristocrats).

verbal, e.g., “(made) fairly” (cf. 495, 543-46). The second of the couplets just quoted shows how the notion of the middle is antithetical to ‘disturbance’ (verb *ταράσσω*), a word that in the context of the ship-of-state metaphor, can be used of waves (Archilochus 105.1 W=105.1 T) and is regularly used of the sea (cf. the third of the semantic categories set out above). Furthermore, the two couplets, taken together, present an opposition between calmness (base *ἡσυχ-*) and ‘disturbance’, an opposition alluded to above (in the fourth of the semantic categories) that will be discussed more fully below apropos ideology.

At this point, it is possible to state the ground of this aspect, i.e. the ‘middle’, of the positive component of the ship-of-state metaphor (polis/ship etc.). As in the case of the negative component (political discord/storm), where *stasis* was the key, the notion of the ‘middle’ has to be generalized in such a way that we can see how it covers both tenor (polis) and vehicle (ship etc.): the ‘middle’ is the steady direction, the straight course, the right way to go (cf. Theognis 945-46).

Once the characterization of Cleon in *Knights* is set in the context of the traditional ship-of-state metaphor, it becomes clear that his ‘disturbance’ of Athens is a matter of stasis. The objection might be raised that such a characterization is too extreme to be funny: certainly Cleon was not guilty of anything like stasis as we know it from Thucydides’ account of stasis on Corcyra. Against this objection, it should be pointed out that Thucydides himself recognized various degrees of stasis.³⁷ Verbal conflict could be taken as stasis. Consider, for example, the phrase: οἱ πολῖται περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιλέγοντες τε καὶ ἀντιδικοῦντες καὶ στασιάζοντες (Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.8). These are the conditions created by Cleontic ‘disturbance,’ in which a gentleman like Crito is not allowed to mind his own business but must fight law suits brought by accusers who hope that he will pay in order to avoid the trouble (ἔχειν πράγματα Xen. *Mem.* 2.9.1; cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* 258-65 quoted below).

Another aspect of the positive component of the ship-of-state metaphor, namely, the ship, appears in *Knights* and shows another dimension of the thought underlying the characterization of Cleon as a fomentor of stasis. In the parabasis of the play, the Knights say of Aristophanes

he thought that one ought first to be an oarsman before trying one's hand at the helm; then after that be bow-officer and look out for squalls; and only then steer for oneself.³⁸

³⁷ See 3.82.2, where the exquisite irony of *ἡσυχαίτερα* should be noted.

³⁸ Lines 541-43. The translation is that of Sommerstein, *Knights* (n. 26 above) 61.

In the immediate context, this image of a naval career applies to Aristophanes' development as a comic poet. Furthermore, this image fits with a discernible strategy on Aristophanes' part, which will be discussed below, to conciliate the rowers in the audience.³⁹ But at the same time, as Neil observed, the metaphor "suits statesmanship."⁴⁰ As in *Acharnians*, the comic poet asserts the political claim of comedy.⁴¹ Right after this metaphor comes the pnigos that concludes the parabasis proper. It continues the nautical theme (544-50).⁴² The chorus bids the audience lift Aristophanes on a surge. The poet's justification of his former reticence is summed up: because "he acted in a self-controlled fashion ($\sigmaωφρονικῶς$) and did not leap blindly in and produce rubbish" (545).⁴³ Aristophanes thus in passing associates himself with the ethical attitude of the Knights (cf. 334) but in the context of the nautical theme.

To sum up, the image of stormy Cleon in *Knights* belongs to the tradition expressed in the ship-of-state metaphor. 'Disturbance' and the comic version of the ship-of-state metaphor place Aristophanes' Cleon-portrait in that tradition. The same images used by the aristocrats Alcaeus and Theognis in vastly different political circumstances can now be used by Aristophanes before the Athenian audience. The tradition is thus not only pan-Hellenic; it has become, at least ostensibly, multi-valent, applicable as well in democratic Athens as in the struggles of aristocratic factions in Mytilene or of aristocrats and their inferiors (Theognis 679 W) in Megara. To this extension of the metaphor from the archaic aristocracies of Mytilene and Megara to the comic theater of Aristophanes, one can compare the extension of terms like *isonomia* from aristocracy to democracy.⁴⁴

The ship-of-state metaphor was, however, especially apt for Cleon, as Aristophanes saw him, for two reasons. First, one of the main traditional functions of this metaphor was to describe the conditions in which a tyrant emerges. Aristophanes can thus play on the Athenians'

³⁹ By 'rowers' I do not mean a faction or other self-conscious group but those persons who in one way or another depended upon this occupation.

⁴⁰ Neil (n. 4 above) on 542-44.

⁴¹ With *Eq.* 510, cf. *Ran.* 686-87; *Ach.* 499-500; on the latter, see L. Edmunds, "Aristophanes' 'Acharnians,'" *YCS* 26 (1980) 11.

⁴² The 'eleven oars' in 546 have not been certainly explained. References in Sommerstein, *Knights* (n. 26 above) ad loc.

⁴³ Trans. by Sommerstein, *Knights* (n. 26 above) pp. 61 and 63.

⁴⁴ Though it is most unlikely that *isonomia* was either an early name for or synonymous with democracy: see C. W. Fornara, "The Cult of Harmodius and Aristogeiton," *Philol.* 114 (1970) 171-80.

fear of tyranny. This fear is clearly reflected in *Wasps*, produced in 422 B.C., two years after *Knights*. Bdelykleon says that he hasn't heard the word 'tyranny' for fifty years but now it's commoner than salted fish (490-91).⁴⁵ In *Knights*, the new fear of tyranny is already evident, and Aristophanes wishes to direct that fear toward Cleon.⁴⁶ The Sausage-seller warns Demos of the band of young men that Cleon has around him (852-54), implying the typical bodyguard of the tyrant (e.g., Hdt. 1.59; cf. Thuc. 6.56.2, 57.1).⁴⁷ Second, the ship-of-state metaphor indicates, through the vehicle (to continue with I. A. Richards' terminology), the ship's cargo, the property of those whose ship is threatened.⁴⁸ Aristophanes' principal explicit charge against Cleon is that he steals the city's money.

'Disturbance' in Contemporary Ideology

In the second part of this paper, I attempt to locate 'disturbance' in contemporary ideology, in which, as I have said, it is the opposite of an ethical attitude that can be summed up in the word *ἡσυχία*.

⁴⁵ Philokleon's quotation of Alcaeus implies that Cleon is like the tyrant Pittacus (1232-35; cf. Alcaeus frag. 141.3-4 L-P).

⁴⁶ In 447-49 the Sausage-seller brings this charge against Cleon: your grandfather was one of the bodyguards of Byrsinē (punning on Myrsinē, the name of the wife of Hippias, tyrant of Athens 527-10 B.C.). In order to understand the joke, we have to remember that the Sausage-seller's strategy is to out-Cleon Cleon. Therefore the charge of tyranny is one that Cleon must have been using. In 1044, Demos asks Cleon: "How did you become Antileon [i.e. a tyrant] without my knowing it?" See H. Lloyd-Jones, "More About Antileon Tyrant of Chalcis (Solon frag. 33 and Aristophanes *Eq.* 1042-44)," *CP* 70 (1975) 197. I disagree with Michael Taylor, *The Tyrant Slayers: The Heroic Image in Fifth Century BC Athenian Art and Politics* (Monographs in Classical Studies, New York 1981) 181, who holds that *Knights* 786-87 (he does not mention 447-49, 852-54, or 1044) "give no hint of any partisan political taint."

⁴⁷ At 786, Demos asks the Sausage-seller if he is a descendant of the house of Harmodius, the tyrant-slayer. Sommerstein, *Knights* (n. 20 above) on 786 comments: "The point of the reference here may be that Cleon was connected by marriage with the family of Harmodius: Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* 145, 320, 476-77 shows that his wife was probably a sister-in-law of the tyrannicide's kinsman, Harmodius of Aphidna, whom we know from *IG* 2²5765. Did Cleon exploit this tenuous connection to his own greater glory, and does Demos now expect that anyone else aspiring to be his benefactor will lay claim to a similar connection?" The suggestion is tempting, but F. Bourriot, "La Famille et le milieu sociale de Cléon," *Historia* 31 (1982) 418-30 has shown, on the basis of an epigraphical and prosopographical analysis of the key datum (the name Cleon in a fourth-century inscription), that there is insufficient reason for positing this woman as the wife of Cleon.

⁴⁸ See Gentili (n. 18 above) 263.

Moments after Cleon appears on stage for the first time and is pummeled by the Knights, he calls for help—he is being beaten by conspirators. Justly beaten, say the Knights,

for you eat up the public funds . . . and you pick off the outgoing magistrates like figs, pressing them to see which of them is green or ripe or not yet ripe. Yes, and you seek out any private citizen who's a silly lamb, rich and not wicked and frightened of public affairs (τρέμων τὰ πράγματα 265), and if you discover one of them who's a simple fellow minding his own business (ἀπράγμον' ὄντα 261), you bring him home from the Chersonese, take him round the waist with slanders, hook his leg, then twist back his shoulder and plant your foot on him (258–65).⁴⁹

We have here in the image of fig (base *suk-*)-picking the theme of sycophancy (*sukophantia*), which is a fundamental mode of 'disturbance.' One of the victims is the outgoing magistrate, the other is the simple-minded rich man, who is 'not wicked' (μὴ πονηρός), thus the opposite of the Sausage-seller (180, 186, 336–37) and, by implication, of Cleon. The key terms, however, in the description of the rich man are those quoted in Greek above. They provide the basis for establishing the ideology opposed to 'disturbance.' The rich man is an *apragnōn*, one who minds his own business; he is frightened of *pragmata*, public affairs, the realm to which the Sausage-seller is called (214, cf. 241, 360) and from which Cleon is finally driven, when he is banished to the edge of the city and to 'asses' affairs' (*pragmata* 1399), i.e. to the selling of sausages adulterated with asses' meat.⁵⁰

Although it is very difficult to say exactly who the Athenian *apragnones* were,⁵¹ their views can still be described. The rich man's principal quality in the passage just quoted, his minding his own business, belongs to a definable ethical position. This quality of the rich man prosecuted by Cleon appears in an illustrative context in *Clouds*. In this play, in the debate between the Stronger and Weaker Arguments, the Stronger, who stands for traditional values, promises young Strepsiades that, if he follows his advice,

you'll be spending your time in gymnasia, with a gleaming, blooming body, not in outlandish chatter on thorny subjects in the Agora like the present generation, nor in being dragged into court over some sticky,

⁴⁹Trans. by Sommerstein, *Knights* (n. 26 above).

⁵⁰I have been unable to obtain E. Spyropoulos, "ὄνεια πράγματα," *Hellenica* 33 (1981) 3–13.

⁵¹A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 2 (Oxford 1962) 177–78.

contentious, damnable little dispute; no you will go down to the Academy, and under the sacred olive-trees, wearing a chaplet of green reed, you will start a race together with a good decent (*σώφρων*) companion of your own age, fragrant with green-brier and catkin-shedding poplar and freedom from cares (*ἀπραγμοσύνη* 'minding one's own business, unmeddlesomeness'), delighting in the season of spring, when the plane tree whispers to the elm.⁵²

Avoidance of the Agora (where the Sausage-seller was born and raised) and of the law courts (which Cleon haunted), exercise in a tranquil setting that breathes 'unmeddlesomeness'—a young man from this background will grow up to be the man rebuked by the Thucydidean Pericles, the man who thinks that he can play the gentleman in this spirit of 'unmeddlesomeness' (*ἀπραγμοσύνη* 2.63.2). Pericles has said that Athenians consider the one who does not participate in public affairs *not* 'unmeddlesome' (*ἀπράγμων*) but 'useless' (*ἀχρεῖος* 2.40.2, whereas such persons consider themselves *χρηστοί* 'useful ones').⁵³

The vice opposite to *apragsmosunē* was, from the gentleman's point of view, *πολυπραγμοσύνη* 'meddlesomeness, being a busybody.' In Euripides' *Antiope*, Amphion says that anyone who is a busybody (*πράσσει πολλά* lit. 'does many things') when he could refrain from so doing and live pleasantly as an *apragsmōn* is a fool (frag. 193 N).⁵⁴ Furthermore, Amphion implicitly rejected the Periclean charge of uselessness. The *ῆσυχος* 'quiet man' is best for the city (frag. 194 N; cf. frag. 187 N). Not surprisingly, the 'meddlesomeness' scorned by an Amphion was another name for sycophancy, i.e. malicious prosecution.⁵⁵ In *Ploutos*, in a scene that, at one point, seems to allude to *Antiope* (with *Ploutos* 921–22 cf. *Antiope* frags. 193–94 N), a sycophant states that he benefits the city. His interlocutor, called Just Man, asks: "To be a busybody (*τὸ πολυπραγμονέiv*) is to benefit the city?"⁵⁶ The sycophant is an

⁵² Alan H. Sommerstein, *Clouds* (The Comedies of Aristophanes: Vol. 3, Warminster 1982) 107.

⁵³ See L. Edmunds, "The Genre of Theognidean Poetry," in Figueira and Nagy (n. 36 above) 98 on the notion of usefulness.

⁵⁴ There are some indications of a class-distinction in the fragments (frags. 186 N, 200 N): it is a question of the appropriate way of life for one who is wellborn. The principal opposition in the play was, however, between a musical, theoretical way of life and an active, political one.

⁵⁵ In *Ach.* 382, Diceopolis, speaking as Aristophanes, describes himself as *μολυνοπραγμονούμενος* 'filthy-troubled' (Sommerstein) by Cleon. Note in this context the verb *διαβάλλω*, and note the general similarity of the passage (379–82) to *Eq.* 258–65.

⁵⁶ 913; cf. 931 and Democritus frag. B80, which could, however, refer to foreign affairs.

avatar of Cleon. He appears on the stage 'rushing' (σοβαρός) like the wind (872), just as Cleon 'blew sycophancy' (*Eq.* 437) and made one of his entrances 'pushing a wave before him' (692).

'Meddlesomeness' affected, however, not only internal political life, as in the matter of sycophancy, but also foreign policy. The two sides of the vice are summed up in a single line of Euripides' *Suppliants*. In this play, the Argive herald tells Theseus, the Athenian king: "It is your custom to be meddlesome (πράσσειν . . . πολλά' lit. 'to do many things') and your city's, too" (576). In Thucydides, the Corinthians blame Athenian restlessness before an audience of Sparta and her allies. Athenians consider ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα 'unmeddlesome peace' as great a misfortune as laborious activity (1.70.8), say the Corinthians, and, in another place, an Athenian acknowledges, before Dorians, the πολυπραγμοσύνη 'meddlesomeness' of his city (6.87.3).⁵⁷ The 'unmeddlesome' gentleman, the one rebuked by Pericles, does not share this Athenian trait. He is anti-imperialist.⁵⁸

The virtue on which this gentleman especially prided himself was *sōphrosynē*. In the passage from *Clouds* quoted above, *sōphrōn* is the only adjective needed to describe the companion who is proposed for Pheidippides. It invokes a whole ethos, which does not have to be discussed at length here.⁵⁹ Cleon's enemies were the σώφρονες 'sensible men',⁶⁰ and chief among them was Nicias (Thuc. 4.27.5). The Knights exhort the Sausage-seller to prove, in defeating Cleon, that τὸ

⁵⁷There have been many discussions. The main ones, in chronological order, are: W. Nestle, "ΑΠΡΑΓΜΟΣΥΝΗ (Zu Thukydides II.63)," *Philologus* 81=NF 35 (1927) 129-40 = *Griechische Studien* (1948) 374-86; "Der Friedengedanke in der antiken Welt," *Philol. Suppl.* vol. 31, Part 1 (1938) 21-23; V. Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics," *JHS* 67 (1947) 44-67 = *Polis and Imperium* (Zurich 1965) 466-501; K. Dienelt, "Apragmosyne," *WS* 66 (1953) 94-104; K. Kleve, "ΑΠΡΑΓΜΟΣΥΝΗ and ΠΟΛΥΠΡΑΓΜΟΣΥΝΗ: Two Slogans in Athenian Politics," *SO* 39 (1964) 83-88; W. R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton 1971) 175-94; A. W. H. Adkins, "POLUPRAGMOSUNE and 'Minding One's Own Business': A Study in Greek Social and Political Values," *CP* 71 (1976) 301-27; J. W. Allison, "Thucydides and ΠΟΛΥΠΡΑΓΜΟΣΥΝΗ," *AJAH* 4 (1979) 10-22; "Additional Note," *AJAH* 4 (1979) 157-58; D. Lateiner, "The Man Who Does Not Meddle in Politics: *A Topos* in Lysias," *CW* 76 (1982) 1-12.

⁵⁸V. Ehrenberg (n. 57 above) 52.

⁵⁹See Gomme (n. 51 above), vol. 3 (1962) 480 on Thuc. 4.40.2 and the article in *CQ NS* 3 (1953) 65-68 he cites.

⁶⁰See Gomme's reflections on Thuc. 4.28.5 (n. 51 above), vol. 3 (1962) 469-70. I have adopted his translation of σώφρονες. For a modern example of the attitude Gomme describes, see Leo Strauss, *Socrates and Aristophanes* (New York and London 1966) 85.

σωφρόνως τραφῆναι 'the education of a sensible man' is now meaningless in public life (334, cf. 191–92). As the Sausage-seller warms to his project, one of his boasts is that he will 'disturb' Nicias (358). Despite their apparent nihilism, shown in their support for the Sausage-seller, the Knights seem to think that they will be able to return to their upper-class life of refinement and leisure. All they want is to wear their hair long and to scrape themselves with the strigil after exercise (579).⁶¹

The quality of life prized by 'sensible men' is ἡσυχία 'tranquillity'. In Epicharmus, *Hēsychia* dwells near *Sōphrosynē* (frag. 101 Kaibel). In the speech of the Corinthians cited above, this quality of 'tranquillity' is said to be un-Athenian; and Alcibiades blamed the ἀπραγμοσύνη 'unmeddlesomeness' of Nicias (6.18.7) on the grounds that 'tranquillity' is not permitted a city like Athens. The Sycophant in *Ploutos* is, on this principle, a good Athenian. He hates the idea of 'tranquillity' and craves action.⁶² Un- or anti-Athenian Athenians, on the other hand, like Euelpides and Peisthetairos in *Birds* look for an 'unmeddlesome' place (adj. ἀπράγμων 44) in which to found a new city. On this new city the 'bright'⁶³ face of *Hēsychia* shines (1321–22).⁶⁴

The opposition between brightness and darkness, as well as the other oppositions associated with it, are articulated in a fragment of Pindar (frag. 109 S-M), which can thus serve as the basis of a summary of the ideological issues under discussion.

τὸ κοινόν τις ἀστῶν ἐν εὐδίᾳ
τιθεὶς ἐρευνασάτω μεγαλάνορος Ἡσυχίας τὸ φαιδρὸν φάος,
στάσιν ἀπὸ πραπίδος ἐπίκοτον ἀνελών,
πενίας δότειραν, ἔχθρὰν κουροτρόφον

Let one set the commonality of the citizens in fine weather
and seek the bright light of proud *Hēsychia*
removing wrathful discord (*stasis*) from his mind,
discord the bestower of poverty, a hateful nurse of children.

⁶¹The slogan they use in this passage has been explained by Alan L. Boegehold, "A Dissent at Athens ca 424–21 B.C.," *GRBS* 23 (1982) 147–56.

⁶²On the nature of the sycophant, see D. Konstan and M. Dillon, "The Ideology of Aristophanes' *Wealth*," *AJP* 102 (1981) 376–78.

⁶³Adj. εὐήμερος from ἡμέρα 'day,' i.e. a basically meterological notion, with which contrast the darkness of the storm that threatens the ship-of-state. See the table in Gentili (n. 18 above).

⁶⁴Eur. *Antiope* cf. frag 193 N with frag. 194 N; *hēsychos* is a synonym for *apragmōn*. Aristoph. *Ploutos* 913ff. shows the opposition between *polypragmosynē* and *hēsychia*. Antiphon *Tetr.* 2.2.1: *apragmōnes* and *hēsychioi* are synonyms. See especially Isocrates *Antid.* 151.

The political order here desiderated is bathed in the light of Hēsychia, just like the new city that those Athenian apragmones, Euelpides and Peisthetairos, intended to found. The condition to be avoided is *stasis*,⁶⁵ which the central metaphors of *Knights* establish as the result of Cleon's activities. The fair weather⁶⁶ of the *stasis*-free city is the opposite of the storm that Cleon blows. Finally, the impoverishment of the city caused by *stasis* (line 5 of the frag.) corresponds to Aristophanes' principle charge against Cleon, that he steals the city's money.⁶⁷

Pindar frag. 109 S-M thus provides in compact form the principle antitheses on which Aristophanes' *Knights* is built. If, however, these antitheses constitute an ideology linked to a minority of Dorian tastes and sympathies, a problem arises for the interpretation of *Knights*. How can Aristophanes effectively use this ideology as the basis of an attack on Cleon before an audience comprised of all sorts of citizens, the majority of whom presumably did not espouse it? Is not *Knights* adopting a point of view that it would be difficult for them to share? One answer is suggested by an article by Donald Lateiner,⁶⁸ who studied "the man who does not meddle in politics" in the speeches of Lysias and showed that, in the law courts of the restored democracy, defendants typically stressed their *apragsynē*, along with its associated virtues. A conclusion that might be drawn from this phenomenon, if it is not to be explained by a change in political involvement and the attitudes toward it between 430 and 380 B.C.,⁶⁹ is that *apragsynē* was a normal and unexceptionable position, one that could be respected by those who did not share it or had no reason for asserting it. Certainly the position of the gentlemen, of the 'sensible' ones, did not entail the claim that all others were *polypragmones* 'busybodies,' only that some, like Cleon, were, and they could expect the demos to agree with them (cf. Ps.-Xen. 2.18).

In *Knights*, however, Aristophanes took special pains to weaken whatever connotation of social and economic class this ideology might possess. He did so in two ways, first by insinuating a rapprochement

⁶⁵With the third of the lines quoted above, where *ερικοτὸν stasin* is to be removed from the mind, cf. *P.* 8.9-10: ὄπόταν τις ἀμειλίχον/ καρδίᾳ κότον ἐνελάσῃ, where *kotos* has been nailed to the heart.

⁶⁶εὐδία is contrasted with stormy weather in *P.* 5.10 and *I.* 7.38.

⁶⁷With πενίας δότειραν, ἔχθρὰν κουροτρόφον cf. the epithets of Eirēnē, Hēsychia's aunt: τεθαλυῖαν (Hes. *Theog.* 901) and κουροτρόφος (Hes. *OD* 228).

⁶⁸N. 57 above.

⁶⁹Lateiner (n. 57 above) 11-13 suggests that it is not. Cf., however, Connor (n. 57 above).

between the Knights and the demos, and second by providing an alternate ideology that could be shared by all Athenians.

Rapprochement between Knights and Demos

The rapprochement is effected in the epirrhematic syzygy in the parabasis. In the ode, the chorus of Knights appropriately invokes Poseidon, the god of horses, but, in keeping with a policy of conciliation on the part of the Knights, Poseidon is also invoked here as the god to whom 'pay-bringing triremes' are pleasing (555). These are the triremes that brought the annual tribute from the Athenian allies, which became the pay of the rowers and jurors. The cult-places with which Poseidon is associated in the ode are Sunium and Geraestus. Mention of Colonus, which was a cult-center of the Knights' Poseidon,⁷⁰ is not included. Poseidon is said to be 'dearest to Phormio, and, of all other gods, to the Athenians at present.' Phormio was "the type of the naval hero,"⁷¹ and Poseidon must appear as his patron. The Poseidon of the ode is anything but the "Tory god" he has been called.

The epirrhema (565–80) begins as a parody of that part of a funeral oration in which the ancestors are praised.⁷² When the leader of the chorus speaks of 'our ancestors' as having fought 'battles on land and in the naval host,' 'our' refers to all the Athenians except to the Knights. They would not have remembered the history of their corps in terms of naval battles, and it is doubtful that the adjective translated 'on land' (πέζαις), which suggests footsoldiers (πέζοι), refers to their exploits. Reference to the historical fact of mounted hoplites⁷³ is excluded by the parodic nature of the passage in any case,⁷⁴ but it is worth remembering that the Athenian Knights kept a separate identity. Gomme has observed: ". . . the social change which followed the military reorganiza-

⁷⁰P. Siewert, "Poseidon Hippios am Kolonos und die athenischen Hippes," in *Arktouros* (B.M.W. Knox Festschrift), edd. G.W. Bowersock et al. (Berlin and New York 1979) 280–89.

⁷¹Neil (n. 4 above) on 562.

⁷²See J. E. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens* (Monographs in Classical Studies, New York 1981) 74–100 for the *topos*.

⁷³On which see P.A.L. Greenhalgh, *Early Greek Warfare: Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages* (Cambridge 1973).

⁷⁴A few lines later, in 595–610, the horses are praised in terms that would be appropriate to their masters, as Nicole Loraux has observed: *L'invention d'Athènes: Histoire de l'oraison funèbre dans la "cité classique"* (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Centre de Recherches Historiques, Civilisations et Sociétés 65, Paris 1981) 312, n. 285.

tion (in the 6th century probably) by which the nobility in all Greek states entered the phalanx of hoplites and so tended to lose their separate status, was by no means so complete at Athens as at Sparta . . . Just as, in spite of Salamis and the radical democracy, the hoplites preserved their social as well as their military distinction, so did the nobility survive, and its status, or at least its wealth, was recognized by the institution of cavalry."⁷⁵ In confirmation of Gomme's observation, *IG* I² 946 (restored from *AP* 7.254) shows that the Knights would commemorate their horsemanship; and it is notable that after the battles of Corinth and Coronea in 394 B.C. the Knights set up their own monument and casualty-list,⁷⁶ while the other casualties were recorded by tribe on the official list.⁷⁷

'Our ancestors' did not include Knights.⁷⁸ The army is divided into land and naval forces but no further distinction is made.⁷⁹ The past was a time of harmony. Further, the oldtime general did not demand free meals in the *pyrtaneum* or the privilege of a front seat (573-76). The speaker alludes to the privileges received by Cleon after his success at Pylos (cf. 702-704). The speaker concludes the *epirrhema* by stating the noble claims of the *Knights* in implied contrast to those of Cleon. The *Knights* only ask to defend the city and its gods, without recompense, and, after the war is over, to wear their hair long and scrape themselves with the *strigil* after exercise (576-80).⁸⁰

In the antode, the chorus invokes Athena. This Athena is peculiar in two ways. First, she is associated with poetry, as were the Athenians themselves in the *kommaion*, whom Aristophanes flattered as 'experienced in every sort of Muse' (504-506). She brings Victory, the compan-

⁷⁵Gomme (n. 51 above), vol. 1 (1966) 328.

⁷⁶Tod, *GHI*, vol. 2, no. 104 (*IG* 2² 5222).

⁷⁷See discussion by Tod, *ibid.* (preceding note).

⁷⁸There may be just a hint of the Knights in that old-time Athens in the reference to the *peplos* in 565. The Knights participated in the procession in which the *peplos* was borne up to the acropolis at the *Panathenaea*. A. Alföldi, "Die Herrschaft der Reiterei in Griechenland und Rom nach dem Sturz der Könige" in *Gestalt und Geschichte: Festschrift Karl Schefold zum seinem sechzigsten Geburtstag am 26. Januar 1965*, edd. Martha Rohde-Liegle, Herbert A. Cahn, and H. Chr. Ackermann (Bern 1967) 31, combining his interpretation of Hdt. 6.112 with an imprecise reading of *Knights* 595ff., states: "Nicht ohne Berechtigung rühmten sich die Ritter im Jahr 424 bei Aristophanes ihrer Heldentaten zu Pferd, zu Fuss, und zur See." Neither in 595ff. nor in 565ff. do we have cavalry fighting as infantry or hoplites.

⁷⁹Cf. Loraux (n. 74 above).

⁸⁰See W. Donlan, *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece: Attitudes of Superiority from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Lawrence, KS 1980) 157.

ion of choristers (589); she protects a city 'mighty in war and poets' (583-84; cf. again 504-506).⁸¹ The patroness of Athens is expected to be the patroness of this chorus (592) and to bring victory to the play in the dramatic competition. This comic imposture is only intensified by the second peculiarity of the antode.

The Athena invoked by the chorus was a popular deity,⁸² and, for this reason, the goddess whom Cleon liked to call upon. As *Knights* shows, Cleon was an "Athenist,"⁸³ and he may have had something to do with the construction of the temple of Athena Nikē.⁸⁴ The epithet used of Athena here, μεδέουσα 'protecting,' (585) is one that Cleon will later use when he parodies the opening of the Themistocles decree (763-64).⁸⁵ as part of his assimilation of himself to Themistocles (811-12). The epithet was, however, no longer in use in Athens; it was an East Greek cult-title related to the religious or politico-religious policy of Athens toward its allies in the Delian League.⁸⁶ The Knights are thus appropriating Cleon's imperialist Athena and associating her with their

⁸¹For Nikē as a democratic symbol, see Jeffrey Henderson on Aristoph. *Lys.* 317-18 in his forthcoming commentary on that play.

⁸²See M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Munich 1955) 439-40, citing Sophocles, frg. 760 N for her *Volkstümlichkeit*. For problems in the evidence for private dedications to Athena, see Jon D. Mikalson, *Athenian Popular Religion* (Chapel Hill and London 1983) 115-16.

⁸³652-56, 763-64, 1171-72, 1181-82.

⁸⁴As Welsh argues, (n. 20 above) 250 ff., starting with a suggestion of J. S. Boersma, *Athenian Building Policy from 561/560 to 405/404 B.C.* (Scripta Archaeologica Groningana 4, Groningen 1970A) 84-86. See also Russell Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 496-503.

⁸⁵For the text, see M. Jameson, "A Decree of Themistocles from Troizen," *Hesperia* 29 (1960) 198-223.

⁸⁶John P. Barron, "Religious Propaganda of the Delian League," *JHS* 84 (1964) 35-48 refers to "colonisation propaganda." The main subject of this article are *horoi*, boundary-stones, of *temenē* of Athena, 'Αθηνῶν μεδέουσα, and of the Eponymoi and Ion (both 'Αθήνηθεν), found in Samos. Barron argues that they are of Samian workmanship and of East Greek wording, including Athena's cult-title. The *horos* from Kos (reference in n. 46) proves that the cult-title was not peculiar to Samos. The headquarters of the cult was Athens; that is the meaning of 'Αθήνηθεν. (Cf. Smyth, *GG* 1661). "The only hypothesis which will meet the case is of a series of common League cults voluntarily set up at the suggestion of the members of the Delian League, and having their headquarters at Athens. The inclusion of Ion and the Eponymoi is a reference to the tradition that all Ionia was settled from Athens at the end of the period of the Dorian invasions. An obvious suggestion would be that the cults were initiated at the same time as the League itself" (p. 45; for other possibilities for the date of the Samian *horoi*, see n. 83). See also Meiggs (n. 84 above) 295-98 and J. Alty, "Dorians and Ionians," *JHS* 102 (1982) 1-14, especially 8-11, for the negative side of Ionianism.

own goal of victory in the dramatic competition. As in the ode they presented Poseidon in an agreeable democratic light, so in the antode they seek to appropriate the city's patroness for their own ends and at the same time to preempt Cleon's "Athenism."

The antepirrhema praises the Knights' horses for bravely leaping into the transport ships (599) and behaving like true sailors (600–603). The reference is to the Knights' participation in Nicias' campaign on the Isthmus (Thuc. 4.42–44), where they had played a part in the victory at Solygeia (Thuc. 4.44.1; cf. *Eq.* 266–69, which may refer to their success). The speaker can thus praise the Knights in an agreeable fashion by assimilating horses to sailors. He also quotes Theorus, the associate of Cleon, as quoting a 'Corinthian crab' on the Knights' achievement, and, through this complicated joke, makes the Knights' enemies within Athens admit their effectiveness.⁸⁷

In the parabasis, then, Aristophanes finds ways to bring either himself or the Knights together with the nautical activity of the Athenian lower class,⁸⁸ and it is incorrect to speak of this parabasis as one that steers clear of the issues of the play.⁸⁹

Alternate Ideology

The alternate ideology is expressed in the last scene.⁹⁰ In the last scene of *Knights*, Demos reappears on stage after undergoing a magical beauty treatment. Despite what is often assumed about this transformation, Demos, formerly in this play an old man, is still an old man.⁹¹ Although he has been made beautiful instead of ugly, he has not been transformed so much as transported. The place to which he has been transported is the old Athens (1323, 1327), which was 'sleek and violet-

⁸⁷See Stephen Halliwell, "Notes on some Aristophanic jokes (*Ach.* 854–59; *Kn.* 608–10; *Peace* 695–99; *Thesm.* 605; *Frogs* 1039)" *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 7 (1982) 153 on the joke.

⁸⁸See K. J. Dover, *Aristophanic Comedy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1972) 99.

⁸⁹As does Stephen Halliwell, "Aristophanic Satire," *The Yearbook of English Studies* 14 (1984) 17 n. 24.

⁹⁰For a survey of the literary-critical problem, see M. Landfester, *Die Ritter des Aristophanes* (Amsterdam 1967) 83ff.

⁹¹To anticipate a possible objection to this point, I should like to say that I do not take line 1349 to mean "Was I that stupid and senile?" (Sommerstein, *Knights* n. 26 above) i.e. that he is now young, not old and senile. The participle *ών* is understood with *καὶ γέρων* and the line thus means: "Was I that stupid, though I was an old man (and should have known better)?"

crowned' (1329). On stage there was some sort of revelation—the mechanics elude us—of the old Athens, in particular of the Acropolis (1326–27). Demos now wears a golden cricket in his hair. It is an ornament that older men wore in the days of the Persian Wars. Thucydides mentions the custom, along with the linen chiton, as evidence of the soft-living ($\tauὸ ἀβροδίαιτον$) of the older men of that time (1.6.3). He says that it is not long since the custom was abandoned; and vase paintings confirm that the custom died out in the 470s.⁹²

The transformation of Demos is indicated by three other signs in addition to the golden cricket. First, he is radiant in the old-style dress (1331), presumably the linen chiton of which Thucydides spoke. Second, he is redolent of peace.⁹³ Third, he is anointed with myrrh (1332).⁹⁴ In this form, he is greeted by the Knights as faring in a fashion worthy of 'the trophy at Marathon' (1334). The Marathon generation, then, in addition to its famous toughness, has another side. This generation is not only tough, it is soft.⁹⁵ Demos is even assigned other appurtenances of the old-time luxury—a portable stool on which to sit wherever he may happen to be (1384; cf Athen. 12.512C) and a boy to carry it (1385). If Demos wishes, he can use the boy as a stool, too (1386). In other words, he is invited to enjoy some good old-fashioned buggery.⁹⁶

Aristophanes has not invented the softness of the Marathon generation. The parallel between Aristophanes and Thucydides in the matter of the golden cricket has already been mentioned. Although the evidence for the softness of this generation is not as extensive as for its toughness, it seems that the former was as well known as the latter. Two fragments of Old Comedy, one from Teleclides (frag. 215 K) and one from Cratinus (frag. 86 K), speak of the luxury of the time of Themisto-

⁹²A. W. Gomme, (n. 51 above) vol. 1 (1962) 103.

⁹³Neil (n. 4 above) on 1332: "There is of course the common play on both meanings of $\sigmaτονδαί$, *peace* and *festal libation*, the second meaning leading on to the mention of *festal array*."

⁹⁴Compare another set of indices of the soft-living of this generation in Cratinus, *Chirones* frag. 239 K (from Athen. 553E): a staff, an apple, mint, and flowers.

⁹⁵Sommerstein, *Knights* (n. 26 above) on 1334, observes: "Cf. *Wasps* 711 where Bdelycleon, in almost the same words, claims that these same achievements ought to be rewarded by giving all Athenians a life of luxury at others' expense."

⁹⁶Compare Right (or Stronger) Speech in *Clouds*. Much of his discussion of the 'old-time education' (961) has to do with pederasty. His opponent, referring to the cricket custom (984), chides him as *passé*. Right replies: but this was the education that produced the Marathonomachae (985–86). Philokleon, the old man in *Wasps*, enjoys looking at boys' genitals at their *dokimasia* (578).

cles, i.e. the time of the Persian Wars. It is not a matter of those images of *Schlaraffenland* in which Old Comedy abounded⁹⁷ but a concept of a particular historical period, which, in these examples, is tied to the name of Themistocles.⁹⁸ Although it is not immediately clear why, the Athenians prided themselves on the softness of their forebears. The Periclean Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2.35–46) is evidence. Pericles implicitly contrasts Athens with the Doric Sparta, which lives by the rule of all work and no play. In Athens, says Pericles, we have many festivals. We have handsome private dwellings (2.38.1) that give us pleasure. We do not go in for strict child-rearing but are relaxed (2.39.1). We love beauty (2.40.1). Our citizens are graceful and dexterous (2.41.1). And yet we are not soft (2.40.1); we are brave fighters when circumstances demand (2.39.2–4).

To return to Demos in the last scene of *Knights*, does his new luxuriousness have this same point? Yes, but in a more precise and sinister form. The contrast between Athens and Sparta as presented by Pericles is the contrast between an Ionian and a Doric city. Ionia, the Eastern part of the Greek world, was supposed to have been colonized by Athens. This tradition is as early as Solon, who speaks of Athens as the 'eldest land of Ionia,'⁹⁹ and, in the aftermath of the Persian Wars, the Ionian Greeks appealed to Athens, on the basis of kinship, to assume the leadership of the Greek cities (Thuc. 1.95.1; and so was formed the Delian League: 1.96). In the time of Thucydides and Aristophanes, however, this traditional idea had been given an ideological twist. From the mid-fifth century, that is from the time when Athens moved the treasury of the Delian league from Delos to Athens and became a frankly imperial city, Athens began to use the Ionian connection for propaganda purposes.¹⁰⁰ Athens' East Greek allies, or subjects, are bound to her not just by the annual tribute they are forced to pay but also by their filial status as colonies. At first, Athens awarded her colonies a privileged status amongst the allies by allowing them to contribute an ox and

⁹⁷ Athen. 6.267E-270A collects the passages. The central theme of *Schlaraffenland* is the easy availability of food.

⁹⁸ The contradiction between the two concepts was commented on in the fourth century B.C. by Heraclides Ponticus, who drew upon the passages in Thucydides and in *Knights* I have already discussed (Athen. 12.512C).

⁹⁹ Frag. 4a.2 W; cf. Hdt. 5.97; 9.106; Thuc. 7.57.4. There is probably a kernel of truth in the idea: see J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*, 2nd ed. (Chicago 1983) 11 n. 2.

¹⁰⁰ See Barron (n. 86 above).

a panoply to the Panathenaia and to march in the procession. By the time, however, of the great reassessment of tribute in 425/24 B.C., which took place shortly before the production of *Knights*, it became convenient to confer this status on *all* the allies.¹⁰¹ The groundwork had been laid by Pericles, who encouraged the belief that Athens and the cities of the Delian League were *homophyloi* (Thuc. 1.141.6).¹⁰² One could give several further examples of this "colonisation propaganda,"¹⁰³ but enough has been said to put the question of Demos in focus.

Demos is characterized in fact not just as one of the luxurious old men of the Marathon age but also specifically as an Ionian. The golden cricket is the sign. In the passage in Thucydides already discussed (1.6.3), it is said that the older men amongst the Ionians wore the golden cricket for a long time because of their kinship with the Athenians. Whether or not Thucydides is right about the direction of the influence,¹⁰⁴ there can be no doubt that it was a shared custom, and, if in Ionia it signified Athens, in Athens it signified Ionia.¹⁰⁵ Old Demos has, then, become an Ionian. Or rather he has become an Athenian of the period in which—so Aristophanes pretends—Athenian and Ionian were still the same thing. In this period, things that are now separate and irreconcilable come together. Virtue and pleasure, to begin with. Demos can be luxurious and, at the same time, he is the Demos who dined with Miltiades and Aristides (1325).¹⁰⁶ Again, city and country. Demos now returns to the country (1394) but he continues his attendance in the assembly and in the law courts (1350–53; 1358–61). Again, the most striking example of all, war and peace. The new Demos of the Marathonian Athens makes peace with Sparta (1388–94) but keeps Athens on a war footing (1366–71).

¹⁰¹ *ATL* 1.155, II.57–58.

¹⁰² See Phyllis Culham, "The Delian League: Bicameral or Unicameral?" *AJAH* 3 (1978) 29–30.

¹⁰³ For the evidence for this propaganda see Barron (n. 86 above) 46–48. One could perhaps add the Ionic Athena Nike temple: Boersma (n. 84 above) 75–76.

¹⁰⁴ Gomme thinks that Thucydides has it backwards: the Athenians wore the golden cricket because of the Ionians.

¹⁰⁵ Asius frag. 13 Kinkel (a quotation in Douris *FGrH*76F60 from Athen. 12.525E–F) seems to connect the custom of the cricket with Samos. Survey of the problem of the cricket in Gomme on Thuc. 1.6.3. The evidence is set out by A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, vol. 3 (Cambridge 1940) 250–56.

¹⁰⁶ See Appendix.

Disarmament is unthinkable if Demos is not only the 'monarch of this land' (1330) but also 'king of the Greeks' (1333).¹⁰⁷ In the reconstituted Athens, none of Cleon's imperialism, about which Aristophanes always seems so bitter, is given up. A first major concession on Aristophanes' part. The soft-but-tough Ionian Athens is the imperial city in its pristine form.

What would be the fate of the Knights, Aristophanes' sponsors, in this city? Has Aristophanes found a place for them? The Knights have disappeared.¹⁰⁸ Instead of their long hair, we now have the Ionian bun held up by the golden cricket.¹⁰⁹ Pederasty, identified with the Knight's class in Aristophanes' time,¹¹⁰ is now available to Demos (1384-86). It was part of the good old days (1387). Anointed with myrrh and redolent of wine, Demos looks like a symposiast (cf. 1325: he is now the one who dined with Aristeides and Miltiades). Another characteristic activity of the Knights has been opened to Demos.¹¹¹ In sum, as the Sausage-seller announces when he first presents the new Demos, "I have made him *kalos*" (1321). The unthinkable has happened. As the Old Oligarch makes abundantly clear, the people are by definition immune to beauty and unbeautiful.

The Knights are thus ellipsed in the new equation of softness and toughness. This ellipsis is the final form of the reconciliation proposed in the parabasis. On the side of toughness, the new Athens is internally busy, political, and, toward the world, imperialist. The Knights' apolitical values haven't a chance. On the side of softness, the new Athens, in recovering its Ionian style, simply renders negligible the Knights' prerogatives in the area of beauty. Now everyone can be beautiful.

In order to achieve the defeat of Cleon, Aristophanes has had to concede much. He even seems to betray his friends (n.b. 507-11), the Knights. Ironically, their own picture of the good old days, when there were only the navy and the foot-soldiers, has become a reality. Aristophanes has had to sacrifice them in order to create an Athens in which there would be no Cleon.

¹⁰⁷Cf. the notion of the tyrant city in Pericles' third speech in Thucydides (2.63), which Thucydides presents not as a private meditation but as a speech before the Athenian people. Cleon continues the theme (Thuc. 3.37).

¹⁰⁸Cf. Strauss (n. 60 above) 105, 107-108.

¹⁰⁹V. Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes* (Oxford 1951) 97 did not realize that there is a significant difference in the two hair styles.

¹¹⁰Ehrenberg (n. 109 above) 100.

¹¹¹Ehrenberg (n. 109 above) 103 on the symposium.

One can be more precise about what he sacrifices in the Knights. When the Knights are first mentioned, they are called ἀγαθοί (225), whereas there is another group of Athenians who are καλοί τε κἀγαθοί (227, cf. 185, 738), distinguished, furthermore, from those in the audience who are 'clever' (228; is there the implication that the *kaloi te kagathoi* aren't even in the audience?). The boiled-down Demos, for his part, is καλός (1321), but not, apparently, *agathos*. Demos has the good looks of a gentleman but nothing more. The play replaces one virtue, the Knights', indicated by ἀγαθοί, with another, Demos', indicated by καλός. Aristophanes assumes that the Athenians will give up Cleon if they can be *kaloi*, and on these terms he will sacrifice the virtue of the Knights. Whatever happened to the *kaloi te kagathoi*, those who possess the complete virtue of which the Knights and Demos each have a part? They aren't considered. There is no Athens for them. (What the Sausage-seller says at 736–40, where he compares Demos to a fickle boy who rejects lovers who are *kaloi te kagathoi*, remains true.) It's possible that Aristophanes mentions them only to distinguish the Knights from them.¹¹² If Aristophanes considers the Knights only *agathoi*, not *kaloi te kagathoi*, it's easier to see why he is willing to make them laughable in this play and to abandon them at the end.

The final scene of *Knights*, then, presents an ideology alternate to that of *hēsychia* and *sōphrosynē*, values that might have been too closely linked with the class represented by the Knights. For that matter, the final scene even replaces the Knights with a renewed Demos, i.e., with a political order in which the Knights are unnecessary. The days of the ancestors of whom they spoke in the parabasis have indeed returned. In this way, the defeat of Cleon, who is most persuasive to the people (629; Thuc. 3.36.6), is made more acceptable. Further, Aristophanes makes the new order of things acceptable by making it continuous, in important respects, with the policies of Cleon. In particular, the new Demos, as 'king of the Greeks' (1333), continues the imperialism of Cleon. Earlier intimations of Ionian propaganda in the play are now realized in a fully Ionian or Ionicized Demos.

At the same time, the final scene is also the final achievement of the policy of 'disturbance' proposed to the Sausage-seller by the Knights, a policy which meant to make mincemeat of the city's affairs (213–15; quoted above p. 234). The decoction of Demos has a mythical

¹¹²The Knights should, however, have been called *kaloi te kagathoi*. That would have been normal. See Deinarchus 3.12 and the comment of G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London 1972) 372; Ehrenberg (n. 109 above) 95.

prototype, in which the victim is chopped into pieces before he is boiled down. Pelias underwent this procedure at the hands of his daughters or of Medea (Diod. 4.52.3; Paus. 8.11.3). Paradoxically, the ultimate 'disturbance' recreates the city. The reappearance of Demos is an epiphany,¹¹³ and it may be that the second parabasis, usually considered a rather inorganic part of the play, sets the mood for the epiphany. Now that the Sausage-seller has won his final victory over Cleon, who has been banished to the edge of the city, the Knights exult. In their second parabasis, the strophe parodies a Pindaric prosodion,¹¹⁴ and although to us the form seems to have nothing to do with the content, and although the obscenity of the first epirrhema (1274-89) seems gratuitous, the effect may have been, like the banishment of Cleon, purificatory and celebratory.¹¹⁵

Appendix

One might have expected Themistocles to be named here, just as he is synonymous with the good old days in the fragments of Telecleides and Cratinus cited above. In the course of *Knights* both Cleon (763-64, 811-12) and the enemies of Cleon (83) have emulated Themistocles, and now, with the Sausage-seller's triumphant recreation of Demos, it would seem that the question of who is the new Themistocles has been decided. That question is dropped, however, and two other illustrious personnages from the days of the Persian Wars are named as the dinner companions of Demos. Of these two, one, Aristeides, needs no explanation. He was 'the Just' (cf. Hdt. 8.79.1), and, if anyone, should be mentioned in this context. The other, Miltiades, is more difficult. From soon after the Persian Wars, Miltiades and Themistocles became ideological anti-types, the one standing for the naval victory at Salamis, the other for the hoplite victory at Marathon.¹¹⁶ Stesimbrotus wrote that it

¹¹³H. Kleinknecht, "Die Epiphanie des Demos in Aristophanes' 'Ritter', " *Hermes* 77 (1939) 58-65 = *Aristophanes und die alte Komödie*, ed. H. J. Newiger (Wege der Forschung 265, Darmstadt 1975) 144-54 (with a one-page Korrekturmachtrag).

¹¹⁴A. M. Dale, *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1968) 180.

¹¹⁵Already in antiquity, the second parabasis was a problem. It was believed that it was the work of Eupolis: see schol. *Nub.* 540; schol. *Eq.* 1291. These scholia should be placed in the context of allegations and counter-allegations by Aristophanes, Cratinus, and Eupolis concerning *contaminatio*. See F. Perusino, "Aristofane e il Maricante di Eupoli: Un Caso di *Contaminatio* nella Commedia Attica del V Secolo," *RFIC* (1981) 407-13.

¹¹⁶Loraux (n. 8 above) 25.

was by overcoming the opposition of Miltiades that Themistocles was able to build a fleet (Plut. *Themist.* 24.5 = *FGrH2B107F*3*). In *Knights*, with its gesture of reconciliation toward the rowers, one might have expected that Themistocles would be mentioned in the final scene. And yet it is the hoplite general Miltiades, and the Knights call Demos "worthy of the trophy at Marathon" (1334). Mention of Themistocles might have been omitted because his character was suspect,¹¹⁷ and oligarchs could use his exile as an example of the demos' fickleness.¹¹⁸ In any case, Aristophanes had positive reasons for naming Miltiades as one of Demos' companions. He wished to present the renewed Demos as incorporating and thus transcending the contemporary ideological and political divisions with Athens. To this end, a pairing of the oligarchs' hero and Demos is quite appropriate. Furthermore, the naval policy of Themistocles is tacitly reaffirmed in the final scene. Faced with the decision whether to spend money on triremes or on direct pay to the citizens, Demos will build triremes (1350-55), just as Themistocles in his day, when the Athenians were faced with the same decision, had caused them to build a fleet with the income from the silver mines at Laureum (Hdt. 7.144). As for his new administrative policy, the first item on Demos' list is pay for the rowers (1365-66, cf. 1065-66). Demos, then, is both the companion of the hoplite general and the continuator of the policies of the founder of the Athenian navy.¹¹⁹

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¹¹⁷ Timocreon, *PMG* 727 from Plut. *Themist.* 21. With the food imagery of the last stanza, cf. *Eq.* 814-16.

¹¹⁸ So I interpret Andocides frag. 3. Cf. Thucydides' comment on the fickleness of the demos in relation to Pericles.

¹¹⁹ I am grateful to Phyllis Culham, Thomas Figueira, Jeffrey Henderson, Kurt Raaflaub, Ralph Rosen, and Daniel Tompkins for their comments on a considerably longer version of this paper, which is still in progress. The extraction of this present, shorter version from the longer one owes much to the comments of Diskin Clay.

THE DATES OF PLAUTUS' *CURCULIO* AND *TRINUMMUS* RECONSIDERED

A. S. Gratwick has recently proposed reading *Curculio* for the present *gurgulio* at *Trinummus* 1016, thereby restoring a reference to the title character of what we now see to be Plautus' previous play.¹ Gratwick's arguments are persuasive: Stasimus, whose entry as a *servus currens* provokes the remark from the eavesdropping *senex* Charmides that (1015–16) *huic, quisquis est/Curculiost exercitor*, has no convincing motivation for his haste. Stasimus is returning from the forum where he failed in his attempt to collect a debt owed to him; thus, unlike the typical *servus currens*, he is bringing his young master neither money nor any news that would advance the plot. Moreover, Stasimus has left behind his ring (1014 *condalium*) in a tavern but despairs of recovering it because his drinking companions were such well-known thieves (1018–23). Gratwick suggests that the model for this dramatically unmotivated scene, rather than another Greek comedy as Fraenkel suggested,² is the running entrance of the parasite Curculio in Plautus' play of that title, the only other surviving example of New Comedy in which the motif of a stolen ring figures. Gratwick accepts a date of c. 188/87 for the *Trinummus* and does not specify how much earlier he believes the *Curculio* to be.

Now that a connection has been established between the two plays, however, I believe that there are strong reasons for dating both plays earlier. Once such an earlier date is established, we can also consider both the thematic relation of Stasimus' tirade against the decay of *mores* in his scene to Curculio's entrance speech and the sociopolitical context of the two plays.

The evidence for the dates of Plautus' plays has been conveniently collected by K.H.E. Schutter and may now be re-examined in light of the close connection between the two plays.³ That the *Curculio* should not long precede the *Trinummus* is clear: when Charmides says Curcu-

¹A. S. Gratwick, "Curculio's Last Bow: Plautus, *Trinummus* IV. 3," *Mnemosyne* 34 (1981) 331–50.

²Gratwick (n. 1 above) 335; E. Fraenkel, *Elementi Plautini in Plauto* (Florence 1960) 146–48, 414–16.

³K.H.E. Schutter, *Quibus annis comoediae Plautinae primae actae sint quaeritur* (Groningen 1952) 61–68 (on *Curculio*); 141–48 (on *Trinummus*).

lio is Stasimus' trainer, the point of the joke will be lost unless the figure of Curculio is relatively fresh in the audience's mind. When Aristophanes refers to one of his own previous plays, he rarely goes back more than a year.⁴ It would seem likely, then, that *Curculio* was produced not more than a year before the *Trinummus*, perhaps at the festival just preceding it.

With this in mind we may turn to the evidence for the date of the *Trinummus*. The only firm *terminus post quem* is provided by line 990, which refers to the new aediles. Ritschl suggested that the aediles would only seem "new" at the Megalensian Games in April, which featured dramatic performances only from 194 B.C. onward (Livy 34.54.3), a view which has been generally adopted.⁵ No other indicator of date is as clear. Efforts to use references to Syrian and Campanian slaves (lines 542–46) to date the play have foundered: the reference to Syrian slaves might well come from the Greek original of the play and that to Campanian slaves is appropriate any time after 211 B.C.⁶ The attempts of Tenney Frank, followed by C. H. Buck, to tie the *Trinummus* specifically to the controversies surrounding the Scipios have not won general support.⁷ The mere mention of Arabia (933–34) or Macedonia (845) is scarcely a firm indicator of date without a specifically Roman context, nor can we argue that jokes about *ambitio* (1034) and the high cost of living (484) would not be funny save in the years when Livy mentions problems with *ambitus* and the cost of grain.⁸

Of more interest is the allusion the Sycophant makes in line 872 to the *census*. Such a specifically Roman reference is likely to be topical. Given our *terminus post quem* of 194 B.C. for the play, Schutter suggests

⁴ *Acharnians* 377–78 refers to the *Babylonians* of the previous year, *Wasps* 1045 to the defeat of the first version of *Clouds* the year before. The exception is *Clouds* 528–29, where the revised parabasis refers to Aristophanes' first play, the *Banqueters*.

⁵ Schutter (n. 3 above) 143, quoting Ritschl, *Parerga zu Plautus und Terenz* (Leipzig 1845) 348. I give references to Schutter as the most accessible source.

⁶ Schutter (n. 3 above) 143: "rei summam in mentione Syrorum Campanorumque verti ratus Ritschl firmis argumentis docuit nullo pacto demonstratum esse vel Trinummum brevi post Capuae cladem tempore edi non potuisse, vel neccesario post Syriacum bellum scriptam esse." Cf. Livy 26.16.7.

⁷ Tenney Frank, "Some Political Allusions in Plautus' *Trinummus*," *AJP* 53 (1932) 152–56; C. H. Buck, *A Chronology of the Plays of Plautus* (Baltimore 1940) 98–102. Schutter (n. 3 above) convincingly disposes of these arguments.

⁸ The suggestion of Frank (n. 7 above) 154, n. 4, that the theft of Jove's crown jokingly imagined at 83–85 is an allusion to some counterchange of the Scipios against their accusers, the Petillii (based on Horace, *Sat.* 1.4.94, which mentions *Capitolini furum Petilli*), seems to me most improbable. See Schutter (n. 3 above) 77–79.

we have here a reference to either the censorship of Sex. Aelius Paetus and C. Cornelius Cethegus of 194/93 or that of M. Claudius Marcellus and T. Quintius Flamininus of 189/88.⁹ To choose between the two, we need now look at the independent evidence for the date of the *Curculio*.

Such evidence is scant but seems to point to the late 190s B.C. In lines 508–10 *Curculio*, speaking to the moneylender Lyco, denounces usurers against whom the people pass laws—which the usurers then break anyway:

vos faenore homines, hi male suadendo et lustris lacerant.
rogitationis plurimas propter vos populus scivit,
quas vos rogatas rumpitis; aliquam reperitis rimam.

Teuffel took these lines to be a reference to the *lex Sempronnia* of 193 B.C. (Livy 35.7.2).¹⁰ The play offers only one other plausible indicator of date. *Curculio*, the parasite of the title, disguises himself with an eyepatch. He first claims to have lost his eye to a catapult shot at the seige of Sicyon (393–94). Is this a reference from the Greek original to the seige of Sicyon in 303 B.C., as Wilamowitz thought, or Plautus' own allusion to events of the recent war against Nabis of Sparta (196–94 B.C.), as Naudet thought? Buck thought to reconcile both views by suggesting Plautus may have found the reference in his original but included it in his Latin version because the name would be familiar to his audience through the campaigns of the middle 190s B.C.¹¹ This view at least has the advantage of assuming that Plautus worked with his own (rather than the original Greek) audience in mind.

Attempts to date the *Curculio* on stylistic grounds have been largely inconclusive, in part because the play as we have it may be a shortened form. Sedgwick places the play in the early 190s based on the proportion of lyric elements, Hough somewhat later based on the use of Greek.¹² Later studies tend to assign it to Plautus' “middle” period.¹³

⁹Schutter (n. 3 above) 147–48.

¹⁰Schutter (n. 3 above) 63–64; Teuffel, *Studien und Characteristiken zur griechischen und römischen Literaturgeschichte*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1889) 325 (this page reference is misprinted in Schutter). An extensive debate, summarized in Schutter 64–66, over the reference to *tabernae veteres* in line 480 and the implied existence of the *tabernae novae* eventually yielded no result, despite the attempt of Urlichs to date the *tabernae novae* to 193 B.C. also.

¹¹Buck (n. 7 above) 65 with references; Schutter (n. 3 above) 62–63.

¹²W. B. Sedgwick, “The *Canticum* of Plautus,” *CR* 39 (1925) 55–58, and “The Dating of Plautus' Plays,” *CQ* 24 (1930) 102–106. See also Sedgwick's final word on chronol-

None of this contradicts the internal evidence on the date of the play, and we may now take up the connection to the *Trinummus* and the question of which census is meant at *Trinummus* 872. Given the presumption that, for the joke about Curculio to have any point, the plays must be very close in date, the censorship of 194/93 seems likelier. If we accept *Curculio* 508–10 as a reference to the *lex Sempronia* on usury of 193 B.C., the *Curculio* will have been produced in 193¹⁴ and the *Trinummus* at the *ludi Megalenses* in the spring of 192.¹⁵

With these dates established on independent grounds, we may now consider the thematic connections between Stasimus' denunciation of contemporary *mores* in the *Trinummus* and Curculio's entrance monologue in his play against the background of 193–92 B.C. Atypically for Plautus, the *Trinummus* is a rather dull play, in large part, as Segal notes in a perceptive article, because of the pervasive theme of *mos*.¹⁶

The most surprising element of this theme of *mos* is precisely the speech which the slave Stasimus makes after his running entrance—the entrance which the eavesdropping Charmides compares to that of Curculio. After he despairs of recovering his ring, Stasimus to the delight of Charmides launches into a wide-ranging denunciation of contemporary morals in which forms of *mos* occur no less than fourteen times in twenty-seven lines (1028–54).¹⁷ Given the prominence of this theme of

ogy, published in response to Buck (n. 7 above): "Plautine Chronology," *AJP* 70 (1949) 376–83. On lyric criteria alone, the *Curculio* belongs before the *Stichus* of 200 B.C., but Sedgwick notes abridgement (which he suspected) would have invalidated the lyric test. The latest work on the play suggests the compression consists in Plautus abridging the Greek original, not in subsequent losses of his text; see Elaine Fantham, "The *Curculio* of Plautus: An Illustration of Plautine Methods in Adaptation," *CQ* 15 (1965) 84–100. Hough's chronology, though bolstered by examination of many other aspects of Plautine style, is ultimately based on the frequency and skill of Plautus' use of Greek: J. N. Hough, "The Use of Greek Words by Plautus," *AJP* 55 (1934) 346–64. As we revise upward our estimate of the sophistication of Plautus' audience and their knowledge of Greek, this has seemed a less secure foundation: see G. P. Shipp, "Greek in Plautus," *WS* 66 (1953) 105–12, and E. W. Handley, "Plautus and his Public," *Dioniso* 46 (1975) 117–32.

¹⁵ Buck (n. 7 above) 66; Schutter (n. 3 above) 68. For a review of various attempts at complete chronologies up to 1952, see Schutter, xii–xxx.

¹⁶ Perhaps at the Plebeian Games in November. This would be the last dramatic festival before the *Ludi Megalenses* the next spring and possibly the most appropriate time to refer to plebiscitary *rogationes* (509).

¹⁷ Later dates are possible but decrease in probability.

¹⁸ Erich Segal, "The Purpose of the *Trinummus*," *AJP* 95 (1974) 252–64.

¹⁹ Out of twenty-one instances in the play, almost three times as many as any other play of Plautus: see Segal (n. 16 above) 260. Segal also notes (p. 257) that everyone in this play has something to say about *mores*; Stasimus is only the last in the series.

mos (and *fides*, with which it is interwoven) throughout the play, we can hardly take this speech as ironic or parodic, odd though it may sound in the mouth of a slave. The audience has moreover the enthusiastic asides of the eavesdropping Charmides to guide it in its response—Plautus clearly expects the audience to approve what is said.

Why, though, does Plautus wish to remind us of Curculio in this context? The threat to *mores* in the *Trinummus* is at bottom *luxuria*, as the allegorical prologue figures Luxuria and Inopia (1-22) make clear.¹⁸ This threat of *luxuria* comes from the wealth pouring in from the conquests in the Greek east, starting in the 190s B.C., but the wealth did not come alone. Along with it came Greeks themselves. Curculio's denunciation of *Graeci palliati* is one of the more famous passages in Plautus and comes from the entrance speech that *Trinummus* 1016 recalls:¹⁹

tum isti Graeci palliati, capite operto qui ambulant,
qui incedunt suffarinati cum libris, cum sportulis,
constant, conferunt sermones inter sese drapetae,
opstant, opsistunt, incedunt cum suis sententiis,
quos semper videoas bibentes esse in thermipolio,
ubi quid surrupuere: operto capitulo calidum bibunt,
tristes atque ebrioli incedunt: eos ego si offendero,
ex unoquoque eorum exciam crepitum polentiarium.

(288-95)

Many have hesitated (and with good reason, given the tight state control of comedy at Rome) to follow Frank and Buck in seeing in the *Trinummus* references to the political rivalry of Cato and the Scipios.²⁰ And yet, when Plautus himself chooses to connect Stasimus' sermon on *mores* with Curculio's denunciation of *Graeci palliati*, one wonders if the influence of the sometime consul and future censor, opponent of luxury and Greeks alike, is not somewhere in the background, even though we should not see as yet any hint of an attack upon the Scipios.²¹

¹⁸The prologue is completely Plautine, according to Fraenkel (n. 2 above) 434, who agrees with Wilamowitz and Jachmann. See also Brix-Niemeyer-Conrad, *Plautus: Trinummus* (Leipzig 1931) 38.

¹⁹Curculio makes a running entrance at 280 and orders everyone out of his way, most with a word. That the *Graeci palliati* merit eight lines of comedy at their expense suggests they are a contemporary issue for Plautus' audience. Visual irony increases the comedy: Curculio himself is wearing the *pallium*.

²⁰N. 7 above. See also Segal (n. 16 above) especially 260-64.

²¹A. E. Astin, *Cato the Censor* (Oxford 1978) 71-73, notes that there is no clear evidence, save the dubious testimony of Plutarch, for hostilities between Cato and the

Cato was not alone in these attitudes, as the controversy over the repeal of the Oppian Law during his consulship in 195 B.C. shows (Livy 34.1–8).²² Initially the two *Bruti*, tribunes of the plebs, shared his opposition to repeal, and the extent of public agitation shows that there was considerable support on both sides of the question of sumptuary legislation. Nor can we say that Cato's suspicions of Greeks and their influence were an isolated reaction.

Indeed Plautus included these elements in his plays precisely because they would play to a broad segment of his audience. Segal is undoubtedly right to call the *Trinummus*, with its extensive moralizing on *mos* and *fides*, "a Plautine venture in Roman mythopoeis."²³ The connection to the *Curculio* makes it clear that this moralizing element in the *Trinummus* is not an isolated aberration in the Plautine corpus, the result of transitory political pressures on the playwright, but a case of giving the audience more of what they enjoyed at the previous festival.²⁴

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Scipios before 187 B.C. On Cato's belief in the Roman duty to conserve property, see Astin, 94–95, and on his complex but ultimately hostile attitude toward Greek influence, chapter 8, especially 172–73 and 176–78.

²²See also Astin (n. 21 above) 25–27.

²³Segal (n. 16 above) 255.

²⁴The question may be raised: if we see the figure of Cato in the background, does that not argue for a later date for these two plays, as Cato's influence in the state increased from his consulship in 195 B.C. to his censorship in 184? Given the choice of dating the *Trinummus* after the censorship of 194/93 or that of 189/88, I think not. Cato made an *unsuccessful* attempt for the censorship of 189/88. We have no direct testimony for what his election "platform" might have been, but given his views and his actions as consul and as censor in 184/83, it is not unreasonable to assume that his views on *luxuria*, Greek influence, and the decay of *mores* formed part of his appeal to the electorate. It then seems unlikely that Plautus would make even the oblique allusion to a defeated candidate and his views immediately after the fact. Plautus could not afford to offend any aristocratic faction.

LUCRETIUS' POEM AS A *SIMULACRUM* OF THE *RERUM NATURA*

Introduction

Early in the *De Rerum Natura* Lucretius implies that his intention in the poem is to present *naturae species ratioque* (1.148): by this he means that he wants to represent and explain the workings of the universe through poetic imagery.¹ The passage containing this formulation of the poet's aim is particularly significant because in it he makes an explicit contrast between his own work and other poetry, specifically the work of Ennius.² That poet, says Lucretius, represents the image or *species* (1.125) of Homer as appearing to him and setting forth in words the nature of things (*rerum naturam expandere dictis*, 1.126). The appearance of Homer at the same time provides Ennius with a claim to poetic authority and with the proof of the existence of an afterlife (*Acherusia templaque*, 1.120). It is to refute this authoritative evidence of Ennius that Lucretius must give a good account of the nature of things, beginning

¹ This phrase has been variously interpreted by critics, but most agree that it has some connection with Lucretius' goals in the poem. See Cyril Bailey, *Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex*, 3 vols. (Oxford 1947) 183 and 625; Richard Minadeo, *The Lyre of Science: Form and Meaning in Lucretius' 'De Rerum Natura'* (Detroit 1969) 12 ff.; Diskin Clay, "Greek Physis and Epicurean Physiologia," *TAPA* 100 (1969) 31-47, 46 f.; Jeffrey M. Duban, "Venus, Epicurus and *Naturae Species Ratioque*," *AJP* 103 (1982) 165-77, 167.

² Lucretius' expression and fulfillment of his intention in his poetry have been interestingly treated in recent work: P. H. Schrijvers, *Hmrror ac Divina Voluptas: Études sur la poétique et la poésie de Lucrèce* (Amsterdam 1970) raises the question of how, in Epicurean terms Lucretius intended to achieve conversion and finds that he intended to convert the reader by proceeding *per falsa ad vera* in his poetry (p. 41); Diskin Clay, "The sources of Lucretius' inspiration," in *Études sur l'Epicurisme antique*, Cahiers de Philologie, 1 (Univ. of Lille 1976) 203-27, disagrees with this portion of Schrijvers' interpretation (p. 224, n. 12); J. H. Nichols, Jr., *Epicurean Political Philosophy: The 'De Rerum Natura' of Lucretius* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press 1972) finds evidence in the honeyed cup image that deception was essential to the role of poetry for Lucretius (p. 36) as does L. Strauss, "Notes on Lucretius," in *Liberalism: Ancient and Modern* (New York 1968) who adds, "The comparison of honey and wormwood on the one hand with the poetry and the doctrine on the other does not hold in every respect . . ." (p. 84). Lucretius' intention to deceive does not prove that falseness inheres in his poetry, nor does it indicate that his poetics is to be considered separately from his "content" as the honey is separate from the wormwood. See also n. 3 below and p. 28 f.

with the movement of the heavenly bodies (*qua propter bene cum superis de rebus habenda nobis est ratio*, 1.127-28), so that we, his readers, might withstand the superstitious beliefs that frighten us with the threat of eternal punishment. Lucretius is well aware of the problems involved in presenting such a difficult subject in Latin verse, but intends to undertake it anyway (1.136-45).

The *species* which Ennius thought he saw was also the *species* which he presented in his poetry. Lucretius himself starts by describing Venus and the *species* of spring with which she is associated (1.10). But *species* alone cannot provide an account of *natura rerum*: to accomplish this the poet must infuse his work with *ratio* as well. It is only by such an account, by *naturae species ratioque* (1.148), that human fears can be dispelled. The hendiadys means, "the vision which corresponds to the workings" or "the ordered account."

In the present paper, I would like to consider how Lucretius' representation of reality tries to fulfill its object, the integration of the *species* and the *ratio* of the *rerum natura*: in other words, how the poet tries to present an accurate picture of reality by poetic means. It is my aim to show that in its representation of reality, Lucretius' poem functions as a *simulacrum* of the *rerum natura* in the technical sense, that is, that the poem presents word-pictures or images of the real world that enter the mind of the reader and are susceptible to evaluation in the same way as the actual *simulacra* given off by material objects. I will conclude by examining one of the major images of the poem and one which has long puzzled students of the *De Rerum Natura*, the presentation of Venus in the first proemium. This examination will serve to illustrate Lucretius' method of using what I call poetic *simulacra* or properly ordered images to fulfill his promise of presenting a more profound understanding of reality than Ennius and, indeed, than any previous poet (*nullius ante trita solo*, 1.926-27). This interpretation of Lucretius' poetic method helps to explain the poet's intention in beginning his work with this very un-Epicurean goddess.

The *De Rerum Natura* as Sense Datum

Lucretius represents reality through poetic images in a work which itself claims to explain the functioning of vision (and sensation in general) through atomic images or *simulacra*. Now if Lucretius' presentation is to be scientifically consistent and ordered as he suggests at 1.148, if it is to combine *species* and *ratio* in a rigorous fashion, his explanation

of the mechanism of visual imagery and his account of how to evaluate it properly must be applicable to the visual imagery of his poem. The images that the poem contains must not be false according to the standard of determining truth which it presents.³

According to the Epicurean account as presented by Lucretius himself, vision is caused by thin rinds or films given off by things, films which resemble their sources in appearance and form (*speciem ac formam*, 4.52). These *simulacra* move with great speed and strike our eyes, conveying to our souls the visual image of the object from which they issue. The image passes through the eyes to the soul.⁴ Now after his account of the mechanism which explains vision, Lucretius deals with possible objections to his explanation. In particular, he defends the infallibility of the process. For an Epicurean, all sensations must be true, so the poet spends some time on the cases in which the visual sense seems to deceive us. The problems connected with vision and with sensation in general can be overcome by learning to see things in their proper contexts. This doctrine underlies the lengthy explanation which Lucretius undertakes to fortify our belief in the truth of sensation. The images

³ See A. A. Long, "Aisthesis, Prolepsis and Linguistic Theory in Epicurus," *BICS* 18 (1971). Critics have long debated whether Epicurus enjoined his followers from poetry because it was by nature false, and if he did, what was the nature and extent of his dictum. See especially Alessandro Ronconi, "Appunti di Estetica Epicurea," in *Miscellanea di Studi Alessandrini in Memoria di A. Rostagni* (Turin 1963) 7-24; C. Giussani, "L'Origine del Linguaggio a V. 1026-1088," in *Studi Lucreziani*, *Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex*, I (Turin 1896) 267-84; Phillip DeLacy, "The Epicurean Analysis of Language," *AJP* 60 (1939) 85-92; Gregory Vlastos, "On the Pre-History in Diodorus," *AJP* 67 (1946) 51-59; David Konstan, Some aspects of Epicurean Psychology (Leiden 1973) 44-50; Pasquale Giuffrida, *L'Epicureismo nella Letteratura Latina nel I Secolo a. C.*, I (Turin 1940) 68 and 72. P. H. Schrijvers, "La Pensée de Lucrèze sur L'Origine du Langage," *Mnemosyne* 27 (1974) 337-64, argues that neither Epicurus nor Lucretius, in his account of the development of language, was discussing the truth value of the names assigned to things, but explaining how language arose. If Epicurus (or his followers) did object to poetry, the objection was perhaps based on the injunction to avoid altering the assignment of names (*Ad Hdt.* 72.8) and the warning to avoid distorting the meaning of words by metaphor (Arrighetti 29.13.12).

⁴ *DRN* 4.45-268. The actual mechanism for vision has been the source of critical controversy, see Cyril Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (Oxford 1928) 406-13; as well as David Glidden, "The Epicurean Theory of Knowledge," (Diss. Princeton Univ. 1971) 29-50. The latter argues that, "the intension of PHANTASIA (*sic*) is strictly shapes in the case of vision for Epicurus," (p. 44), but goes on to claim quality or color (in vision) as part of the intension of φαντασία (pp. 78-79) maintaining that these differ from the idols themselves which lack color (p. 102f.). This may contradict Epicurus' statement on the subject, but see Jean Bollack, Mayotte Bollack and Heinz Wismann, *La Lettre d'Epicure* (Paris 1971) ad 49.9.

seen in mirrors are not false or magical, but follow the ordinary dynamic of visual perception in the context of an extraordinary space (4.269–323); looking into bright lights alters but does not invalidate the result of the mechanism of vision (4.324–31); the context of jaundice adds atoms that cause yellowness (*luroris semina*) to the simulacra received from the outside (4.332–36) the images received from something at a distance must be evaluated in accord with this context of remoteness (4.353–63); in general, care must be taken to supply the proper context for sensations, if we are to make the proper inference (4.379–468), as, for example, what is seen from a moving ship must be interpreted in the context of being on such a vehicle (4.387–90).

But even before he presents the solution of the various optical phenomena such as the image in the mirror and the optical illusions proper, Lucretius presents a poetic image of the misleading visual image in his account of the swiftness of motion of the *simulacra*. There are, he says, images that arise spontaneously in the air which disturb the calm picture of our world:

. . . quae sponte sua lignuntur. . . .
ut nubis facile interdum concrescere in alto
cernimus et mundi speciem violare serenam.

(4.131–35)

These image-confections are vast, and they are the cause of human fear, Lucretius asserts:

. . . taetra nimborum nocte coorta
impudent atrae formidinis ora superne;

(4.172–73)

Later in the book Lucretius explains the nature of these misleading confections: they are composed of bits of images united by chance (. . . *casu convenit imago*, 4.741) and because of their light movement are perceived singly by the mind. Immediately after the description of the fear-producing cloud bank, Lucretius describes his own verse in the same terms,⁵ as contrasted with a song scattered into the clouds:

suavidicis potius quam multis versibus edam;
parvus ut est cycni melior canor, ille gruum quam
clamor in aetheriis dispersus nubibus austri.

(4.180–82)

⁵ Lucretius derives his greatness from Epicurus: he is the swallow singing the swan's song. Cf. 3.6. On *parvus* (1.181) see I. C. Newman, "De verbis 'dicere' et 'cantare,'" *Latinitas* 13 (1965) 86–106, 100–102.

The analogy is for the most part clear: Lucretius' account will not be like the vast cloud images that arise spontaneously, formed from dispersed true images to disrupt the calm appearance (or appearing) of the world and produce fear. It will arise directly from the surface of the *rerum natura* like an image in the near view, firmly founded in reality. Lucretius' verses will be like the song of the swan which is *parvus*, fine or subtle in texture, and they will present not the frightening lies, but the soothing truth, as does the true perception of reality.

The image found in these lines acquires new dimension by the time of their repetition at 4.909–11. The later passage comes after Lucretius has explained what *simulacra* are and how they cause sensation. He concludes:

deinde adopinamur de signis maxima parvis
ac nos in fraudem induimus frustaminis ipsi.

(4.816–17)

The *simulacra* themselves are subtle, *parva*. We produce error by adding to them our gross views. After this conclusion Lucretius launches into a new topic, applying his theory of sensation to show how the *simulacra* cause desire. The climax of this section is the account of the workings of sex which reduces love to its physiological manifestations. The repetition of 4.180–82 comes in the middle of this section, at a crucial point in the poem: the introduction to the section on sleep, which will show definitively that we have nothing to fear from images like the one of Homer that Ennius claimed to see, or to hope from images like the one of Venus with which Lucretius himself opened his poem. The repetition itself functions as a transition from the explanation of how *simulacra* work to an account of the implications of this teaching for freeing us from the false images which frightened us before we understood it. In the repetition, Lucretius makes it clear that *parvus* is to describe his poem as well as the song of the swan, and that *parvus* means “fine” and is, in a sense, a synonym of *tenuis*. Lucretius' comparison of his own poem with the song of the swan acquires, by the time of its second appearance, the implication of a reference to *simulacra* because of the intervening account of the nature of these rinds or films.

The repetition of 4.180–82 presents the lines in a new context which itself emphasises the subtlety of Lucretius' song. After the second instance of the lines, Lucretius goes on to address his reader, demanding from him *tenuis auris animumque sagacem* (4.912), a subtle ear and a keen mind, to prevent error as he listens to Lucretius' account (4.913–15). The account is *parvus*, subtle, and requires subtle ears. If the

reader pays close attention to it, the account, like any sensation, will not mislead. The passage recalls Lucretius' earlier description of his work as *haec vestigia parva* (1.402). The passage recalled, like the line following the repetition, ends with a form of the rare word *sagax*:

verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci
Sunt per quae possis cognoscere cetera tute.
(1.402-403)

The image of the hunting dogs contained in this passage will be discussed in detail below. Here it is enough to note that the passage calls the reader to pay close attention to a subtle message which conveys the truth about the nature of the world. In its repetition, the passage which compares Lucretius' poem to the song of a swan acquires new meaning because it is followed by a line which recalls the image of the hunting dog.

There is one further aspect of the image which compares Lucretius' poem to the song of the swan which is less obvious than the rest. Lucretius says that his poetry stands in the same relation to that of others as does the song of a swan to that of cranes. The relevant difference between cranes and the swan is surely not that cranes honk all the time and swans do not,⁶ but that the effect of the song of cranes is merely cumulative, not melodious. Cranes do not produce a wide range of sound from which they can develop an ordered, coherent melodic line. Lucretius' song will be fine, *parvus*, because it will be coherent and therefore will seem limited in time—shorter because it will have an end, whereas the song of cranes has no cadence: Lucretius' song will be properly ordered like the images firmly founded in the *rerum natura*. Surely it is this which Lucretius means, and not that he will be brief! For he is not brief in the *De Rerum Natura* as a whole, preferring to pile up argu-

⁶See D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds* (London 1936) 68 ff. and 179 ff., for an account of the classical allusions to the cry of the crane and the significance of the swan's song respectively. The cry of the crane is noisy (p. 70) and cranes signalled or produced storms, often by their cry (p. 74). The swan, on the other hand, was a good omen to sailors (p. 185) and was sacred to Venus or Apollo (p. 184 f.). (Dying swans are considered separately, and seem unrelated in their significance). Often swans sing while on or near the water, which may be presumed calm, even when it is whirling (*Hymn Hom. XXI*) in its natural motion (p. 180 f.). The song of the swan is compared, to its advantage, with that of other birds (p. 182). It is not known for its brevity, as the crane's song is not known for its length. It seems that Lucretius is suggesting in this image that he, the swan-poet-of-Venus, partakes in calm and produces good fortune for man, and distinguishes himself from the cacophonous sound of the other poets which causes human misfortune by its falseness.

ments for his case, as he admits at 1.417:⁷ he is not brief even in the explanation in question, that of the swiftness of motion of the *simulacra* which with all its ramifications proceeds from 4.182 to 4.268. If it can be granted that the basis for Lucretius' analogy at 4.180-82 is quality as it affects the perception of duration, and not simple duration itself,⁸ it will become apparent that Lucretius intends his song to be better because of its sonority (*suavidicis*) or cogency, not its brevity.

Lucretius' Poem as *Vestigia Certa*

Lucretius' suggestion that his poem surpasses a cloud-image is given added significance by his description of his work as *vestigia*. At 1.402-11 Memmius is compared to hunting dogs ferreting out their prey in the mountains: the image of the keen-nosed hunting dog on the tracks of the truth recurs several times in the poem. Its elements are the keen mind or *animus sagax*, the track or *vestigia*, the high path followed, and the prey. As Schrijvers points out,⁹ this image is connected with Lucretius' description of himself as following the tracks or *rationes* of Epicurus (5.55), of stepping in the master's tracks (3.40-41) along the steep path (1.926-27 and 4.1-2). Lucretius describes himself as making the journey in order to convince Memmius to follow suit. It is for this purpose that the poet tells the reader to turn his mind to the *vestigia* which he will provide (2.123). Indeed, in explaining sensation, Lucretius connects *vestigia* with *simulacra*. For he says, describing the *simulacra*:

sunt igitur iam formarum vestigia certa
quae vulgo volitant subtili praedita filo.

(4.87-88)

The *simulacra* are the traces of things from which one can learn about the world, for they are the means of knowing. Lucretius' image for this process of learning is the picture of *vestigia* that are informed by *ratio*:

propterea quid sit prius actum respicere aetas
nostra nequit, nisi qua ratio vestigia monstrat.

(5.1446-47)

⁷ See 1.417: *argumentorum sit copia missa per auris.*

⁸ Schrijvers, (note 2 above) 47-48 and 214 f., considers the swan's song to be an aesthetic *summum* and a symbol of harmony and poetry.

⁹ Schrijvers, (note 2 above) 22-26.

For if one is guided by the *vera ratio*—*siquis vera vitam ratione gubernet*, (5.1117)—he can reach peace. Lucretius tells the reader that his own work will provide *vestigia* which act the same way as the *simulacra* which he calls *vestigia*. He says that, to achieve an understanding of the world, we must be guided by *ratio* in applying our mind to the *vestigia* which his work provides:

verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci
sunt per quae possis cognoscere cetera tute.

(1.401-402)

For the *vestigia* like the *simulacra* are small things which explain great things. Lucretius goes on to describe the movement of the motes in the rays of the sun as worthy of notice because they hint at the unseen atomic motions beneath our ken:

. . . rerum maganarum parva potest res
exemplare dare et vestigia notitiae.

(2.123-24)

These lines show the paradox involved in the image: the motes, small things, point to even smaller things, the atoms, which are great in importance. In the earlier passage it is Lucretius' (small) arguments which lead to the (great) theory of the existence of the void. Lucretius expands the scope of *vestigia*, which are, literally, small things or prints indicating the existence and whereabouts of the greater things that left them. *Vestigia* become, in this image, signs or arguments indicating the existence of the invisible. The connection of *vestigia* with the word *parvus*, which is used almost as a technical term for the atoms in Book 3 (205, 244, 246, 278, etc.) helps to connect Lucretius' poem with the invisible. This aspect of the image will be considered further below, in the discussion of Lucretius' presentation of the invisible through the sensible.

Another aspect of the image of the hunting dogs is the need to pay close attention to the tracks. For the *vestigia parva* (1.402) which are Lucretius' presentation become *vestigia certa* (1.406) once the dogs pick up the trail. In other words the slight indications of the truth which the poet presents become the solid basis of understanding the workings of the universe once the reader trains his attention upon them as upon sense data. This idea corresponds exactly to an aspect of the Epicurean theory of knowledge. In the Epicurean view, sensation, as Bailey notes, is unique and is always true in the sense of originating in an external

reality. However an image never achieves its full value unless we direct our senses upon it. It is the “clear image” obtained by ‘attention of the senses’ (ἐπιβολὴ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων) which alone is of scientific value.¹⁰ This is why Lucretius tells Memmius to pay attention:

. . . . vacuas auris <animumque sagacem>
semotum a curis adhibe veram ad rationem.

(1.50-51)

Once Memmius pays attention, the sense data which constitute Lucretius’ poem themselves become the *certa vestigia* of the truth, i.e., the clear image or the ἐνάργεια. In this way the arguments of the poem serve as a sure path to the Epicurean doctrine.

Now the *simulacra* or sense perceptions, on which we must focus our attention in order to learn about the universe, themselves rely on order for their certainty. Lucretius tells us that *simulacra* preserve the order of their source:

. . . cum sint in summis corpora rebus
multa minuta, iaci quae possint ordine eodem
quo fuerint et formai servare figuram.

(4.67-69)

Lucretius uses *figura* to speak of the *simulacra*:

. . . rerum effigias tenuisque figurae
mittier ab rebus summo de corpore eorum.

(4.42-43)

Similarly, the echo keeps the order (*formas*) of words:

saxa paris formas verborum ex ordine reddant.

(4.574)

Simulacra preserve the form or the shape of their source by maintaining the order of the parts of the source with respect to one another, that is, by maintaining their relative position. For it is order which produces the appearance of the thing, which is the content of the sense datum:¹¹

. . . . quam quisque det ordo
formai speciem totius corporis eius.

(2.481-82)

¹⁰Bailey, *Greek Atomists*, 243.

¹¹See n. 4 above.

Order is not the only quality which makes things what they are in the world:¹²

.... . magni refert primordia saepe
cum quibus et quali positura contineantur
et quos inter se dent motus accipiantque.

(1.817-19)

However, it is the quality which allows us to perceive what they are by our senses and it is what makes things what they are *in poetry*:

.... . nostris in versibus ipsis . . .
tantum elementa queunt permutato ordine solo.
at rerum quae sunt primordia, plura adhibere
possunt unde queant variae res quaeque creari.

(1.823-29)

In this respect poetry is analogous to the nature of things, for the elements of Lucretius' poem operate in the same way as the atoms: by altering their order alone he is able to replicate all of reality in his poetry:¹³

quin etiam refert *nostris in versibus ipsis*
cum quibus et quali sint ordine quaeque locata;
namque eadem caelum mare terras flumina solem
significant, eadem fruges arbusta animantis;
si non omnia sunt, at multo maxima pars est
consimilis; *verum positura discrepant res*.
sic ipsis in rebus item iam materiai
[intervalla vias conexus pondera plagas]
concurrus motus ordo positura figurae
cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.

(2.1013-22)

¹² For Lucretius' list of the conditions necessary for the perception of things as they are, see especially 1.677, 681, 685-86, 801, 827, 1022; 2.252, 489-94, 518, 571-72, 686, 884, 896, 900, 1014; 3.513-14, 621, 757, 857; 4.68, 370, 574, 973; 5.185, 420, 679, 732, 736. The list changes in the terms used, but not in its basic meaning. Also see *Ad Hdt.* 70.5 as well as Schrijvers' discussion of the importance of form in Lucretius, p. 219ff. and especially p. 222.

¹³ Jane Snyder, *Puns and Poetry in Lucretius' 'De Rerum Natura'* (Amsterdam 1980) notes the analogy between atoms and words in Lucretius and traces it back to Democritus (p. 54).

We began by suggesting that Lucretius' explanation of how to evaluate images should, to satisfy his claim of producing a scientific explanation, apply to the images of his poem, and now we can see not only how he has constructed a poetics which conforms to his visual theories, but also how self-consciously he has done so.¹⁴ He is well aware that he must fulfill this condition and explicitly does so in the *elementa* analogies (see n. 13).

We have seen that Lucretius presents us with the poetic picture of the misleading visual image, the misleading cloud images, just before he describes the optical illusions and tells us both to add no opinions to, and to come to no conclusions from, doubtful facts (4.465–68), and to adopt no *ratio* which does not depend on the senses (4.520–21). It is now clear that the cloud images, and therefore poetry like Ennius' which, to Lucretius, is bad poetry, are images which have lost the order, or the contours, of their source. And these in turn are like mirror images and optical illusions, which are all instances of lost order, or misplaced context. And it is lack of context or poor ordering which causes mistakes of attribution (4.816–17). The mirror image (4.269–317) as we saw above, was not strange if we took into consideration (or added the proper δόξα of) its distance. So each image of the universe which reaches us through our senses, whether it is a physical *simulacrum* or one of Lucretius' poetic images, will be understood properly when we have learned to consider it in the proper context.

The Invisible Through the Sensible

It would not be so difficult for Lucretius to present an accurate picture of the workings of the universe through poetic imagery, if he only needed to represent the order of things visible and not the invisible as well. He proceeds in two ways to present the invisible: (1) through striking images which illustrate what happens beneath the ken of our five senses (one example out of many is the movement of sheep on the hillside [2.317–22] which is like atomic movement); (2) through his argument, which shows that facts, i.e., what can be seen, indicate the

¹⁴ See Paul Friedlander, "The Pattern of Sound and Atomistic Theory in Lucretius," *AJP* 62 (1941) 16–34 for an analysis of some of the correspondences between Lucretius' poetic devices and the theory which he expounds. Snyder (note 13 above) chapter 5, notes that the *elementa* analogies and the various puns which she connects with them help Lucretius teach Epicureanism. See also below, p. 17–20, and p. 24–26.

truth, or the existence of the invisible.¹⁵ For example, he says that if the *primordia* were limited in number, they could never form or maintain compounds, nor would the compounds grow. And yet compounds are formed, endure and grow: the facts prove this (*manifesta docet res*, 2.565). Similarly, Lucretius appeals to *res manifesta* to support the truth of his explanation of the thunderbolt (6.249). As Schrijvers puts it, *res manifesta* = *res vera*.¹⁶

Furthermore, what is clear or evident urges belief in the invisible:

. . . neque id manifesta refutant
nec contra pugnant, in promptu cognita quae sunt,
sed magis ipsa manu ducunt et credere cogunt.

(2.867-89)

The belief that is required is not a blind faith, but a trust in the senses, in sensation when it is properly interpreted:

sensus; cui nisi prima fides fundata valebit,
haud erit occultis de rebus quo referentes
confirmare animi quicquam ratione queamus.

(1.423-24)¹⁷

Optical illusions are important because they tempt us to violate this trust:

cetera de genere hoc miranda multa videmus,
quae violare fidem quasi sensibus omnia querunt.

(4.463-64)¹⁸

Lucretius hopes to produce this faith through his argument,¹⁹ which we saw, he describes as *vestigia*:

multaque praeterea tibi possum commemorando
argumenta fidem dictis corraderem nostris
verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci.

(1.399-401)

¹⁵ Cf. Anaxagoras B21a, ὅψις γὰρ τῶν ἄδητων τὰ φαινόμενα and Aristotle, *Nich.* *Eth.* 1104 a13-14, δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι.

¹⁶ See Schrijvers' description of the role of *manifesta* in Lucretius' argument, p. 87 ff. For this equation, he cites 2.245-46 and 3.353.

¹⁷ Here Lucretius is absolutely faithful to his master's teaching. Epicurus says σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔστιν. αὐτὴ δὲ αἰσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ, *Ad Hdt.* 39.8.

¹⁸ Other mentions of faith in the senses: 4.480, 482, 505.

¹⁹ Lucretius identifies the disciple with the hunting dog, as shown above. Perhaps this is why he speaks of *fida canum vis* (6.1222).

In general it can be said that the senses urge belief in the ἄδηλα, and that this faith is achieved by seeing things in their contexts, just as what is seen from a moving ship (4.387-90) must be understood from the context "moving ship."

Now Schrijvers has objected that it is possibly this form of perception that Lucretius warns is subject to error.²⁰

deinde adopinamur de signis maxima parvis
ac nos in fraudem induimus frustaminis ipsi.

(4.816-17)

Schrijvers argues that Lucretius could not render the invisible visible without convincing the reader to add *opinatus animi*, the Epicurean τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον τῆς διανοίας, and with it the possibility of error to a visible scene. Yet it is precisely the *opinatus animi* which renders the invisible in some sense visible:

propter opinatus animi quos addimus ipsi,
pro visis ut sint quae non sunt sensib' visa.

(4.465-66)

Schrijvers concludes that Lucretius accepts this false manner of presentation to the degree that it serve objective reality, which only Epicureanism expounds.²¹ Yet I believe that Lucretius intended to appeal not to the fallible process to which Schrijvers alludes, but to another, infallible mechanism of perception, the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας. Bailey's explanation of this concept is still influential, and convincing despite attacks by Furley, Sedley and Glidden.²² Bailey says, ". . . in Epicurus' view, the concepts of science are built up, step by step, by the juxtaposition (σύν-

²⁰ Schrijvers, p. 119ff. Cf. Anke Manuwald, *Die Prolepsislehre Epikurs* (Bonn 1972).

²¹ See Schrijvers, p. 192f.

²² Bailey's explanation of πρόληψις and ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας have been the subject of much discussion. David Furley, *Two Studies in the Greek Atomists* (Princeton 1967) interprets *Ad Hdt.* 50-51 as indicating that ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας refers to the apprehension of illusory images and that πρόληψις is not a technical term but refers to the retained sense image in comparison with new sense perceptions (pp. 202-206). See also David Furley, "Knowledge of Atoms and Void in Epicureanism," in *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas (New York 1971) 607-19. See David Sedley's introduction to *Epicurus, On Nature Book XXVIII (Cronache Ercolanesi)* 3 (1973). Sedley argues convincingly against Furley's view, but his own analysis falters on his judgment that κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ in *Ad Hdt.* 62.10 cannot refer back to the argument as a whole. A passage at the end of a section on atomic motion quite naturally harks back to the argument as a whole. A. A. Long (note 3 above) defends the technical sense of πρόληψις but does not concern himself with ἐπιβολὴ τῆς

θεσις) of previous concepts, each in their turn grasped as self-evident [*and thus free from error*] by the immediate apprehension of the mind (ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας) . . . [which] . . . immediately apprehends a new concept as the necessary result of the combination of concepts, themselves similarly apprehended." Thus Bailey sees scientific truth as "a chain of necessarily connected and self-evident visualizations."²³ He finds that ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας apprehends "the 'vision' or 'image' or 'concept' of the atoms still, even inside the moving compound body themselves moving in every direction."²⁴ The image or concept which results is similar to the πρόληψις which Bailey has defined as the general concept created in the mind from individual sense perceptions and serving as a test of truth for other images presented by sense perception.²⁵ We saw at the beginning of this paper that Lucretius starts his poem with the statement that he will present *naturae species ratioque*, which we translated, "the vision which corresponds to the workings of

διανοίας. The latter concept is considered by David Glidden (note 4 above) 155–61. Glidden's attack on Bailey is based on the questionable premise that for Epicurus knowledge of the atoms and void is subject to error. Manuwald, *Die Prolepsislehre*, 115–20 argues against Bailey maintaining that in *Ad Hdt.* 62.8 ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων does not refer to the atomic theory. But Epicurus' reference there to both sensation and mental perception does not rule out reference to the atomic theory: rather it may indicate a desire to focus attention on the similarity of direct mental perception to sensation to affirm that it is infallible in exactly the same way as sensation.

²³ This is a metaphor, but a thoroughly Epicurean one: the connection between seeing and mental perception is part of the Epicurean doctrine. See Schrijvers' discussion of the relationship between *simulacra* and language in *De Rerum Natura* 4.777–817, 91–128, and also nn. 25 and 26, below. He finds (p. 121) that the process of judgement which follows mental perception is not identical with, but analogous to, the thought processes which follow visual perception. If this is so, it means only that the metaphor, which belongs to all of Epicurean thought and not to Lucretius alone, is imperfect, but it does not affect the directness or the truth value of such mental perception. In accordance with Epicurean theory, Lucretius saw himself as affecting the store of mental visualizations possessed by the reader. The correctness of the theory on which Lucretius relied is of no concern to the present study.

²⁴ Bailey, *Greek Atomists*, 570–71. By self evident Bailey appears to mean ἐναργής. The notion that the ἄδηλα become ἐναργῆ is consistent with Lucretius' description of knowledge as a kind of illumination or clarity brought to the mind (see for example 1.144–45: *clara tuae possim praepandere lumina menti, res quibus occultas penitus convisere possis*). Epicurus himself does not seem to refer to the knowledge of the ἄδηλα as ἐναργῆς.

²⁵ Bailey, *Greek Atomists*, 245–46. As Long, (note 3 above) p. 116, says: "the 'truth' value of momentary feelings and sensations is purely subjective, whereas for an objective test of ἀλήθεια feelings and sensations must be 'clear' and coordinated with προλήψεις." But according to Long *contra* Bailey προλήψεις themselves are true in the same way as are οἰσθήσεις (p. 131, n. 27). See also Schrijvers, pp. 104–107.

nature." After our examination of Lucretius' teaching about sense perception, we can say that Lucretius' images and arguments are meant to present to the immediate apprehension of the mind a world ordered by the *ratio* of atoms in ever larger and ever different combinations. We do not see the *ratio* for it is itself an ἄδηλον, but we perceive it directly with the ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας applied to Lucretius' arguments: this mental perception is the necessary consequence of the "images" or "concepts," in Bailey's sense, of atoms moving in the void. At the same time, Lucretius wishes, through the ordered arrangement of his images, or *species*, to make the order of both the visible and the invisible world so obvious that we can, in some sense, see it.

It is necessary to remember that reading a poem is physically a different experience from direct perception: the images of visible and of invisible entities which reading produces in us are of exactly the same order, that is, they produce cognition acting directly on the mind which then summons the physical images or mental concepts evoked, producing them from the air or from its own stockpile.²⁶ In the case of Lucretius' poem, what we "see" as the poem works on our imagination expands the scope of our προλήψεις so that they now include a conception of atomic theory. Thus the poet changes the atomic motions in our mind in such a fashion as to turn us into Epicureans. Thus the poem's representation of the ordered context of the *rerum natura* is intended to serve as the actual instrument which effects the reader's conversion to Epicureanism. The perception of this ordered context is direct and involves no error, so that the conversion is genuine and dependent only upon a particular sort of acquiescence by the reader, i.e., his willingness to pay close attention.

The Function of Context in Lucretius' Poetics

verum positura dicrepat res

We have seen the important role that the proper context or perspective plays in interpreting sense data according to the Epicurean the-

²⁶ Long follows Merbach in the view that προλήψεις are mental entities to which words refer (p. 131, n. 33) and he finds that they are recognizable derivatives of things clearly experienced or experienceable (p. 128). See also Manuwald, pp. 103-14 and especially p. 111. The poem adds to our fund of experience providing us with προλήψεις we lacked previously through the proper use of words and of images (which constitute experiences).

ory of sensation. Not surprisingly, an examination of the *De Rerum Natura* with an eye to poetic method indicates that Lucretius' account consists of verbal units of different sizes, presented in shifting contexts on a variety of levels of meaning and stylistic form. On the most basic level this method involves, as we saw above, the deliberate manipulation of letters in shifting contexts to form various words and thus replicate the behavior of the elements of the universe within the texture of the poem.²⁷ Deutsch has studied the patterns produced by the repetition of sounds in the *De Rerum Natura* and finds that the use of patterns made up of individual sounds as well as of whole words and phrases functions to unify the poem.²⁸ Minyard and Ingalls indicate that Lucretius wrote in a quasi-formulaic style reminiscent in some ways of the style of Homer.²⁹ Minyard examines the repetition of metrically regular phrases, a device prevalent throughout the poem. Lucretius uses the same phrases in different contexts and about different subjects; repeated phrases recall their earlier contexts, drawing these contexts into the current discussion. At the same time these repetitions play a different role in the meaning and at times in the syntax of the new passage.³⁰ Other phrases, empty of any great poetic interest or value, are repeated to provide a network of metrically regular expressions which ties together the poem in a purely formal fashion.

Studies of Lucretius have shown that on every level elements repeated in shifting contexts serve as illustrations of the poet's meaning: Friedlander finds that the relationship between words and letters functions as a lesson by example for atomism and Deutsch concludes that Lucretius' sound patterns often exemplify his meaning.³¹ Schrijvers has shown that Lucretius makes use of the lesson by example in his imagery.³² The pattern of argumentation which develops as the poem un-

²⁷ As shown above, optical illusions have lost their contexts.

²⁸ See Rosamund Deutsch, "The Pattern of Sound in Lucretius," (Diss. Bryn Mawr College 1939) 172-76 and, for an analysis which relies on Friedlander and Deutsch and analyzes how syntactic units are a poetic device like Homeric formulas, see Anne Amory, "Obscura de re lucida carmina: Science and Poetry in the *De Rerum Natura*," *YCS* 21 (1969) 143-68, especially p. 152.

²⁹ John Douglas Minyard, "Mode and Value in the *De Rerum Natura*" *Hermes Einzelschriften* 39 (1978) and W. B. Ingalls, "Repetition in Lucretius," *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 227-36.

³⁰ See n. 14 above.

³¹ Deutsch (note 29 above) Chapter V, on "Theme Words," 97-120.

³² Schrijvers, p. 33: the presenting an example of a stylistic device upon discussing that device, without a deictic note. Schrijvers cites J. Marouzeau's "La Leçon Par Exemple," and applies it to the *DRN*. See also Schrijvers, p. 98 and n. 4.

folds is an even more profound example of the use which Lucretius makes of proper placement in context. The exposition which the poet provides is cumulative and the reader is meant to remember the earlier parts of it. We have already seen (p. 270) that Lucretius begins his poem by using words in their everyday meanings (e.g., *species*, 1.10, *simulacrum*, 1.123) before he gives them technical, Epicurean meanings. Earlier explanations are recalled by allusions or by the repetition of metrically regular words, phrases or passages, or these explanations are presupposed in later accounts. For example, earth, air, fire and water are the causes given for phenomena in Books 5 and 6: for a complete explanation of these phenomena, the reader must insert into the accounts of Books 5 and 6 an account of the atomic composition of the four elements, which was explained in Books I and II. In the later books, atoms and void are taken for granted as the bases of reality. Similarly the atomic explanation of disease is given in Book 3 (463–525) but in Book 4 (especially 1095–1137), disease is explained in terms of the climate and water (which themselves are explained at 5.195–350, where Book 1, in particular, is assumed). Lucretius relies on the reader to assemble the complete explanation, inserting the atomic workings of disease into this new context as an explanation auxiliary to his present topic. He is explicit about his method: *vestigia parva . . . sunt per quae possis cognoscere cetera tute* (1.403–404); . . . *suscipere haec* [the details of the life of the gods] *animi tranquilla pace valebis. inde videre licet qualis iam vita sequatur* (6.78–79).

Just as Lucretius gives explanations and assumes that the reader remembers them, so at times he speaks for a while with technical precision and in a different context dispenses with it. In the early part of his description of the composition and the workings of the soul (this starts at 3.136), he defines the *animus* and the *anima* and distinguishes between these two parts of the soul rather consistently.³³ Later in Book 3 when Lucretius is interested in demonstrating the mortality of the soul, he uses *animus* and *anima* interchangeably.³⁴

Lucretius' method then is to present his explanation in shifting perspectives or contexts. The shift however is not random but hierarchical, fitting nicely of detail (Books 1 and 2) into ever larger contexts.

³³ An exception can be found at 3.177 where *animus* includes *anima*.

³⁴ See Bailey *ad* 3.417–24.

Thus one explanation prepares the way for others in an ordered method of argument and description:

namque alid ex alio clarescat nec tibi caeca
 nox iter eripet quin ultima naturai
 pervideas: ita res accendent lumina rebus.

(1.1115-17)

It seems then that Lucretius' method of composition involved the use of letters, words, phrases and arguments whose significance changes in context. As we have seen, for instance, *simulacrum* is first used of the images of the dead (1.123) which, in the popular view, return to frighten the living: Lucretius' example is Ennius. The word is then used to mean "statue" (2.24) and, the singular is used of an image or example of a physical process: the motion of sheep is a *simulacrum* of atomic motion (2.112). *Simulacra* is a technical term for the means of perception in most of Book 4. In the diatribe against love at the end of this book, *simulacra* refers, ambiguously, to the images, both atomic and wrought with a chisel, of the lover: these are to be fled. After Book 4, the word *simulacrum* for the most part reverts to its colloquial meaning of statue (5.75, 5.308, 6.419), but can again have its technical sense (6.76).

I believe that the technique of expanding and contracting meaning which I have described in Lucretius' use of words can be found also in the poet's manipulation of imagery, and it is for this reason that, as commentators on the *De Rerum Natura* have remarked, his various uses of the same image are hard to reconcile. Anderson sees a discontinuity in the use of such major symbols as light and dark, *terra mater*, Mars and war, Venus *genetrix*, death and the sea. "Instead of using his symbols in a single sense, e.g., war always to signify destruction, Lucretius tends to allow the same symbol to assume any of three principal directions, according to its particular context."³⁵

I would like to illustrate the use of the stylistic device I have described with a brief examination of the Venus imagery in the *De Rerum Natura*. Lucretius' portrait of the goddess has posed several different problems of interpretation. Venus' presence in the first proemium has

³⁵ William S. Anderson, "Discontinuity in Lucretian Symbolism," *TAPA* 91 (1960) 1-29 *passim* and p. 22.

raised doubts about Lucretius' motivation in writing his poem. Her portrait early in the poem is said to indicate a discord or disunity in the poet's intention which has been labelled as schizophrenia³⁶ or his manifestation of what has been called the Epicurean dilemma.³⁷ The problem does not end with the first proem, for, even if the critic has found satisfactory reasons for the presence of Venus in the first proem, he is then called upon to explain the deterioration of the initial pleasant view of the goddess. As the poem progresses, the various aspects or attributes of Venus in the first proem become separated from the goddess: the image suffers discontinuity. Some critics claim that the poem itself declines from the Venus picture and that the plague of Book 6 does not provide a satisfactory ending.³⁸ Lucretius seems inconsistent in his treatment of Venus and the powerful and lovely image of her at the start of his poem throws the work off balance. Thus, a consideration of the Venus image of the first proemium is as significant for an evaluation of the quality of the outcome of Lucretius' method of composition as it is for an analysis of that method of composition.

The first proemium presents a picture, almost a serial tableau, of Venus in several of her functions or aspects. At the outset, Venus is described as *voluptas*, the pleasure or delight, of men and gods (1.1). She is associated with nature, which she "governs" (1.20) and she is a goddess (1.5): by the interaction of these aspects she is in charge of generation, creation, and nurture or feeding (1.3-5, etc.). She carries out her charge with varying degrees of detachment. At times she operates through her driving force or power (*volucres . . . percussae corda tuae vi*, 1.12-13; *efficis ut cupide generatim saecla propagent*, 1.20), and she is therefore associated with strong passion.³⁹ The goddess' initial designation as *Aeneadum genetrix* (1.1), tying her to the mythical

³⁶ The solution encountered by the reader of the *DRN* through an analysis of Lucretius' mental state was launched in ancient times by St. Jerome and is carried on in modern criticism by Logre, *L'Anxiété de Lucrèce* (Paris 1946) and Perelli, *Lucrezio Poeta dell'Angoscia* (Florence 1969).

³⁷ See P. DeLacy, "Process and Value: An Epicurean Dilemma," *TAPA* 88 (1957) 114-26.

³⁸ Against this, the opinion of many scholars, see Elizabeth McLeod, "Lucretius' *carmen dignum*," *CJ* 58 (1963) 145-56 and Minadeo, *The Lyre of Science*, 18 f. and 24 f.

³⁹ See J. P. Elder, "Lucretius 1.1-49," *TAPA* 85 (1954) 88-120, especially p. 119 where Elder describes the interactions of the three kinds of *voluptas* which he finds in the poem: static, harmless kinetic and harmful kinetic. By "passion" I mean "harmful kinetic." I agree with Elder that various degrees of the three meanings play through the opening lines.

founder of the Roman people, indicates her Romanness, as does the request that she protect Memmius, a particular Roman (1.26). The connection between Romanness and passion and violent action prepares for the association of Venus with war, that particularly Roman passion, when the god of war is described as in passionate contact with her (1.32). However for the moment Mars is at peace, a peace which is due to Venus and connected explicitly with her (1.40). In describing the goddess' essential role in creation and again in explaining her role in producing peace, Lucretius asks her aid in writing his poem (1.24 and 1.40), thus associating Venus with poetic creation as well as with biological reproduction. And finally Lucretius looks to a peace that transcends the activities of Venus, both reproductive and artistic: the peace enjoyed by the gods themselves (1.44-49).

As the poem continues however the various aspects or attributes assigned to Venus in the early description of her are reevaluated or reassigned. The initial Venus picture is qualified and limited as Lucretius shows that *voluptas* is a concrete physical force (which he can explain), not an attribute caused by the goddess. Venus' connection with nature is seen to be a subordinate role in a great process of creation and destruction.⁴⁰ At the end of Book 4 the ramifications of the total Venus picture emerge as the goddess' connection with physical generation is made explicit: Venus is described as a fire (1077), a madness (1117), a destructive force rejected by nature itself (1088). Yet she is not, as has been suggested,⁴¹ debased in the true sense of the word. The elaboration of her specific function as the goddess of procreation limits the vague notion of her abstract physical power which was suggested in the earlier portrait. Venus is as much a generative force as she was at the end of the first proemium, but the significance of such generation is diminished in the new context of the full scientific explanation of the workings of the universe.

⁴⁰ Snyder (note 13 above) says (p. 134-35), "Although Lucretius accepts Venus as a representation of the generative forces of nature, the real basis of all that is created is, according to the Epicurean system, *materies*. . . ." See Minadeo, pp. 31-54, Nichols, p. 28 ff., Duban, p. 176-77, and Eva Thury, "Naturae species ratioque: Poetic Image and Philosophical Perspective in the *De Rerum Natura* of Lucretius," (Diss. Univ. of Pennsylvania 1976) 170-73.

⁴¹ Anderson, p. 19 f. suggest that she loses value. Minadeo, p. 36, says: ". . . Venus reappears here as a common destroyer." He maintains however that at 4.1209 ff. the original creative Venus of the first proemium reappears. He concludes (p. 90) that the final couplet of Book 4 is a false or at best equivocal ending.

As Barra has shown, in his account of atomic motion Lucretius equates Venus with the swerve: as Venus provides animals with the impulse for union, so *voluptas*, or Venus causes creation on the atomic level in her aspect of the swerve.⁴² As we have seen, Venus is, at the beginning of the poem described as *hominum divumque voluptas* (1.1). Barra shows that Venus becomes *divum hominumque voluptas* in a different sense, for men and gods are alike made of atoms. The presence of Venus herself proves to be less important than the effect she has, that of causing *dia voluptas* which is *dux vitae* (2.172). And it is Epicurus, through his teaching, and not Venus, through procreation, who causes *divina voluptas* (3.28): the word *venus* comes to mean little more than "sex" as the goddess becomes subordinate to the processes of nature.

Ultimately poetic inspiration derives not from Venus but from Epicurus. This becomes apparent once the subject of Lucretius' poem is revealed to be that same nature over which Epicurus has triumphed. As soon as this is understood, Calliope will serve as well as Venus for the source of Lucretius' inspiration.⁴³ Even Venus' connection with Romanness loses its significance as Lucretius explains the nature of things: nationality is seen as only one accidental part of the condition of man—Venus' importance is only to the realm of *eventa* (if at all, see 1.464). The importance of Romanness is challenged within the first proemium itself by the account of salvation brought to mankind by the *Gravis homo* (1.65) and disappears completely as emphasis shifts to the blind impersonal force of nature, for which humanity constitutes an indifferent unit (5.198–350, see 206–34 in particular). In the context of this explanation Lucretius may ask Venus for respite from war, but real peace is produced by an understanding of the workings of nature.

It becomes apparent even from a brief examination of the Venus imagery of the *De Rerum Natura* that there is no discontinuity in its presentation, but a progression from the popular or traditional view to

⁴² Giovanni Barra, "Fatis avolsa voluptas, DRN II.257," *RAAN* 39 (1964) 149–65, 160 f.

⁴³ Bailey, Lucretius, p. 567, considers this invocation purely conventional, but see Barra, p. 165 and Clay, "The sources of Lucretius' inspiration," p. 220 ff. The transfer from physical to philosophical pleasure (from *blanda* to *vera voluptas*) is perhaps aided by Lucretius' use of the image of the goal at 6.92–93: *tu mihi currenti spatium monstrā*. The last use of *spatium* referred to physical love (4.1196), while here the word refers to the goal of Lucretius' poetry, the aim of his pure love for Epicurus and for the latter's pure philosophy. The *spatium* has shifted from *blanda* to *vera voluptas*. Friedländer notes (p. 20 and pp. 24–25) that according to the etymology of Calliope, which is emphasized by the *callida* of 1.93, it is the loveliness of Lucretius' work (as inspired by his new goal) that will get him through the home stretch of the poem.

the proper Epicurean attitude toward the goddess who is not a goddess. The movement from Venus to the plague is a natural one for Lucretius: it is, to be sure, as Minadeo has noted, the movement of a cycle of creation and destruction,⁴⁴ but its more significant character is that of a *simulacrum* of reality. The first proemium presents an inaccurate picture of Venus, a picture whose elements are out of context, so that humans reason poorly about them. Suspicion is thrown on this image by its immediate successors, the portrait of Epicurus as a Greek hero and the image of Iphigenia, the victim of religious piety. Venus is a great goddess, but Epicurus deserves praise for conquering religion (1.62-79) and it was religious faith which destroyed Iphigenia. As subsequent images and arguments are added to the first view of Venus, the elements of that view are rearranged and the picture in the mind of the reader becomes an accurate one. Imagine a heap of fragments that are all that remain of an ancient vase. Then imagine them as part of a museum restoration which has located each fragment in what was its place in the original vase. The restoration allows us to see the shape of the whole and the proper spatial relation to each other of the original fragments. So Lucretius does not destroy the original Venus picture but "locates" its components in an accurate, full picture of reality.

Thus, the images of the poem possess a logical structure of their own, not the logic of philosophical discourse but the logic which derives from an understanding of the process of human sensation, a *ratio* based on human psychology. The poem's imagery is ordered so that, when added to the beliefs of ordinary men it will reshape them into the truth.⁴⁵ The process of building the correct image is similar to that of understanding the *simulacra* of the square tower seen at a distance; it involves a perception of the image in the proper context for a correct interpretation. However, understanding does not result from a conscious process like the reasoning about the tower, which admits to the possibility of error, but from an automatic and error-free process which allows us, as long as we pay close attention, to perceive the true nature of things by combining the mental images presented to us by Lucretius' poetry. Of course it can be argued that this method of perception does

⁴⁴ See nn. 41 and 42 above.

⁴⁵ The image I have in mind is that of a mask in boolean logic. A mask is a string of binary numbers that alters the configuration of the string (data string) to which it is applied in a boolean operation, but alters only the parts of the data string which need altering. The resulting string, is, of course, completely different in its pattern of 0's and 1's than the data string. Thus Lucretius applies the "mask" of the *DRN* to the configuration of atoms in the reader's mind, changing the order of what is there.

not differ significantly from the way in which images are constantly altered in any poetry of any length. It seems to me that it is precisely because of this capacity of a poetic exposition that Lucretius chose to write his account in poetry, and I have tried to indicate how he made use of the potential inherent in poetic organization and poetic imagery to convey his message in a manner which conformed to the tenets of his doctrine. For Lucretius presents us with a poem which represents the order or *ratio* of nature in the arrangement of its letters, sounds, words, arguments and images and which at the same time can claim to be ordered according to the *species* of nature, because it presents images and arguments which are perceived like the *simulacra* of things. It appears that Lucretius' images and his arguments are properly aligned and connected with respect to each other and to external reality, so that the *De Rerum Natura* is truly a representation of reality which fulfills Lucretius' intention as stated just after the proemium of Book 1:

Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.

(1.146–48)

Is Lucretius' Poetics Connected with His Ethics?

It remains to consider Lucretius' reason for choosing to produce a poetic account of the Epicurean philosophy (beyond the novelty of the task, see 1.926–50), an account which required the presentation of letters, words, phrases and images whose primary significance changes in context. A likely explanation of his reasons for preferring such an account can be found in Epicurean ethics.

Epicureans based ethical judgement upon sensation, on the calculation of pleasures relative to one another. Of necessity, the value of any given experience varied from situation to situation according to the sensations of pleasure available in each situation. This meant that what was *just* varied from situation to situation,⁴⁶ as did what was *right* for the wise man to do.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ *KD*, 33 and 36.

⁴⁷ This is perhaps the direct meaning of Usener 18. Plutarch's interpretation is different, but may be wrong: οὐκ εὔοδον τὸ ἀπλούν ἔστι κατηγόρημα. Plutarch connects this with Epicurus' statement that the wise man can break the laws (Usener 134). See also the statement that even politics is an acceptable pursuit if abstinence from it disturbs the mind (Usener 555).

Epicureans held that the meaning of words is by nature, and not convention. Yet, it seems that in using the same words or formulas differently in different contexts, Lucretius is trying to align Epicurean language theory with Epicurean physics and ethics. At 4.1160–69, he criticizes the words which the lover applies to his beloved. The misperception, or the disturbance, love, produces the misuse of words:

nigra melichrus est, immunda et fetidaacosmos.

(4.1160)

Here the words used are wrong, i.e., out of context, and the right ones would be found with the help of ethics, i.e., the rejection of love which Lucretius advocates. The *De Rerum Natura* presents words in their right contexts, but the contexts change, and we are perhaps to understand that although the meaning of words is by φύσις context is a νόμος over them, and an ethical calculus must be used to evaluate the νόμος that governs each word, just as it must be used to evaluate the νόμος that is to govern each action.

We are left with the conclusion, from 4.1160–69, that the disturbance of the harmony of the atomic union produces false words. This is necessarily so, since, for an Epicurean, the physical and mental plane are functionally related:

quin etiam morbis in corporis avius errat
saepe animus; . . .

(3.463–64)

It is our understanding of the universe which can help us live better and more happily.⁴⁸ According to Epicurean ethics, a moral choice cannot be made in the abstract, it must be made in context, so Lucretius presents his reader with a striking picture of Venus in the first proem, only to repudiate it step by step in the rest of the *De Rerum Natura*. Lucretius cannot alter our view of Venus by altering the meaning of the word *venus*, since, for an Epicurean, the meaning of names is fixed by nature. It is only by shifting the context in which we view Venus that Lucretius is able to redefine the meaning of the name in a fashion acceptable for an Epicurean and to highlight the triumph of the true god Epicurus. The resulting understanding can only be acquired by following Epicurus and thereby attaching a positive value not to the per-

⁴⁸ David Furley, "Lucretius the Epicurean," in *Lucrèce, Entretiens sur L'Antiquité Clasique Tome XXIV*, 1–37, argues that the tendency to interject moral commentary was peculiar to Lucretius.

spective of man and his fears and hopes, but to the larger perspective of the whole of nature, which is sometimes in accord with the human perspective, but often not. The shift of perspective requires the reader to see man in a more complete context, and to understand that man's flawed perspective is the source of his own difficulties. Thus, Lucretius describes the misery of glorious Athens as a disease which Epicurus recognized:

intellegit ibi vitium vas efficere ipsum
omniaque illius vitio corrumpere intus.

(6.17-18)

The cause of the disease may be chance or nature (the thought of 6.30-31 resembles that of 6.1133-36), as in the case of the plague of Athens with which the book ends. But this disease is like the fear of small boys in dark rooms, and is to be cured by *naturae species ratioque* (6.41). The cure of the disease is the proper perspective or understanding of it as one among many forces in a world not made for man. Lucretius provides the medicine for these small boys (at 1.936-50 and 4.11-25), and for the adult troubled by the disease of ignorance and fear: the bitter cup ringed with honey. For ignorance of Epicureanism is like a disease, (6.17-42) but more fearful. Lucretius' medicine will be the right words, the words which will allow us to live properly. He gives us what seems like a pleasing explanation—*species* to allay our fear, but his explanation hides a *ratio*, the *ratio-in-species* of nature which is the honeyed cup of Lucretius.⁴⁹

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⁴⁹ Schrijvers notes, "Lucrèce se range parmi les auteurs qui . . . ont défini avec une conformité remarquable l'essence de la méditation et de l'assimilation d'une doctrine par des métaphores ou des comparaisons empruntées aux processus corporels." p. 37, n. 18.

CICERO'S *DE LEGIBUS* I: ITS PLAN AND INTENTION

Although the *Laws'* transitions from one topic to another are managed adroitly if one considers them dialogically,¹ their thematic purpose is obscure. It is easy to see how historiography yields to legal philosophy, and that the poorness of Roman historians matches the narrowness of Roman jurists (5-7, 14), but not how the opposition between poetry and history, and in particular that between Cicero the published poet and Cicero the historian yet to be, introduces properly the question of law. Cicero, however, has suggested how we can go about trying to put together the argument with the form of the dialogue.²

Perhaps the clearest suggestion lies in the contrast implied between the published *de re publica*, which Quintus and Atticus have read, and *de legibus*, which is happening now and turns out to be written behind the backs of Quintus and Atticus. They have read a book that assigned the death of the Roman republic to the moment at which Scipio, through a natural death or assassination, could not assume the dictatorship (6.12). *de legibus* is meant to supply the legislation for a regime that no longer exists except in speech. It is accordingly even more imaginary than the idealized version of the Roman republic that Scipio gave. His had a chance; this has none (cf. 3.29). The Rome of *de re publica* is now like Marius' oak; it has taken the place of, or is indistinguishable from, the real Rome, just as Cicero's Marian oak can be pointed out at Arpinum without one ever being certain that the deictic pronoun *haec* points any further than from one text to another: *lucus quidem ille et haec Arpinatum quercus agnoscitur, saepe a me lectus in Mario: si enim manet illa quercus, haec est profecto; etenim est sane vetus* (1). Indeed, since the irregularity of *lectus*, in agreeing with the more remote *lucus* in Atticus' speech, leaves *haec . . . quercus* recognized but not read, Atticus can refer to the Marian oak as *illa*, as if it were not a Ciceronian fiction but something once real, whose survival

¹Cf. M. Pohlenz, "Der Eingang von Cicero's Gesetzen," *Philologus* (1938) 102-27.

²A. Laudien, "Die Composition und Quelle von Ciceros I. Buch der Gesetze," *Hermes* (1911) 108-43, in starting from the presumed sources to work out the plan, argues for the almost total incoherence of the first book. Ph. Finger, *Die Grundlegungen des Rechts im 1. Buche von Cicero's "Schrift de legibus,"* *RhM* (1932) 155-77, 243-62 is much less destructive.

would allow for its possible identification with the *haec* he sees before him. Quintus' misunderstanding of Atticus' *manet*, so that survival in speech replaces survival in deed, and the ageing (*canescet*) of Cicero's oak merely guarantees its deathlessness, seems not only to put *de legibus* at a greater distance from us than *de re publica* is, which temporally is remote but otherwise of a fully determinate time and place, but to indicate that the problem of law is bound closely with referents that cannot be fixed.³ Atticus' *haec* is the same as Quintus', but Quintus' *illa* is not necessarily the same as Atticus', for Quintus' is that from which *olim evolavit nuntia fulva Iovis*, and Atticus' *haec est profecto* must become Quintus' *nunc sit haec*.

Atticus wants Cicero to imitate his master Plato and follow up the writing of *de re publica* with its counterpart *de legibus* (15). In Cicero's reply, Plato the writer becomes the *ille* who disputed with the Cretan Clinias and the Spartan Megillus. The Athenian stranger thus ceases to be without a name and is no more a mask than Cicero himself is. Since Clinias and Megillus are the pair whose kinship, through the similarity of Spartan and Cretan laws, sets them together and apart from the Athenian stranger, the kinship of Quintus and Marcus, we might suppose, as well as their political activity, would set Atticus apart and make him the spokesman for Cicero's views, especially since his cognomen recalls Clinias' refusal to address the Athenian stranger as ἈΤΤΙΚΟΣ (626d3). Atticus, however, cannot possibly be the spokesman, for Epicureanism has no political philosophy at all (at least in the required sense of what the best political order is), and everything Marcus says, from the divine principle of the universe to the separation of the noble from the pleasant, is wholly alien to it (31). Cicero has a friend stretch his friendship to its utmost and thus deny dialogically what Marcus asserts dogmatically, that the slightest difference nullifies friendship (34). Not despite their differences but because of them, the association the three speakers have with one another seems to be a sounder and more realistic ground for political community than the friendship of the wise with the wise, which is so perfect as to be indiscernible from self-love (34). The deictic pronouns of Stoic doctrine are self-referential and no

³Cf. M. Ruch, *Le prooemium philosophique chez Cicéron*, on Book 1 of *de legibus*, p. 252: "L'absence de toute indication chronologique—fait unique—donne à la fiction un caractère indéterminé." It seems to be a happy accident that the utopian character of *de legibus* is echoed in Cicero's own silence about it in his published writings and letters, and hence that no agreement as to the time of its composition has been reached; see Ziegler's introduction, pp. 1-12, and Ruch, o. c., pp. 123-41.

more point to anything other than do those assigned to the Marian oak. Atticus' goodwill lets Cicero win a case which Atticus cannot even be a party to. He is in fact the representative of the view, which chiefly consists in maintaining the priority of body to soul, that the Athenian stranger combats in the tenth book of the *Laws* (891e4–892b8). So Cicero has law pit itself against the most refractory of opponents and appeal to principles it could not argue for. It is as if law were a tragedy in which everything followed of necessity once the implausible had been neatly tucked away in the time before it began. That the implausible, however, is not tucked away in *de legibus* but rather constitutes its very structure offers a way to link the tangential manner in which law gets broached with Cicero's understanding of law.

The first word of Plato's *Laws* is θεός, and it refers to either Zeus or Apollo, the presumed sources respectively of Cretan and Spartan law. The first principle that Atticus has to accept is that all of nature is ruled by some indeterminate characteristic of the gods (21). Cicero thus alludes to his putting a weaker version of Plato's tenth book at the beginning,⁴ just as the discussion of the two suns at the beginning of his *de re publica* alludes to his putting a weaker version of the seventh book of Plato's *Republic* at the beginning. Socrates had there proposed that the mathematical astronomy of his own day be replaced by a purely mathematical science of motion which would in turn depend on the not yet developed geometry of solids. That development had in part taken place and led to Archimedes' armillary sphere, which Marcellus the conqueror of Syracuse had brought back to Rome. *de re publica* thus began after the advanced sciences had come to Rome but prior to the coming of political philosophy, which Cicero is in fact the first to bring but generously assigns to an earlier period (*Tusc.* 1.5).⁵ Similarly, in *de legibus* he starts with a natural law teaching and only later introduces a doctrine that does not depend on any special premise but is acceptable to all the schools, with the exception of the Epicurean and the sceptical Academy. Cicero thus goes back to Socrates after he has acknowledged the changes that Socrates through Plato effected. Socrates becomes a discovery of Cicero rather than part of the philosophic tradition.

Cicero first speaks in answer to a question of Atticus, who wants to know *tuine versus hanc quercum severint, an ita factum de Mario ut*

⁴ The consequence of putting Plato's Book 10 first is that Cicero makes his Book 2 a version of Plato's Book 11 (cf. 2.44, 67).

⁵ Cf. R. Harder, "Die Einbürgerung der Philosophie in Rom," 26–27 in *Das Neue Cicerobild*, ed. K. Büchner (Darmstadt 1971).

scribis acceperis. (3) Cicero is not asked whether the story of Marius' oak is true; he is asked whether he made it up on his own or took over an older account. Cicero's counterquestion therefore puzzles Atticus, for he is asked whether Romulus announced to Proculus Iulius that he was a god and Aquilo raped Orithyia. Atticus' answer would of course have to be "no" to both; but Cicero's question implies that tradition does not differ from a poet's free invention, and *fabula* covers them both. Such a shift in the issue certainly allows the *leges historiae* to be introduced, but at the price of confining history, as Atticus wants to do, to contemporary eyewitnesses (8). The question of identity, however, which the Marian oak raised, is not settled. Cicero assigns to Atticus two houses, one in Rome not far from Romulus' epiphany, and one in Attica not far from the rape of Orithyia. These two places are known to Atticus through his dwellings; they are known to everyone else through the stories attached to them. Atticus' local knowledge cannot help to dismantle or confirm the tradition. It can only do so elliptically, by recalling a passage in Plato's *Phaedrus* (229c1-5). Socrates' curt denial that the place which Phaedrus reasons might be where Boreas raped Orithyia prompts him to ask whether Socrates is convinced τὸ μυθολόγημα is true (229c1-5). Phaedrus' inference from the charming, clear and transparent waters of the Ilissus, that, since they would afford a suitable spot for girls to play near, it could be the place, recalls Atticus' own inference, *etenim est sane vetus*, that led him to ask whether *illa quercus* was *haec quercus*. Cicero, then, has crossed the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*, and urged us to consider the difference between Socratic self-knowledge and pre-Socratic rationalism as the proper way to approach his *Laws*. Self-knowledge proves to be the last theme of Book 1 (59-62). It is there linked with the untranslatable word *philosophia* and separated from *prudentia* and *sapientia* which belong to the context of the natural law teaching (19), just as the philosophers are at first *doctissimi viri* (18) and *philosophi* only in the second half (36, 50, 53).⁶

People say, Atticus reports, that Cicero as a native of Arpinum and a near contemporary of Marius should tell the truth. Cicero evades the challenge these people pose and identifies them as those who believe that Numa talked with Egeria and an eagle placed the hat on Tarquin. They are not the sceptical but the credulous. They no less than Atticus want his *Marius* to be true. Poetry, it seems, makes them both uneasy;

⁶For the difference between *sapientia* and *philosophia*, see *Tusc.* 5.3; see further, Finger, op. cit., 158-63.

they do not recognize that, as Quintus says, it has its own laws. Quintus thus supplies the thematic word of the dialogue but with a deviant sense, even though the mention of Numa offered the occasion to slide over into the issue of divine law. Why, then, is law postponed until after history has been discussed? Does history strike up a more suitable prelude than poetry? This deviant sense of *leges* recalls the deviant sense of *vóμοι* in the first book of Plato's *Laws*, where so much is made of the connection between musical nomes and laws proper (cf. 2.39). The laws of history amount to one—to tell the truth; the laws of poetry are more than one, for only a great part of it looks to pleasure. Law, then, in its ordinary sense, would seem to be closer to the truthtelling of history than to the delightfulness of poetry. The identification of law with right reason would seem to confirm this (23). Cicero admits, however, that not only the father of history but also Theopompus relate countless *fabulae* without either of them ceasing to be historians. It would seem that truth is the aim of history to which it does not necessarily attain. In the *Minos* law is similarly defined: "Law wants (βούλεται) to be the discovery of what is (315a2-3)." Law then is not the discovery of what is. The meaning (*vis*) of law is the assignment of things to their proper place; it therefore must also mean the selection of things to be so assigned; but it only means this if its Latin significance is put together with its Greek. Law is in intention both *delectus* and *aequalitas* (19). It fails, however, at both selection and assignment. It deviates from what is. Its deviancy first comes to light in the deviancy of *leges*. It is therefore the inadequacy of Roman historians rather than the fulfillment of the "laws" of historiography that serves as the proper introduction to law.

Atticus faults the Roman historians not for their failure to observe the sole law of history but for what Cicero had told him was especially the task of the rhetorician (5).⁷ This is perhaps the most surprising turn in *de legibus*. If the annals of the *pontifices maximi* suffer only from dryness and the rest of the historians from lack of various refinements, it is hard to see the relevance of stylistics to the discussion of law. Inasmuch as Cicero adopts for the formulation of the laws themselves an archaizing version of the language of the twelve tables and thus deviates from them (2.18),⁸ it would seem that the old Roman annals are to the laws as the awaited Ciceronian history would be to his *de legibus*. *de*

⁷ Cf. Pohlenz, op. cit., 110-11 for *de Orat.* 2.62 as Atticus' source for his presentation of Cicero's view.

⁸ For Ciceronian innovation in his archaizing, see D. Daube, *Roman Law* (Edinburgh 1969) 46-48.

legibus must be stylistically advanced. It contains no *res gestae* at all except as they emerge in the speeches of the speakers. *de legibus* is a poem about law: delight is an ingredient in it (14; cf. 2.14). It conforms to the laws of one kind as it argues about the laws of another kind. It thus subjects law in its original sense to a deviant mode. It is only possible long after the beginning because its theme is the true beginning and not the beginning of Rome or any other city (19).

The conversation that immediately precedes Cicero's exposition of law does not prepare that exposition in a straightforward manner. The sequence that focuses on some aspect of law is this. 1) Marcus reserves for his old age along with philosophy the writing of history, while his public duties would be confined not unwillingly to giving *responsa* "more patrio" (10). 2) Atticus remarks that Cicero's more philosophic style of speaking will let him continue the pleading of cases up to extreme old age (11). 3) Quintus insists that the role of *iuris consultus* would meet with wide approval (12). 4) Marcus, in tacitly accepting Atticus' view that he never has to give up forensic speaking, remarks that he would be increasing his labor, since he always devotes long study to his briefs (12). 5) Atticus proposes that Cicero in this fractional time write (*conscribus*) about the *ius civile* more subtly than others (13). 6) Marcus accepts, on Quintus' appoval; Quintus is delighted to spend the whole day on it (13). 7) Marcus proposes that they walk first and then rest (14). 8) Atticus suggests a walk to the Liris with a discussion of *ius civile* (14). 9) Marcus objects; others do it perfectly adequately for all practical purposes, though they do not treat *ius civile* as it deserves, for *ius civile* is *ius civitatis*.⁹ Cicero knows of course that the possessive adjective is by usage not at all the equivalent of the genitive of possession; but he has recourse to their equivalence in principle, just as Scipio began his account of *res publica* by decomposing it into *res populi* (1.39). Cicero imagines that he is being asked to compose legal treatises (*libellos conficiam*), even though he had just agreed to talk about *ius civile* (14). This is the second time that speaking has been confused with writing; but it is not the last. 10) Atticus now declares that he wants Cicero to imitate Plato and write a companion piece *de legibus* to his *de re publica* (15).

This sequence contains two apparently unrelated perplexities. The first concerns the deliberate violation of dramatic illusion by the

⁹ For a study of the term *ius civile* in Cicero, see F. Cancelli, "L'interpretazione del *De legibus* di Cicerone," *RCCM* (1973) 205-39.

failure on the part of Cicero and Atticus to keep speaking and writing separate. This failure recalls the second half of Plato's *Phaedrus*, where Socrates seems to speak indifferently of speaking or writing even though the topic is writing (258d1-5, 259e1-2). That it has some connection with the problem of law is suggested by Cicero's reminder that since their whole *oratio* is popular in character (*in populari ratione*), they will necessarily speak popularly and call *lex* that which is written and sanctions what it wants by command and prohibition (19; cf. 2.11). It seems that *lex* implies the written law to such an extent that the very mention of *ius civile* has Atticus speak of speaking as writing. Law is truly oral only when Cicero contemplates his adoption of the way of the fathers, and he is to sit in judgment in particular cases in which the decision does not have to be strictly applicable to any other case no matter how similar. Cicero thus opposes prudence operating within the confines of Roman law to both a juridical treatise on some point of Roman law and a treatise on law in general. Inasmuch as it is Cicero's decision to turn the present occasion into a discussion of law, he implies that he combines the particularity of oral *responsa* with the generality of writing through a dialogue that even though written preserves the circumstantiality of speaking. The context in which the *ratio* of Stoicism is presented compromises its presentation. Dialogue makes the community of reason deviate from reason.

The second difficulty is this. It would seem to have been enough, if Cicero had wanted to prepare the way for law, for Atticus to ask Cicero to speak or write on *ius civile* as soon as Cicero himself spoke of *responde-re* (10). Why should Atticus have to deny that Cicero will ever be free of advocacy and Quintus remark that if he will devote himself *ad ius respondendum* it will meet with the people's approval? Why should Cicero's superior skill in *ius civile* be tied in with the present? Why should it be something that does not have to be postponed but can be done at any spare moment? Law thus loses its connection with history and philosophy and has assigned to it the partisanship of the lawcourt (21). Cicero the arbiter yields to the controversialist, who will have to build the best possible case for law. Cicero's initial adoption of a Stoic teaching on law seems to be a direct consequence of this reorientation, and just as he had argued that the critics of his *Marius* were demanding truth from a poet as if he were a witness (4), so he will later ask for the silence of the sceptical Academy (39), and go on to dissolve almost all the substantive issues of the schools into merely verbal disagreements (53-54). Although the greater subtlety Atticus wants Cicero to bring to *ius civile* seems to

make a parallel with what he is to do for Roman historiography (13), it turns out that Cicero has no fault to find in Roman jurisprudence as such, nothing in any case that he could do better (14); rather, Cicero is to do something that no one else could do because no one has written his *de re publica*. He defends his own (cf. 2.17). His defense is to be *aliquid uberiorum quam forensis usus desiderat* (15), but for all that it requires his being *vacuus*, it does not demand that he be *liber* and without an *impeditus animus* (8, 13).¹⁰

Cicero's outline proposes a strictly deductive disputation on law: 1) the nature of *ius* expounded from the nature of man; 2) *leges* by which states are to be ruled; 3) the *iura* and *iussa* of people which comprehend the *iura civilia* of the Roman people (17). This outline, however, fails to indicate where the best city of *de re publica* fits in. If it were not for the ambiguity of *leges*, one might say that the second part refers to it, and the third the relation between the kinds of inferior regimes and the variety of laws to be found in various cities; but it is also possible that the second part alludes to those features indispensable in any legislation if it is to guarantee the peace and well-being of the city. This purpose of law only emerges in Book 2 (11), where Quintus replaces Atticus as the main interlocutor, and Cicero makes another beginning (2.1). There are altogether three beginnings, of which the first two can be said to place law in the light of reason and the third in the light of piety and religion.¹¹ In Book 1, the universe is the common city of gods and men (23); in Book 2, it is the temple and home of the Persian gods (cf. *Rep.* 3.14–16), but the Greeks and Roman do better since for the increase of piety they “wanted the gods to inhabit the same cities as we do (2.26).” Anonymous *deus* yields to *summus Iuppiter* (2.10). The perspective of piety allies Marcus with Quintus and makes of Atticus an outsider, who cannot share the love they bear their ancestral land (2.5). The ground of their subrational attachment to Arpinum has nothing in common with Atticus’ to Athens, which by his own account mainly consists in his recollection of the wise men who lived there (2.4). The land of brothers is their real homeland (*germana patria* 2.3), and Rome is only theirs by

¹⁰ See Kenter, 52–53, for the distinction between *vacuus* and *liber*.

¹¹ A. Hentschke, “Zur Bedeutung von Cicero's Schrift 'de legibus,'” *Philologus* (1971) 118–30, argues against K. Büchner's view that Book 1 was added after Book 2 was written. K. Büchner, “Sinn und Entstehung von 'De legibus,'” in *Atti del primo congresso internazionale di studi Ciceroniani* (Rome 1961) 81–90, revived a notion, on wholly different grounds, of R. Reitzenstein, *Drei Vermutungen zur Geschichte der Römischen Literatur I* (Marburg 1894) 1–31.

law and obligation (2.5).¹² So alien is all this to Atticus that he goes out of his way to regularize it. Arpinum becomes the father that actually generated Marcus, and the island on which they sit to have their conversation was due to the action of the river Fibrenus, which almost had it as its duty and function (*tamquam id habebat operis ac muneris*) to arrange for such a place for them (6). Whereas Cicero in his prose and verse went out of his way to deny any allure to Arpinum (2.2), Atticus through poetry now rationalizes the irrational and proposes a teleology of the local and contingent. Book 2 thus begins with Atticus adjusting the particular to the universal and the real to the fictional (26), just as Cicero had in Book 1 tried to accommodate the universal to the particular through a double account of law.

The first account is from sections 18–35, the second from 36 to the end. The first account involves a teleological cosmology, the second separates off from it the discussion of natural right. The first goes from the beginning, the second to the beginning. The first aims at being synthetic, the second at being analytic:¹³ only the second speaks of self-knowledge (58, 62). The first begins with *lex* as the *ratio summa* of the whole cosmos (18), the second with the phenomenon of conscience (40). The first starts with the divine, the second from the human. The first establishes the community of reason of gods and men (23), the second assigns the foundation of right to the natural affection among men (43). The first speaks of the perfect friendship of the perfectly wise (34), the second speaks of the controversies among the very philosophical schools whose unanimity was the basis of its argument (52–53). The first says we are born for justice (28), the second that we are born for civil society (62). These differences could be multiplied, and they all would point to the second argument's undercutting of the dogmatic postulates of the first; but they do not by themselves explain why Cicero proceeds in this way. For this, we have to look at the first argument more carefully.

Marcus' first long speech is in two parts: the first (22–23) presents man's rationality as his essence, the second (24–27) gives him a genera-

¹² Cicero's allusion to Theseus' unification of Attica, so that the demesmen *et sui erant idem et Attici* (2.5), shows a profound understanding of Thucydides 2.14–17 and Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, in which Theseus makes use of a willing Oedipus to keep together and apart Colonus and Athens. The first stasimon of that play is built on their difference and sameness, with the first strophic system devoted to Colonus and the second to Athens.

¹³ For the distinction, see C. Mugler, ed., *Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie géométrique des Grecs*, s. vv.; it is first formulated by Socrates *Phaedrus* 265c8–266b1 and forms the basis of Scipio's procedure *Rep.* 1.38.

tional history and distinguishes him from all other beings in terms of the teleological character of his body, arts, and senses.¹⁴ Speech (*oratio*) is the gathering power of human society (27), reason (*ratio*) of man with god (23). There is, then, even a double account within the natural law teaching, which can be characterized, following Cicero, as tantamount to the difference between *agnatio* and *cognatio*. *Agnatio* is ascribed to the relationship between gods and men on the basis of its legal standing in cities (23); but *cognatio* is ascribed to that same relation without any appeal outside of nature (25). Indeed, *natura* does not occur in the first account until its last sentence (*in rerum natura*) and accordingly follows the introduction of *deus* and *lex*; but the second begins with the nature of man, and *natura* becomes the single principle of things which in the case of the arts *ratio* imitates (26); and god is brought in as the equivalent of nature only at the end (27). The rational animal of the first account is one "we call man" (22): he does not have a nature. In the first account the uniqueness of man is his reason, in the second a conception of god that includes the worship of vices and animals void of reason (cf. 2.28). The teleology of man seems to bring along with it the Fall (*quae fragilia essent et caduca* 24); and Cicero will later argue that vices prove the similarity of men to one another, but not of course to god (31). It would seem, then, that sections 24–27 show a tendency to weaken the principles of 22–23; but even those sections suffer in themselves from an apparently unnecessary weakness.¹⁵ In man and god there is reason; the first society man has is with god (*cum deo*); right reason is common to those who have reason, and since it is *lex*, we men are to be counted as associated with gods (*cum dis*) by *lex*. *cum dis* picks up *cum deo*, for the singular, it now seems, merely stood for the class name of the gods. Marcus then goes on to say that those who have a community of *lex* have a community of *ius*. *ius* is not defined, but it suffices to introduce *civitas*: gods and men belong to the same city. And this is all the more true, Marcus adds, if they obey the same commands and powers, and they do so because they obey *huic caelesti descriptioni, mentique divinae et praepotenti deo*.¹⁶ *Lex* as right reason becomes an authoritative and commanding principle by becoming a principle to be obeyed and not shared, or only shared to the extent that it is obeyed. The community of gods and men is established through the equality of reason; but the order of the city they share is established through a principle of reason

¹⁴C. Finger, op. cit., 168–75.

¹⁵Kenter, 98–99, discusses the difficulty.

¹⁶See Kenter ad loc. for the punctuation and reading.

that transcends that common city. *in omni caelo et terra* is Marcus' phrase when he speaks of the unsurpassable dignity of reason; but he uses *universus hic mundus* when he now speaks of the single common city of gods and men. *hic* in the latter phrase is no easier to identify than the deictic pronoun with which the dialogue began, for the unity now implied is not perceptible, and might allow for a god no longer imminent in either heaven or earth (cf. 3.3).¹⁷ The celestial revolutions that determine the generation of soul in men certainly seem to imply an intelligence beyond the heavens (24). In any case, Cicero implies that right reason does not suffice for rule if the very society of men with gods in the universe prevents the gods of that society from ruling men. Cicero thus adumbrates the following paradox. Right reason brings gods and men together, but only false opinions about the gods allow gods to rule men.

Marcus connects the upright posture of man and the expressiveness of his face with the purposiveness of nature (26); but he distinguishes them. Uprightness urges men to look up at their original home, but the face prevents each man from hiding deep inside his true character. The sky is there to be looked at, but the eyes are there to be looked into. Man is open to the whole and each other; but the eyes in speaking (*locuntur*) socialize man more than the sky summons him to thought. If the eyes put a limit on evil thoughts, they would be the first natural sanction the law of right reason has, and Cicero would be implying that *volutus* and *volo* are cognate.¹⁸ It would thus seem that the tension in the first account between the horizontal society of gods and men and the vertical commandments of the divine mind over both is repeated in the second with the dual function of the human face to look up and look through. In the second account, however, there is both body and soul (*animus*), in the first only mind.

That Cicero has been making the first principle of natural law—reason and mind—more and more conform with the human condition is clear enough; but it should occasion no surprise that Atticus is more aware of the distant derivation of the principle of right than of the continual deformation Marcus has had it submit to. Marcus, however, tries

¹⁷ This difficulty goes back to Plato's *Timaeus*, where it is only the identification of οὐρανός and κόσμος that allows Timaeus to assert that the κόσμος is a visible "this" and hence corporeal (28b2-4). This error compels him to postulate the separation of the ideas, but he later tries to correct it by speaking of the invisible soul as the envelope of the cosmos (36d8-e6).

¹⁸ Cf. Ernout-Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*, s. *volutus*.

to correct him; the discussion so far is not greater (*maiora*), as Atticus asserts, than their present concern, it is only great (*sunt haec quidem [μὲν οὖν] magna*); but the truly outstanding thing to be understood is that our having been born for justice and right is by nature and not by opinion (28). Cicero puts natural right at least on a par with first principles. It would seem then that he should try to prove that there is natural right independent of the concession Atticus made him. Cicero's proof has as its centerpiece a *contrafactual*: if the original nature of men could be restored, the identity of every man with the highest in man would be self-evident (29, 32); but as it is, the class-characteristic of man, rationality, suffices only to distinguish us from beasts; it is not enough to make us interchangeable with one another. Such interchangeability now occurs only in the case of two strictly wise men, for each of whom the love of another is the same as the love of himself (34).¹⁹ It is not clear whether Marcus said that he knew of any friendship of this perfect kind, for the gap in our text between 33 and 34 cannot be filled with anything near certainty.²⁰ We can conjecture, however, from the change in the order of topics Atticus makes in his summary of Marcus' argument that it was not clear to him at any rate whether the society of right was derivable from the natural goodwill of all men or natural goodwill was derivable from the society of right (35). Atticus' inversion of the order makes reason far less potent as the basis of right than it presumably was in Marcus' presentation. Atticus' goodwill toward Marcus is independent of his concession about the place of reason in the whole. Their friendship is not a sign of their agreement but a compensation for their disagreement. It makes up for all that divides them. Marcus' proof, then, has to be pronounced a failure, for it replaces the society of men with gods with the society of the wise man with himself, and that seems to be an unwarranted extension of the word friendship. The gods, to be sure, cease to be members of human society, but human society is a society of one. Cicero can bring men together if there are gods, but then there is no rule; or he can put the gods aside but then there is no plurality of men. The wise man transcends the human race as much as the divine mind was beyond the society of gods and men.

Up to this point there has been no discussion of morality; indeed, if Ziegler was right to bracket *honestia* at 16 there has been no mention

¹⁹ Cf. Finger, *op. cit.*, 158.

²⁰ Laelius discusses this radical form of friendship only to dismiss it in *Amic.* 18. In Aristotle *EN* the identification of the self with just mind occurs in the discussion of both friendship and the contemplative life (1166^a17, 1178^a2-7).

of it.²¹ The new beginning brings in morality, and at the same time happiness. The implication seems clear enough: the first argument was pitched too high to involve the issue of happiness; but the implication is not clear, for Cicero there invokes Socrates for his denunciation of whoever first separated usefulness from right (33): *recteque Socrates execrari eum solebat qui primus utilitatem a iure se iunxit*. This first mention of Socrates is mysterious—Bake wanted to delete everything from *rectaque* to 36.²²—for it seems that Socrates anticipated the form of Cicero's own first argument and denounced its starting point. If, then, we could imagine that Socrates' purpose was just that, to serve as a connecting link between the two parts of Book 1, Cicero would thus be hinting that the comprehensive character of the first argument has to be complemented by the less global range of the second. The second argument does not simply replace the first, but in harmonizing the differences among the schools it casts doubt on the possibility of wisdom and restores the primacy of philosophy in the literal sense. We could then say that the first argument differs from, and joins with, the second in just the way that in Book 2, the best and the oldest are and are not the same (40). In Book 2, *quasi* is the word that signifies the indeterminate degree of equatability between them: *ritus familiae patrumque servare, id est, . . . a dis quasi traditam religionem tueri* (27). In Book 1, it is signified by a complex pun that involves Socrates.

Marcus has been trying to narrow the difference between Stoicism and the old Academy (including the Peripatetics) to a terminological dispute; but that difference stubbornly resists dissolution and has to be put aside, since, as Quintus decides, it is not relevant to the issue of *ius civile* (57). Quintus can intervene in this way, and declare that whether *naturam sequi et eius quasi lege vivere* or *ex natura vivere* is the chief good is perhaps undecidable (50), because Marcus gives him his chance by saying: *ex hac autem non rerum sed verborum discordia controversia est nata de finibus, in qua, quoniam usus capionem duodecim tabulae intra quinque pedes esse noluerunt, depasci veterem possessionem Academiae ab hoc acuto homine non sinemus, nec Mamilia lege singuli, sed e XII tres arbitri finis regemus. QUINTUS. quamnam igitur sentiam dicimus? MARCUS. requiri placere terminos quos Socrates pergerit, iisque parere* (55–56).

Finis is either a calque on τέλος and belongs to philosophy or a word of native meaning and definable by Roman law. It is as if Plato

²¹ See Pohlenz, op. cit., 114–16 for the reading.

²² See Kenter ad loc. for ways of filling the lacuna.

were to shift from metaphysics to the courtroom by constructing a sentence that began with οὐσία as essence and ended with οὐσία as property (cf. *Theaetetus* 160b5–e3, 164e2–5). Here, Cicero seems himself to be guilty of linguistic transgression while he asserts that it is only a question of “semantics” and yet charges Zeno with the crime of transgressing the boundaries of the old Academy. This type of category mistake was known to the rhetoricians as κατάχρησις or *abusio*.²³ When it first occurred Marcus had called attention to it: *nam nec arboris nec equi virtus quae dicitur (in quo abutimur nomine) in opinione posita est sed in natura* (45). “Manliness” cannot really be the excellence of a tree or a horse. Why, then, can the philosophical extension of “boundaries” into “ends” be declared unlawful and its primary meaning fixed by Socrates? *termini* is the equivalent of *fines* and not of τέλη.

Socrates, in drawing the line between the old Academy and Stoicism, must be keeping for himself the five feet of no-man’s land between them, inasmuch as the law states that so much room must be left for the turning of the plow. If this is the correct inference to be drawn, Cicero would be proposing, by way of his abrogating the newer Mamilian law in favor of the procedure of the twelve tables, to go back to a time even before the establishment of the Academy. He would be saying, “Back to Socrates!” Such a return would be that outlined in 58–62, where for the first time wisdom and philosophy are distinguished (58), and self-knowledge becomes the hallmark of the philosopher. The consequence of this self-knowledge is that Cicero adds rhetoric to the usual tripartition of philosophy into ethics, physics and dialectics: *quomque se ad civilem sociatatem natum senserit, non solum illa subtili disputatione sibi utendum putabit, sed etiam fusa latius perpetua oratione, qua regat populos, qua stabilitat leges, qua castiget improbos . . . qua pracepta salutis et laudis apte ad persuadendum edat suis civibus* (62, cf. 3.14).

Self-knowledge is bound together with the knowledge that “political animal” and “rational animal” are not separable definitions of man, and that *oratio* makes possible *ratio* no less than *ratio oratio*. The greater rhetorical effects of Cicero’s second argument,²⁴ in contrast with the plainness of the first, give the actual evidence for the link between dialectics and rhetoric that he finally suggests here; and of rhetorical

²³ On *catachresis*, see J. A. Schuursma, *De poetica vocabulorum abusione apud Aeschylum* (Amsterdam 1932) and E. Fraenkel’s note 1, p. 90 of his *Agamemnon* Commentary. For its use in law, see Papinian *Digest* XLVIII, v. 6.1: *lex stuprum et adulterium promiscue et καταχρηστικώτερον appellat*.

²⁴ See Kenter 199, 203–204, 243.

devices, none is of greater importance for the understanding of law than *abusio*. It allows for *caste* to be understood as primarily applicable to the soul without cancelling ablutions of the body (2.24),²⁵ and gods to be shut up within walls without denying that mind is the god within (2.28). All of Book 1, one might say, is one long catachresis by means of which Cicero can fit together elements that seem to resist harmonization. It is the technique of incremental deviation that Adeimantus recognizes as the source of Socrates' persuasiveness (*Republic* 487b1-c4), and Socrates himself describes and employs in the *Phaedrus* (261e6-262a4).

The source for Cicero's understanding of the relation between *lex as recta ratio* and *lex as ius civile* seems to be a passage in Plato's *Laws*, where the Athenian stranger, in showing what Clinias should have said in defence of Cretan laws, gives a summary of the *Laws* itself (with the significant exception of Book 10), and in following the citizens from birth to death concludes by saying: μέχριπερ ἂν πρὸς τέλος ἀπάσης πολιτείας ἐπεξελθῶν ἵδη τῶν τελευτησάντων τίνα δεῖ τρόπον ἐκάστοις γίγνεσθαι τὰς ταφὰς καὶ τιμὰς ἀστινας αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμειν δεῖ (632c1-4). The ultimate purpose (τέλος) of the entire regime is not only the last item of legislation but also the death of those who have come to their own end. This triple pun ties together the fourfold differences between the divine and the human goods, in light of which all legislation is to proceed, with the difference between soul and body as it comes to light in whatever burial practices the legislator recommends (cf. 2.67-68).²⁶ Only the greatest rhetorical and dialectical skill could do that tying together without either sanctioning the most absurd superstitions or speaking over the heads of the people for whom one legislates (cf. 2.45). Cicero does seem to have tried his own version of Plato's enterprise, still being himself, as he says, while remaining true to his master (2.17). It would explain in any case how he meant us to understand his allusions to the *Phaedrus* in a book about law.

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²⁵ *caste iubet lex adire ad deos, animo videlicet in quo sunt omnia; nec tollit castimoniā corporis.*

²⁶ That *mens divina* is the same and not the same as *prudentia*, *recta ratio*, and *sapientia* reproduces the difference and sameness of φρόνησις and νοῦς in Plato's *Laws* (631c5, 7, d5).

THE LOVE POETRY OF PHILODEMUS

Of the thirty or so poems in the Greek Anthology safely attributable to Philodemus of Gadara, about two-thirds are concerned with his love for and with a wide variety of women:¹ he loves Philainion because she is black, Kallistion because she is fair; Charito can still evoke passion at age 60, while Lysidike is his Lolita; most are Greek but Oscan Flora's brave vibrations have their charms; girls named Demo have an ominous and onymous attraction for one named so philo-demotically; some affairs are adulterous, some are with "girl friends,"² and some are purely mercantile. With so many interests and so many to choose from, it is not surprising that most of the women named in his small corpus appear only once. One or another of the Demos is mentioned in a second poem, but Xanthippe is named in at least four (the ascription of a fifth is doubtful) and perhaps referred to in several more.

Thus, even though the poems are short (none more than eight lines long), their very number allows Philodemus to develop a multifaceted view of her character and her relationship with him. She proves, I think, to be quite an intriguing figure, in some ways a precursor of Lesbia, Cynthia, Delia, etc.,³ and in other ways perhaps a more advanced woman in her own right.

¹For text and commentary, see A.S.F. Gow and D. L. Page, *The Greek Anthology: The Garland of Philip and Some Contemporary Epigrams* (Cambridge 1968) to be referred to as Gow-Page. Their earlier collaboration, *The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams* (Cambridge 1965) will be called simply HE. The only separate work on Philodemus' poems (at least those thought worthy of him) is G. Kaibel, *Philodemus Gadarenensis Epigrammata* (Greifswald 1885); other comprehensive treatments of his poetry are R. Del Re, "Filodemo, poeta," *Mondo Classico* 6 (1936) 121-42; L. A. Stella, *Cinque Poeti dell' Antologia Palatina* (Bologna 1949) ch. 4, "Filodemo di Gadara," 239-307; J. M. Snyder, "The Poetry of Philodemus the Epicurean," *CJ* 68 (1972) 346-53. These authors will be referred to by name alone.

²That the point of too many Hellenistic love epigrams has been lost by considering all unmarried women whores is demonstrated by Alan Cameron, "Asclepiades' girl friends," in *Reflections of Women in Antiquity*, ed. H. P. Foley (New York 1982) 275-302.

³Philodemus' influence on Latin poetry is undeniable; cf. J.I.M. Tait, *Philodemus' Influence on the Latin Poets* (Diss. Bryn Mawr 1941) which remains the most useful survey of this subject. More concerned with the reception of Philodemus' theoretical writings on literature is G. Barra, "Filodemo di Gadara e le lettere latine," *Vichiana* n. s. 2 (1973) 247-60. For a bibliographical survey of recent work on these theoretical works,

Our starting point will be Epigram I Gow-Page (*A.P.* 5.4), a textual problem in which will suggest the course of investigation.

τὸν σιγῶντα, Φιλαινί, συνίστορα τῶν ἀλαλήτων
 λύχνον ἐλαιηρῆς ἐκμεθύσασα δρόσου
 ἔξιθι, μαρτυρίην γὰρ “Ἐρως μόνος οὐκ ἐφίλησεν
 ἔμπνουν” καὶ πτυκτήν κλεῖε, Φιλαινί, θύρην.
 καὶ σύ, φίλη Ξανθώ με· σὺ δ’, ὡ φιλεράστρια κοίτη,
 ἥδη τῆς Παφίης ἵσθι τὰ λειπόμενα. 5

φίλη Ρ φίλει C Ξανθώ με C Ξανθῶι ut vid. Ρ
 φιλεράστρια κοίτη J. G. Schneider -τρι' ἄκοιτις C
 -τρια κοίτης Ρ [vv. 5-6 om. Pl.] 5

Thus the text and relevant apparatus of Gow-Page. Whether or not the Corrector (C) had a manuscript to guide him at this point,⁴ we can see what led him to make his changes: to provide a verb to govern με and, by simple redivision of words, an acceptable noun for φιλεράστρια, assuming in both cases errors arising from ioticism (as in vv. 5 and 6, where C corrected P's Παφείης). We can also see why Schneider (ap-prob. Beckby, Kaibel, Gow-Page, Gigante) prefers to have Philodemus address his last remarks to the bed: to account for the δέ and to avoid having Philodemus address his amorous words to (of all people!) his wife.

Although the notion of addressing a bed is not in itself implausible—it can even be considered a neat close to a poem that begins with a συνίστωρ λύχνος⁵—I hope to show not only how the two objections mentioned above can be met, but also that the poem is even wittier with

cf. C. Romeo, “Filodemo: la ‘Poetica’,” in *Συζήτησις: Studi . . . a Marcello Gigante*, vol. 2, (Naples 1983) 565-83. Also useful for making one's way through the thickets of Philodemean scholarship is L. Berkowitz and K. A. Squitier, *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Canon of Greek Authors and Works* (Oxford 1986); I am grateful to Professor Berkowitz for making the Philodemus entry available to me in advance of publication.

⁴He had available at least one ms. no longer extant (see A.S.F. Gow, *The Greek Anthology: Sources and Ascriptions* [London 1958] 12), so that we usually do not know whether a reading of C is the result of collation or conjecture. Gow-Page, p. 6, n. 5, regard φιλεράστρι' ἄκοιτις as one of C's “blunders,” although it was read without trouble (or comment) by Jacobs (in several editions) and I. G. Huschke, *Analecta Critica in Anthologiam Graecam* (Jena and Leipzig 1800) 152.

⁵Cf. Plut. Moral. 513f οὐτω καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς ἡ πλείστη διατριβὴ περὶ λόγους μνήμην τινὰ τῶν ἐρωμένων ἀναδιδόντας· οἵ γε καν μὴ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, πρὸς ἄψυχα περὶ αὐτῶν διελέγονται· “ὡ φιλτάτη κλινῆ” καὶ “. . . εὐδαιμον λύχνε.” In the Anthology, however, addresses to beds are otherwise unknown, whereas lamps are addressed several times; e.g., *A.P.* 5.7 (Asclepiades 9 *HE*) and 5.8 (Meleager 69 *HE*; also ascribed

wife than with bed—always an important consideration in the interpretation of a Hellenistic poem—and that part of the wit lies in the words' being spoken by one Epicurean to another.

Let us begin with the question of *φίλει* vs. *φίλη*. Gow-Page argue for the latter on the grounds that “a completed sentence here detracts from the effect of the abrupt change of address and from the significance of *ἴσθι τὰ λειπόμενα*.” It may well be that a change of address would be all the more striking after an aposiopesis; but it is hardly necessary, especially as aposiopesis and ellipsis are often used to convey a clear sexual innuendo,⁶ as is evidently the case here where the next words may be read as an explanation for the interrupted sentence. (I shall return to this point). And if this is so, then *δέ* need not necessarily signal a change of address, especially as apparently superfluous *δέ* often occurs “in passionate or lively exclamations, where no connexion appears to be required” (Denniston, *Gk. Part.* 172).

But what about the weightier objection—that one does not write love poetry to one's wife?⁷ As an Epicurean, Philodemus may well have been discouraged from falling in love and marrying;⁸ he certainly had

to Philodemus). In the latter and in *A. P.* 5.5 (Flaccus I Gow-Page), the lamp is called a *συνίστωρ*; cf. Martial 10.38.6 f. *o quae proelia, quas utrimque pugnas / felix lectulus et lucerna vidi*, which jocularly describes the wedded bliss of Calenus and Sulpicia. This Sulpicia (not to be confused with the poet in the *Corpus Tibullianum*) wrote love poems to her husband, which Martial (10.35) considered chaste: *sed castos docet et probos amores, / lusus, delicias facetiasque* (8 f.). . . . *Hac condiscipula vel hac magistra / eses doctior et pudica, Sappho* (15 f.). The one small fragment we have, however, suggests something less decorous: *si me cadurci dissolutis (?) fasciis / nudam Caleno concubantem proferat*. W. Kroll, “Sulpicius (Sulpicia) 115,” *RE* 2.4 (1992) 880–82, thinks that the poem represents a dialogue between Sulpicia and a Muse. For more on the role of lamps during love-making, see R. Parker, *Miasma* (Oxford 1983) 77.

⁶Cf. *A. P.* 5.184.5 (Meleager LXXII *HE*) and 9.241.5 (Antipater LII Gow-Page), Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1178, Theocr. 1.105, Herodas 1.84. For this device in Latin poetry, see J. N. Adams, “A type of sexual euphemism in Latin,” *Phoenix* 35 (1981) 120–28.

⁷It should be pointed out that *άκοιτης* always signifies “wife” and never merely “bedmate,” as its masculine equivalent *άκοίτης* often does. The learned etymology of Plato, *Crat.* 405d, *όμόκοιτιν . . . “άκοιτιν” ἐκαλέσσαμεν*, hardly qualifies as an exception.

⁸Epicurus against love and marriage: Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 2.23, Diog. Laert. 10.118–19, Theodoret 12.74, *PHerc* 1251 col. 15 Schmid. Cf. C. W. Chilton, “Did Epicurus approve of marriage? A study of Diogenes Laertius 10.119,” *Phronesis* 5 (1960) 71–75; A. Grilli, “Epicuro e il matrimonio (D. L. 10.119)” *RSF* 26 (1971) 51–56. (Chilton argues that modern scholars are right to introduce a negative into D. L. 10.119; Grilli disagrees, arguing that Epicureans will marry, but only in exceptional circumstances.)

the word of the master discouraging the writing of poetry.⁹ It is thus clear that—with the obvious exception of the poetical invitation to a meal in Epicurus' honor (23 Gow-Page, *A.P.* 11.44)—orthodox Epicureanism, although it may be consistent with some of the poems, can be but an insecure guide to their interpretation.¹⁰ This is all the more true when one considers that by Philodemus' day, Epicureanism was no longer a monolithic philosophy.¹¹

On the particular point of marriage, for example, we can point to Epigram 21 (*A.P.* 11.34), where Philodemus looks forward to marrying a “stay-at-home maiden”:¹²

λευκοῖνους πάλι δὴ καὶ ψάλματα καὶ πάλι Χίους
οῖνους καὶ πάλι δὴ σμύρναν ἔχειν Συρίην
καὶ πάλι κωμάζειν καὶ ἔχειν πάλι διψάδα πόρνην
οὐκ ἐθέλω μισῶ ταῦτα τὰ πρὸς μανίην.
ἀλλά με ναρκίσσοις ἀναδήσατε καὶ πλαγιαύλων
γεύσατε καὶ κροκίνοις χρίσατε γυνία μύροις
καὶ Μιτυληναίφ τὸν πνεύμονα τέγξατε Βάκχῳ
καὶ συζεύξατέ μοι φωλάδα παρθενικήν.

5

Philodemus has two surprises in store for his audience—one for each banquet. As we first read, and as Philodemus' original audience first heard, of wreaths, songs, wine, myrrh, and feasts—I translate generically because at first details like “Chian” and “Syrian” would seem merely ornamental—and as we meet the repeated πάλι and ἔχειν, we may be forgiven for expecting that these pleasures are to be enjoyed

⁹Diog. Laert. 10.120. Cicero says of Philodemus that *est . . . ceteris studiis quae fere ceteros Epicureos neglegere dicunt perpolitus* (*In Pis.* 70). The disparity between the contents of Philodemus' poetry and his professed beliefs as found in his philosophical works has been stressed by P. Merlan, “Aristoteles' und Epikurs müssige Götter,” *Zeits. f. philos. Forsch.* 21 (1967) 489 f. For a discussion of how Lucretius could square his writing of poetry with his Epicureanism, see J. H. Waszink, “Lucretius and poetry,” *Med. d. Kon. Nederl. Ak. v. Wetensch. Afd. Letterk.* 17 (1954) 243–57; D. Clay, *Lucretius and Epicurus* (Ithaca 1983) ch. 1, esp. pp. 40–48.

¹⁰Philodemus argued that poetry as such is not designed to instruct: κανόνωφελῆ, καθὸ ποίματ' οὐκ ὀφελεῖ (π. Ποιημάτων V col. 29, 17–19 [p. 65 Jensen]). Cf. fr. 2, col. 1, 1–31; N. A. Greenberg, *The Poetic Theory of Philodemus* (Diss. Harvard 1955) 15 ff.

¹¹T. Maslowski, “Cicero, Philodemus, Lucretius,” *Eos* 66 (1978) 216. Cf. *Philod. Rhet.* Bk. 2, where Philodemus attacks other Epicureans for holding heretical views.

¹²Φωλάς = “stay-at-home” is Gow-Page's rendering; also possible is “obscure” or “humble,” as suggested by G. L. Hendrickson, *AJP* 39 (1918) 29, n. 1.

again. The drunken whore disturbs this picture,¹³ however, and οὐκ ἔθέλω turns it completely around. As the poem proceeds, we learn immediately (for no tricks of word order now keep us in suspense)¹⁴ what is now considered desirable. The puzzle, as Gow-Page demonstrate, is that we find no significant difference between violets and narcissi, between harps and cross-flutes, between Chian and Mytilenaean wine. (Philodemus' audience would have been listening to the attributes of the second banquet while trying to recall the details of the first.) But when we get to the last line, we are told the one significant difference, that between *pornē* and *parthenos*, between drunken revelry and wedded tranquility. And with this revelation, we also realize that the seeming insignificance of the other pairs is exactly that: of no account whatsoever in comparison with the difference that this new woman will make in Philodemus' life.¹⁵

Conceivably this was Philodemus' actual wedding announcement to his friends, just as we have what seems to be an actual dinner invitation in verse.¹⁶ But, whether she is real or merely a poetic creation, we can at least say that Philodemus' wife (here more precisely wife-to-be)

¹³For this translation of διψάς, which goes beyond LSJ, cf. Ov. *Am.* 1.8.2 *est quaedam nomine Dipsas anus. / ex re nomen habet: nigri non illa parentem / Memnonis in roseis sobria vidit equis.* For an even more disapproving description of a party such as this, cf. Cic. *In Pis.* 22.

¹⁴Philodemus argues for the importance of word order in his work on poetry: ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀξιοῦν ἡμᾶς δεήσει τὸ νόμημα βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον γίνεσθαι διὰ τὰς μεταθέσεις (*PHerc* 1676, col. 8.1); cf. N. A. Greenberg, "Metathesis as an instrument in the criticism of poetry," *TAPA* 89 (1958) 262-70.

¹⁵That the point of this poem lies in the revelation of marriage being withheld until the last line has been shown by G. Giangrande, *Maia* 25 (1973) 65; *Grätz. Beitr.* 1 (1973) 147 f.; *Mus. Phil. Lond.* 5 (1981) 38.

¹⁶XXIII Gow-Page (*A.P.* 11.44) in which Philodemus invites his patron Piso to celebrate Epicurus' birthday. Since he invokes the Epicurean idea of friendship by his address to φίλτατε Πείσων, we should probably understand his description of himself as μουσοφιλής (a *hapax*) as similarly invoking an Epicurean idea. For the relationship between Piso and Philodemus, see W. Allen, Jr. and P. De Lacy, "The patrons of Philodemus," *CP* 34 (1939) 59-65. For the institution of a monthly celebration in Epicurus' honor, see D. Clay, "Individual and community in the first generation of the Epicurean school," in *Συζήτησις* vol. 1, (n. 3 above) 272-78. On the genre of poetical invitations, cf. G. Williams, *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford 1968) 125 ff.; L. Edmunds, "The Latin invitation-poem," *AJP* 103 (1982) 184-88; M. Marcovich, "Catullus 13 and Philodemus 23," *QUCC* 11 (1982) 131-38; B. Pavlock, "Horace's invitation poem to Maecenas: gifts to a patron," *Ramus* 11 (1982) 79-98.

makes an appearance in his poetry. In Ep. 17 (*A.P.* 11.41), the woman who spells an end to his madness is identified as Xanthippe:

έπιτά τριηκόντεσσιν ἐπέρχονται λυκάβαντες,
ἡδη μοι βιότου σχιζόμεναι σελίδες·
ἡδη καὶ λευκά με κατασπείρουσιν ἔθειραι,
Ξανθίππη, συνετῆς ἄγγελοι ἡλικίης,
ἄλλ' ἔτι μοι ψαλμός τε λάλος κῶμοι τε μέλονται
καὶ πῦρ ἀπλήστῳ τύφεται ἐν κραδίῃ·
αὐτὴν ἀλλὰ τάχιστα κορωνίδα γράψατε, Μοῦσαι,
ταύτην ἡμετέρης, δεσποτίδες, μανίης.¹⁷

5

As Giangrande, *GB* 1 (1973) 143–47, has shown in great detail, Philodemus asks the Muses to inscribe Xanthippe as the end (*coronis*) of the first half of his life:¹⁸ “das Mädchen ist daher eine metaphorische *korownīç*” (143). But although there is some disagreement on the precise meaning of *koronīç*, all agree that Philodemus “Xanthippam cupit ultimam suam curam esse” (Kaibel 14; cf. Stella 270 f., Del Re 131), by which they mean not only that Xanthippe is to be the last woman in Philodemus’ life (with which I agree) but also that, at age 37, he is asking to live the rest of his life without any women at all. This cannot be right, however, as a moment’s reflection will show. For one thing, the bookish metaphor falls flat if Xanthippe is merely the last in a series. A *coronis* marks the end in a special way; Xanthippe cannot represent both madness and the end of madness. It seems better to infer that if a woman in his life is to symbolize that an earlier stage is over, she can do this only by being present in some permanent way in this new phase, which is to begin in Philodemus’ 37th year, the very age determined by Aristotle to be the ideal time for a man to marry (*Pol.* 1335a29). The invocation to the Muses, furthermore, makes far more sense if she is to be the subject of future poems than if they were called upon at the close

¹⁷Much of the difficulty of interpreting the last distich would disappear, were we to read ταύτης for ταύτην, which could easily have arisen from the αὐτήν above; cf. Soph. *El.* 530 πατήρ σὸς οὐτος. For the postponed ἀλλά, a Hellenistic nicety ignored by LSJ, Denniston *Gk. Part.*, and the new *Diccionario Griego-Español*, cf. Callim. Hymn 1.18, Ep. 5.11, frr. 10, 110.61, 260.55; *A.P.* 5.17 (Gaeticulus), 5.9 (Rufinus).

¹⁸Cf. LSJ *s.v.* γράφω 2.3. *Contra Gow-Page*, who understand “write this same ‘Finis’ to my insanity,” with no reference here to Xanthippe. A. H. Griffiths, *BICS* 17 (1970) 37 f., goes further, arguing that the *coronis* actually appeared alongside the poem to mark the end of a book of Philodemus’ epigrams. Note the similar metaphor in Philod. *de Morte* col. 39.18 τὴν τοῦ βίου παραγραφήν; cf. Diog. Laert. 10.138.

of this one poem, for one needs—and hence invokes—the Muses at the beginning of one's poetic efforts, not at the end.¹⁹

Moreover, if Xanthippe is to symbolize by her role in his life and poetry a less manic Philodemus, she could not simply be one of a number of female Epicureans with whom he could engage in philosophical discourse.²⁰ A relationship that is less than manic and more than ascetic is clearly called for. Marriage would fit the bill, especially as the Xanthippe of this poem is certainly meant to be taken as the same as the Xantho of Ep. 1.²¹

Let us look next at Ep. 15 (*A.P.* 10.21), which is a poem addressed to a wife soon after marriage:

Κύπρι γαληναί φιλονύμφιε, Κύπρι δικαίων
σύμμαχε, Κύπρι Πόθων μῆτηρ ἀελλοπόδων,
Κύπρι, τὸν ἡμίσπαστον ἀπὸ κροκέων ἐμὲ παστῶν,
τὸν χιόστι ψυχὴν Κελτίσι νιφόμενον,
Κύπρι, τὸν ἡσύχιον με, τὸν οὐδενὶ κωφὰ λαλεῦντα,
τὸν σέο πορφυρίφ κλυζόμενον πελάγει,
Κύπρι φιλορμίστειρα φιλόργιε, σῷζέ με, Κύπρι,
Ναϊακούς ἡδη, δεσπότι, πρὸς λιμένας.

5

How long after marriage a husband—especially an aggrieved one wishing to score points with his wife—would continue to call himself a

¹⁹Although a *topos* exists of declaring at the beginning of a poem that one calls upon the god addressed first and last, “the principle is one more honoured in theory than in observance” (West *ad Hes. Th.* 34). An interesting parallel to our poem is Verg. *Cat.* 5, where the poet bids farewell to empty rhetoric, luxury-loving friends, and riotous living; he will leave them all for the *docta dicta Sironis* (i.e., the Epicurean circle in Herculaneum, where Philodemus was also in residence). And to the writing of poetry too he would bid a tentative farewell (11–14):

*ite hinc, Camenae, vos quoque ite salvete,
dulces Camenae, nam fatebimur verum,
dulces fuistis, et tamen meas chartas
revisitote, sed pudenter et raro.*

Cf. G. Barra (op. cit. n. 3 above) 259 f.

²⁰For the role of women in the Epicurean Garden, see C. J. Castner, “Epicurean *hetairai* as dedicants to healing deities?” *GRBS* 23 (1982) 51–57. Some names are in fact known to us from Philodemus, *PHerc* 1005, 15–17. Diog. Laert. 10.4–6 may represent more slander than fact.

²¹In Ep. 14, she is called both Xantho and Xantharion (see below); cf. Ep. 16, where Demo is also called Demarion.

nymphios and their bedroom a bridal chamber is impossible to say, but the appeal to Aphrodite along with vv. 4 f. shows that he feels unfairly deprived of his wife's sexual favors. Despite the sevenfold invocation of Aphrodite, the poem is clearly directed to his wife; and despite the threat that he will turn to the courtesan Naias,²² he would prefer to sleep with his wife.

We may judge, then, that the quarrel occasioning this poem does not spell the end of their relationship or of this cycle of poems about his wife, whom it now seems safe to call Xanthippe. Two other poems refer to her by name: 11 (A.P. 5.131)

ψαλμὸς καὶ λαλὶ ἡ κωτίλον ὅμμα καὶ ψδῆ
 Ξανθίππης καὶ πῦρ ἄρτι καταρχόμενον,
 ὥψυχή, φλέξει σε· τὸ δ' ἐκ τίνος ἡ πότε καὶ πῶς
 οὐκ οἰδα· γνώση, δύσμορε, τυφομένη.

and the mysterious 16 (A.P. 9.570):

—Ξανθὼ κηρόπλαστε μυρόχροε μουσοπρόσωπε,
 εὐλαλε, διπτερύγων καλὸν ἄγαλμα Πόθων,
 ψῆλόν μοι χερσὶν δροσιναῖς μύρον· ἐν μονοκλίνῳ
 δεῖ με λιθοδῆμάτῳ, δεῖ ποτε πετριδῷ
 εῦδειν ἀθανάτως πούλυν χρόνον. ἀδε πάλιν μοι,
 Ξανθάριον, ναὶ ναὶ τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦτο μέλος.
 —οὐκ ἀίεις, ὧνθρωφ', ὁ τοκογλύφος, ἐν μονοκλίνῳ
 δεῖ σε βιοῦ<ν> ἀεί, δύσμορε, πετριδίῳ.

5

Of the former, no more need be said than that it offers a distillation of qualities attributed to Xanthippe in other poems: Playing an

²²I follow Del Re 126, n. 25 and G. Giangrande, "Quelques aspects de la technique littéraire des épigrammatistes Alexandrins," *Mus. Philol. Lond.* 5 (1981) 42 f., who show that Naias is a variant of Naïs, a name well known as that of a courtesan. With the pun involved in this Naias's harbor, cf. Emped. 31 B 98.3 DK Κύπριδος ὄρμοσθεῖσα τελείοις ἐν λιμένεσσιν, Soph. *OT* 1208. The same sort of double entendre occurs in Philod. Ep. V. 8 (A.P. 5.107) ήμετις δ' ἐν κόλποις ήμεθα Ναιάδος, with which cf. *Il.* 6.136 Θέτις δ' ὑπεδέξατο κόλπῳ; sim. Verg. *Ecl.* 4.32 (Thetis), Catull. 64.11 (Amphitrite); cf. D. Konstan, *Catullus' Indictment of Rome: The Meaning of Catullus 64* (Amsterdam 1977) 15 f.; M. Rossi, "Nota a Filodemo Ep. V G. P. (A.P. V 107)," *Maia* 33 (1981) 213 f.

Philod. Ep. V employs an interesting technique which was imitated by Ovid *Am.* 2.5: Half-way through each poem, the listener/reader learns that the words up to this point are in fact a repeat of what the poet has told his mistress (wife?) before and which he now repeats to her: Philod. V. 5 τοῦτ' ἐβόών αἰεὶ καὶ προύλεγον, ἀλλ' ... ἔκλυες, and Ov. v. 31 *haec tibi sunt mecum, mihi sunt communia tecum.*

instrument and singing (14, 17), a pleasing voice (14, 17),²³ and the ability to arouse Philodemus' passion (17). Epigram 14 is not so straightforward; Dübner, for example, thought that the poem might be addressed to a bee, and Kaibel thought it obvious that the last two lines were due to "iram rabiemque byzantini hominis."²⁴ The bee in Dübner's bonnet has long been laid to rest, however, and W. Schmid has shown how the last distich may be squared with the preceding.²⁵ He shows, *inter alia*, that ὄνθρωπε *vel sim.* ("populärphilosophische Mahnrede") occurs several times in Epicurean literature (203 n. 13), and that the greedy man, here ὁ τοκογλύφος, who reckons out his days in fear of death, is a frequent target of Epicurean criticism; note in particular Philod. *de Morte*, col. 38.10 ἐντεταφιασμένος περιπατεῖ.

Epicurus himself had earlier compared the person who thought properly about death to a god, in words that may have led Philodemus eventually to his own paradoxical expression of the relation between life and death: ζήσεις δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔσικε θνητῷ ζῷῳ ζῶν ἀνθρωπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς (*Ep.* 3.135). Philodemus presents us with a picture of himself (the narrator of vv. 1–6) so afraid of death that he illogically refers to it with the words εὔδειν ἀθανάτως, 'to sleep the sleep that will not die',²⁶ to which is added as if in further description πουλὺν χρόνον — logically inconsistent with the preceding, but thereby all the more expressive of his fears. Since from an Epicurean

²³For conversation as well as singing; *contra* Kaibel, p. 14, who thinks singing alone is meant.

²⁴*Hermes* 15 (1880) 460; cf. Gow-Page, vol. 2, p. 384, "plainly the composition of a relatively late reader."

²⁵"Philodem als Dichter und als Philosoph: über eine Athetese Kaibels in A.P. 9.570," *Acta Conventus XI Eirene* (Warsaw 1971) 201–207. Schmid directs some of his argument against P. Merlan (op. cit. n. 9 above) who, accepting the last two lines as genuine, argues that this poem reflects a split in personality between Philodemus the poet and Philodemus the philosopher. The last distich is also accepted by M. Gigante, *Filodemo, Epigrammi Scelti* (Naples 1970) 29.

²⁶Cf. Del Re 132, 'quell' ἀθανάτως che ha poi qui, sulla bocca dell' epicurèo Filodemo, un sapore ironico, e ci fa pensare al lucreziano *mors immortalis*.' M. Gigante, *Recherche filodemee* (Naples 1969) 64, adduces Amphis fr. 8 Kock θνητὸς ὁ βίος, ὀλίγος οὐνὶ γῇ χρόνος / ἀθάνατος θάνατός ἔστιν, ἀν ἄπαξ τις ἀποθάνῃ. Cf. "Linus" fr. 2.9 f. West ὡδε γὰρ ἀθάνατος θάνατος περὶ πάντα καλύπτει / θνητὸς ἔων. For the motif of death as sleep (which is as old as Homer; e.g., *Il.* 11.241), see further M. B. Ogle, "The sleep of death," *MAAR* 11 (1933) 81–117; B. P. Wallach, *Lucretius and the Diatribe against the Fear of Death: De Rerum Natura III 830–1094* (Leiden 1976; *Mnemosyne* suppl. 40) 52 f. For the Epicurean view of time and death, cf. D. Puliga, "Χρόνος ε θάνατος in Epicuro," *Elenchos* 4 (1983) 235–60 (pp. 258 ff. on Philodemus).

point of view a life lived thus is little different from death,²⁷ to tell Philodemus that he will "live forever—in a coffin" is an apt way to jar him out of this unphilosophical melancholy.

Instead of singing back to him this sweet song he has composed, Xanthippe repeats only part of the song, in words that are anything but sweet. Although Philodemus addresses Xanthippe in terms that would bestow upon her a kind of immortality (in vain hope that she too could avoid death)—κηρόπλαστε, μουσόπροσωπε, ἄγαλμα—she will have none of this, for herself or for Philodemus. Refusing to play the role of the complacent love object, brusquely²⁸ she, in effect, reminds him why he chose her in the first place. Cf. 17, given above, and 18 (*A.P.* 5.112):

ἡράσθην, τίς δ' οὐχί; κεκώμακα, τίς δ' ἀμύτος
κώμων; ἀλλ' ἐμάνην· ἐκ τίνος; οὐχί θεοῦ;
ἐρρίφθω, πολιὴ γάρ ἐπείγεται ἀντὶ μελαίνης
θρὶξ ἡδη, συνετῆς ἄγγελος ἡλικίης.
καὶ παίζειν ὅτε καιρός, ἐπαίξαμεν· ἡνίκα καὶ νῦν
οὐκέτι, λωτέρης φροντίδος ἀψόμεθα. 5

The similarity of thought and language in 18 to that in 17 suggests that this poem too is addressed to Xanthippe. And, in accord with the interpretation of 17 given above, the first person plural ἀψόμεθα, following several verbs in the singular, indicates that this is no plural for singular but rather that Xanthippe is to join him in this application to higher thoughts (cf. Snyder 352).

That the poems that name or seem to refer to Xanthippe present a complex but essentially consistent picture should cause no surprise; the use of one name leads us to expect this. The surprise comes when one realizes that this one name stands for lover, wife, and partner in philosophical discourse. Xanthippe, in other words, is an Epicurean. Epicureans, however, from the very beginning, were willing to accept women into the garden as equals in discussion and occasionally as wives,²⁹ so that the picture of Xanthippe developed here is not so surprising after all.

If the case for reading ἄκοιτις still seems a little short of certain, perhaps we can clinch the argument with an analysis of its adjective

²⁷Cf. Epic. *Ep.* 3.124-27, esp. γνῶσις ὄρθη τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸν θάνατον ἀπολαυστὸν ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θνητόν, οὐκ ἀπειρον προστιθεῖσα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένη πόθον.

²⁸J. M. Rist, *Epicurus: An Introduction* (Cambridge 1972) 10 f., 134.

²⁹Cf. Philod. *de Morte*, col. 37.6-12. The person who bewails his mortality does not even deserve an answer: ὁ δ' οὐδὲ προσφωνήσεως ἀξιωθήσεται.

φιλεράστρια. Applied to “bed,” Gow-Page’s translation “lover-loving” is acceptable but bland (cf. the current “user-friendly”), even more so than Meleager’s φιλέραστον ρόδον (42 *HE*, *A.P.* 5.136),³⁰ which could be taken as Philodemus’ model by those who prefer “lover-loving bed.” Φιλεράστρια Κύπρις (Marc. Arg. 29 Gow-Page, *A.P.* 10.18) and Φιλέραστος Ζηνοφίλα (Meleager 31, *A.P.* 5.144) show that adjectives built on this stem can be applied to people, which helps our case a little, but more can be said of Philodemus’ particular use of this word.

We begin by asking which half of φιλεραστ- is verbal and which substantival. Plato, who may have coined the word, would answer that the first half contains the verbal force: Aristophanes in the *Symposium* says of the broken tally of original homosexual beings that ὁ τοιοῦτος παιδεραστής τε καὶ φιλεραστής γίγνεται. Despite the similar formation of the two nouns here, context makes it clear that “the former term applies to the pursuer, the latter to his younger quarry”;³¹ similarly Aristotle, who includes φιλεραστάι with φίλαυτοι, φιλοκόλακες, φιλτότιμοι, καὶ φιλότεκνοι.³² But outside such determining contexts, the word would seem to have been formed on the model of παιδεραστής κτλ, γυναικεραστέω and -ής (Pollux 3.68.70), ἀνδρεράστρια (Aristoph. *Th.* 392 and perhaps fr. 930 Kock), and δημεραστής (*Pl. Alc.* 1.132a).³³ Φιλεραστ-, in fact, is the only stem ending in ἐραστ- where this element is not equivalent to τὸ ἔραν. Without the context to determine otherwise, one is drawn to take it first as a typical φίλο- word and then as a typical -εραστής word. Philodemus seems to have expanded Homer’s φίλη ἄκοιτις (*Il.* 3.138), φίλος ἄκοίτης (*Od.* 5.120), and φίλος πόσις (*Od.* 1.363),³⁴ adding -εραστρια not only to bring out the sexual nature of the relationship and so amplify φίλη Ξανθώ, but also to exploit the tension inherent in the formation of the word. Thus, Xanthippe, an Epicurean and therefore a “friend” in the special sense used within the Garden,³⁵ is now addressed by a term that can be under-

³⁰Note also IG 14.793a, a Renaissance transcription of a now-lost (and hence undatable) tombstone from Naples which praises the wisdom, beauty, and musical skill at πακτίδα τὰν φιλέραστον of a certain Kleopatra.

³¹Dover in his commentary ad 192b4; cf. 191e παῖδες . . . φιλοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας, 213d (*Soc. on Alcib.*) ἐγὼ τὴν τούτου μανίαν τε καὶ φιλεραστίαν πάνυ ὄρρωδῶ.

³²*Rhet.* 1371b24.

³³Others are ἴππεραστής (*Ael. NA* 2.28), οἰνεραστής (*id. VH* 2.41), ἀντεραστής (*Aristoph. Eq.* 733 etc.), συνεραστής (*Timocles fr.* 8.6 Kock).

³⁴Cf. J. Taillardat, “Φιλότης, πίστις, et *foedus*,” *REG* 95 (1982) 1-14, esp. 12 f.

³⁵Cf. Rist (*op. cit.* n. 28 above) 134. Note how in Lucretius’ archeology, marriage is the immediate preliminary to the development of *amicities* (5.1013-18).

stood as both "friend to your lover" and "lover of your friend," the alternation suggesting the reciprocity of their relationship: each is lover and (Epicurean) friend of the other.

One final question, which, along with its answer, may have already occurred to the reader: Is there any significance to the choice of the name Xanthippe? We answer indirectly by first considering *A.P.* 5.80,

μῆλον ἐγώ· βάλλει με φιλῶν σέ τις· ἀλλ' ἐπίνευσον,
Ξανθίππη· κάγω καὶ σὺ μαραινόμεθα,

which P and Diogenes Laertius ascribe to Plato, P1 to Philodemus. Although Platonic authorship has been thoroughly disproved by Ludwig,³⁶ this only slightly enhances the possibility that it was written by Philodemus,³⁷ for someone may have composed a love poem to Socrates' wife in Plato's name. This is bizarre, but no more so than some of the other amatory poems ascribed to Plato, in which he is supposed to express his love for Phaedrus and Agathon, each many years his senior. "It is necessary to conclude that some person or persons composed and published a number of epigrams under Plato's name" (Page, *FGE*, p. 126). Thus, (1) *A.P.* 5.80 was composed by Would-be-Plato; or (2) an anonymous poem, on the basis of Xanthippe's name, was assigned to Plato by the source of Diog. Laert.³⁸ and to Philodemus by someone else; or (3) it was written by Philodemus, with a mistaken ascription in P to Plato for the reason given in (2). Each seems equally probable.

In any case, *A.P.* 5.80 suggests the answer to our question above; namely, that Philodemus' "wife" was named after Socrates'—not necessarily for any qualities exemplified by the original Xanthippe, whom history has not treated kindly,³⁹ but simply because she *was* Socrates'

³⁶ W. Ludwig, "Plato's love epigrams," *GRBS* 4 (1963) 59–82.

³⁷ *A.P.* 9.44, ascribed to Flaccus by PPl and to Plato by C, is assigned to the former by Gow-Page; cf. Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* [= *FGE*] (Cambridge 1981) 166, 180.

³⁸ So Ludwig (*op. cit.* n. 36 above) 76. The name Xanthippe appears in other epigrams: (1) as one of three Bacchants in *A.P.* 6.134 (Ps.-Anacreon), of probable Hellenistic date, but with no Philodemean echoes; (2) in an epitaph as the wife (*akoitis*) of Arche-nautes, attributed to Simonides (*A.P.* 13.26); and note (3) *Epigr. Bobiensia* 35, *Musarum Xantho decimast, Cytherea secunda, / quarta Charis: Xantho Musa, Venus, Charis est.* For the problems of authorship in epigrams attributed to Anacreon, Simonides, and Plato, see Page *FGE*, 119–27, 138 (Anacreon), 164 (Plato), 251 f. (Simonides).

³⁹ The charge that she was a *hetaira* (and worse) by some ancient slanderers has been revived by some moderns; cf. P. J. Bicknell, "Socrates' mistress Xanthippe," *Apeiron* 8 (1974) 1–5, agreeing with J. W. Fitton, "That was no lady, that was. . . .," *CQ* 64

wife. It is true that in his philosophical writings, which follow the form of polemical argument established by Epicurus, several anti-Socratic comments may be found;⁴⁰ but these may have been written more *pro forma* than for any feelings of actual hostility toward Socrates harbored by Philodemus. In fact, if Cicero is to be trusted, Socrates was regarded as a model for philosophers of all persuasions;⁴¹ and perhaps Philodemus more than most, if G. Friedrich is right to see a reference to him in Catullus 47.1 *Porci et Socation, duae sinistrae / Pisonis*.⁴² Let us accept Porcius as someone's real name, however much it reminds us of Cicero and Horace's Epicurean pig jokes.⁴³ Nevertheless, although the attested name Σωκράτιών⁴⁴ could conceivably appear in Latin as Socation rather than the expected Socratio,⁴⁵ Socation is more likely to be the Latinization of Σωκράτιον, which is otherwise unattested, probably

(1970) 56–66. This view has been successfully challenged by L. Woodbury, "Socrates and the daughter of Aristides," *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 7–25; R. D. Crome, "Socrates' Myrto," *GB* 9 (1980) 57–67.

⁴⁰K. Kleve, "The philosophical polemics in Lucretius: A study in the history of Epicurean criticism," *Entretiens Hardt* 24 (1978) 39–75; M. T. Riley, "The Epicurean criticism of Socrates," *Phoenix* 34 (1980) 55–68; K. Kleve, "Scurra Atticus: The Epicurean view of Socrates," in *Συζήτησις* (op. cit. n. 3 above) 227–53.

⁴¹So Cicero, *de Or.* 3.16.61 *Nam cum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat; prosemnatae sunt quasi familiae dissentientes inter se et multum disjunctae dispare, cum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent et esse arbitrarentur.* Cf. K. Döring, *Exemplum Socratis* (Wiesbaden 1979; *Hermes* Einzelschr. 42) 8 f.

⁴²Catulli *Veronensis Liber* (Leipzig 1908) 228: "Wir haben nach dem Wortlauf unseres Gedichtes keinen Grund, uns den Socation anders vorzustellen als den Philodemus von Gadara, der auch bei Piso in Macedonien war." Even if Philodemus did not accompany Piso, his association with him is assured and the identification of Philodemus with Socation is an attractive one. It has been accepted by T. Frank, *Catullus and Horace* (New York 1928) 82–84; C. L. Neudling, *A Prosopography to Catullus* (Oxford 1958) 147; contra P. Giuffrida, *L'Epicurismo nella letteratura latina nel I sec. a. c.* (Torino 1950) vol. 2, 179 f.; F. Della Corte, *Personaggi Catulliani* (Florence 1976) 204–208. Cf. also R. G. M. Nisbet, *Cicero. In Pisonem* (Oxford 1961) appendix III, "Piso and Philodemus," 183–86.

⁴³Cic. *In Pis. 37 Epicure noster* (sc. Piso), *ex hara producte non ex schola; Hor. Ep. 1.4.16 Epicuri de grege porcum, Plut. Mor. 1091c, 1094a; cf. Nisbet ad Cic. In Pis. 37.* Porcius, however, along with other names derived from animals (cf. Varro *RR* 2.1.10) is too common for us to be sure that a Roman ear would immediately understand it in this way. (One wonders, though, about M. Porcius Aper; *CIL* II 4238.)

⁴⁴Galen, *Comp. Med.* 12.835 Kühn.

⁴⁵Socratio appears in *CIL* 3, 948. Neue-Wagener, *Formenlehre d. Lat. Sprache*³ (Leipzig 1902) 246 ff., list some few Latin names ending in -on deriving from Greek names ending in -ων, but all names in -ιών show up in Latin as -io; cf. Nisbet (op. cit. n. 42 above) 182.

because it is not a real name but rather a diminutive for Socrates. Any-one called Little Socrates is presumably a philosopher; any philosopher in Piso's entourage is almost certainly an Epicurean. Moreover, just as Cicero singles out Philodemus as the Greek philosopher who had the greatest influence on Piso,⁴⁶ so too would Catullus be more likely to address Philodemus before any other, less well known, philosopher. The tone of a diminutive, of course, depends to a great extent on who employs it and under what circumstances. Thus, Strepsiades mingles familiarity with annoyance when addressing his sleeping son as Pheidippidion (*Clouds* 80), but when later on entering the Phrontisterion he calls out ὁ Σωκρατίδιον (223), schol. 5 is doubtless correct in saying ὅπο τοῦ ὑποκοριστικοῦ διαβάλλει αὐτόν. If Philodemus does stand behind Socrates, Catullus' aim — also διαβολή — could be achieved only if Philodemus were widely known as Socrates and/or Socation.

And if Philodemus *alias* Socrates calls a woman Xanthippe, the natural inference is that she is his wife, a notion that I hope to have shown sits very well with the Xanthippe found in his poetry. Let us return now to the poem with which this investigation began, assuming that Xantho is indeed his wife. The lamp, although a "witness," has been rendered drunkenly insensate; and Philainis, who could (and perhaps would) speak of what she might see, has gone, closing the door behind her.⁴⁷ Philodemus now proceeds to tell Xantho to. . . . But these words if spoken would leave another witness, namely, the reader. So Philodemus cuts short the words that would describe τὰ ἀλλήτα, hereby excluding us as he had excluded Philainis. Xantho will know what is to occur, and that is all that matters. Let the line in question be printed as καὶ σύ, φίλη Ξανθώ με. . . σὺ δ', ὁ φιλεράστρι, ἄκοιτις.⁴⁸

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⁴⁶In *Pis.* 68–71. There is universal agreement that Asconius (16.12 Clark) correctly identified the unnamed *Graecus* of *In Pis.* as Philodemus. For Cicero's familiarity with Philodemus' works, cf. D. Delatte, *BAGB* (1984) 27–39.

⁴⁷On v. 4, Gow-Page print Jacob's πτυκτήν, where P has πυκτήν and Pl τυκτήν. Since the *locus classicus* for the desire to have unobserved sexual intercourse between man and wife occurs in the *Dios Apatē*, where Hera says of her room that Hephaistos πυκνάς δὲ θύρας σταθμοῖσιν ἐπήρσεν (*Il.* 14.339), I am tempted to read πυκνήν in Philodemus; to be understood, that is, as an amusing literary allusion rather than as actual description.

⁴⁸For advice on earlier stages of this paper, I am indebted to Georg Luck, Diskin Clay, David Konstan, and Matthew Santirocco.

ADDENDUM

The argument presented above receives some additional support from *Oxyrhynchus Papyrus* LIX (1987) 3724. For permission to refer to this in advance of publication I am very much grateful to the Egyptian Exploration Society of London and to its editor Peter Parsons. In brief (so as not to anticipate too much of the *editio princeps*), *POxy* 3724 (later first century A.D.) contains, i. a., 175 incipits of epigrams, among which there are 25 (perhaps 27) of poems attributed in our mss. to Philodemus, two of poems attributed to Asclepiades, and two more known but anonymous. Clearly, the likelihood is that among the remaining, unidentified, poems there are others (perhaps many others) written by Philodemus, some of which have already been identified by Parsons. Three incipits are of interest for my article:

Col. 4.1 ἀνθιογούκηδει, for which Parsons suggests either Ξάνθιον οὐκ ἥδειν or Ξ. οὐ κήδειν. Xanthion would thus be added to Xantho and Xantharion as yet another nickname for Xanthippe. And there would be at least one more Xanthippe poem in the cycle.

Col. 4.31 μῆλον εγώ πεμ () is more interesting, as it seems to confirm Philodemean authorship for *A.P.* 5.80 μῆλον ἐγώ· βάλλει κτλ. Although an apple tossed is an image more exciting than one conveyed by messenger, πέμπει cannot be denied to Philodemus for this reason alone. That it is not an isolated scribal error is shown by its translation in *Epigr. Bob.* 32, *malum ego: mittit me quidam tibi munus amator*, as has been pointed out to me by Alan Cameron.

Col. 3.14 οκτωκαιδεκετίν (“an 18-year-old girl”), from an unknown poem, is of greatest potential interest. In discussing Ep. 17 (*A.P.* 11.41) above, I referred to Aristotle’s designation of 37 as the ideal age for a man to marry. Since in this same passage he also gives 18 as the age of the woman in this ideal marriage, it is tempting to regard this incipit not only as Philodemean but also as further indication that in writing of Xanthippe Philodemus had in mind an ideal marriage.

Further reinforcement of ἄκοιτις comes from the investigations of Alan Cameron, who shows in his forthcoming book *The Greek Anthology: From Meleager to Planudes*, OUP 1987 (referred to here with his kind permission), that C “had an excellent ms., the copy of Michael Chartophylax made directly from the autograph of Cephalas,” and is far more likely to have found ἄκοιτις in his exemplar than to have thought of it himself.

C. OPPSIUS ON JULIUS CAESAR

Apart from the very few places where sources are explicitly acknowledged, the origin of the material employed by Plutarch in his life of Caesar is even more obscure than that of Suetonius in his *Julius*. In this paper, I examine certain anomalous passages in the *Caesar* and, by comparing parallel passages in other writers, not merely deduce (as has indeed been conjectured in the past) that we have traces of the work of Caesar's friend Gaius Oppius, but come to some conclusions concerning the nature of that work. In particular, apart from the evidently panegyrical nature of Oppius' account of Caesar, it will be shown that the work to some extent anticipated Suetonius' imperial biographies in following not so much a chronological pattern as one arranged *per species* (Suetonius' own description in *Aug.* 9) and containing groups of anecdotes to illustrate different qualities of the subject.

This is not the normal practice of Plutarch, who tends to follow a basically chronological scheme throughout, interspersed with a good deal of moralising and often with anecdotes to illustrate his particular point. In a very few passages, however, he abandons his narrative for digressions comprising collections of details of something like the Suetonian type. Most noticeable is the passage in the *Cicero* (25-27) consisting of witty remarks made by the orator at the expense of Crassus and other public figures. This digression occurs just after the end of Cicero's consulate (23) and serves to explain how he came to lose so much support during the ensuing months. The chronological narrative resumes in 28, with the beginning of Clodius' attacks on Cicero, which were to lead to his exile in 58 B.C. However, the witticisms do not all belong to the period when they might actually have contributed to his unpopularity; for at least one (26.1) belongs at least as late as Crassus' departure for Syria in 55 B.C. The whole collection serves to illustrate the general acerbity of Cicero's tongue. Another and shorter group of witticisms occurs in 38.2-6, much more closely tied in to its context, as showing his malice towards his comrades in Pompey's camp. Both sets appear to be derived from some much fuller collection of Cicero's sayings, such as that made by Tiro, which was drawn upon by Macrobius (*Sat.* 2.3) or his source, with an entirely different selection to illustrate humour rather than malice. It is a fair inference that Plutarch was able to draw on this collection to enliven his biography, and inserted the extracts at conve-

nient points without regard to precise chronology. A similar collection of sayings appears in the *Cato major* 7.2-9.7.¹

Such digressive passages seem to be very unusual in Plutarch. There is one particularly striking one, however, in the *Caesar* (15-17), just after the events of his consulate and before the start of the Gallic campaign. For Plutarch, this moment marks the beginning of Caesar's real greatness (whereas the main digression at the end of Cicero's consulate marks the start of his political decline). He devotes chapter 15 to a comparison of Caesar's generalship, not with Alexander the Great² (who is specifically paired with Caesar in the *Parallel Lives*, although the summing-up has been lost), but with other Romans, from Fabius Maximus to Pompey, and then to a summary of his achievements in the Gallic war, the full account of which follows in chronological order in chapters 18 to 27. Chapters 16 and 17 consist of an explanation of the reasons for his great success, especially in relation to his own soldiers. Plutarch gives four examples of individual devotion and valour: of Acilius in the sea-fight before Massilia; of Cassius Scaeva at Dyrrachium; of an unnamed soldier in a marsh in Britain; and of Granius Petro in Africa. Only the third of these appears to belong to the Gallic war; and this completely upsets the chronological arrangement of the other three, taken in sequence from the civil wars, although the paragraph appears to be concerned with Gaul only. The later part of this illustrative matter (17) comprises a general account of Caesar's self-sacrifice and endurance of hardship, and of his rapid travelling without pause for sleep or dictation of letters. This section concludes with two stories showing Caesar's indifference to his own comfort: that of the asparagus served with myrrh by Valerius Leo at Milan, and that of Caesar's giving up to Oppius the one bed available in a poor hut where they had taken refuge in a storm. Plutarch then goes straight on with the narrative of the Gallic war as if the interruption had not occurred.

¹ The *Alcibiades* contains a chapter of anecdotes (16) on the subject's capriciousness; but all apparently belong to the same period, of Alcibiades' greatest power, just before the Sicilian expedition is described (17ff.). As with Cicero, they serve to explain the subject's fall from eminence.

² In *Pompey* 46.1 Plutarch refers to comparisons of Pompey with Alexander, including the claim made by some that Pompey was the same age at his *acme* as Alexander was at his death (i.e., 33), when in fact he was nearly 40. Plutarch is not normally good at chronology, not mentioning the date of Pompey's death at all, but correctly noting his first command in 106 B.C. at the age of 23 (6.3). Here either he or his authorities underestimate his age by several years.

Virtually every item in these three chapters is to be found elsewhere, sometimes with some striking discrepancies, which will be considered in due course. Most noticeable, however, is the way in which the four examples of soldiers' valour occur in the same order in Valerius Maximus, writing about 35 A.D. In 3.2, *de Fortitudine*, after a number of stories drawn from republican history, Valerius relates first (22) the story of Acilius at Massilia, then (23) that of M. Caesius (so the manuscripts have it) Scaeva in battle against the Pompeians, and then that of Scaevius on an island off Britain. The fourth anecdote, of the brave officer in Africa, is delayed for several chapters to appear under the heading *de Constantia* (3.8.7) with the name of Titius or Totius (variously emended) and the rank of centurion, emphasized for the contrast with the aristocrats featuring in the previous stories. Although Caesar is a favourite subject of anecdotes in Valerius, these are the only four to illustrate the prowess of his men; and they correspond closely to the four in Plutarch's chapter, although with enough discrepancies (to be discussed below) to prove that Plutarch has not taken them from Valerius.

Some further clues to the origin of this material shared by Valerius and Plutarch are provided by Suetonius, writing his *Julius* probably a few years after Plutarch's *Caesar*,³ but certainly in no way indebted to the Greek writer. At the end of his long analysis of Caesar's character (*Jul.* 45–64), which concludes with sections on courage and *constantia*, the biographer turns to his attitude to his troops (65–67), as a result of which they display singular devotion to their general (68.1–2) and courage on his behalf (68.3–4). The former of these qualities is illustrated by general statements of the readiness of the men to contribute their own savings to the cost of the civil war and to endure the scantiest diet at Dyrrachium. Between these comes the claim that a large number (*plerique*) when captured refused to purchase their lives by serving against Caesar. This is essentially the same story as that of Granius/Titius; although Suetonius has omitted the name altogether (as well as the location of the event in Africa) and multiplied the number of those involved,⁴ as he not infrequently does, though seldom in the earlier Lives. After describing the collective valour of the men at Dyrrachium, he continues with reference to individual acts of courage (*nec mirum, si quis*

³ Suetonius' first *Caesars* at least were dedicated to Septicius Clarus as praetorian prefect c. A.D. 120. C. P. Jones, *J.R.S.* 56 (1966) 67–69, gives a date about A.D. 116 for Plutarch's *Caesar*.

⁴ However, in the version of the story in *Bell. Afr.* 44–46 (to be considered below), the officer's death was accompanied by that of a body of veterans.

singulorum facta respiciat) to give the stories of Cassius Scaeva and C. Acilius, adding the words, *ne de pluribus referam*, as if to indicate the availability of further examples if he chose to use them. In fact, he nowhere mentions Scaevius, the third in the lists of Valerius and Plutarch. Scaeva is placed before Acilius evidently because Suetonius has just been describing the valour of other troops at Dyrrachium, and perhaps because Caesar himself (B.C. 3.52-53) links Scaeva with the general courage of the garrison of the hard-pressed fort there. There are considerable variations between our versions of the stories, which will be discussed below. Suetonius and Plutarch still agree in exploiting the stories of Acilius and Scaeva to illustrate the valour of Caesar's troops on his behalf; while Valerius, whose purpose is simply to produce examples of qualities without reference to any specific context, uses them to exemplify fortitude pure and simple. Likewise his placing of Granius/Titius under *constantia* corresponds closely to his appearance in Plutarch and (anonymously) in Suetonius as an example of devotion to his general in a general situation where actual fighting was not in question.

The third of Valerius' and Plutarch's examples, omitted by Suetonius, presents special problems, not completely resolved by the fact that Dio Cassius (37.52.3-53.3) relates this story, of the valour of Scaevius, in an historically circumstantial context along with other material to be found in Plutarch, to be discussed below.

Almost all the material given by Plutarch in the following chapter (17) occurs in Suetonius and nowhere else, but by no means arranged in the same way as in Plutarch, where there is no clear scheme determining the order of items. Letter-writing, in particular is introduced by Plutarch twice within a few lines, first (17.3) in connection with Caesar's unsparing speed of travel, then in connection with his ability as a horseman, although the topic is continued with a general statement about his unprecedented use of correspondence for communication with friends (17.4). It is difficult to believe that this arrangement was the result of any deliberate plan on Plutarch's part, but rather that what we have represents a somewhat unsatisfactory paraphrase of a more systematic paragraph in his source. Suetonius, on the other hand, has clearly adapted each item to an appropriate topic in his own scheme, so that physical characteristics and ill-health appear under *forma* (Jul. 45.1), the habit of writing while on the road under literary activity (58.5), and, of the two anecdotes which conclude the digression, that concerning the unusual olive oil served at dinner comes under indifference to diet (53.1) and that on giving up a bed to Oppius under relationship to

friends (72). Altogether Suetonius' use of this material indicates clearly how he employs his own complicated scheme of topics to organize items found in an entirely different order in an earlier work.

As to the nature of the earlier work underlying at least part of the *Caesar* 15–17, there has been general agreement for over a century.⁵ The details of Caesar's correspondence (*Caes.* 17.4) are attributed by Plutarch to Oppius; the story of the olive-oil (17.5), in the same context of indifference to diet, is specifically attributed by Suetonius (*Jul.* 53) to the same source; and Oppius is the recipient of Caesar's kindness in both versions of the final anecdote (*Caes.* 17.6, *Jul.* 72). G. Thouret⁶ goes so far as to assert that we have here "fragmentum ex scriptis C. Oppii"; P. Flacelière and E. Chambry⁷ give the whole of chapter 17 to Oppius. Without following Thouret in assigning the whole of the early part of the *Caesar* to Oppius, which he does largely on the basis of the strongly Caesarian attitude exhibited throughout, and particularly of the detailed knowledge displayed of personal affairs including finance, it is difficult to deny the validity of the more cautious conclusion.

Gaius Oppius is known as an intimate of Caesar from at least 54 B.C. and as taking responsibility for his correspondence (e.g., Cic. *ad Q. fr.* 3.1.8, Gell. 17.9.1). Our knowledge of his writings is set out by H. Peter and by F. Münzer.⁸ In addition to a work devoted specifically to proving that Caesarion was not the child of Caesar (Suet. *Jul.* 52.3), Oppius is credited with writing about the elder Africanus and Marius; Charisius quotes the form *volgu* from Oppius *de vita Cassii* and *de vita prioris Africani*. There is considerable doubt whether these represent three actual biographies: Peter himself believes that the stories of Africanus' miraculous birth and subsequent converse with Jupiter (fr. 1–3 = Gell. 6.1.2–6) and of Marius' endurance of physical pain (fr. 8 = Plin. *N.H.* 11.252) are taken rather from the work on Caesar which evidently lies behind certain parts of Plutarch's and Suetonius' biographies. Plutarch, in his own life of Marius (6.3), which includes a cross-reference to the *Caesar* as already written, gives the story of Marius' endurance of an

⁵ The scattered nature of the group of anecdotes precludes an annalistic writer like Livy as a possible source. Livy must have given the three civil war stories (if at all) in their proper contexts in books 110 and 111, that of Scaevius in 105 or 106.

⁶ *De Cicerone, Asinio Pollione, C. Oppio rerum Caesarianarum scriptoribus: Leipziger Studien zur classischen Philologie* I (1878) 356.

⁷ In the Budé *Plutarch*, vol. 9 (1975) 136–37.

⁸ *Hist. Rom. reliquiae*, vol. 2, 63–64 and 46–49; *R-E* 18.1 (1942) 729–36; also Schanz-Hosius 1, 350ff.

operation for the removal of varicose veins without being tied down, in a context of his connection by marriage with Caesar's family and the latter's emulation of Marius' fortitude.⁹ The elder Pliny (loc. cit.), who likewise describes Marius' endurance of surgery, gives Oppius as his authority—the only citation from Oppius in the whole of *N.H.*,¹⁰ with no explanation of the work in question. It is unfortunate that we lack the opening of Suetonius' life, which may well have given an account of Caesar's birth; Plutarch's life, at least as we now have it, starts abruptly with Caesar's unfortunate connection with both Cinna and Marius as a handicap to his career under Sulla. It would be surprising if this biography contained nothing to balance the stories of the miraculous conception of Alexander in the parallel life. This would have provided an occasion for Plutarch to refer to the stories which Gellius specifically compares to those about Alexander. In any case, one of the most striking features of the opening of the digression in the *Caesar* (15.2–3) is the explicit comparison with a number of earlier Roman generals, including the Scipios and Marius. The same point is made by Dio, in his account of Caesar's propraetorship in Spain in 60 B.C., which goes on to some other items of apparently Oppian origin, including the story of Scaevius (37.52–53). Caesar is here stated to have been eager to emulate Pompey and others who had enjoyed great power (not necessarily in Spain); and there is also an implied comparison with Alexander, to which we shall return. Quite a different sort of comparison with Pompey is attributed to Oppius in Plutarch's *Pompey* (10.4) where Pompey is described as deceitfully engaging the captured Q. Valerius in conversation before ordering his summary execution; but Plutarch adds that Oppius was not to be trusted on the subject of Caesar's friends and enemies. Oppius appears to have related this anecdote about Pompey in order to emphasize Caesar's well-known clemency—one of the elements listed in *Caes.* 15.2 as “reasonableness and mildness towards his captives” among the respects in which he surpassed the other generals. We cannot tell how extensive this comparison was in Oppius' original work, nor whether more than a single anecdote was given to cover each predecessor. It may be significant that the story of Marius' operation happens

⁹ Plutarch repeats the story in *Apophth. Rom.* 20.2; and Cicero gives it in *Tusc.* 2.53 (also 35), with emphasis on Marius' refusal *alligari*. The *Tusculans* are generally dated not long after March, 44 B.C.; Oppius may have written at any time after Caesar's death.

¹⁰ In Pliny's table of contents (*N.H.* 1), Oppius is cited as a source for this book alone.

to be quoted in two independent extant authorities, and that there is no trace of any other detail about him to be attributed to Oppius. At the same time there is evidence that both the *Pompey* and the *Marius* were written after the *Caesar*.¹¹ Plutarch seems to have noted these stories attested by an unusually well-informed source and held them over for biographies where they would be more appropriate than in the *Caesar*, where the specific comparison was to be with Alexander alone.¹² The one further character allegedly described by Oppius is Cassius (fr. 4); which Peter likewise believes to belong to the work on Caesar, though in some connection which now escapes us completely.

There seems to be a *prima facie* case for accepting the view that Plutarch's *Caes.* 15-17 represents a paraphrase of a key section of whatever sort of work it was that Oppius wrote about Caesar—evidently a memoir rather than a history or a biography, as Thouret makes clear (p. 347), and altogether in Caesar's favour, composed at some time after the Ides of March. The main elements in this section will have been: (a) Caesar's superiority to all previous Roman generals down to and including Pompey, with examples given for the particular respects in which he surpassed each; (b) the devotion he inspired in his men, with the examples of Acilius, Scaeva, Scaevis and Granius; and (c) his rejection of luxury and acceptance of hardship, with stories of his asceticism and particular emphasis on his correspondence (a special interest of Oppius' own), and the two anecdotes of Valerius Leo's olive-oil and the giving up of a bed to Oppius to illustrate Caesar's indifference to diet and comfort. The grouping of the anecdotes involved effectively disproves the arguments of R. Saller¹³ of the totally irresponsible and largely oral transmission of such quasi-historical material. The way in which Valerius Maximus connects the three examples of *fortitudo* (3.2.22-23) is particularly noteworthy. In the first three books at least of this immense collection of *exempla* I can find no comparable method of linking: chapter 23 opening with the careful contrast between Acilius' naval glory and Scaeva's glory on land, and then continuing with a rhetorical deliberation on the value of Scaevis' brave deeds in the water (the island and the escape from it) and his brave words on land (reporting

¹¹ *Caes.* 35.1, 45.5; *Marius* 6.2; C. P. Jones in *J.R.S.* 56 (1966) 67-70.

¹² Plutarch's lives of Fabius, Sulla and Lucullus, who are mentioned in the comparison and may have had items illustrating each, were written before the *Caesar* and so presumably before Plutarch had studied Oppius' work. The others, of the two Africani and of Metellus, if ever written, have not survived.

¹³ *Greece & Rome* 27 (1980) 69-83.

back to Caesar on the mainland). The nearest parallels in Valerius juxtapose such features as private and official (1.1.10), daytime and night (1.8.1), men and women (2.6.14); but none of these links more than two examples, and in none is there a common element like Caesar's leadership in these three. It is not clear whether this ingenious linking was already there in Oppius or was added by Valerius. Nor is it clear whether Plutarch's fourth example, of Titius/Granius, was originally distinguished from the first three by involving no fighting and illustrating *constantia* rather than *fortitudo*, as exemplified by Acilius and Scaeva, as Valerius has it (3.8.7) and effectively Suetonius as well (*Jul.* 68.1). The agreement of the other two suggests that already in Oppius the two qualities were exemplified separately and that Plutarch, with his minimal concern for categorization, has simply run the two together.

But if this general picture of this part at least of Oppius' work may be regarded as correct, the inconsistencies between the witnesses are considerable enough to justify further conclusions:

1. Acilius is described by Plutarch as boarding an enemy ship (ἐπιβεβηκώς), having his right hand cut off with a sword, and using his shield on his left arm to drive the enemy back and capture the ship. Suetonius has Acilius' hand severed as he grasps the stern of the ship; he goes on to drive the enemy back with the boss of his shield. Valerius, who adds the detail that Valerius belongs to the Tenth legion, makes him lose his right hand after seizing the Massilian ship, then seize the stern with his left and continue fighting (it is not clear how) until the ship is captured and sunk. Valerius seems to have been guilty of over-enthusiasm in elaborating a fairly straightforward story; which Plutarch has confused only by mistranslating the Latin verb *inicere* (used by both the Latin writers), so as to make Acilius board the vessel before losing his hand. He also omits the comparison with the Athenian Cynegirus at Marathon, made by both Latin writers, perhaps because he regarded this as unsuitable in a series of lives based on major comparisons between Greeks and Romans. Neither Plutarch nor Valerius mentions the siege of Massilia elsewhere. Caesar himself, in his account of the naval engagement (*B.C.* 2.6-7) does not mention Acilius at all.¹⁴

¹⁴ Lucan, in his account of the Massilian sea-battle, devotes a long passage (3.603-34) to an account of the valour of two twins, whose names he does not give—possibly because his own mother, whom he evidently detested (*Tac. Ann.* 15.56.4), was an Acilia. One of the two, clearly the Acilius of the tradition, loses both arms in grasping the enemy ships (*iniectare manum*), but continues to protect his brother until death overcomes him.

2. Cassius Scaeva is acknowledged by Caesar (*B.C.* 3.53) in a context from which Suetonius (*Jul.* 68.3-4) draws further information, apparently neither directly nor accurately. Caesar has one Volcatius Tullus with three cohorts withstand the attack of a whole Pompeian legion before Dyrrachium; Suetonius has one cohort of the Sixth legion *praeposita castello* repel four legions for several hours. Caesar has every man in the fort wounded and four centurions losing eyes. As proof of their valour, about 30,000 arrows are picked up; Suetonius has 130,000 with a patent misinterpretation at some stage of the abbreviation *C* for either *circiter* or *centum*. In Caesar's account, Scaeva's shield is brought to him with 120 or 220 (most probably c. 120) holes in it, and he is promoted from junior centurion to *primus pilus* for his major part in saving the fort. Suetonius makes him lose an eye and suffer wounds in thigh and shoulder and receive 120 holes in his shield. Plutarch's version is identical to Suetonius', except that the number of holes has become 130; but he goes on with a story of Scaeva's pretended offer to surrender and treacherous attack on two Pompeians who come up to his assistance, one of whom has his shoulder lopped off. Valerius relates the same story, though without specific reference to Dyrrachium. Scaeva is himself *castello praepositus* (the same words as used by Suetonius to describe the valiant cohort of the Sixth), and withstands Pompey's prefect Iustuleius and a large number of men, before collapsing with the same wounds listed by Suetonius. The verb *corruit* does not make it clear whether he survived; though one manuscript inserts the statement that he was saved by the intervention of his fellows—exactly as is stated by Plutarch. One additional version here is that of Appian (*B.C.* 2.60), who has the story of Scaeva's feigned appeal for help to a Pompeian centurion (= the prefect Iustuleius?) and attack on the two men sent to help him, with the same severing of the shoulder of one as in Plutarch. Again he is saved by his own men. Scaeva loses an eye, but his other wounds are not specified. The pierced shield, however, with six wounds and the loss of an eye, is attributed by Appian to Minucius, in command of the fort. The fullest of all the versions is that of Lucan (6.144-262), who sets the scene in *Minuci castella* (126) and mentions Scaeva's rank as centurion, the showers of missiles, the loss of Scaeva's eye, his deceit of one Aulus (= Iustuleius?) with the promise of surrender, and his saving by his comrades. There is still enough ambiguity in Lucan's language for Robert Graves, in his Penguin translation, to assume that Scaeva was killed ("When he died . . ."), although he turns up again in 10.544 and is evidently still alive among Caesar's former followers after

the Ides of March (Cic. *Att.* 14.10.2). The rather discreditable item of the false surrender, which is the main element in the story not mentioned by Caesar, may have been an addition to the common version, perhaps given by Pollio on the authority of Scaeva himself. If Suetonius and Valerius found it in the common source, they may well have omitted it as hardly illustrating the theme of *fortitudo*.

3. Scaevius is not mentioned by Suetonius at all, perhaps because he has enough examples without him, perhaps on account of some unsatisfactory features in the way the story was given. So far as Plutarch and Valerius are concerned (Dio's version requires special consideration), the event takes place during one or other of Caesar's campaigns in Britain—Caesar himself has no mention of Scaevius or of any possible occasion for his prowess. In Plutarch some leading centurions (a most improbable group for a joint action) have plunged into a marshy and watery place (not specifically the sea) and are attacked by barbarians. A common soldier, unnamed, presumably on account of the confusing similarity to Scaeva's name, charges into the middle of them, saves the centurions by routing the enemy, and swims or wades back to Caesar, to apologize for the loss of his shield. In Valerius the whole episode is blown up into high rhetoric, with Scaevius apostrophized in the second person throughout. Scaevius has crossed with four other soldiers onto a rock near an island held by a large force of Britons. As the tide goes out, the barbarians start to attack. The four others return on a raft, leaving Scaevius alone to hold off the attack with immense valour, to the wonder of the watching Romans and Britons. He is wounded, loses his helmet and shield, and finally swims back to shore carrying two breast-plates (it is not clear whose), to apologize for the loss of his shield and to be rewarded with the rank of centurion. Neither story is fully comprehensible, explaining either why the troops ever left dry land or why Scaevius was left behind when the others escaped. A good deal may be due to Valerius' gross rhetoric; but the impression is left that neither writer understood the source properly.

4. Granius Petro's story is at least related lucidly enough by Plutarch. He is quaestor designate, captured in a ship of Caesar's by Scipio, evidently during the campaign leading to the battle of Thapsus. Scipio makes booty (*λείαν*) of the others, but offers Granius his life. Granius refuses to accept mercy (no terms are mentioned) and kills himself with his sword. Suetonius presumably refers to this same story in very general terms, with no specification of Africa or of the persons concerned, simply referring to a number of soldiers (*plerique*) who refuse the offer of

life in return for serving against Caesar. Their death is not described, but may be inferred. Valerius differs in various respects. The hero of his version is Titius or Totius or something similar. His rank is emphasized as being that of centurion, as opposed to the preceding examples of *constantia* among persons of rank. He is not sailing but *excubans* (on picket-duty) when captured by Scipio's men, and is offered his life in return for serving under Scipio against Caesar. He refuses, and his death evidently follows, though this is not stated. What must be more or less the same story is given in *Bell. Afr.* 44–46, where a centurion with some veterans and recruits is captured at sea and brought to Scipio, who offers them life on the same terms. The centurion proposes that he and ten veterans should be given the chance to fight against a whole cohort; but they are promptly killed *cruciabiliter*. There is no reason to suppose that Oppius or anyone else derived the story from this undistinguished work, despite its circumstantial plausibility. Apart from anything else, it does not provide a name for the hero. The inconsistency over this person's rank and name may be resolved by the assumption that a serving centurion in Caesar's army might well have been elected quaestor for the following year¹⁵ (when he would also enter the senate); and his name may have been T. Granius Petro, somehow corrupted in Valerius' archetype so that *T. . . . ius* had to be restored as well as the scribes could manage it.¹⁶ No matter how free historical writers (even those as unsystematic as Valerius) may have been in adapting anecdotes to suit their particular purposes, there could hardly have been an actual disagreement over the name of the hero of an incident of this sort.

It is clear from these discrepancies between the extant authorities in reproducing the common source that there must have been positive ambiguities in the language of that source which made it possible for such diverse interpretations to be made. Some of these may be due to Plutarch's evident uncertainty in translating Latin, which will be the more excusable if Oppius' narrative was at least as obscure as that of Valerius. But the way in which Oppius put his material together, in this section of the work at least, seems to have given rise to uncertainties of another sort.

¹⁵ For the advancement of Caesar's centurion and others to senatorial rank, see R. Syme, *Roman Revolution* (1939) 70, 78–79.

¹⁶ In fact, I can find no example of a Granius with the praenomen Titus, nor Tiberius. Syme, p. 90, suggests that the wealthy Granii from Puteoli were notoriously Marian and may have supported Caesar to their mutual advantage.

Dio Cassius shows no sign of knowing the material we have attributed to Oppius except in a single extended passage. In 37.52-52 he gives the fullest account we possess of Caesar's propraetorship in Further Spain (or Lusitania, as he anachronistically calls the province in 61 B.C.). He describes first how Caesar scorned simply to take limited action against bandits, being anxious "to rival Pompey and others before him who had exercised great power"—an expression which closely recalls Plutarch's explicit comparison, at the beginning of his "Oppian" passage (15.2), with a list of Roman commanders culminating in Pompey, although the comparison is there made by the historian, here by Caesar himself. Dio goes on (52.2) that Caesar's ambitions for the consulate and beyond were encouraged by the fact that, while at Gades as quaestor¹⁷ (that is, in 69 B.C., some eight or nine years earlier), he had dreamed of lying with his mother and learned from seers that this meant he should enjoy great power. As a result of which, Dio goes on, when he saw a likeness of Alexander in the temple of Heracles at Gades he lamented that he had as yet achieved nothing great. The narrative continues (52.3) with an account of Caesar's operations to subdue the population of the Herminian mountains and his pursuit of them as far as the ocean. Here the natives withdraw to an island, where Caesar cannot follow them for lack of ships. He sends some men across on rafts to a point close to the island (the Greek is uncertain at this point), from which the commander is forced by the tide to withdraw. He leaves a number of men to be attacked and killed, with the sole exception of P. Scaevius, who loses his shield and suffers many wounds, but swims safely to shore. The section concludes with Caesar's subsequent operations with ships from Gades and capture of the town of Brigantium.

This is a much more coherent account than those of Plutarch and Valerius, (convincingly) tying the story of Scaevius to a comprehensible operation on the west coast of Spain, and at a date earlier than the period ostensibly covered by Plutarch's prospective passage on Caesar's excellence as a general once the Gallic war had begun (as Thouret engagingly puts it [p. 360], "In puro Galliae aere ingenium eius claruit"). The least obviously historical element in Dio's narrative is his disquisition on Caesar's aspirations and the incidents which encouraged them, after which he returns to his main theme with the words ὥσπερ εἴπον.

¹⁷ Dio repeats this reference to Gades and the quaestorship in 40-1.24.2, in connection with the grant of citizenship to Gades after Ilerda. This emphasis may owe something to the fact that Oppius' friend and colleague in Caesar's service, Cornelius Balbus, came from that city.

It is hard to detect whether the story of Scaevius is an integral part of the narrative of the campaign: the phrase which concludes it, *ΤΟΤὲ μὲν δὴ ταῦτ ἐγένετο, ὅστερον δέ . . .*, rather suggests that Dio has enriched his account of the Spanish command with two extracts from the same source which provided both to Plutarch. But there are two problems about the position occupied by the material in Dio's narrative. First, he sets the scene, quite circumstantially, in Spain; both Valerius and Plutarch place the incident in Britain. The likelihood is that these two were both misled by the hint of the name Brigantium, suggesting that of a famous tribe in Britain; but to account for what looks like a strange coincidence there must have been something in the common source which failed to make it clear in what part of the world the incident took place.¹⁸ At all events, Dio's story hangs together too convincingly to be faulted. Secondly, while Dio must be correct in placing the campaign during Caesar's praetorship in 60 B.C., it is curious that he inserts under this year the dream of incest which Caesar had at Gades (in the same province) "when he was quaestor." It is obscure whether Dio intends the attached story of Caesar's mortification at seeing the statue of Alexander at Gades to be placed at the earlier date or to emphasize his distress on returning after a long interval to the place where he had been warned to look forward to greatness. Suetonius, on the other hand, relates circumstantially how Caesar was in Gades as quaestor, going round the assize-circuit on the instructions of the praetor (*Jul.* 7.1), the event being related at the correct point in chronological sequence. Caesar, in this version, sees the statue of Alexander in Hercules' temple and laments his own lack of enterprise in achieving nothing memorable at the age when Alexander had conquered the world. He is also upset by the dream of incest *proximae noctis*—an ostensibly ambiguous phrase, which Rolfe (Loeb) translates as "the following night," Ailloud (Budé) as "sa nuit précédente." The latter is clearly right, as shown by the tense of Suetonius' following verb, *visus erat*, and confirmed by the order of events in Dio. Either way, this appears to attach the two events together during the quaestorship, although Dio has found the occasion to introduce them only under the praetorship, if only because the events of Caesar's earlier office had no real place in annalistic history, although they are significant in Caesar's biography.

¹⁸ Oppius may simply have said, for example, *in praetura*, without specifying the province; and the invasions of Britain were certainly Caesar's most famous naval operations.

Plutarch, on the other hand, separates the two anecdotes by nearly twenty years. Just before the start of the propraetorship in Spain (*Caes.* 2.2–3) he has a paragraph introduced with the words λέγεται δέ, as if indicating some change of status for the following material, and containing first the remark made in a native village while crossing the Alps, “I had rather be first here than second in Rome” (repeated without context in *Apophth. Rom.* 206.5), and then the comparison with Alexander’s achievements, located in Spain without further precision of place or date (again repeated, *ibid.* 206.4). In addition, while Suetonius and Dio agree in making Caesar observe a statue of Alexander in the temple of Hercules, Plutarch has him read from writings about Alexander. Although Plutarch appears to be talking about the propraetorship, of which a brief account follows (12.1), in both versions Plutarch emphasizes that Caesar was the same age as Alexander (τηλικοῦτος μὲν ὅν and ταύτην τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχων), exactly as in Suetonius and evidently with the same significance. Alexander was 33 when he died, a year or two less at the peak of his success; Caesar, born in 100 B.C., was 32 at the time of his first service in Spain, nearly 40 when governor. Saller (pp. 74–75) is clearly wrong to regard the coincidence of age as a deliberate modification of the story for the sake of effect, since Plutarch, despite misplacing the anecdote, is equally conscious of the coincidence and its meaning for Caesar.¹⁹

Likewise the story of the incestuous dream, closely linked by both Suetonius and Dio with the statue of Alexander and the quaestorship, is loosely appended by Plutarch (32.6) to the story of the Rubicon, with the same phrase λέγεται δέ, again indicating the use of a different source from the main narrative. Certainly the common version to be found in Suetonius (*Jul.* 31–33) and Appian (*B. C.* 2.35) allows no space for such a dream on the night before the crossing (when Plutarch specifically places it), since all agree that Caesar did not sleep at all before advancing into Italy at daybreak. Otherwise the versions correspond closely, apart from Suetonius’ additional story of the mysterious piper on the river-bank. Plutarch’s προτέρᾳ νυκτί is evidently derived from the same original phrase as Suetonius’ ambiguous *proximae noctis*, but has been transferred to an entirely different night before another critical decision.

¹⁹ H. Strasburger, *Caesars Eintritt in die Geschichte* (1938) 94–96, prefers to place the events during the praetorship, on the grounds of historical plausibility. He is followed by M. Gelzer, *Caesar, Politician and Statesman* (trans. 1968) 32, n. 2. Historical plausibility must take second place in anecdote of this sort to the clear assertions in two authorities, with the emphasis on Caesar’s age at the time.

There are further discrepancies between the ways in which Suetonius and Plutarch relate the two most distinctively Oppian anecdotes with which Plutarch concludes his digression (17.5-6). Both writers give the story of the curious olive-oil as the single illustration of Caesar's indifference to food, and both explain his reasons, though Plutarch gives Caesar's actual words, with a rather different point. Plutarch provides circumstantial details of place (Milan) and host (Valerius Leo) and states that the dish was asparagus dressed with "myrrh instead of oil"; Suetonius (53) gives few details, as is often his way, and says nothing of the asparagus, but refers to *conditum oleum pro viridi*. The meaning of *conditum* has divided interpreters. H. Ailloud, in the Budé Suetonius (1961) dismisses Montaigne's rendering "aromatisé," preferring "de l'huile rance au lieu de l'huile fraîche." This is supported by Graves's "rancid" and Rolfe's "stale." These imply the derivation from *condo*, "store" or "preserve," as in Cato, *R.R.* 7.4, repeated in similar words by Varro, *R.R.* 1.60 and Pliny, *N.H.* 16.21, including the phrase *virides in muria*. Butler and Cary, in their commentary on the *Julius*, prefer "perfumed," as if from *condio*, "flavour"; and this is followed by Howard and Jackson in their *Index verborum Suetonii* (1922), which gives this as the only occurrence of this verb in Suetonius. The confusion appears to originate in the word *muria*, "brine," as in the agricultural writers, misunderstood by Plutarch as "myrrh."²⁰ Despite an interesting passage in Pliny (*N.H.* 15.29), where *pretiosora odoramenta* are mixed with olive-oil, and oil in the gymnasium *conditur odoribus vel vilissimis*, Suetonius' contrast is patently between "fresh" and "stale" (although the choice of words seems very unusual), and Plutarch has simply been let down by his lack of mastery of Latin.²¹

The second story, of Caesar's giving up a bed to Oppius, is placed by Suetonius (72) under the heading "devotion to friends"; in Plutarch (17.6) it has no self-evident function, but evidently illustrates the reference in 17.1-2 to endurance of hardship. However, Plutarch's version is once again confused: the travellers are caught in a storm and take refuge in the single room of a poor man's hut (which may correctly represent what Suetonius means by *deversorio[lo]* but may be slightly wrong), with Caesar's obscure remark, "honours to the strongest, necessities to the weakest." The remark is not in Suetonius, but makes much better

²⁰ In Persius 6.19-21 the mean man dresses his vegetables with *muria*, apparently without oil.

²¹ cf. *Dem. 2.2-3*, R. H. Barrow, *Plutarch and his times* (1967) 150-55; C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (1971) 81-87; A. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (1974) 159, and especially H. J. Rose, *The Roman Questions of Plutarch* (1924) 11-18.

sense (as does Caesar's conduct on this occasion) in Suetonius' context, where Oppius is seized with a sudden illness. It is not clear what Latin words in the original (hardly Suetonius' *correpto subita valetudine*)²² can have induced Plutarch to introduce the idea of a storm.

Most of the other material in Plutarch's digression can be matched in Suetonius, although the arrangement is quite different. The physical details of Caesar's white skin and tendency to epilepsy (17.2) are included in Suetonius' account of Caesar's *forma* (45.1). Plutarch twice refers to Caesar as dictating letters while driving or riding and as employing two secretaries at once or "as Oppius says, even more" (17.3 and 4); Suetonius makes Caesar write on his journeys, but not while on horseback (56.5). For Plutarch, Caesar's skill at riding includes galloping with both hands behind his back (17.4); for Suetonius, who devotes several lines to horsemanship (57.1), this detail is lacking. For Plutarch, Caesar's innovation in letter-writing is the totally improbable claim of being the first to correspond with friends (17.5), perhaps referring to correspondence within the city, though this is not made clear; for Suetonius, who knows all about correspondence from his own employment as imperial *ab epistulis*, the innovation was in adopting the form of a *memorialis libellus* (56.6), apparently with columns of writing running from top to bottom of the scroll. This technicality, whether Oppius' or Suetonius', may well have misled Plutarch into describing something quite different. It is noticeable that the comment on Caesar's letter-writing, following closely on the citation of Oppius for writing on horseback, is introduced with λέγεται δέ, just like the two anecdotes of Caesar at Gades.

Thus it appears that certain of the discrepancies between Plutarch's version of the Oppian material on the one hand and those of Suetonius, Dio and Valerius Maximus on the other were due to Plutarch's poor command of Latin²³—there seems no reason to suppose

²² Probably some phrase involving *impetus*, commonly used for the onset of a fever and of a storm; possibly *motiuncula*, used by Seneca and Suetonius of mild fevers, which Oppius may well have used to depreciate his own illness and which could easily have confused Plutarch.

²³ The same Greek phrase is found occasionally in Plutarch's other Roman biographies, especially in the *Brutus*, where three anecdotes are introduced in the same way (5.2, 6.4, 39.2, the first repeated exactly in *Cato min.* 24.1), all of them suggesting a source other than the main one. Likewise in *Cato ma.* 15.3, a saying is introduced which, unlike most does not occur in the *Apophthegmata* and may well have an independent origin.

that this weakness was shared by Dio, as a Roman senator and consul, long resident in the capital. Other discrepancies are of a chronological nature, best explained by the assumption that Oppius did not choose to relate his anecdotes to a historical framework or even to give clear indications of their relative dates, but arranged them in a manner still traceable in Plutarch's scheme in *Caes.* 15-17. Further differences between the extant authors are simply the result of the different techniques of composition adopted by each: the extremely rhetorical and anecdotal manner of Valerius, the annalistic scheme of Dio, and Suetonius' arrangement by topics, together with his tendency to omit circumstantial detail (including proper names) when not directly relevant to the central figure of the biography. The elements common to the various versions are still more striking than the discrepancies: particularly striking are the traces of the original grouping of anecdotes, which is more evident in Plutarch than in the others. Plutarch was still liable to remove items from the original context, whether to hold them over for use in other biographies (Pompey or Marius) or to allocate them to contexts which he judged, often wrongly, to be more suitable; as he has transferred Caesar's reflections on Alexander to his command in Spain (and not to the quaestorship, as would have been correct) and the dream of incest to the already crowded narrative of the Rubicon. This latter anecdote, together with the preceding one about the possibility of ambition among obscure Alpine natives, is again introduced with the same λέγεται δέ which seems to characterize intrusions of this sort into the main narrative.

There is no guarantee that Oppius is not the source of other details found in Plutarch or our other authorities besides those we have identified. But the evidence of Plutarch in particular serves to indicate something of the nature of Oppius' work on Caesar, as largely panegyrical, lacking in a basic chronological pattern but rather exploiting disjointed anecdotes to illustrate certain qualities which rendered Caesar superior to his predecessors and contemporaries; also, perhaps, containing an element of obscurity in his style which permitted those who used him to extract a false meaning from his words. For Plutarch, he seems to have been something of a stumbling-block; for Valerius, unconcerned with anything but illustrations of particular virtues and vices, he provided some excellent material for rhetorical development. Suetonius, however, appears to have found in Oppius the rudiments of a pattern which he was to take over and develop for the *Julius* and to employ as the main structural principle of all his *Caesars*: namely, the listing of the main

THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY AS A WORK OF LITERATURE*

Much, in fact most of the scholarship devoted to Boethius' *Consolatio* has dealt with the work as a philosophical treatise.¹ And this it certainly is. The author is almost ostentatiously conversant with Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Epicurean, and neo-Platonic thought; what is more, he weaves these various strands into an organic whole. But in addition to philosophy the *Consolatio* is also literature. Formally, it is an example of an ancient literary genre, the Menippean Satire, a medley of alternating verse and prose, which had served the very different purposes of Petronius, the author of the *Apocolocyntosis*, Martianus Capella, and the mythological allegorist, Fulgentius. But even those critics who do treat the *Consolatio* as a work of literature too often limit themselves to tracing Boethius' sources and to indicating his influence on subsequent authors, Dante and Chaucer being the most renowned.² What I should like to do, and the present paper is merely a *premier essai* in this direction, is to determine Boethius' literary purposes and to suggest what implications the literary aspects of the work may have on its philosophical content. More specifically, I shall try to explain how Menippean Satire functions in the *Consolatio* and why Boethius chose this medium for a philosophical treatise.

*Editor's note: Professor Curley finished this essay in December of 1983, when he was a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Classics at the Johns Hopkins University. He left this contribution without its final revisions at the moment of his death in October 1984. Had his health permitted, he would have added some additional references to the notes to this essay, but in the judgment of his editor his essay can stand without their added support. His text for the *Consolation* is that of Ludwig Beiler (cited in note 1). I have made only a very few alterations to clarify his meaning; and a very few corrections. I wish to thank Professor Michael McCormick for his initial advice and Professor Michael Roberts of Wesleyan University for very helpful advice as I prepared this important *premier essai* for publication. D.C.

¹For bibliography see:

- a. Beiler, L. (ed), *Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii Philosophiae Consolatio* (Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 94) (Brepols, Turnholt, 1957) 16-17.
- b. Gruber, J., *Kommentar Zu Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae*, Walter De Gruyter (Berlin 1978) 417-27.

²The most important literary critics and those to whom I am most indebted are L. Alfonsi, F. Klinger, and K. Reichenberger.

The *Consolatio* is an extended dialogue between the prisoner Boethius and Dame Philosophy who appears to him as he pens an elegiac lament on his fall from fortune. In the course of their discussion Philosophy guides her pupil from a state of self-centered despondency to a conception of God, all-good and all-powerful, whose providence controls the cosmos. Philosophy's purpose is to make apparent to Boethius God's dynamic presence in the world, and the structure of the work may be viewed as three progressively lofty disquisitions on this theme: Books 2 and 3 treat of *Fortuna*, that wears the guise of fickle chance under which divine action presents itself to unregenerate mortal eyes, and in contrast to *Fortuna*, the nature of the true good; Book 4 deals with *fatum*, the same divine action perceived in all its orderliness by human reason; Book 5 ascends to the level of *providentia* and attempts to explicate God's own immediate and all-inclusive perception of the workings of the world. The function of Book 1 is therefore preliminary: it introduces and characterizes the two interlocutors; it sets forth the issues to be treated; and it exposes the misconceptions under which the prisoner Boethius is laboring and from which he must be freed in order to enjoy a vision of the truth.

But, as a number of scholars have pointed out,³ the first book not only introduces the work, in its structure it also foreshadows the progress from *Fortuna* to *providentia*, thus reproducing in miniature the shape of the whole. As it opens, Boethius is wallowing in the despair which an attachment to *Fortuna*'s gifts necessarily entails. At first he does not recognize Dame Philosophy, for his vision is clouded with tears (prose 1.13). He remains silent, incapable of speech (prose 24). He takes his first step on the road to recovery by recognizing Philosophy and by regaining his ability to speak (prose 3.2 & 3). He then presents his case as before a judge (prose 4.2-46). Finally he submits to Philosophy's examination (prose 6.1 & 2), on the basis of which, like a good doctor, she diagnoses the causes of his illness (prose 6.17-19) and prescribes certain mild remedies as preliminary to the stronger medicine of pure philosophy (prose 6.21).

Thus, a close reading of this first programmatic book may serve to illumine the character of the whole work; at least such is my assumption in concentrating on Book 1 and referring only very sketchily to the following books. I shall proceed by first isolating the formal, stylistic ele-

³First noted by F. Klinger in his *De Boethii Consolacione Philosophiae* (Berlin 1921).

ments with which Boethius is working and then attempt to demonstrate how the resulting structure functions.

One enters the *Consolatio* by way of a lament in elegiac couplets in which Boethius bemoans his fall from eminence and in the course of which he echoes many well-known passages of Latin elegy, most conspicuously and most appropriately from the *Tristia* of his fellow exile, Ovid. For instance, both poets portray their Muse or Muses as their only loyal companions in adversity:

Has [sc. *Musas*] saltem nullus potuit pervincere terror
ne nostrum comites prosequerentur iter.

(verse 1.5-6)

Me quoque Musa levat loca iussa petentem.
Sola comes nostrae perstitit illa fugae.

(*Tristia*, 4.1.19-20)

And both characterize the genre of elegy as appropriate to their unhappy condition:

Ecce mihi lacerae dictant scribenda Camenae
et veris elegi fletibus ora rigant.

(verse 1.2-3)

Flebilis ut noster status est, ita fleibile carmen,
materiae scripto conveniente suae.

(*Tristia*, 5.1.5-6)

This *queremonia lacrimabilis*, as Boethius himself describes it (prose 1.1), is interrupted by the sudden appearance of Dame Philosophy. The description of her person and dress is firmly within the tradition of ancient vision literature, both Christian and pagan. At the opening of the *Shepherd of Hermas*, for instance, the protagonist is granted two visions:

προσευχομένου δέ μου ἡνοίγη ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ βλέπω τὴν γυναικα
ἔκεινην ἣν ἐπεθύμησα ἀσπαζομένην με ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ λέγουσαν·
Ἐρμῆ χαῖρε.

(*Visio* 1.1.4)

ταῦτά μου συμβουλευομένου καὶ διακρίνοντος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μου,
βλέπω κατέναντί μου καθέδραν λευκὴν ἐξ ἐρίων χιονίων γεγονούσαν
μεγάλην· καὶ ἥλθεν γυνὴ πρεσβύτις ἐν ἴματισμῷ λαμπροτάτῳ, ἔχουσα
βιβλίον εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, καὶ ἐκάθισεν μόνη, καὶ ἀσπάζεται με.

(*Visio* 1.2.2)

Boethius seems to conflate these two women, one young and one old, when he describes Dame Philosophy:

visa est mulier . . . colore vivido atque inexhausti vigoris, quamvis ita
aevi plena foret ut nullo modo nostrae crederetur aetatis.

(prose 1.1)

Likewise, Fulgentius, the fifth-century allegorist of pagan mythology, uses the same device of the sudden appearance of a divine female figure to dramatize his inspiration to write:

Adstiterant itaque sirmate nebuloso tralucidae ternae viragines edera lar-
giore circumfluae, quarum familiaris Calliope ludibundo palmulae tactu
meum vaporans pectusculum poeticae proriginis sparsit; erat enim
gravido ut apparebat pectore, crine neglecto. . . .

(*Mythologiae*, 1.13)

Boethius reproduces this meticulously detailed description of appearance and dress; he further echoes Calliope's "touch" with Philosophy's wiping the tears from his eyes:

. . . oculosque meos fletibus undantes contracta in rugam veste siccavit.
(prose 2.7)

Although Boethius is consciously setting himself against the tradition of inspired poets from Hesiod to Fulgentius by substituting for a Muse the castigator of the Muses, Philosophy, in this section, which describes the breaking through of a higher reality into the realm of the human, he avails himself of the conventional literary means of portraying such an event.⁴

There follows the second verse section in which Philosophy delivers a counter-lament, a *querela* corresponding to, but contrasting with, that of Boethius. Instead of bemoaning his fall from good fortune she bewails his descent from the heights of wisdom which he had attained under her tutelage. This change of perspective is paralleled, I believe, in the respective meters of the two poems. Boethius' elegy is written in elegiac couplets, the conventional meter for lamentation. Philosophy casts her words in dactylic trimeter catalectic plus an adonic (i.e.: -UÜ-UÜ-/-UU--), a meter which echoes certain patterns in the elegiac couplet, in fact one might say that it is composed of the last half of the pentame-

⁴Of course the locus classicus for the apparition of the Muses is Hesiod's *Theogony* (22-34). The philosophic use of this motif may have been suggested to Boethius by the apparition, in a dream, of a lovely woman, dressed in white, to Socrates two nights before his execution (*Crito* 44A10-44B2).

ter plus the usual ending of the hexameter, but which is somewhat curtailed and severe, as befits a philosophic elegy.

But in addition to constituting a philosophic as opposed to a poetic *querela* this second verse section also draws heavily on topoi traditional to Latin didactic poetry. Philosophy's description of Boethius' former happy state is clearly based on conventional portraits of the position of the sage:

Hic quondam caelo liber aperto
suctus in aetherios ire meatus
cernebat rosei lumina solis
visebat gelidae sidera lunae.

(verse 2.6-9)

. . . et extra
processit longe flammantia moenia mundi
atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque.

(Lucr., *De Rerum Natura*, 1.72-74)

And the content of the sage's knowledge, largely meteorological and cosmological, is also traditional in Latin didactic poetry:

visebat gelidae sidera lunae
et quaecumque vagos stella recursus
exercet varios flexa per orbes
comprenum numeris vitor habebat.

(verse 2.9-12)

. . . . caelique vias et sidera monstrant,
defectus solis varios lunaeque labores.

(Verg., *Georgics*, 4.477-78)

This use of didactic motifs immediately characterizes Philosophy as a *magistra*, one of her principal roles throughout the *Consolatio*.⁵

In the second and third prose sections and in the first sentence of the fourth, Philosophy begins her education of Boethius in the tones of the Cynic-Stoic diatribe. I am aware that some scholars question the existence of this genre, of which we have no real examples; but it is not my concern to argue with them here.⁶ I merely find the term a conve-

⁵For further parallels in Latin didactic literature see Virgil, *Georgics*, 2, 475-80; Horace, *Epistulae*, 1, 12, 12-20; Manilius, *Astronomia*, 1, 72-74; Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, 15.67-73.

⁶For a good discussion of the Cynic-Stoic diatribe see the article by W. Capelle and M. I. Marrou in *RAC* 3 (1957) 990-1009.

nient label for the kind of discourse frequently encountered in Seneca's prose, in Epictetus, and sometimes in Latin satire. It is characterized by a staccato pattern of short sentences and jabbing rhetorical questions and often makes use of homey old saws and well known *exempla*, all calculated to rouse the addressee from complacency towards the exercise of a more strenuous virtue. For instance, Philosophy's list of *exempla* of philosophic martyrs:

Quodsi nec Anaxagorae fugam nec Socratis venenum nec Zenonis tormenta, quoniam sunt peregrina, novisti; at Canios, at Senecas, at Soranos, quorum nec praevetusta nec incelebris memoria est, scire potuisti."

(prose 3.9)

may be compared with Seneca's own list of heroes who exhibited great courage under great duress:

Ignem experitur [sc. *Fortuna*] in Mucio, paupertatem in Fabricio, exilium in Rutilio, tormenta in Regulo, venenum in Socrate, mortem in Catone. Magnum exemplum nisi mala fortuna non invenit.

(Seneca, *De Providentia*, 3.4)

Likewise Philosophy in the final words of her diatribe:

Sentisne . . . haec atque animo illabuntur tuo an ὄνος λύρας? Quid fles, quid lacrimis manas? Ἐξαύδα, μὴ κεῦθε νόῳ. Si operam medicantis exspectas, oportet vulnus detegas.

(prose 4.1)

makes use of insistent questions and colloquial language to bring home her point in a manner similar to that of Davus, for instance, in one of Horace's *Sermones*:

. . . Quid, si me stultior ipso
quingentis empto drachmis deprenderis? Aufer
me vultu terrere; manum stomachumque teneto,
dum quae Crispini docuit me ianitor edo.
Te coniunx aliena capit, meretricula Davum:
peccat uter nostrum cruce dignius?

(2.7.42-47)

Thus Boethius has Philosophy begin her instruction in a style reminiscent of popularized philosophy, just the right mode for those making their first steps towards wisdom.

The third verse section, which celebrates the moment when Philosophy wipes the tears from Boethius' eyes, thus enabling him to recognize her for the first time, is strikingly cheerful in contrast to the two preceding laments. It employs the same celestial and meteorological imagery of Philosophy's lament, but to opposite effect; for here we are concerned with the return of vision and not with the loss of wisdom. Throughout the *Consolatio* many of the verse sections will be couched in such imagery. The effect is something like that of the similes in the *Iliad*, that is, the stark setting of the action, in this case a prison cell, is both relieved and highlighted by the constant reference to stars, sun, moon, and sublunar natural phenomena. Perhaps notions such as *sympatheia*, the Stoic conviction that every level of the cosmos is sensitive to events in the others, and a concept of man as microcosm further contribute to the significance of this pervasive imagery.

In the fourth verse section, where Philosophy commends Stoic virtue as a bulwark against the onslaught of fortune, we very appropriately encounter the first clear allusion to the great expounder of Roman Stoicism, Seneca. The opening lines of the poem clearly echo a choral ode in the *Thyestes*, where the *sapiens* is described as the true king, loftily ensconced beyond the reach of fortune's blows:

Quisquis composito serenus aevo
Fatum sub pedibus egit superbum
Fortunamque tuens utramque rectus
invictum potuit tenere vultum. . . .

(verse 4.1-4)

Qui tuto positus loco
infra se vidit omnia
occurritque suo libens
fato nec queritur mori. . . .

(*Thyestes* 365-68)

What is more, the two poems inculcate the same lesson couched in similar terms:

Quid tantum miseri saevos tyrannos
mirantur sine viribus furentes?
Nec spes aliquid nec extimescas,
exarmaveris impotentis iram.

(verse 4.11-14)

Rex est qui metuít nihil,
rex est qui cupiet nihil,
hoc regnum sibi quisque dat.

(*Thyestes* 388-90)

In the fourth prose section Boethius delivers his defense before Philosophy as if he were a defendant in a Roman court of law. Upon analysis the speech is seen to be organized according to the five conventional parts of an *oratio forensis*: *exordium* (prose 4.2-4), *narratio* (5-19), *probatio* (20-36), *refutatio* (37-44), and *peroratio* (45-46).⁷ In addition to these formal elements many turns of phrase and stylistic habits are redolent of the law court. Besides the usual tricks of the orator's trade such as rhetorical questions and anaphora, examples of which are too numerous and too obvious to mention, there are clear allusions to specific Ciceronian speeches. For example, in the *exordium* there is a clear echo of the famous opening of Cicero's first Catilinarian:

Nihil te ipsa loci facies movet?

(prose 4.2)

Nihil hic munitissimus habendi senatus locus, nihil horum
ora vultusque moverunt?

(*in Cat.* 1.1)

Thus Boethius composes his defense according to structures traditional to Roman oratory and purposely alludes to the great master of the craft, Cicero.

Boethius follows his defense with a prayer to the deity (verse section 5), in which he complains of God's apparent disregard for the lot of mankind. The heavens and the seasons accomplish their rounds in perfect harmony, whereas in human affairs no discernible order holds sway: the just suffer, the wicked flourish. The poem is remarkable for its close similarity to a choral ode in Seneca's *Phaedra* (959-88), which expresses the same sentiments in similar terms and in a similar structure. Both poems open by calling on the god or gods responsible for the good order of the cosmos:

O stelliferi conditor orbis
qui perpetuo nixus solio
rapido caelum turbine versas. . . .

(verse 5.1-3)

⁷See K. Reichenberger, *Untersuchungen zur literarischen Stellung der Consolatio Philosophiae*, Kölner Romanistische Arbeiten, N.F., Heft 3 (Köln 1954) 20-22.

O magna parens, Natura, deum
 tuque igniferi rector Olympi
 qui sparsa cito sidera mundo
 cursusque vagos rapis astrorum
 celerique polos cardine versas. . . .

(*Phaedra*, 959-63)

Both poems then enumerate the details of celestial harmony as a prelude to the question which marks the turning point:

Omnia certo fine gubernans
 hominum solos respuis actus
 merito rector cohibere modo.
 Nam cur tantas lubrica versat
 Fortuna vices?

(verse 5.25-29)

Sed cur idem qui tanta regis
 sub quo vasti pondera mundi
 librata suos ducunt orbes,
 hominum nimium securus abes,
 non sollicitus prodesse bonis,
 nocuisse malis?

(*Phaedra*, 972-77)

Finally, both poems go on to describe the apparent chaos and injustice operative in human affairs:

. premit insontes
 debita sceleri noxia poena,
 at perversi resident celso
 mores solio. . . .

(verse 5.29-32)

Tradere turpi fasces populus
 gaudet, eosdem colit atque odit.
 Tristis virtus perversa tulit
 praemia recti.

(*Phaedra*, 983-86)

But the bleak despair of Seneca's verses is here offset by the fact that Boethius has cast his poem in the form of a prayer,⁸ ending, as was conventional, with a *supplicatio*:

⁸Reichenberger, (note 7 above) 23ff. It should also be noted that both the Senecan ode and the Boethian verse section are composed in the same meter, anapestic dimeter catalectic.

Rapidos, rector, comprime fluctus
et quo caelum regis immensum
firma stabiles foedere terras.

(verse 5.46-48)

This *cri de coeur* initiates, as it were, a dialogue between the prisoner and god, mediated of course by Philosophy, who will eventually lead to a vision of the cosmos as a perfectly ordered whole.

This lengthy poem marks yet another stage of Boethius' recovery, for immediately thereafter he characterizes his self-absorbed defense as mere barking:

Haec ubi continuato dolori delatravi. . . .

(prose 5.1)

thus indicating that he may well be prepared to accept Philosophy's less than sympathetic response. For, unmoved by his complaints, she proceeds in the equable tones of the *genus deliberativum* to sum up, rather dismissively, his points one by one. She then relents so far as to admit the pain of Boethius' illness and to state that she will at first employ only mild medications:

Sed quoniam plurimus tibi affectuum tumultus incubuit diversumque te
dolor ira maeror distrahunt, uti nunc mentis es, nondum te validiora re-
media contingunt.

(prose 5.11)

This concern that the remedy be appropriate to the condition of the patient is the one and only motif that Boethius borrows from the conventions of the *consolatio* as a genre. For instance, Seneca, at the beginning of his *Consolatio ad Helviam Matrem*, states:

Dolori tuo, dum recens saeviret, sciebam occurrentum non esse, ne illum
ipsa solacia irritarent et accenderent; nam in morbis quoque nihil est
perniciosus quam immatura medicina.

(*Cons. ad Helv.* 1.2)

This single echo of consolation literature and the general absence of allusion to that genre elsewhere in this work express quite clearly the status of Boethius' *Consolatio*. It shares with the genre of the *consolatio* a common goal, i.e., a cure, and a common concern that the therapy be pursued in a manner suited to the patient. But because it is a consolation of philosophy, its scope will be greater, thus transcending the limits of the genre.

Philosophy ends her speech, just as Boethius did his, with a poem (verse 6), in which she insists on a universal divine order to which man must conform if he is to live happily. This poem serves a dual purpose: on the one hand its central point, that "to everything there is a season and a time to every purpose under heaven," provides a rationale for Philosophy's remarks about what remedies are appropriate for Boethius at this stage of his recovery; on the other hand, the divine order which man must respect responds, albeit obliquely, to Boethius' complaint that the divine order does not obtain among men. Furthermore, this poem, like Philosophy's first poetical pronouncement (verse 2), draws heavily on the commonplaces of didactic poetry, thus reinforcing her position as *magistra*. For example, the main point of the poem:

Signat tempora propriis
aptans officiis deus
nec quas ipse cohercuit
misceri patitur vices.

(verse 6.16-19)

is a very important theme in Virgil's *Georgics*, where, for instance, in Book 1 (203-58) the order of the seasons is set forth, an order which the farmer must observe if he is to reap abundant crops. Needless to say, this motif is as old as the genre itself, being a principal aspect of Hesiod's *Works and Days*.

In the following prose section (6) Philosophy questions and Boethius responds, until the underlying causes of his dejection are revealed: ignorance of his true nature as a human being, ignorance of the ultimate purpose of things, and further ignorance of the specific means by which the universe is governed (prose 6.19). Nonetheless, Philosophy remains hopeful about Boethius' recovery because of his unshaken conviction that the universe is not governed by blind chance but by the guiding hand of God (prose 6.20), for, as she puts it:

iam tibi ex hac minima scintilulla vitalis calor illuxerit.

It has already been remarked that there are many affinities between this passage and Platonic dialogue, especially the discussion between Diotima and the young Socrates as related in the *Symposium* (201D1-212C3).⁹ In both cases an august female figure catechizes a younger and less proficient male. This is no doubt so; but the fact that Philosophy

⁹Reichenberger (note 7 above) 31.

refers to her discourse in medical terms (prose 6.20–21) and describes her inquiry as a kind of diagnosis (prose 6.1) is also reminiscent of the opening of the *Charmides* (153A1–158E5) where Socrates characterizes his *elenchus* as a kind of charm or drug (ἐπωδή/φάρμακον) and where he proceeds to examine Charmides to see if *sophrosyne* really resides in his soul.

Thus Book 1 ends with the discovery of the precise nature of Boethius' illness as preliminary to its cure; and the nature of that cure is adumbrated in the closing verse section. After taking up the celestial and meteorological metaphors for spiritual blindness and insight employed in the second, third, and fourth verse sections, Philosophy ends her song with straightforward philosophical advice:

Tu quoque si vis
 lumine claro
 cernere verum,
 tramite recto
 carpere callem,
 gaudia pelle,
 pelle timorem
 spemque fugato
 nec dolor adsit.
 Nubila mens est
 vinctaque frenis
 haec ubi regnant.

(verse 7.20–31)

The sentiment and to some extent the language are again reminiscent of a Senecan choral ode:

Rex est qui posuit *metus*
 et diri mala pectoris.

Rex est qui metuit nihil,
rex est qui cupiet nihil.
Hoc regnum sibi quisque dat.

(*Thyestes*, 348–49 & 388–90)

The significance of this echoing is that at this stage, that is, during Boethius' first steps towards health after Philosophy has determined the nature of his disease, the Stoic analysis of the passions and the threat they pose to the balance and clarity of the mind is the first lesson to be

learned.¹⁰ But in addition, the meter, stichic adonics, is that of the short-lined hymns popular at the period, a descendant of which is perhaps to be seen in the litany of the Medieval church.¹¹ Thus this final poem of Book 1 by its use of imagery recalls the joy of Boethius' first revelation in verse 3, by its Stoic doctrine recalls Philosophy's first teachings in verse 4, and by its religious resonance recalls the prayer which is verse 5, in which Boethius first turned away from his self-preoccupation and called on God, thus orienting himself by the true center of the cosmos.

The preceding analysis of genres and sources will have made clear the peculiar texture of the *Consolatio*. We see that in Boethius' case Menippean Satire allows for the inclusion of many various genres within a single structure in such a way that patterns of harmony and dissonance are established among these different modes of discourse. Furthermore, the numerous direct allusions and vaguer echoes of earlier examples of these genres indicates that Boethius is self-consciously engaged in literary eclecticism; that is, he knows and wants his reader to know that the individual building blocks of his structure have been taken from older structures, as, for instance, many early Medieval churches were constructed with materials taken from older Roman buildings. But if we go no further than this, we have not gone anywhere near far enough. To isolate the elements of a work of literature and to trace their sources are valuable, in this case necessary, preliminary procedures; but the real question still stands: What does the form of Menippean Satire, as Boethius handles it, allow him to do, which otherwise he could not have done?

The first obvious and somewhat banal observation to be made about Boethius' manipulation of literary genres is that he chooses the appropriate medium for the message in question. When, for instance, he bemoans his fall from fortune, he speaks as an elegiac poet; when he describes the apparition of Dame Philosophy, he draws on the established conventions for portraying divine visitations; when Philosophy begins her instruction, she speaks in the tones of Latin didactic poetry;

¹⁰See Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.6, for the classic Stoic analysis of the passions, according to which *gaudium* and *spes* are human reactions to external good, the former in the present, the latter as anticipated in the future. Likewise, *dolor* and *timor* are human reactions to external evil, the former in the present, the latter in the future.

¹¹Reichenberger (note 7 above) 32-33.

and so on throughout the work. But something more interesting is also going on. In his manipulation of literary genres Boethius is commenting on their nature and on the nature of literature as a whole. On the surface, the *Consolatio* is a work of philosophy; but just below the surface there runs a continuous stream of reflection on literature and on its relationship to philosophy.

Before proceeding I should forestall a possible confusion of terms. The Menippean Satire is often defined as a potpourri of verse and prose, which is as good a definition as any. When I speak of the relationship between literature and philosophy in the *Consolatio*, I do not mean to suggest that Boethius has cast his philosophy in prose and his poetic or literary aspirations in verse. The verse and prose sections are equally poetic or literary; the philosophy of the *Consolatio* is not to be found in any one specific mode of discourse, but in the arrangement of the work as a whole. Thus, although to illustrate my thesis concerning Boethius' manipulation of literary genres I limit myself to discussing the verse sections of Book 1, I nonetheless want to make it clear that precisely the same analysis could be applied to the prose sections as well.

Boethius' opening elegy contains the usual reflections on the function of verse familiar to readers of Latin elegy: it is the refuge of the poet in distress; it alone abides by him to console him when abandoned by fortune and friends. But even within the traditional conventions of elegy the poet sometimes acknowledges the ambivalence of indulging in protracted complaint, for lamentation can exacerbate as well as alleviate the poet's despondence:

Non equidem vellem, quoniam nocitura fuerunt,
 Pieridum sacris imposuisse manum.
 Sed nunc quid faciam? Vis me tenet ipsa Sororum:
 Et carmen demens, carmine laesus, amo.
 Sic nova Dulichio lotos gustata palato,
 illo, quo nocuit, grata sapore fuit.
 Sentit amans sua damna fere, tamen haeret in illis;
 materiam culpae persequiturque sua.
 Nos quoque delectant, quamvis nocuere, libelli:
 quodque mihi telum vulnera fecit, amo.

(Ovid, *Tristia*, 4.1.27-36)

It is just this negative estimate of elegiac verse which Dame Philosophy emphasizes, when she confronts Boethius' attendant Muses and exclaims:

Quis . . . has scenicas meretriculas ad hunc aegrum permisit accedere, quae dolores eius non modo nullis remediis foverent, verum dulcibus insuper alerent venenis.

(prose 1.8)

And as she sends the elegiac Muses on their way, she further states:

Sed abite potius, Sirenes usque in exitium dulces, meisque eum Musis curandum, sanandumque relinquite.

(prose 1.11)

It is interesting to note that, just as Ovid had, Philosophy avails herself of an episode from the *Odyssey* to characterize the dangerous fascination of verse. But even more significantly, she speaks of her own Muses, that is, philosophic as opposed to poetic Muses, and immediately substitutes for their elegiac complaint her own philosophic *querela*, a lament, not for Boethius' fall from fortune, but from philosophic insight and calm. Thus lamentation, of the right kind at least, is here granted its proper place in the hierarchy of literature. It is not the loftiest verse form, but the recognition of true misery which it articulates is the necessary first step towards health.

But when Philosophy ends her *querela*, she comments:

Sed medicinae . . . tempus est quam querelae.

(prose 2.1)

Consequently the next two poems, verse sections 3 and 4, delivered by Boethius and Philosophy respectively, express two aspects of Boethius' cure. In verse 3 Boethius celebrates the return of his sight, while in verse 4 Philosophy states her conviction that the mind can protect itself from the ravages of Fortuna by divesting itself of hope and fear. Thus these two poems together fulfill the promise made by Philosophy in prose I that her Muses would cure Boethius.

But immediately after the healing counsel of verse 4 Philosophy asks Boethius:

Sentisne . . . haec atque animo illabuntur tuo an ὄνος λύρας? Quid fles, quid lacrimis manas? Ἔξαύδα, μὴ κεῦθε νόῳ.¹² Si operam medicantis exspectas, oportet vulnus detegas.

(prose 4.1)

¹²This second Greek tag is a quotation from the *Iliad* (1.363). Thetis is asking Achilles to reveal the reasons why he is weeping. Just as the parallel to the *Symposium* in prose 6 serves to characterize the relationship between Boethius and Philosophy by reference to Socrates and Diotima, so too here the relationship of the goddess to her mortal

The Greek proverb, "as an ass to the lyre," indicates that although verse may proclaim the cure of philosophic truth, the sensibilities of the auditor must be trained to the point where they are capable of perceiving and appreciating the truth contained in philosophic verse.

And it is precisely this process which is dramatized in the juxtaposition of prose 4 and verse 5. For in both his Ciceronian defense and in his anguished appeal to God, the former prose, the latter verse—the former concerned with the specifics of Boethius' condition, the latter with the cosmic implications of the injustice done him—Boethius "uncovers his wound" as first step on his road to health. The very articulation of his troubles and his subsequent calling on God accomplish a great deal, for immediately thereafter Boethius is able to characterize his performance as mere "barking," indicating an awareness that his petulant self-pity threatens to make a Hecuba of him and anticipating Philosophy's own characterization of his complaint: *Musae saevientis* (prose 5.10). What is more, that verse 5 is in the form of a prayer demonstrates that Boethius has managed, despite his despair, to turn to the appropriate agent of relief, God.

To sum up thus far: Dame Philosophy first substitutes an appropriate for a self-destructive elegy. Then Boethius and she use verse, first to celebrate the return of vision and then to give moral instruction, which the hearer may or may not be ready to receive. Finally, we have arrived at the stage of verse as prayer, which effects the necessary change of heart, enabling one to accept the *remedium* which verse can convey.

Towards the close of Book 1, Philosophy twice defines the function which verse will serve in at least Books 2 and 3 of the *Consolatio*. At the end of prose 5, in which Philosophy has responded to Boethius' complaint, she states:

Sed quoniam plurimus tibi affectuum tumultus incubuit diversumque te
dolor ira maeror distrahunt, uti nunc mentis es, nondum te validiora re-
media contingunt. Itaque lenioribus paulisper utemur, ut quae in tu-
morem perturbationibus influentibus induruerunt ad acrioris vim medi-
caminis recipiendam tactu blandiore mollescant.

(prose 5.11-12)

son parallels that between divine Philosophy and her mortal alumnus. One wonders if some allegorical reading of the *Iliad*, Stoic or otherwise, further contributes to the significance of the quotation.

The language here is clearly meant to harken back to Lucretius' famous image of verse as honey on the bitter cup of philosophy (*De Rerum Natura* 1 935-50 = 4.10-25). Thus, though Dame Philosophy is in part referring to the kinds of philosophic demonstrations appropriate for Boethius at this stage of his therapy, she is also referring to verse as the proper medium for truth in the case of an invalid. Because Boethius is suffering from an imbalance of the passions, verse, which by its nature more directly addresses the passions, must be applied before Boethius can rise to higher levels of discourse. Thus, here verse is not, as in Lucretius, merely something sweet to disguise the bitter taste of truth, but a milder form of the truth itself, a kind of pabulum from which the invalid may draw sustenance until fit for solid food.

Likewise, at the end of prose 6, when Philosophy has determined the causes of Boethius' illness, she again speaks of the mild remedies now called for because of his weakened state:

Sed quoniam firmioribus remediis nondum tempus est, et eam mentium
constat esse naturam ut quotiens abiecerint veras, falsis opinionibus in-
duantur, ex quibus orta perturbationum caligo verum illum confundit
intuitum, hanc paulisper lenibus mediocribusque fomentis attenuare
temptabo, ut dimotis fallacium affectionum tenebris splendorem verae
lucis possis agnoscere.

(prose 6.21)

This passage, although strikingly similar to that just discussed, nonetheless represents a still higher estimate of the status of verse. For, although Philosophy is here referring to the whole content of Books 2 and 3, where discussion is limited to *Fortuna* as a *propaideusis* to the loftier revelations of Books 4 and 5, nonetheless in the context of Book 1 expressions such as *firmioribus remediis* and *lenibus mediocribusque fo-
mentis* clearly refer to verse as a mild form of philosophic discourse. But, whereas in the passage at the end of prose 5 verse was characterized as helpful in the battle against the passions, here its ability to induce clarity of vision is emphasized. This point is highlighted by the following final verse section of Book 1, in which the path towards intellectual vision is clearly mapped out.

Thus we see that the form of Menippean Satire allows Boethius to portray the process by which Philosophy first purges verse of its dangerous aspects and then appropriates it for her own purposes. Like a φάρ-
μακον, verse can either excite or calm the passions, cloud or clarify the mind. Philosophy, like a good doctor, knows how to apply this ambiguous substance in a beneficial way. And it is indicative of the extent to

which she has made verse her own instrument that, whereas in Book 1 Boethius speaks three of the seven verse sections, he speaks but once in verse in the remaining four books. By the end of Book 1 verse has been raised to parity with at least the first stages of philosophic discourse and throughout the following two books both verse and various kinds of prose, in alternation, will further the same goals.

In the course of Books 2 and 3 Philosophy explains to Boethius the fickle nature of *Fortuna* and suggests that he should welcome bad luck more readily than good, for it impresses more clearly on the human mind the need to free oneself from attachment to external felicity (Book 2, prose 8). In contrast to the false goods of *Fortuna*, Philosophy outlines the nature of the true good which is God. Throughout these two books Philosophy employs verse along with prose to further the argument. In fact, one might well point to the justly famous philosophic hymn, which is the ninth verse section in Book 3, as the high-point of verse's status in the *Consolatio*:

O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas,
terrarum caelique sator, qui tempus ab aevo
ire iubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri.

Tu causis animas paribus vitasque minores
provehis et levibus sublimes curribus aptans
in caelum terramque seris, quas lege benigna
ad te conversas reduci facis igne reverti.
Da, pater, augustam menti concendere sedem,
da fontem lustrare boni, da luce reperta
in te conspicuos animi defigere visus.

(Book 3, verse 9.1-3 & 18-24)

This is the only verse section in the entire *Consolatio* to be composed in dactylic hexameter, thus drawing attention to itself as in some way the most important verse section in the work. Furthermore the poem is calculated to respond in a definitive way to Boethius' complaint in verse 5 of Book 1 that the divine order of the universe does not seem to apply to the world of men. The first three lines of this latter poem recall and contrast the opening of Boethius' prayer:

O stelliferi conditor orbis
qui perpetuo nixus solio
rapido caelum turbine versas
legemque pati sidera cogis. . . .

(Book 1, prose 5.1-4)

That is, whereas Boethius could see God's handiwork only in the heavens, Philosophy, by the epithet *terrarum caerulea sator*, indicates her conviction that God's will is as effective on earth as it is in heaven. Likewise, the final *supplicationes* of the two poems make clear the progress that has been made in the first three books. Whereas Boethius had beseeched God to establish order on earth:

Rapidos, rector, comprime fluctus,
et quo caelum regis immensum
firma stabiles foedere terras.

(Book 1, verse 5.46-48)

Philosophy asks for the insight to perceive the order that has always existed and will forever exist in the universe:

Dissice terrenae nebulas et pondera molis
atque tuo splendore mica; tu namque serenum,
tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis,
principium, vector, dux, semita, terminus idem.

(Book 3, verse 9.25-28)

But shortly after this highpoint, the career of verse in the *Consolatio* begins to decline. For the final verse section in Book 3, which immediately precedes the ascent to the level of *fatum* in Book 4, represents, if not a definitive *envoi* to verse, at least a diminishing of its importance. The poem retells the tale of Orpheus' descent into Hades to rescue Eurydice. Although the singer charms Pluto and Proserpina into releasing his wife, in the end he is unable to lead her back to life, for the very emotion, the poetical expression of which had won him his beloved, moves him to violate the conditions of her return. The stated interpretation of the fable is that in the ascent towards the truth one must avoid fascination with terrestrial matters:

Vos haec fabula respicit
quicomque in superum diem
mentem ducere quaeritis;
nam qui Tartareum in specus
victus lumina flexerit,
quicquid praecipuum trahit
perdit dum videt inferos.

(Book 3, verse 12.52-58)

But what is more, because Orpheus was a conventional archetype of the poet in the tradition of Latin literature, this poem also hints at theulti-

mate incapacity of verse to lead one to the truth, a task for which philosophy alone is fit.¹³ This interpretation gains further weight if one remembers that in the first elegy in Book 4 of Ovid's *Tristia*, the same poem which Boethius echoes in lines 5 and 6 of his opening lament and to which Philosophy alluded in her attack on the Muses, Orpheus is mentioned as the last in a series of *exempla* of verse's power to console:

Cum traheret silvas Orpheus et dura canendo
saxa, bis ammisa coniuge, maestus erat.

(*Tristia*, 4.1.17-18)¹⁴

Thus, according to Boethius, although verse can to a certain extent further the soul's quest for truth, nonetheless, as one approaches the great mysteries, it is found to be inadequate.

From this point on in the *Consolatio* verse assumes a new and subsidiary role. It is no longer a *remedium* on a par with philosophy; it becomes a mere *refrigerium*, a refreshment to restore the mind between bouts of strenuous dialectic. Thus, for instance, as preface to a long and involved lecture on the relationship between fate and providence (Book 4, prose 6.7-56), Philosophy requests that Boethius put off his desire for verse:

Quodsi te musici carminis oblectamenta delectant, hanc oportet paulisper differas voluptatem dum nexas sibi ordine contexo rationes.

(Book 4, prose 6.6)

And at the end of this same lecture, she states:

Sed video te iam dudum et pondere quaestionis oneratum et rationis prolixitate fatigatum aliquam carminis expectare dulcedinem; accipe igitur haustum quo refectus firmior in ulteriora contendas.

(Book 4, prose 6.57)

A further indication of the decreasing importance of verse is the fact that, whereas Book 1 began and ended with verse, Book 5 is framed by prose passages. The work concludes with the famous disquisition on the harmony of divine providence and human free-will (Book 5, prose 6), a

¹³For Orpheus as the type of the poet see Virgil, *Georgics*, 4.453-527; Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, 10.1-77; Seneca, *Hercules Furens*, 569-91.

¹⁴There is an ambiguity about this mention of Orpheus even in the Ovidian poem. Although it is clear that Ovid is strengthening his point that poetry consoles by claiming that Orpheus was sad when he exercised his great poetic gifts, nonetheless the reference to twice losing his wife, a circumstance showing up the inadequacy of those gifts, does give the reader pause.

passage which recalls the lofty philosophic prose of Plato, as, for instance, when Socrates explains the dynamics of Eros in the *Phaedrus* (244A-257B) or when Diotima reveals the mysteries of love to the young Socrates in the *Symposium* (201D-212C).¹⁵ At the limits of human vision a poetic philosophy, that is, a philosophic prose of the most rigorous rationality, which has nonetheless appropriated the rhythms and some of the suggestiveness of verse, takes over from conventional verse.

The status of verse at this stage of enlightenment is represented in the third verse section of Book 5. This poem is the only occasion in Books 2 through 5 where Boethius rather than Philosophy speaks in verse. Boethius has just pointed out the seeming contradiction in maintaining both God's providence and human free-will. This leads him to ponder man's epistemological condition: is this apparent contradiction inherent in the nature of things or is it the result of man's faulty perception:

Quaenam discors foedera rerum
causa resolvit? Quis tanta deus
veris statuit bella duobus
ut quae carpit singula constent
eadem nolint mixta iugari?
An nulla est discordia veris
semperque sibi certa cohaerent,
sed mens caecis obruta membris
nequit oppressi luminis igne
rerum tenues noscere nexus?

(Book 5, verse 3.1-10)

Boethius then proceeds to reason along lines established by Plato (*Meno* 80D-E), and comes to the conclusion that the doctrine of *anamnesis* best describes man's half-way state between knowledge and ignorance:

¹⁵I am thinking of the kind of discourse exemplified by the passage in the *Phaedrus* (245C5-246A1): Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος· τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ κίνητον ἀθάνατον, τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς. Compare Book 5, prose 6.2-5: "Deum igitur aeternum esse cunctorum ratione degentium commune iudicium est. Quid sit igitur aeternitas consideremus; haec enim nobis naturam pariter divinam scientiamque patefaciet. Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio, quod ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quicquid vivit in tempore, id praesens a praeteritis in futura procedit. . . ." Although the Gorgianic features are more marked in Plato, both passages are alike in exemplifying a rhythmic and highly wrought prose.

Igitur quisquis vera requirit
 neutro est habitu; nam neque novit
 nec penitus tamen omnia nescit,
 sed quam retinens meminit summam
 consultit alte visa retractans,
 ut servatis queat oblitas
 addere partes.

(Book 5, verse 3.25–31)

The last time Boethius spoke in verse it was to ask the question, how to justify the ways of God to man:

Omnia certo fine gubernans
 hominum solos respuis actus
 merito rector cohære modo.
 Nam cur tantas lubrica versat
 Fortuna vices?

(Book 1, verse 5.25–29)

And Books 2–5 can be read as Philosophy's attempt to answer this question. She employs all kinds of discourse, among them verse, to make her case. But we have seen how the nearer to ultimate truth the discussion gets, the less important verse becomes. Now that all but the very last mysteries have been revealed, Boethius once more speaks in verse. Why?

Because the answer is complex and lies at the heart of the *Consolatio*'s meaning, a full and clear explication is called for. Among other things Book 1 portrays the process whereby Philosophy wrests from Boethius the instrument of verse and uses it for her own ends: first as *remedium*, then as *refrigerium*. But it was Boethius' articulation of the felt disharmony in things (i.e. Book 1, verse 5) that set this whole process in motion; and now that the process is nearly completed he again asks a question. That these two verse sections serve as important landmarks in the process of the argument is indicated by two facts: in both cases Boethius poses a question which elicits a response from Philosophy and in both cases he speaks in the same meter, anapestic dimeter catalectic, and employs similar phrases, for example:

et quo caelum regis immensum
 firma stabiles *foedere* terras.

(Book 1, verse 5.47–48)

Quaenam discors *foedera* rerum
 causa resolvit?

(Book 5, verse 3.1–2)

The great difference, however, lies in the fact that whereas the first question was passionate and naive, this second restatement of the problem is intellectual and self-consciously sophisticated. In Book 1, Boethius was in an emotional state where the apparent contradictions of the human condition touched him personally and where his only possible response was an anguished appeal to God. In Book 5, as a result of the therapy he has in the meantime undergone, he is enough in possession of himself not only to see that the question is really a question of man's perception of the universe, but also to provide an answer. This state of self-possession, which allows him to manipulate with a degree of sophistication both verse and philosophic discourse, is reflected in the fact that he now speaks in verse for one last time. It is as if Philosophy in Book 1 had taken verse out of Boethius' hands, as a concerned mother might take a dangerous object from her child; now that Boethius has undergone the therapy in which Philosophy has demonstrated, among other things, the proper use of verse, she hands it back to him, as the mother might in a few years allow the child to handle the object which he had matured enough to know how to use wisely.

Verse 3 of Book 5 is not only the last verse Boethius speaks in the *Consolatio*, it is just about the last time he says anything at all. For in response to this poem Philosophy launches into her explanation of the harmony between *providentia* and human free-will, a demonstration in which Boethius takes no greater part than to give his assent from time to time (Book 5, prose 4.8 & 16; prose 5.19). This final silence on Boethius' part and the fact that he does not frame Philosophy's disquisition with a description of her departure to match the elaborate description of her apparition in Book 1 have puzzled many readers of the *Consolatio*.

I suggest that this puzzlement arises from a failure to appreciate the significance of verse 3 in Book 5. There is no need to round off or to re-establish in a human context the vision of Philosophy, because both these functions have already been served by the poem, which not only shows Boethius cured and able to handle discourse properly, but also as formulating the issues in such a way as to elicit the best Philosophy has to offer. It seems particularly appropriate that this dialogue between the human Boethius and divine Philosophy should end with Boethius posing a question in sophisticated but human terms and with Philosophy answering by adumbrating the viewpoint of eternity but ending with a justification of human hope, prayer, and action:

Nec frustra sunt in deo positae spes precesque, quae cum rectae sunt inefficaces esse non possunt. Aversamini igitur vitia, colite virtutes, ad rectas

spes animum sublivate, humiles preces in excelsa porrigite. Magna vobis est, si dissimulare non vultis, necessitas indicta probitatis cum ante oculos agitis iudicis cuncta cernentis.

(Book 5, prose 6.46-48)

By way of a conclusion I shall refer to what is perhaps the most important model for Boethius' text, the *Phaedo* of Plato, as a means of suggesting in what context of ancient thought the *Consolatio* is to be understood.

Early on in the dialogue (60C7-61C1) Socrates explains to Cebes that because he has often been visited by a dream instructing him to practice poetry (*μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου*, 60E6), which he had hitherto interpreted as applying metaphorically to his practice of philosophy, he now, as death approaches, thinks it fit to take literally. Thus he has taken up the lyre and is engaged in versifying Aesop's fables. Later in the same dialogue (84D8-85B8) Socrates compares himself to the swan who was thought to sing its own dirge at the approach of death. But Socrates takes issue with the traditional reading of the fable, according to which the swan in its song laments its demise. Instead, Socrates maintains, it sings more beautifully than at any other moment of its life in happy anticipation of otherworldly bliss.

I suggest that this motif in the *Phaedo* might well serve as text to the relationship between philosophy and poetry in Boethius' *Consolatio*. Plato, who had written verses and tragedies in his youth and subsequently abandoned the practice when he met Socrates, portrays his teacher as indulging in verse in the face of oncoming death.¹⁶ Boethius had also written verse as a youth and after a life devoted to politics and philosophy he portrays himself as returning to verse when faced with death.¹⁷ In both cases, however, the traditional preconceptions and conventions of poetry undergo a transformation. As Socrates reinterprets the swan song as a paean of joy, so does Boethius transform his song from elegiac lament, by way of philosophic *remedium* and *refrigerium*, into an intellectually sophisticated expression of the human condition.

¹⁶Diogenes Laertius, 3.5.

¹⁷See Book 1, verse 1.7. See also H. Usener's *Anecdoton Holderi - Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Roms in ostgotischer Zeit* (Bonn 1877). The author of this fragment, whom Usener takes to be Cassiodorus, confirms Boethius' own claim that he wrote poetry as a youth.

Thus the purpose behind Boethius' chosen form, the Menippean Satire, becomes clear. He required a form which would allow poetry and philosophy to play off of each other in order to define their relationship and to suggest a possible reconciliation.

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INTERPRETATIONS

PINDAR OLYMPIAN 6.82-83: THE DOXA, THE WHETSTONE, AND THE TONGUE

δόξαν ἔχω τιν' ἐπὶ γλώσσᾳ λιγυρᾶς ἀκόνας,
ἄ μ' ἐθέλοντα προσέρπει καλλιρόοισι πνοαῖς,
ματρομάτωρ ἐμὰ Στυμφαλίς, εὐανθὴς Μετώπα,
85 πλάξιππον ἄ Θήβαν ἔτικτεν, τᾶς ἐρατεινὸν ὑδωρ
πίομαι, ἀνδράσιν αἰχματαῖσι πλέκων
ποικίλον ὕμνον.

Of line 82 Bergk wrote in *PLG*⁴: "Hic locus iam veteres valde exer-
cuit, in scholiis plurimae proponuntur explicaciones, quae non magis
probabiles sunt quam quas nostri homines commendant."¹ That nostri
homines have not reached a consensus is evident from the emendations
and interpretations of later scholars. Most recently, Gordon Kirkwood
in his *Selections from Pindar* (Chico, California 1982) has decided that
no emendation is needed. I disagree and believe that several modern
interpretations of the MSS are untenable.

I. *The Doxa*

In his commentary of 1932 Farnell stated the prevailing view: "I
have the impression, the feeling of a shrill whetstone on my tongue."² Norwood objected to the grotesqueness of the image and took δόξα to
be "reputation": "In addition to my power of song, I have a high repute
as a trainer of others in music."³ For the same reason Beattie suggested

¹The transposition λιγυρᾶς ἀκόνας (82) for MSS ἀκόνας λιγυρᾶς has been attrib-
uted to Bergk and Wilamowitz by recent editors. Bergk considered it possible in the sec-
ond edition of *PLG* but did not adopt it; in later editions he abandoned it as unnecessary
and attributed it to Hartung. Wilamowitz accepted it, without comment, in *PU* 9 (1886)
167, n. 20. Hartung did not hold that it was necessary, but that the hiatus was not.

In his *Emendations in Pindar* (Amsterdam 1976) 42f. Douglas E. Gerber records
several other changes proposed in the nineteenth century but not considered here.

²G. Norwood "Pindar Olympian VI 82-88," *CP* 36 (1941) 395.

ἐπὶ γλώσσας ἀκόνα: "I have a certain reputation for the sharpness (or 'sharpening power') of my clear-sounding tongue."³ Dover thought that the terminations of the MSS could be kept, with ἀκόνας in apposition to δόξαν and λιγυρᾶς as a transferred epithet: "Among the good things said of me there is one—it acts as whetstone on my tongue, making it clear-sounding. . . ."⁴ Dover gave the strongest positive arguments for "reputation":⁵ with one or two exceptions this is the meaning of the word in Pindar; and, while from the sixth century onwards δόξαν ἔχειν normally means "have reputation," "have belief" is unexampled before the fourth.⁶ But, even if Dover's exceptions are admitted, it is only to be expected that "reputation" should predominate in epinician odes; and δόξα as an acquired or possessed "belief, fancy, illusion" is found with several other verbs in the fifth century.⁷ If an audience could understand Pindar's ἐλπίδα, λάθαν, μερίμναν, φροντίδα ἔχειν, surely "have fancy" would not seem strange.

Woodbury, following Gildersleeve and followed in turn by Kirkwood, rendered δόξα as "feeling." He went further and proposed that here the tongue is not simply the instrument of the mind, but, as well as being independent of the mind, is its own percipient and able to perceive a state of mind.⁸ That the tongue could be thought an independent agent with a will of its own is well attested, but there is no parallel for the kind of perception that Woodbury assigned it. Moreover, it is doubtful that in any case δόξα would be understood as "perception." When it is what seems to oneself, it is distinguished from, and usually opposed to, perception.⁹

³A. J. Beattie "Pindar, *OI.* 6.82 f.," *CR NS* 6 (1956) 1-2.

⁴K. J. Dover "Pindar Olympian Odes 6.82-86," *CR NS* 9 (1959) 195f.

⁵Against the interpretations of Norwood and Beattie see C. A. P. Ruck "Marginalia Pindarica," *Hermes* 96 (1968) 134.

⁶Dover excepted only *N.* 11.24 as certain and *O.* 10.63 as possible. To these Rumpel's lexicon adds *O.* 6.82, and Slater's adds *P.* 1.36. In the last δόξαν φέρειν must refer to belief about the future, expectation; and the same interpretation of the phrase is possible at *O.* 8.64 and *N.* 9.34, which the lexica put under "fama" and "reputation." So, too, *P.* 8.24 f. may mean "has had its expectation fulfilled from the beginning."

⁷λαμβάνειν *A.* A. 275, παρεῖναι *A.* 421, είναι c. dat. pers. *Ch.* 1053; παρίστασθαι *S. OT* 911 (and *Rhesus* 780); κτάσθαι *E. Hec.* 489, ἐνείναι *Hipp.* 1115. Similarly δόκησις with ἔρχεσθαι *S. OT* 681 and ἔχειν *E. Hel.* 119 and δοκῶ with ὑπέρχεσθαι *E. El.* 747.

⁸L. Woodbury "The Tongue and the Whetstone: Pindar, *OI.* 6.82-83," *TAPA* 86 (1955) 32-36.

⁹See the contexts of the passages referred to in note 7 above.

The scholiasts, although uncertain about its application, understood δόξα as δόκησις 'fancy, opinion' (Sch. 140a and 141b-d).¹⁰ There is good reason to prefer their interpretation. The antithesis between reality and appearance, between what is true and what is believed or pretended, runs throughout Greek literature. Among the early philosophers it is put most clearly by Parmenides when he sets the unshaken heart of truth and the trustworthy account and thought about truth against the δόξαι of mortals: Ἀληθείης εύκυκλέος ἀτρεμές ἦτορ ορρ. βροτῶν δόξας (B. 1.29 f.); πιστὸν λόγον ἡδε νόημα ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης ορρ. δόξας βροτείας (B. 8.50 f.). It is a commonplace in poets of the fifth century, and it underlies many passages in Pindar, such as βροτῶν φάτις ὑπέρ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον, "the tale of mortals beyond the true account" (O. 1.28f.).¹¹ He invokes it when, after his δόξα, he goes on:

ὅτρυνον νῦν ἔταιρους,
Αἰνέα, πρῶτον μὲν "Ἡραν Παρθενίαν κελαδῆσαι,
γνῶναι τ' ἔπειτ', ἀρχαῖον δνειδος ἀλαθέσιν
90 λόγοις εἰ φεύγομεν, Βοιωτίαν ὕν.

Commentators have not noticed the antithesis and have, therefore, not seen how this passage is related to what precedes. They have generally concurred that the ode is a test and that Aeneas is to learn whether, by it, Pindar is freed from the gibe "Boeotian swine." The phrase ἀλαθέσιν λόγοις has been variously translated as "in the very truth" (= after honest calculation, Gildersleeve), "if the truth be told," "on a true account." Such translations suppose that in the audience at Stymphalus there will be some who will cavil at the work of the Boeotian poet. No evidence has been given for the existence of such cavillers, and no reason for the appearance of this gibe in this ode. Pindar does not need, except in joking self-mockery, to prove to any Stymphalian that he is not a poetaster. As Dissen observed in his commentary, "immo non nunc primum refutatur vetus opprobium, sed diu iam refutatum erat Pindarica maxime poesi."

What he does need, and from Hagesias alone, is assent to his fanciful genealogy. He is giving the conventional antithesis a novel twist: for the purpose of the ode the fancy must be the true account. Aeneas is to

¹⁰References to the scholia are by the numbering of A. B. Drachmann *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina*, vol. I (Leipzig 1903).

¹¹For example, τὸ δοκεῖν ορρ. ἀληθεία, Simon. 55 D and E. *Or.* 236; δοκεῖν ορρ. εἶναι A. *Th.* 592 and E. *HF* 341; δόκησιν εἰπεῖν ορρ. ἐξακριβῶσαι λόγον S. *Tr.* 425 f. Further on Pindar, note 13 below.

go back to Pindar's origin, as Phintis has done for Hagesias (22–25), and he is to submit the δόξα as proof of Stymphalian lineage. If it is not accepted as true, Pindar will be rejected as a Boeotian rustic. Beyond that, if it is not accepted, his mythological compliment to Hagesias becomes incredible. He is the first poet to know that Poseidon was the father of Evadne and that Apollo was the father of her child.¹² In other odes, when he offers a new or corrected myth, his λόγος 'account' is the truth¹³; but here ἀλαθέσιν λόγοις cannot refer only or primarily to the myth of Iamus. If Hagesias is to believe the myth, he must also believe the δόξα, since for this, too, Pindar is his sole authority. Thus the δόξα, not the myth or the poem as a whole, is the test. It is Pindar's own myth, and ἀλαθέσιν λόγοις is "by my true account of myself."¹⁴ On this interpretation, it may be added, δόξαν τιν', while perhaps seeming so, is not tentative or modest and does not indicate one of many possibilities; the indefinite, rather, signals that what follows is remarkably strange and important.¹⁵

On this interpretation, too, Pindar's genealogy ties the beginning of the ode to the end. In the first strophe he announces that, as if building a wondrous megaron, he will build a thalamos of which the porch

¹²See Farnell on 26–63. If the myth were already familiar in this form, the secrecy about Pitana's pregnancy (29–31) and Evadne's lover (35–38) would be superfluous, since it is not essential to the course of events. Pindar's secrets are a device to explain why others have not known the truth to which he has access. In an earlier version of the myth Aepyptus may have been Evadne's father and may have consulted the oracle because he feared that his grandson would oust or kill him. (See Jacob Stern "The Myth of Pindar's Olympian 6," *AJP* 91 [1970] 332–34.) In the ode the potentially tragic beginning leads to a happy ending, and the angry king is reduced to the rank of messenger (47–51).

¹³The tale of mortals beyond the true account opp. Pindar's own version (*O.* 1.28 f. and 52); his accurate account, which corrects that of Homer (*O.* 7.21); the ancient account, which is true and is his invention (*N.* 1.33f.); Homer's exaggerated account opp. the truth (*N.* 7.21 f. and 25).

¹⁴Some recent views of the test and proof: the genealogy is a test, and the song and its truth are proof to the mind that Pindar and Aeneas give due praise (E. L. Bundy "Studia Pindarica," *CPCP* 18 [1962] 60, n. 66); the performance will be proof that the interpretation is authentic (Ruck [note 5 above] 141); the choreography and performance will refute the gibe (William Mullen *Choreia: Pindar and Dance* [Princeton 1982] 36).

¹⁵This introductory indefinite is the stock-in-trade of fabulists, messengers, and sage poets from Homer on. See, e.g., *Od.* 3.293, 4.354, 4.384, 9.508, 13.96. In Pindar: *O.* 7.45 (aetiological myth), *O.* 8.25 (revised myth, Sch. 41a), *P.* 4.247 f. (abbreviated myth; explanatory asyndeton at 249), *N.* 9.6 (proverb; cf. *Archil.* 89 D, *Simon.* 37 D, *Ar.* *Av.* 652). Other examples: *A. Pers.* 447; *S. Tr.* 46 and 237; *E. Hipp.* 1199 and 1201; *Rhesus* 780.

will have golden columns and a far-shining facade. He completes the image thus:

εἰ δ' εἴη μὲν Ὀλυμπιονίκας,
 5 βωμῷ τε μαντείῳ ταμίας Διός ἐν Πίσῃ,
 συνοικιστήρ τε τῶν κλεινῶν Συρακοσσῶν, τίνα κεν φύγοι ὕμνον
 κεῖνος ἀνήρ, ἐπικύρσαις ἀφθόνων ἀστῶν ἐν ἴμερταῖς ἀοιδαῖς;

Gildersleeve identified the columns: "Agesias is an Olympic victor, a ταμίας Διός, a συνοικιστήρ of Syracuse, and beloved of his people."¹⁶ He understood the sentence as "an ideal condition of a fair dream, too fair to come to pass, yet it has come to pass." It is more complicated than appears from his note. The fourth column is added in a different form, after the sentence is seemingly complete, as though to say in after-thought "if, that is, he has met with fellow citizens ungrudging in song."¹⁷ The first three columns are secure facts, and so the optatives are needed only if the fourth is in doubt; in prose the optatives of the protases would be causal participles, and the participle would be an optative. Further, since Hagesias was a citizen of both Stymphalus and Syracuse, there is a question as to who the fellow citizens are. And in what way are they ungrudging—in composing, in singing, or in applauding?

Pindar gives a hint when he says that he is not contentious or over-fond of victory and that he has the bidding of the Muses (19–21). He clears away all doubt about himself when he reveals that he, the weaver of the cunning hymn, is a Stymphalian. A question still remains about the Syracusans. To this he turns in the final triad, with a hope that Hieron will give a friendly welcome to the festal band as it comes from Stymphalus (98–100). The acclaim of Hagesias that he expects at Syracuse will be the counterpart of the ode sung by his chorus at Stymphalus and will complete the column of fellow citizenship.¹⁸

¹⁶He could have gone further with the architecture. The megaron is a princely palace, as at *P.* 4.134 and 280. The thalamos is more than a chamber (Kirkwood) if its facade is to be seen from afar, and more than a house (Gildersleeve) if it is not to suggest inferiority. It may be a treasury (cf. *P.* 6.5–18), like the freestanding treasuries at Olympia and Delphi and unlike the inner treasure-chambers of Homer, like a palace but more splendid. If so, the hymn of praise is the pediment supported by the columns.

¹⁷Such afterthought protases often add a substantial, and sometimes grim, qualification: *P.* 4.263–69; *A.* 4.345–47; *S. Tr.* 584–87; *Pl. Phd.* 67 E 8–68 A 1.

¹⁸The hymn of praise has a similar function in linking the occasion of the ode to the past and the future. At line 87 it celebrates the most recent accomplishment, but it also looks back to the more distant past at line 6 and forward to line 105, where Pindar prays for future success. (The future πίομαι [86] refers only to the performance of the ode; see Ruck [note 5 above] 141f. and Bundy [note 14 above] 21 f.)

II. *The Whetstone*

The δόνξα would probably not have been a problem if it were not for the whetstone on the tongue. Gildersleeve justified the metaphor by saying that "the tongue is freely handled in Greek." Pearson added that "the tongue was freely associated with and sometimes identified with a sharp striking-instrument" and that "if the instrument employed is to remain efficient, it must be sharpened from time to time."¹⁹ All this is true, but it misreads the metaphor. "Whet" might later be reduced to "urge, stimulate," but in the fifth century the whetstone was used metaphorically to prepare for violent action. The man who trains a pancratiast is a whetstone (*I. 6.72 f.*); justice is whetted for a deed of harm on the whetstone of destiny (*A. A. 1535*); within the state bloody whetstones harm the young (*A. Eu. 895 f.*). Whatever is whetted—man, mind, tongue, or utterance—is always hostile or ready to be so.²⁰ Thus Pindar in an ode for a boxer: θάξαις δέ κε φύντ' ἀρετᾶ, "you might whet a man who is born for excellence" (*O. 10.20*). In *O. 6* such violence is out of place. Despite the Homeric ἀνδράσιν αἰχματαῖσι (86), the mules of Hagesias have not carried him into battle on a war-chariot; and Pindar is celebrating his victory, not whetting him for combat.

The hostility of the metaphor is not lessened by Gildersleeve's comment that "λιγυρᾶς is not used in a bad sense" or by Norwood's that it is a "corrective epithet."²¹ Pindar frequently speaks of himself and his poetry in language reminiscent of Homeric battles. Unlike Homer's weap-

¹⁹A. C. Pearson "Pindar, *O1. 6.82*," *CR* 45 (1931) 210.

²⁰τραχεῖς καὶ τεθηγμένους λόγους A. *Pr.* 311, τεθηγμένος ὡμῆ ξὺν ὄργῃ . . . στόλος *Supp.* 186 f., τεθηγμένον τοι μούκ ἀπαμβλυνεῖς *Th.* 715; γλῶσσα . . . τεθηγμένη S. *Aj.* 584, στόμα πολλήν ἔχον στόμωσιν *OC* 794 f., μὴ ἐπιμεῖναι τούμὸν ὁξῦναι στόμα *Tr.* 1176; μὴ παροξύνης φρένας E. *Alc.* 674, ὄργῃ συντεθηγμένος φρένας *Hipp.* 689, παῦσαι λῆμ' ἔχων τεθηγμένον *Or.* 1625; στομώσεις αὐτὸν . . . γναθὸν στόμωσον *Ar. Nu.* 1108 and 1110, αἱ φύσεις . . . παρηκόνηται *Ra.* 1115 f.; ὁξυθεῖς πέμπει ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἵππεας *Hdt.* 8.138.1; ἦν τις ἄρα ξὺν κατηγορίᾳ παροξύνη *Th.* 1.84.2.

The forging of the tongue on the anvil of truth at *P. 1.86*, often cited in comments on the whetstone, is irrelevant. Forging does not imply whetting; and Pindar is there not speaking for himself, but is giving Deinomenes advice in loco parentis.

The later weakened metaphor is illustrated by LSJ παροξύνω I.1 and the scholars' παροξύνουσα καὶ παρορμῶσα (Sch. 140c and 141c). By further weakening ἀκόνω is used of rubbing gold against a touchstone (Sch. P. 10.105d). There is, however, no good evidence for a parallel weakening of ἀκόνη to "touchstone." Bundy to the contrary (note 14 above). In Scol. Anon. 33 λιθίναις ἀκόναις ὁ χρυσὸς ἐξετάζεται more likely refers to a test by abrasion; a whetstone of emery, unlike a touchstone of slate, could show whether the gold was solid or only a plating.

²¹Note 2 above, 396.

ons, however, his poetic arrows and javelins do no harm; his concern is only with the accuracy of the shot and the length and direction of the cast.²² He may well, then, use such oxymora as εύκλέας ὄϊστούς (*O.* 2.90) and γλυκὺν ὄϊστόν (*O.* 9.11f). The λιγυρὰ ἀκόνα is not analogous. In these other cases the adjective negates an essential, not merely usual, attribute of the noun; but the sound is not essential to the whetstone. Pindar's arrows may bring glory instead of groans and may be sweet instead of bitter; but the whetstone, however it sounds, has the sole function of making a weapon more destructive. To be analogous it should blunt the point.

A further difficulty is the relation of the fair-flowing breezes to the whetstone. Gildersleeve acquiesced in the harsh combination: "καλλιρόοισι πνοαῖς shows that in this case, at any rate, the sound of the whetstone was the voice of the Muses." Woodbury, too, understood the breezes as coming from the Muses: "the infusion of the divine breath, which will sharpen his utterance."²³ But the Muses have not been mentioned by name since line 21, and there is nothing to suggest their presence here. Beattie and Pavese, after Hartung, separated the breezes from the whetstone and made Metope the source of inspiration.²⁴ This solution is no more satisfactory. Metope is not one of the Muses or a likely surrogate for them. She is better seen as the source, through his mother, of Pindar's inborn talent, his φυά. He goes to Thebe's spring and drinks the water that sustains his talent and enables him to receive and respond to the inspiration of the Muses, just as Iamus goes to the Alpheus to commune with Poseidon and Apollo (58-61).²⁵

On a different track Ruck proposed "the liquid breath of flutes," musical accompaniment.²⁶ This is consistent with the role of the aulos in

²²See especially *O.* 2.83-85 and 89-95; *O.* 9.5-12; *O.* 13.93-95; *P.* 1.42-45; *N.* 6.26-29; *N.* 7.70-72; *N.* 9.53-55; *I.* 2.35-37; *I.* 5.46-48.

²³Note 8 above, 39.

²⁴Beattie (note 3 above) 2; C. Pavese "Pindarica," *Maia* 16 (1964) 307-308. For this interpretation in the scholia see note 29 below.

Dover understood the phrase as "the smell of a lovely stream," Metope, because in other occurrences the adjective is applied to rivers and springs (note 4 above) 196. There is no parallel for "breath" as "smell" in Pindar. He so often applies "liquid" words to poetry and music that more likely than not he is doing so here. See *O.* 6.91; *O.* 7.7 f.; *O.* 10.98 f.; *P.* 4.299; *P.* 8.57; *N.* 3.77-79; *N.* 7.12; *I.* 3/4.90b; *I.* 6.1-3,21,64,74; *I.* 7.19; *I.* 8.58.

²⁵On water as the "source and sustenance of life" (Gildersleeve) see *O.* 1.1. On water as the junction of human and divine see *O.* 1.71-74, *Il.* 1.34-36 and 348-51, *Od.* 2.260 f.

²⁶Note 5 above, 135.

other odes, and it is favored by references to the aulos in the scholia²⁷ and by several passages in poets of the fifth century, Pindar included.²⁸ In those passages, however, as elsewhere in Pindar and in Homer, Hesiod, and the dramatists, the meaning of “breath” is limited by the context—as if “breath” by itself is only air in motion. Here, as Hartung and Pavese saw, nothing connects the breaths to the aulos. It would appear, then, that this passage is exceptional and the scholia no more than a learned guess.

There are many signs that the scholiasts used a text different from the source of our MSS or along with it. At line 83, for example, the scholia are based both on MSS προσέρπει and on προσέλκει(οι), which is recorded as a variant in some MSS.²⁹ In the same way, it seems, while some scholia are based on MSS ἀκόνας λιγυρᾶς (Sch. 141a-f), those that refer to the breaths of the aulos are based on a lost text. I would suggest that the missing aulos is hidden in ἀκόνας, that the scholiasts had δόνακος λιγυροῦ, and that the reading of the MSS is due to the scrambling of δόνακος and the subsequent accommodation of the adjective to the gender of ἀκόνας. If this solution is correct, there is no oxymoron or transferred epithet, since “clear-toned reed” is in keeping

²⁷ ὑπὸ ταῖς τῶν αὐλῶν πνοαῖς καὶ ἡχῶν διὰ πνοῆς γάρ ὁ ἡχος ἐκφέρεται Sch. 140c; καλλίροοι δὲ ῥοι αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ὄργανῶν ἐκπεμπόμεναι Sch. 142c; ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ὄργανῶν ἀναφερομέναις *{καὶ?}* τῶν μετ' αὐλῶν ὑμνῶν Sch. 143a; ἐν καλλιρόοις πνοαῖς, ἥγουν πρὸς τὸ αὐλεῖν καὶ ὑμνεῖν Sch. 144g.

²⁸ Αἰολίσσιν ἐν πνοαῖσιν αὐλῶν N. 3.79; λι[γ].. αι σὺν] αὐλῶν πνοᾶι Bacchyl. 23.4 Sn.; ἀδυβόδα Φρυγίων αὐλῶν πνεύματι E. Ba. 127f.; συρίγγος πνοὰ λεπτοῦ δόνακος Or. 145 f.; λωτοῦ κατὰ πνεύματα Ph. 787; αὐλῶν πνοή Ar. Ra. 154.

²⁹ The paraphrase of the *recensio vaticana* recognizes both προσέλκει and προσέρπει, with δόξα as the subject: ἔχω . . . δόκησιν . . . με προτρεπομένην λέγειν but also δόκησις θέλοντι μοι καὶ βουλομένῳ προσέρπει καὶ προσπίπτει (Sch. 140c). The other scholia give no further evidence for προσέρπει; those of A have προσάγει and προσέλκεται (Sch. 142a and 144c), and those of the *recensio vaticana* have ἔλκεται and προσέλκει (Sch. 144d and 144g), with Μετώπῃ the stated subject in all but Sch. 142a. It is clear that the MSS and the scholia reflect two different ancient texts and interpretations and that προσέλκει is not a late intrusion. Mommsen thought that it was substituted by Alexandrians for the unusual προσέρπει. But neither προσέρπει by itself nor with the accusative, rather than dative, of person would be enough to cause the substitution. ἔρπω and its compounds were not rare; nor was the accusative of person with such compound verbs as ὑφέρπω, ἐπέρχομαι, and ὑπέρχομαι. Usage is on the side of προσέλκει (see LSJ ἔλκω II.8 and ἔφέλκω II.2 and III.2).

That this instance is not unique may be seen from the following: ἐπεδείξαντο Sch. 44a and 44c for ἐπεὶ δέξαντο 27; θέλοντι Sch. 140c for ἐθέλοντα 83 with Sch. 142b; γλώσσης Sch. 141b and d for γλώσσα 82; ῥοαῖς Sch. 142b and 143a for πνοαῖς 83 with Sch. 144g; πνοαῖ Sch. 162d and e for λύραι 97.

with the musical association of λιγυρός, λιγύς, and their compounds³⁰; nor is it necessary to consider avoiding hiatus by transposing the adjective before its noun.³¹

The δόναξ, being both the plant and the aulos made from it, would be especially appropriate in this context.³² Pindar lived near the Cephisus, whose waters were famed for the reeds that grew in them (Thphr. *HP* 4.11. 8-9). His grandmother, Metope, was the daughter of Arcadian Ladon, which flows into Arcadian-Elean Alpheus, and she bore Thebe to Boeotian Asopus (Sch. 144b-i). Thus the waters of the region combine with mythology to make an aquatic connection between the home and song of Theban Pindar and the home and Olympic victory of Stymphalian Hagesias.³³

III. *The Tongue*

~~There was a proverb, widespread and certainly known to Pindar and his audience, that anything placed on the tongue—a bar, a seal, an ox, etc.—prohibits utterance.³⁴~~ Pindar has this proverb in mind when, after his complimentary address to Hagesias, he changes abruptly with "I have a fancy on my tongue," as if he cannot say more. He might be expected, if anything, to tell why he cannot, but, instead, he proclaims his genealogy. He gives the proverb a paradoxical twist, as he does the truth-fancy antithesis. The proverb does not apply to him, since, as the delegate of the Muses, he must speak out.

³⁰For wind-instruments see ὑπὸ λιγυρῶν συρίγγων Hes. *Sc.* 278; σὺν αὐλίσκοισι λιγυφθόγγοις Thgn. 241; λίγειται . . . σύριγγες Call. *Dian.* 242 f.; λιγυροῖς δονάκεσσι Nonnus *D.* 16.306.

³¹While anagrammatism is frequent in the MSS of Pindar, transposition by scribes of metrically equivalent words is not (Douglas Young, "Typical Scribal Errors in the Manuscripts of Pindar," *GRBS* 6 [1965] 255-257).

³²At *P.* 12.25 δονάκων = αὐλῶν 19; see Sch. *P.* 12.45b; cf. κάλαμον, αὐλός *O.* 10.84,94. For δονάκων Hesychius gives καλάμων ἡ αὐλῶν; similarly Suidas and *E.M.* for δονάκες. If the proposed emendation is correct, it may not be a coincidence that the only earlier uses of the δόναξ in musical instruments are in hymns to Arcadian deities: the lyre, *h. Merc.* 47 and the shepherd's pipe, *h. Pan.* 15.

³³With the link between the poet and the victor in *O.* 6 may be compared that in *P.* 12, which was composed for Midas, a citizen of Acragas—again beside a river (2 f.). The aulos with which he won is related to the δόναξ growing in the precinct of Cephisus: the instrument invented by Athena both woos men to the contests and is a trustworthy witness to the chorus (19-27).

³⁴See notes of Fraenkel and Thomson on *A. A.* 36 f.; add Critias B. 5.3 and *PMC* fr. 960.

If he passed directly from fancy to genealogy, he might mean that he is ready and eager to tell something wonderful that is on the tip of his tongue. What to do with the intervening aulos? In an ode in which there is so much that is less than serious and is contrived for the immediate occasion it should be no surprise if the aulos is another instance.³⁵ I would suggest that here again Pindar is playing, now with the ambiguity of γλῶσσα, which was a technical term for the reed-tongue of the aulos (*Thphr. HP* 4.11.4-7). If so, he is blending the anatomical and musical senses of the word: "I have a fancy on my tongue—on the tongue of my aulos—which fancy draws me, with my will, to fair-flowing breaths."

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³⁵Note also the nomen-omen play on Iamus. The ίόπλοκος Evadne (30) names him from the ία (ιώv 55) in which she places him. More ominous are ίω (47), which is a sign of prophecy, and ίμεν (64), which is anticipated by ὠχετ' ίώv (38) and presages many other goings—of Iamus from Arcadia to Olympia, of the Iamids from Greece to Sicily, of Hagesias to the games and from Stymphalus to Syracuse, of Phintis to Hagesias' origin and of Aeneas to Pindar's. Hagesias must be simple indeed if he does not see that Pindar is manipulating the omens. The naming of Iamus could just as well predict a line of physicians, and the honey on which the serpents fed him could have been a sign that he would be a king—as he wished (60; cf. Hes. *Th.* 81-84).



AESCHYLUS *CHOEPHORI* 3A-3B (OR 9A-9B?)

Ἐρμῆ χθόνιε, πατρῶι ἐποπτεύων κράτη,
σωτὴρ γενοῦ μοι σύμμαχός τ' αἴτουμένωι
ῆκω γὰρ ἐς γῆν τίνδε καὶ κατέρχομαι
* * *
τύμβου δ' ἐπ' ὄχθωι τῶιδε κηρύσσω πατρὶ⁵
κλύειν, ἀκοῦσαι
* * *
< > πλόκαμον Ἰνάχῳ θρεπτήριον,
τὸν δεύτερον δὲ τόνδε πενθητήριον
* * *

οὐ γὰρ παρὼν ὄιμωξα σόν, πάτερ, μόρον
οὐδὲ ἔξετεινα χειρ' ἐπ' ἐκφορᾶι νεκροῦ

* * *

10 τί χρῆμα λεύσσω; τίς ποθ' ἥδ' ὅμήγυρις
στείχει γυναικῶν φάρεσιν μελαγχίμοις
πρέπουσα; ποίαι ξυμφορᾶι προσεικάσω; . . . κτλ.

The first nine lines printed in modern editions of the *Choephoroi* are supplied from four separate ancient quotations: 1-3 from Aristophanes' *Frogs* 1126-28; 4-5 from *Frogs* 1172-73 (both of these first retrieved by Canter in 1580); 6-7 from a scholion to Pindar P. 4.82 (145) (Stanley, in 1663); and 8-9 from a scholion to Euripides *Alcestis* 768 (Dindorf, in 1827). In the Mediceus, our sole manuscript of the play (together with its apograph, the Guelferbytanus), the pages containing most of *Agamemnon* and the beginning of *Cho.* have disappeared.¹

There is no way to be sure how much we lack of Orestes' opening speech. It could be anything from five to forty lines.² Most recent scholars have agreed that at least one line must separate each of the four quoted passages, and that probably several intervene between the fourth and the point where M resumes (1.10). Of the various attempts that have been made to restore or compose such lines, if only *exempli gratia*, none has found its way into the body of a printed text. Yet, over a century ago, Friedrich Thiersch and Gottfried Hermann both noticed, apparently quite independently, that another two lines might be restored from *Frogs* 1141-43.³ Hermann, arguing against the then

¹See E. Fraenkel, *Aesch. Agamemnon* 1 (Oxford 1950) 2 for further details. (In quoting Aeschylus' text, I follow D. L. Page's *OCT* (Oxford 1972), except where specified.)

²Most editors and critics have thought that only a few lines are missing; but e.g., F. A. Paley, *The Tragedies of Aesch.*² (London 1861) 457-58, and H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Libation Bearers by Aesch.* (Englewood Cliffs 1970) 9, suggest that there may be as many as twenty or thirty. In view of the notable parallelism of structure between the three plays of the trilogy, we might expect Orestes' speech to have been considerably longer than its present twenty-one lines. (The Watchman of *Ag.* has thirty-nine lines, the Priestess of *Eum.* sixty-three.) On the other hand, all three opening speeches have a sharp break roughly half-way through, as the speaker suddenly becomes aware of an unexpected apparition: so, if Orestes' exclamation, τί χρῆμα λεύσσω; . . . κτλ. (10) was preceded by roughly the same number of lines as follow it (twelve), only very few lines have been lost.

³Fr. Thiersch in a lecture given in 1846, and published in *Abhandl. der philos.-philol. Classe der Königl. Bayerischen Akad.* 5.2 (1849) 25-27; G. Hermann in the second volume (Commentary) of his posthumously published edition of Aesch. (Berlin 1852). For Thiersch's proposal, see further below, n. 6.

prevalent view that 4–5 follow directly on from 1–3, suggested inserting the following three lines between 3 and 4:

τλήηων Ὀρέστης, κρυπτὸν εἰσβαλὼν πόδα
οὐ δὴ βιαίως ἐκ γυναικείας χερός
δόλοις λαθραίοις ούμὸς ὅλλυται πατήρ.

The proposal was ignored by Wilamowitz and Tucker in their influential editions—and, as far as I can see, by almost all their successors.⁴ Yet I think there can be little doubt that these lines belong, in some form, in our printed texts of Aeschylus' play.

The lines occur as ‘Euripides’ is tearing apart the prologue of *Cho.* for its ambiguities and redundancies. He seizes first on the phrase πατρῶν ἐποπτεύων κράτη (*Cho.* 1):

Ευ. οὐκουν Ὀρέστης τοῦτ’ ἐπὶ τῷ τύμβῳ λέγει
τῷ τοῦ πατρὸς τεθνεῶτος; Αἱ. οὐκ ἄλλως λέγω.
Ευ. πότερον οὖν τὸν Ἐριμῆν, ὃς ὁ πατήρ ἀπώλετο
αὐτοῦ βιαίως ἐκ γυναικείας χερός
δόλοις λαθραίοις, ταῦτ’ ἐποπτεύειν’ ἔφη;

Eur. “Doesn’t Orestes say this at the tomb of his dead father?”

Aesch. “I don’t deny it.”

Eur. “So, after his own father perished violently at a woman’s hand, through stealth and trickery, does he say that it was Hermes who ‘presided over’ that?”

(*Frogs* 1139–43)

The words βιαίως . . . λαθραίοις are unmistakably tragic, not comic, in language and metre. ἐκ γυναικείας χερός is an elevated periphrasis for

⁴U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aisch. Orestie II (Das Opfer am Grabe)* (Berlin 1896) and *Aisch. Tragoediae*, ed. maior (Berlin 1914); T. G. Tucker, *Aisch. Cho.* (Cambridge 1901). I find no mention of these lines, nor of Hermann’s or Thiersch’s proposals, in the editions of Sidgwick (Oxford 1902); Mazon (Budé, Paris 1920); Weir Smyth (Loeb Cl. Lib., Cambridge, Mass. 1926); Headlam and Thomson (Cambridge 1938; 2nd ed. Prague 1966); Murray (OCT 1937, 2nd ed. 1955); Groeneboom (Groningen 1949); Lloyd-Jones (n. 2 above); Page (n. 1 above), or Garvie (Oxford 1986); nor in recent criticism of the play. Only Fr. Blass, *Aisch. Choephoren* (Halle 1906) 75–76 and H. J. Rose, *A Commentary On The Surviving Plays of Aesch.*, Verhand. der Konink. Nederl. Akad. van Wetenschappen, afk. Letterkunde, ser. 2, v. 64.2 (Amsterdam 1958) 120–21, consider the possibility: Blass acknowledges that *Frogs* 1141–43 “employs a very Aeschylean-sounding form of expression,” but does not commit himself; Rose concludes, “It is not certain that Ar. is actually quoting, nor, if he is, that the words come from this passage, or even from Aeschylus at all.” I shall argue that both underestimated the weight of the evidence.

ύπὸ γυναικός; the adjectives γυναικεῖος and λαθραῖος are not Aristophanic, but are common in tragedy; and the lack of resolution, or of any other metrical irregularity, in the two successive trimeters (1142-43) is distinctly unusual for comic dialogue. So the lines must be either tragic parody or direct quotation. Since parody would be pointless in this context, and the lines in any case contain nothing inherently amusing or absurd, quotation is far more likely.

It would anyway suit "Euripides'" argument best if he can use Aeschylus' own words to convict him of incoherence; and the similarities of language to other passages in the *Oresteia* further confirm that the source of the quotation must indeed be *Cho.* itself (*Cho.* 549 θανεῖν βιαίως; *Ag.* 1495-96 δολίωι μόρῳ δαμεὶς ἐκ χερὸς . . . ; *Cho.* 556-57 δόλωι . . . δόλωι, 888 δόλοις ὀλούμεθα; *Ag.* 1230 ἄτης λαθραίου; *Cho.* 626-30 γυναικοβούλους . . . γυναικείαν . . . , cf. *Ag.* 11, 594, *Cho.* 90, 304, etc.).⁵ And in how many other tragedies could someone refer to a man stealthily and violently murdered by a woman's hand? Short of an explicit statement by Aristophanes or a scholiast, we could hardly wish for clearer evidence.

If this is accepted, three questions then immediately present themselves: (1) How much of 1141-43 is quotation, how much paraphrase? (2) Where did the lines come, in relation to our four other preserved quotations? (3) What does the addition of these lines add to our understanding of Orestes' speech and of the play as a whole?

(1) Only the six words, βιαίως ἐκ γυναικείας χερὸς δόλοις λαθραίοις, are likely to be direct quotation. The introductory ὡς ὁ πατήρ ἀπώλετο αὐτοῦ looks like Aristophanes' paraphrase of the context (ὁ and αὐτοῦ would obviously be out of place in Orestes' mouth), though πατήρ and ἀπώλετο might easily have occurred close by, as Hermann conjectured (cf. *Cho.* 96-7). Both words are equally at home in tragedy and comedy.

(2) Hermann's insertion of the lines between our present 3 and 4 may be correct.⁶ The Aristophanic context perhaps supports it, since "Euripides" mentions these lines after the quotation of 1-3 and before asking for ἔτερον (sc. ἵαμβεῖον, 1170), i.e., 4-5. Certainly the mention of δόλοις λαθραίοις would give a special point to Orestes' appeal to

⁵See further n. 7 below. Behind all these passages, of course, lie the numerous Homeric accounts of Agamemnon's death, especially *Od.* 11.437-39 . . . , and 4.92 . . .

⁶But his stopgap supplement is neither elegant nor appropriate: οὐδή and the repetition πατήρ, πατρί at successive line-ends, are clumsy; and we need a more impressive introduction of Agamemnon's name and status. In this respect, at least, Thiersch's

Hermes, who is himself Δόλιος,⁷ and can therefore be expected to be an effective “ally” (2) in an act of retaliatory deception (cf. *Cho.* 555–56).

Another possible place for the lines would be shortly after line 9 (not immediately after, for the repetition of χεῖρα, χερός would be clumsy): “I was not there at your funeral, as you were carried out (unwept, dishonoured, a king shamefully and) treacherously slain by a woman.” For this we could compare *Ag.* 1489–96 = 1513–20:

[*Chorus*] ίώ ίώ βασιλεῦ βασιλεῦ,
πῶς σε δακρύσω;
... κεῖσαι δ'... ἀσεβεῖ θανάτῳ βίον ἐκπινέων,
... δολίῳ μόρῳ δαμείς
ἐκ χερὸς ἀμφιτόμῳ βελέμνῳ.

and *Cho.* 444–45:

[*Electra*] λέγεις πατρῶιν μόρον ἐγὼ δ' ἀπεστάτουν
ἀτιμος, οὐδὲν ἀξία. . . .

Here the reference to δόλοις λάθραιοις, with its implicit reminder of Hermes in the opening lines, would amount to a Ring Composition, rounding off the first half of the speech (cf. *Ag.* 1 ~ 20f, *Eum.* 1 ~ 20); it might be followed by a prayer to him along the lines of the remark about Apollo at *Cho.* 556–59; for Hermes acts in close conjunction with Apollo throughout (cf. *Eum.* 89–93).⁸

(3) The addition of these six words can hardly be said to transform our interpretation of the opening of the play. But such an early

proposal was more suitable (though hardly convincing in its wholesale importation of phrases from Soph. *El.* 1ff and Eur. *El.* 89), inserting after 1.3 the following:

ὅ τοῦ στρατηγήσαντος ἐν Τροίᾳ ποτὲ
Ἄγαμέμνονος παῖς, σὺν θεῶν τύχῃ φόνον
πατρὸς φονεῦσι κρύβδα θωρήσσων, ἐπεὶ
καύτὸς βιαίως ἐκ γυναικείας χερὸς
δόλοις λαθραιοῖς δυσκλεής τ' ἀπώλετο.

⁷Δόλιος is his cult title at Pellene, in Achaea (Paus. 7.27.1); and cf. *Cho.* 726–27; Soph. *El.* 1391–97 (also 37, 123–26, Eur. *El.* 154–55, 166). On the importance of Hermes in *Cho.*, see further A. F. Garvie *BICS* 17 (1970) 79–91, esp. 85, 88. R. P. Winnington-Ingram *Studies in Aesch.* (Cambridge 1983) App. H, 222, suggests possibly taking *Cho.* 946–47 ἔμολε δ' ὡι μέλει κρυπταδίου μάχας δολιόφρων ποινά (with M's ὡι, rather than Auratus' ὄι, accepted by Page) as referring again to Hermes.

⁸So Garvie (n. 7 above), who points out too the significance of the roles—and names—of Strophius and Pylades for Orestes' connection with Hermes, god of twists and doorways; see too the note on *Cho.* 1 in his edition of the play (n. 4 above) 48–49.

and emphatic mention of stealth and trickery does help to establish Orestes' own role from the start as one of similar cunning and deceit: his plan of 554ff has already been foreshadowed, and his relationship to Hermes clearly fixed in our minds. Conversely, the explicit mention of a woman's murderous act, in language that is echoed by Electra in the next scene (141 χεῖρά τ' εὐσεβεστέραν), shows that we should not exaggerate the degree to which Orestes avoids reference to his mother during the first half of the play. His opening lines have already vividly reminded us of the final scenes of *Agamemnon*, and have assured us of his own firm commitment to a stealthy, treacherous, and violent revenge.

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THE "RECENT" PROMINENCE OF THEMISTOCLES

Readers of Herodotus are first introduced to Themistocles at 7.143: the Athenians are puzzling over the meaning of the "wooden wall" in the second response from the Delphic oracle, and Themistocles supported those who thought it meant the fleet and offered his own interpretation of the reference to Salamis. He is described as ἐς πρώτους νεωστὶ παριόν, which appears to be at variance with the evidence of Dionysius of Halicarnassus that he was archon in 493/92 B.C.¹ The reasons scholars have adduced for this admittedly contrived introduction have varied: it is a distortion of the literal truth "to give Themistocles the impact of a *deus ex machina*";² it is intended as a slur;³ the whole

¹ *Ant. Rom.* 6.34; cf. Frank J. Frost, "Themistocles" Place in Athenian Politics," *CSCA* 1 (1968) 105–24, esp. pp. 114–15; id., *Plutarch's Themistocles* (Princeton 1980) 5, n. 7; A. J. Podelecki, *The Life of Themistocles* (Montreal 1975) 68; M. B. Wallace, *Phoenix*, 28 (1974) 36, n. 33.

² John Hart, *Herodotus and Greek History* (London 1982) 142.

³ Podelecki, op. cit., 69.

introduction has Homeric overtones,⁴ or simply “the expression cannot be pressed.”⁵ I have myself suggested that it may be a backhanded reference to the ostracism of Themistocles’ rival, Aristides, which brought him firmly into the circle of the political elite in Athens.⁶

There is, however, a parallel in the *Histories* which has been generally overlooked. When Mardonius is sent to Ionia in 492 B.C. to take charge of the Persian offensive, he is described as having recently married the daughter of Darius, Artozostra.⁷ This is Mardonius’ introduction into the *Histories*, and there is implicit the suggestion that Mardonius’ rise to prominence had something to do with his recent royal marriage. How recent? The unwary reader might assume that the nuptials took place a few months—a year, perhaps—before Mardonius took up his role in the theme of Herodotus’ *Histories*: the struggle between Greece and Persia. Not so. Mardonius’ wife, identified securely as the king’s daughter, though the name Artozostra does not appear, turns up in one of the Persian Fortification Tablets, dated to Darius’ twenty-third year (499 B.C.).⁸ The recent marriage had taken place at the very least, seven years before Mardonius’ appointment to command in 492 B.C.

I suggest there is a parallel. Herodotus may have lacked a secure date for Mardonius’ marriage, but he connected his appointment in 492 B.C. with a recent rise to prominence in the Persian court. In fact, his rise was probably a process that had taken place over a number of years. As far as Themistocles was concerned, it can be argued that Herodotus might have found a date for his archonship had he investigated, but there is no clear evidence that he did. He connected Themistocles’ crucial role in the debate on the “Wooden Wall Oracle” with a recent rise to prominence, and at 7.144, he explains that before the debate on the oracle, there had been another debate where Themistocles’ δνώμη ἡρίστευσε. Aristides is not mentioned here, but if we wish to press the meaning of “recent” and make it refer to an event in the recent past, then we must point to the defeat of Themistocles’ political rival in the naval debate. But in the cases both of Mardonius and of Themistocles, in Herodotus’ vision of history these men achieve prominence just

⁴C. Fornara, *Herodotus: An Interpretative Essay* (Oxford 1971) 68.

⁵W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, II (Oxford 1957) 185.

⁶*Herodotus* (Boston 1982) 108.

⁷Hdt. 6.43.1.

⁸PFa5: Richard T. Hallock, “Selected Fortification Texts,” *Cahiers de la D.A.F.I.*, 8 (1978) 109–36.

before they are introduced into the chain of events that make up the theme of the *Histories*, where they both play leading roles. Their introduction into the *Histories* is dramatic, but as far as chronology is concerned, How and Wells was right: the word *νεωστί* cannot be pressed.

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αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα, *PHAEDO* 74C1: A PHILOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

There has been a good deal of discussion in the philosophical literature of the argument concerning equality at *Phaedo* 74, and in particular of the phrase αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα at 74c1. The questions are: 1) To what does it refer? 2) Why is it plural? I shall first sketch the history of the debate and then I shall offer some observations in support of what has been termed “the standard interpretation” of αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα.

In the context of a discussion of ἀνάμνησις Socrates is concerned with establishing a distinction between Forms and their instantiations. He takes equality as a test case,¹ first asking Simmias to agree that there is a Form of Equal distinct from the set of its instantiations and then advancing an argument (consisting of two premises in question form and a conclusion) which purports to prove this claim (74a8-c5):

Σκόπει δή, ή δ' ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἵσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον. φῶμέν τι εἶναι ή μηδέν; Φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. "Η καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ δὲ ἔστιν; Πάνυ γε, ή δ' ὅς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν τοῦ δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ή ξύλα ή λίθους ή ἄλλα ἄπτα ἴδοντες ἵσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἔτερον δὲν τούτων; ή οὐχ ἔτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆδε. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἵσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίστε ταῦτα δύντα τῷ μὲν ἵσα φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἀνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ή ή ἵστης ἀνιστης; Οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὡς Σώκρατες. Οὐ ταῦτὸν ἄρα ἔστιν, ή δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἵσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον.

¹That equality is only a test case is abundantly clear from 75c7ff.

"Then consider whether this is the case. We say, don't we, that there is something *equal*—I don't mean a log to a log, or a stone to a stone, or anything else of that sort, but some further thing beyond all those, the equal itself: are we to say that there *is* something or nothing?"

"We most certainly are to say that there *is*," said Simmias; 'unquestionably!'

'And do we know *what it is?*'

'Certainly.'

'Where did we get the knowledge of it? Wasn't it from the things we were just mentioning: on seeing logs or stones or other equal things, wasn't it from these that we thought of that object, it being different from them? Or doesn't it seem different to you? Look at it this way: *don't equal stones and logs, the very same ones, sometimes seem equal to one, but not to another?*'

'Yes, certainly.'

'But now, did the equals themselves ever seem to you unequal, or equality inequality?'

'Never yet, Socrates.'

'Then those equals, and the equal itself, are not the same.'"

(Gallop's translation; my emphasis)

The controversy regarding *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* centers around two major lines of interpretation, one ("the standard interpretation") taking this expression to refer to the Form of Equal, the other taking it to refer not to the Form but either to a class of perfect equals, whether (specifically) mathematical equals or the class of (unspecified) equal things, or to the relations exemplified by perfectly equal things, whether existent or not.²

There are difficulties with both interpretations. The first is subject to the objection that it requires "explanation how, contrary to appearances, the plural 'αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα' is a referring expression for the individual form 'αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον'"³ (a difficulty all the more keenly felt because the second clause of the question in which *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* occurs—which on the standard interpretation is merely a paraphrase of the first—has as its subject the *singular* noun *ἴσότης*). Opponents of this view claim that no adequate explanation is possible or at least that none has yet been advanced. Proponents have made a number of attempts to ac-

²Already in antiquity Olympiodoros had worried about the plural, taking *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* to refer to the several thoughts or mental representations of the Form in various persons' minds (Olymp. 159.11.12-15), a view that Archer-Hind records as having been "adopted by most commentators."

³Wedin 194.

count for the plural form but as yet no suggestion has been widely accepted, even among those sympathetic to the view.

That $\alpha\gamma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ refers to the Form of Equal was long ago suggested by Heindorf and Archer-Hind, who explain the plural as resulting from the inherently plural reference of "equal."⁴ Burnet, on the other hand, in his 1911 edition of the *Phaedo*, gives us, as Vlastos says, "the cheering remark"⁵ that "there is no difficulty about the plural"; he takes $\alpha\gamma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ to refer to "things that are 'just equal'" and cites Euclid, thereby providing the impetus for the "mathematical equals" interpretation, which was subsequently adopted by Bluck and Hackforth in their respective editions of the dialogue (both published in 1955). Variations on this view had been espoused in the interim by Cornford and Ross.⁶ Against the "mathematical equals" interpretation, it is argued that "equals of that sort would be irrelevant to the conclusion that sensible equals differ from the *Form Equal*, which is what the argument purports to prove."⁷

In the mid-fifties, the interpretation of $\alpha\gamma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ as a Form-designator was reaffirmed by Geach and Vlastos. In his "Third Man" paper, Geach, inspired, as he says, by Wittgenstein, proposed a view of the Forms as *standards*, a concept which he felt would account for, among other things, Plato's apparently indifferent use of singular and plural grammatical forms to refer to certain Forms, e.g., $\tau\alpha\pi\omega\lambda\alpha$ and $\pi\lambda\eta\theta\omega\zeta$ (*Parm.* 129b6-7, d5-8), $\alpha\gamma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ and $\delta\mu\omega\dot{\alpha}\tau\eta\zeta$ (*Parm.* 129a1, 4, b1), $\alpha\gamma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$, $\alpha\gamma\tau\omega\tau\omega\tau\alpha$ and $\iota\sigma\dot{\alpha}\tau\eta\zeta$ (*Phaedo* 74a11-12, c1, 4-5). "This way of speaking [Geach says] can be explained if we take seriously the conception of the Form as a standard. The Imperial

⁴Archer-Hind quotes with approval Heindorf's judgment on $\alpha\gamma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ and $\alpha\gamma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ (*Parm.* 129b): "multitudinis numerus adhiberi in his potuit, quoniam aequalitatis vel similitudinis notio non unum continet, sed ad duo certe refertur," and adds his own comment: "When Plato asks 'does the idea of equality seem equal or unequal?' the implied comparison compels him perforce to use the plural; not that he thinks there are more ideas of equality than one, but because to ask whether one thing is equal or unequal is sheer nonsense." Archer-Hind feels however that by the time of the *Parmenides* Plato "had got rid of these unfortunate ideas of relations" and that the plural form $\alpha\gamma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ may indeed be used there with "the intention of pointing to the contradiction which such ideas involve."

⁵Vlastos 287, n. 2.

⁶Cornford 71, 75; Ross 25 (cf. 22, but cf. also 60). According to Archer-Hind Doederlein had taken $\alpha\gamma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ to refer to "perfectly equal objects, such as can be conceived but do not exist in nature."

⁷Gallop 123; cf. Archer-Hind 37.

Standard Equality, or Imperial Standard Equals, would naturally consist of a pair of absolutely equal things.”⁸

Vlastos, having at first embraced Geach's view (albeit with specified reservations) as “the most ingenious and plausible explanation of this puzzling expression that has yet been offered,”⁹ later rejects it, preferring to explain the plural as an instance of the Greek “use of the plural form of the (neuter) adjective with the article to signify the corresponding abstract—i.e., as roughly equivalent to: (a) the abstract noun and (b) the same adjectival form in the singular.”¹⁰ In support of his suggestion, Vlastos cites Plato's use of alternating singular and plural neuter forms of δίκαιος and ἀδίκος at *Gorgias* 454e–455a and plural forms of δίκαιος, καλός and ἀγαθός at *Rep.* 520c5–6 and 538c6–7.

Owen dismisses Vlastos' suggestion with the remark that the plural forms adduced in support “are naturally explained as pointing to such questions as ‘What things are beautiful?’”¹¹ And, with the observation that previous interpretations of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα “have hardly measured up to that remarkable plural,”¹² Owen offers his own suggestion, which amounts to a kind of “attraction” to the (τὰ) ἴσα (sensible equals) with which the Form is contrasted: Plato, he says, “takes the predicate ‘equal’ out of context in whatever form it has just assumed, singular or plural. After introducing it in the singular, he goes on to speak of ‘stones and sticks which appear equal to one but not to another’ . . . and at once picks it out in its *plural* form. . . . He is interested, not in the different forms in which the predicate may appear, but in that single Idea which we wittingly or unwittingly mention in calling one stick ‘equal’ to another or a pair of sticks ‘equal’ each to each.”¹³

Despite the efforts of Rist and others, the situation had not advanced significantly when Gallop's edition of the *Phaedo* appeared in 1975.¹⁴ On this passage in general and αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα in particular Gallop

⁸Geach 269. But we might ask why not a *dual* form for the “Imperial Standard Equals.”

⁹Vlastos 287.

¹⁰Vlastos 289; cf. 291 Additional Note.

¹¹Owen 114, n. 2.

¹²Owen 114.

¹³Owen 115.

¹⁴Proponents of the Form-designating role of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα include—in addition to Geach, Vlastos and Owen—Loriaux, Tarrant, Mills, Verdenius, Crombie, Haynes, Rist, Brentlinger, Dorter, Ackrill and Gallop. However, their explanations of the plural form (when, that is, an explanation is attempted) and their interpretations of the passage in general often show considerable variety.

comments "the argument itself is much vexed, and has become a notorious philosophical crux. . . . Plato's use of the unusual plural, 'the equals themselves', has been variously interpreted."¹⁵ He mentions the suggestions of Burnet, Bluck,¹⁶ Geach and Owen (the last of which he favours) and then passes over the problem with the remark that "In any case, whatever the explanation of the plural may be, there need be no shift of subject in the two halves of Socrates' question at 74c1-2. When he adds the second half, 'or (did) equality (ever seem to you to be) inequality?', he is asking a question about the same entity as in the first half, namely the Form of Equality."¹⁷

Subsequent interpretations by Wedin and Matthen¹⁸ have again rejected the Form-designating role of the plural phrase and have at the same time attempted to circumvent certain objections directed against the "mathematical equals" interpretation.

It is clear, then, that the problem posed by *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* is its plural form. And the proposed solutions are basically two: 1) Take the phrase as perfectly equivalent to a singular on contextual grounds and attempt an *apologia* for the plural form; 2) Take the phrase as a decided plural and propose some *plural* referent for it.

The suggestion of this paper is that both approaches are misguided—although the first interpretation is, despite its want of an adequate explanation of the plural, nonetheless correct. Its adherents have seen intuitively what I hope to support on philological grounds, namely, that the plural phrase (*αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα*) may indeed refer to the property equality and therefore to the Form of Equality; that it is the functional equivalent of the singular adjectival phrase (*αὐτὸν τὸ ἴσον*) and of the singular abstract noun *ἴσοτης*. The historical explanation for this equivalence we will consider shortly. But first let us look at some examples from Greek literature of the use of plural forms of the neuter adjective and pronoun.

As Vlastos saw, Greek usage admits plural as well as singular forms of the neuter adjective with generic/abstract reference.¹⁹ This use of the

¹⁵Gallop 121, 123.

¹⁶In *Phronesis* (1959) 5-11 Bluck suggests that *αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα* may refer to "immanent characters" or "Form-copies," as he calls them.

¹⁷Gallop, 124.

¹⁸I am indebted to Professor Matthen for a pre-publication copy of his paper.

¹⁹Rosenmeyer 99 remarks, on *Gorg.* 497e, "the apparent equivalence of the neuter plural adjective, ἀγαθά, and the abstract noun, κάλλος"; cf. 100, "τὰ ἀγαθά and τὸ ἀγαθόν are near-equivalent terms for the group or field or class of which ὁ ἀγαθός is a concrete member or representative or participant."

plural neuter adjective is a fact of Greek usage; it is not to be explained away, with Owen, by an appeal to a (determinate) plural referent in each instance (even if only a preceding one exercising attraction). The generic plural—differing in no respect from the generic singular—is well illustrated in Heraklitos. Fr. 126, for example, juxtaposes plural and singular in successive clauses, both forms clearly having generic/abstract reference:²⁰

τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὸν ψύχεται, ὑγρὸν²¹ αὐαίνεται, καρφαλέον νοτίζεται.

“What is cold warms, what is warm cools, what is moist dries, what is parched becomes wet.”

Singular and plural forms are also juxtaposed in Heraklitos, fr. 10:

συλλάψιες δόλα καὶ οὐχ δόλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνάδον διάδον· ἐκ πάντων ἔν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα.

“συλλάψιες²² What is whole and not whole, what is brought together and brought apart, what is in tune and out of tune: out of everything one and out of one everything.”

Hesiod, too, uses singular and plural forms of the generic/abstract adjective with apparent indifference, e.g., *WD* 216f.:²³ “The road taken to bypass on the other side is superior to reach what is just (τὰ δίκαια)”; 225ff.: “They who to strangers and to demos-dwellers give justices that are straight and do not at all step across out of what is just (δικαίου)”; 280f.: “If it be a man’s wish to declare-in-assembly what is just (τὰ δίκαια), discerning what it is, on him prosperity does wide-viewing Zeus endow.”²⁴

²⁰Snell (1926) 356ff. argued that the neuter adjectives here are not to be taken as denoting abstract qualities; he emphasized rather the vital nature of the processes referred to. His view has been very influential and seems in the main correct. However, it would perhaps be preferable not to draw too sharp a distinction between generic and abstract force but to say rather that the early generic use of the adjective *incorporates* reference to the property insofar as it was susceptible at this stage of being abstracted from its manifestations. See below on τὰ δίκαια, p. 11, and note 43.

²¹Kirk restores ὑγρὸν. (Hermann, in his edition of Tzetzes, *Scholia ad Exeg. in Iliadem*, 126, indicates a lacuna of four letters in the manuscript.) The plural forms ύγρά and θερμά occur in the fifth pseudo-Heraklitean letter.

²²I unabashedly evade the problem of συλλάψιες: see Kirk 170ff. for discussion, and see note 25 below.

²³I use a modified version of the translation by Havelock (196, 201, 212).

²⁴Snell (1953) would apparently deny generic/abstract force not only to the plural neuter adjective but also to the singular adjective *without* the article: see his comments on Hesiod’s usage, 228–29 (and cf. 229, n. 4 [319], on Heraklitos). He seems to feel that

Remarkably enough, Greek usage even permits singular and plural forms of the neuter adjective to be predicated of the *same* subject,²⁵ e.g., *Tyrtaios* 7.26: to see the naked body of an old man slain in battle, clutching his bloody genitals as he gasps out his life in the dust, is αἰσχρὰ καὶ νεμεσητόν, "a thing of shame and a reproach."²⁶

Indeed, as Johannes Schmidt long ago observed,²⁷ it is not at all uncommon to find, from Homer on, neuter plural forms in apposition to or predicated of a subject in the singular, e.g.,:

χρυσὸν Ἀλεξάνδροι δεδεγμένος, ἀγλαὰ δῶρα 'in hope of receiving gold from Alexander, glorious gift(s),' *Il.* 11.124.

ὅρχος / χρύσεος ἦν, κλυτὰ ἔργα περιφρονος 'Ηφαίστοιο 'a row of vines in gold, splendid work(s) of clever Hephaistos,' *Hes. Sc.* 297.

Πάτροκλος ὃς σου πατρὸς ἦν τὰ φίλτατα 'Patroklos, who was your father's best beloved,' *Soph. Phil.* 434.

Αἰσχίνης ὁ Νόθωνος, ἐών τῶν Ἐρετριέων τὰ πρῶτα 'Aeschines, the son of Nothon, being the foremost man among the Eretrians,' *Hdt.* 6.100.

ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος, παιδικά ποτε ὕν αὐτοῦ καὶ πιστότατος ἐκείνω 'a man of Argilus, once a favourite of his and most loyal to him,' *Thuc.* 1.132.6.

We should also note such commonly used plural forms with singular reference as τὰ ἀληθῆ 'the truth' and τὰ δεξιά 'the right.' These forms are in fact instances of the substantivized adjective used with ge-

generic/abstract force is entirely dependent on the article: 227-28, "If the definite article had not permitted the forming of these 'abstractions' as we call them [τὸ ὕδωρ, τὸ ψυχρόν, τὸ νοεῖν] it would have been impossible to develop an abstract concept from an adjective or a verb. . . ." But it was always possible (if not popular: see p. 394 below) to "develop an abstract concept from an adjective" by coining an abstract noun, e.g., δικαιότης (cf. ποιότης), and in the verb this function was filled by the infinitive even before it became articular (although the article allowed for its declension in the oblique cases). Why, then, deny this role to the pre-articular adjective? On the view advanced here, it is not so much the generic/abstract force of the adjective which was a late development but rather the use of the article to indicate this force. (And the article may be omitted in "articular" constructions even in Plato: cf. *Euthyphro* 7d1-2 τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, and Burnet's comment: "Observe the characteristic avoidance of formal symmetry in the use of the article." And at *Euthy.* 5d10 we find an "articular" infinitive (ἐπεξέιναι) *without* the article.)

²⁵On Snell's interpretation of Heraklitos fr. 10 (1926) there would be a similar syntactical disagreement in the various terms predicated of συλλάψιες: see Kirk, 176.

²⁶Dover 191 points out that *Tyrtaios* could easily have avoided the syntactical disagreement between singular and plural neuter by simply observing the initial digamma latent in ἴδειν.

²⁷Schmidt 22-23.

neric as opposed to particular reference—a point that may be obscured by their very familiarity.

Riddell points out that Plato's tendency to use plural forms with singular reference "is observable in the case of adjectives which admit of it,"²⁸ by which he apparently means verbal adjectives used impersonally, e.g., *Tim.* 69a οὐ δύναται [ἐστι] 'it is not possible', and he refers to Herodotos and Homer for the same usage. Thucydides, too, makes frequent use of this construction, e.g., ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμητέα εἶναι 'they voted that it was necessary to make war', 1.88; ἀδύνατα ἦν 'it was impossible', 4.1.

Plural forms with singular reference are very common in the Greek pronouns; Plato's use of ταῦτα, αὐτά, ἔτερα, ἀμφότερα, πότερα, etc., is documented by Riddell,²⁹ who observes that "ταῦτα is so constantly thus used, that it is only remarkable in particular juxtapositions" and he cites, among other examples, *Alcib.* I 109c πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα, τὸ δίκαιον,³⁰ τοὺς λόγους ποιήσει; "about this then, namely, what is just, you will make speeches?"; *Symp.* 198b οὐχ οἰός τ' ἔσσομαι οὐδὲ ἐγγὺς τούτων 'I will not be able—nowhere near able—[to speak so eloquently]',³¹ and *Phaedo* 62d τάχ' ἀν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου '[A foolish man] might perhaps think this, that he ought to run away from his master.'

This apparently anomalous use of plural forms with singular reference is explained by the Indo-European origin of the neuter "plural" as a singular (or rather, non-countable) abstract/mass noun, marked by a suffix in *-ā (*-eH₂), identical with the classical Indo-European feminine in *-ā.³² (It is of course not surprising to find both abstract nouns

²⁸Riddell 43.

²⁹Riddell 41–43. Cf. Schwyzer/Debrunner 44.

³⁰Burnet follows Nürnberger in bracketing τὸ δίκαιον.

³¹Riddell notes that here τούτων = τοῦ οἰός τ' εἶναι.

³²As demonstrated by Johannes Schmidt in 1889. The term traditionally used by linguists, from Schmidt on, to characterize the original category, namely, "abstract-collective," is potentially misleading. It must be emphasized that "collective" is here used in a broad sense to include not only nouns denoting determinate collections of individuals but also mass nouns. Collectives proper, in English and indeed in Greek are ambivalent between singular and plural with respect to verbal concord (e.g., τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐν αἰτίᾳ ἔχοντες τὸν Ἀγιν ἀνεχώρουν, Thuc. 5.60). Mass nouns, on the other hand, cannot normally be pluralized. (Cf. Jespersen 198–200.) Nor was the neuter in *-ā pluralized in Indo-European; it functioned, that is, as a mass noun rather than as a collective proper. Cf. Watkins 368, "Das Neutrum war ursprünglich nicht zählbar und der grammatischen Kategorie des Numerus gegenüber indifferent."

denoting properties and concrete mass nouns marked by a single suffix since the two types have obvious semantic affinities in that they both have generic as opposed to particular reference. And consequently they show a similar semantic shift when pluralized; compare, for example, English "bronze"/"bronzes" [material/objects] and Greek δίκη/δίκαι [property/instances].³³

In late Proto-Indo-European this original category of abstract/mass noun split into two categories, yielding ultimately the abstract feminine noun in **-ā* (the Greek type δίκη) and the neuter plural in **-ā*.³⁴ However, the neuter "plural" was never in fact pluralized in Indo-European;³⁵ it continued to function as a (non-countable) mass noun with singular verbal concord into the historical dialects, as attested in Hittite, Palaic, Vedic, Gatha-Avestan and Greek.³⁶ Indeed it is in our earliest Indo-Iranian texts and in the Greek dialects that the process of reinterpretation of the old mass noun as a true plural may be seen in progress.³⁷ Nevertheless, the process of reinterpretation is here *in progress* only; the neuter in *-ā*³⁸ may still function semantically and syntactically as a mass noun, e.g., *RV* 1.63.9 *dkāri ta indra gótamēbhīr bráhmāny óktā* 'prayers have been made by Gotamas, O Indra, addressed to thee'; *Il.* 10.252 ḍóstṛa δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε 'and already the stars have moved on'.³⁹

³³Cf. Rosenmeyer 92–93, discussing Jespersen's "nexus-substantives," which "do duty now as a mass-word, and now as a thing-word."

³⁴The distinction, however, was by no means absolute; considerable confusion between the two categories may be seen in Greek (e.g., ἡνία, οἰκία, Homeric neuter plurals, post-Homeric feminine singulars) and in Vedic (e.g., *táñā*, neuter plural *RV* 9.62.2, feminine singular *RV* 3.25.1).

³⁵See note 32 above.

³⁶Moreover, as Watkins has shown (365), the archaic system of masculine (or common gender) singular and plural versus neuter mass noun in *-ā* may be seen in e.g., Hittite *šuppala* 'animal', *suppale*, *šuppala*; *wašpas* 'article of clothing', *wašpē*, *wašpa*. He compares Latin *locus* 'place', *loci* 'single places', *loca* 'region, ground' and Greek μηρός 'thigh(-bone)', μηροί, μηρα.

³⁷Among the Greek dialects Attic was most conservative in retaining singular verbal concord, whence the term "Attic syntax" sometimes used of this phenomenon.

³⁸Greek *-a* probably represents a sandhi variant of IE **-ā*; cf. Burrow 238.

³⁹The objection might be made that "prayers" and "stars" are not mass nouns with non-countable reference. Neither is "leaves" but "foliage" is; and yet "leaves" and "foliage" may be used with exactly the same reference. It is a question of *perception*: the perception of the speakers who use the word. Thus English "grapes" is a count noun whereas Italian "uva" is a mass noun. English "prayers" and "stars" are indeed count nouns; but Vedic *bráhmāni* and Homeric ḍóstṛa are mass nouns.

Generic/abstract force, then, is not only demonstrable for the Greek neuter in *-a*; it is in fact the primary function of the category, which was in its origins a *generic* term. The form subsequently took on the additional function of designating two or more (or three or more, allowing for a dual form) particular instances or individuals of the genus. But the generic force of the neuter in *-a* remained primary well into historical times, as evidenced by its mass noun function and attendant singular verbal concord observable in Anatolian, Indo-Iranian and Greek. (The neuter singular in *-ov* doubtless took over generic force from its association with the generic *-a* form, eventually ousting the latter in this function, a process that may be seen at work from Hesiod and Heraklitos down to Plato.)⁴⁰

In (Attic) Greek, then, the semantically unmarked use of the neuter in *-a* is generic; the semantically marked use is particular (and in this function a plural verb is normally used). As, for example, we use English "timber" primarily in a generic sense—we may also say "a timber" or "three timbers" but this particular (as opposed to generic) use is secondary and semantically marked,⁴¹ likewise, Greek *τὰ ζῶα τρέχει*, in the absence of semantic marking, means, as Schmidt puts it, "animals run, or rather, the living or what lives (das lebendige oder, was lebt) runs."⁴²

The Greek neuter substantivized adjective in *-a* thus denotes the "stuff," as it were, that carries the property referred to by the adjective—and thereby the property itself, as manifested in its instantiations. *τὰ δίκαια*, that is, refers to "what is just," "that which is just," with the generic reference of these phrases. And this "what is just" in (archaic) Greek thought comprises also the property "justice" insofar as the property was susceptible of being abstracted from its manifestations.⁴³ Simi-

⁴⁰I hope to discuss the development of the neuter singular elsewhere.

⁴¹Indeed, English "timber" is a remarkably exact parallel to Greek *ξύλα*, which always retained its mass noun force (although in classical Greek it was secondarily countable), while the singular *ξύλον* had only specialized uses, e.g., "a ship's mast," "a race-course turning-post," etc.

⁴²Schmidt 10n1 (11). Similarly, Greek plant names in *-a* (as in the ancient Flower song *Ποῦ μοι τὰ ρόδα; ποῦ μοι τὰ ἵα; ποῦ μοι τὰ καλὰ σέλινα; . . .*, Ath. 14.629e) are not plurals but mass nouns. Compare English "parsley, sage, rosemary and thyme."

⁴³See Havelock *passim*, especially 217 and 233ff. Havelock (217) observes that Hesiod's personification of *δίκη* as a goddess is as close as he comes to "the separation of justice as idea from the activity which achieves it." Cf. Rosenmeyer 92: "The Good, or the Just, is a kind of doing, an activity. The Good, and the good deed, are near-identical concepts"; and 91, on *Charmides* 169e: "Plato does not . . . distinguish sharply between

larly, in early Greek, the abstract noun in *-η* (ᾳ) does not normally refer to the property as separated from its instances but rather as instantiated.⁴⁴

Abstract nouns in *-της*, *-συνη*, etc., which, in contrast to abstracts in *-η*, do indeed typically denote the property as distinct from its instantiations, are rare in early Greek; they proliferate only with the spread of philosophy and science.⁴⁵ And even in this period the ordinary language continued to prefer the generic adjective in which the property was bound up with its manifestations. Thus when Socrates asks, again and again, "What is *τὸ δίκαιον*?" "What is *τὸ καλόν*?", etc., and is offered examples in reply, his respondents are simply drawing upon the categories of traditional Greek thought. The effort required on the part of Socrates—and Plato—to separate out the property from its instances (or types) testifies to the novelty of such an enterprise.⁴⁶

the sum total of all conceivable knowers-having-knowledge ("collective") and the act of all knowers as distinct from their persons ("abstraction")."

⁴⁴See the previous note. And cf. Rosenmeyer 93–94 on the absence of the precise distinctions of modern logic and grammar in Plato's use of mass-words to embrace "both entity and group . . . both concrete act and abstraction."

⁴⁵See Buck/Petersen 464ff. for nouns in *-της*, *-τητος*: "The suffix forms secondary abstracts denoting an attribute or a condition, largely involving the conscious abstraction of qualities. . . . of almost 700 words with the suffix only 9 are Homeric. Its use naturally spreads with the growth of abstract thought, it is an instrument of philosophy, science, and theology. Most words in *-τητ-* have a frigid and intellectual flavor, avoided alike by poets and everyday speech. Thus there are 46 first occurrences in Hippocrates and his school, 38 in Plato, 56 in Aristotle, but only 9 in Herodotus, 10 in all the orators." (See also Mignot.) For *-συνη* see Buck/Petersen 289 and 294–96. (However, as Rosenmeyer has shown, even such terms as these by no means always function as mere abstractions in Plato's usage.)

⁴⁶For an explicit statement of the novelty of this effort, cf. *Parm.* 130b, Parmenides to Socrates: "Tell me, did you invent this distinction yourself, which separates abstract ideas from the things which partake of them? And do you think there is such a thing as abstract likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and abstract one and many, and the other abstractions of which you heard Zeno speaking just now?" 'Yes, I do,' said Socrates." (Loeb translation). Nehamas has an interesting discussion of the difficulty Socrates encounters in this effort, which rejects the common view that Socrates' interlocutors are simply confusing universals and particulars, due to an inability to recognize (or comprehend the conception of) a universal. On Nehamas' reading, Socrates' interlocutors typically refer not to *particular* F's but to *types* of F, *ways of being* F; their difficulty is in isolating the *uniqueness* which Socrates requires in his definition of a universal. Cf. Rosenmeyer 97: "In Plato's dialogues, nobody ever supposes that ideas, i.e., entities signified by mass-words, do not exist; otherwise, indeed, the 'theory' could not

In this effort Plato, no doubt following Socrates' actual practice, *starts from* the ordinary language's generic adjective and moves *from there* to the abstract noun (in -της, -συνη, etc.,) to designate the separated property.⁴⁷ And since, as we have seen, Greek usage permitted plural (i.e., mass noun) as well as singular forms of the neuter substantivized adjective with generic/abstract force, Plato was at liberty to use plural forms to designate properties. The relative infrequency of generic/abstract neuter plurals in the Platonic corpus indicates merely that the singular was increasingly becoming the preferred form, owing in part, perhaps, to the progressive reinterpretation of the old mass noun as a true plural and doubtless in part to the ubiquitous fifth-century use of the singular neuter *article* in forming abstract substantives at will from adjectives, participles and verbs.⁴⁸ But in appropriate circumstances the old mass noun form with abstract reference was still admissible, for example, when a point was to be explicitly made of contrasting the property with the set of its instantiations, as at *Soph.* 225b-c, where the Eleatic Stranger says that δικανικόν treats of τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα, while ἐριστικόν, on the other hand, is concerned with δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἄδικων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως; or at *Parm.* 129b, where αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια and τὰ ἀνόμοια are used as Form-designators. Those scholars who deny that plural forms may refer to properties are forced into a wilful misreading of this passage. When the passage is considered in full—and free of prejudice—it will surely be seen to admit of only one reasonable reading insofar as the terminology is concerned. In response to Zeno's thesis that what is cannot be multifarious for if it were it would necessarily be both like and unlike, which is impossible, Socrates proposes his distinction between εἴδη and what participates in εἴδη and says that it would not be at all surprising if what participates in εἴδη should be shown to suffer opposites; if, however, εἴδη themselves should

be utilized as a valid and untested hypothesis. It happens to be merely a more pregnant formulation of a general assumption."

For an account of Plato's Form-language along somewhat similar lines, see Robin Smith's illuminating discussion of Plato's use of mass terms and generic expressions. Smith recognizes the difficulty of "the problematic *auta ta isa* at *Phaedo* 74c1" (148, n. 16) but does not attempt an explanation.

⁴⁷As Vlastos recognized (291, n. 1), the use of the generic adjective to designate the corresponding property brings with it certain philosophical difficulties; for example, self-predication is, as it were, built into the usage.

⁴⁸Cf. Webster 23-24 and Snell (1953) 227-34.

be shown to suffer opposites, he would be truly amazed. There is a clear dichotomy between what participates, on the one hand, and what is participated in, on the other; there is no concern here with an intermediate category. What is participated in are εἰδη; what participates in εἰδη may indeed suffer opposites but εἰδη themselves do not. αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια and τὰ ἀνόμοια do not suffer opposites; therefore αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια and τὰ ἀνόμοια are εἰδη. Further, αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια and τὰ ἀνόμοια are themselves explicitly said to be participated *in*. (The natural reference of τούτων ἀμφοτέρων at 129b3-4 is to the immediately preceding pair αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια/τὰ ἀνόμοια, not to the earlier pair ὅμοιότης/ἀνομοιότης at 129a5-7).⁴⁹ Moreover, if αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια and τὰ ἀνόμοια are ruled out as Form-designators we no longer have, anywhere in this passage, an explicit statement that the *Forms* of likeness and unlikeness do not suffer opposites. (Similarly τὰ πολλά at 129b9, d6 and 130b6 unquestionably refers to the Form alternately designated τὸ πλῆθος, e.g., at 129b7. Compare τὰ τρία alternating with ἡ τρίας at *Phaedo* 104a-e).⁵⁰

In the passage in question in this paper, Socrates contrasts the property equality with sensible equals, namely, stones and logs. The set of sensible equals is designated τὰ ἴσα,⁵¹ the property (i.e., the Form) by contrast (in common Platonic idiom) αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα. ἡ ἴσοτης in the second clause is, as it were, the philosopher's gloss on αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα.⁵² It is as

⁴⁹Cf. Rist 30.

⁵⁰Cf. Rist 29-30. The alternation of singular and plural forms in τὰ πολλά/τὸ πλῆθος and τὰ τρία/ἡ τρίας serves to emphasize that use of the neuter "plural" as a Form-designator carries no suggestion of plurality within the Form itself.

⁵¹The phrase τὰ ἴσα does not actually occur at this point in the text but it is implicit in λίθοι . . . καὶ ξύλα . . . ἴσα. It does occur a few lines later at 74c4 with reference to sensible equals.

⁵²Socrates' point, I take it, is that while sensible instances of equality can appear to be what they are not (viz. sensible instances of non-equality) equality itself cannot appear to be what it is not (viz. non-equality). (Cf. *Hipp. Maj.* 291d1-3, ζητεῖν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τοιούτον τι τὸ καλὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὃ μηδέποτε αἰσχρὸν μηδαμοῦ μηδενὶ φανεῖται 'for you seem to me to be seeking to reply that the beautiful is something of such sort that it will never appear ugly anywhere to anybody' [Loeb]; and *Theaet.* 196a, αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά . . . φαμεν . . . ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι.) Matthen argues that the fact that the predicate of the first clause of Socrates' question concerning the Form is an adjective (ἀνίσα) and that of the second a noun (ἀνισότης) rules out taking the second clause as epexegetical (the first clause is predicative, the second an identity statement—or, since it is negated, a non-identity statement). This view seems to me to require an overly precise distinction between the categories of noun and adjective—a distinction that is at best problematical in Greek. This is not to say of course that a Greek speaker (e.g., Plato) was incapable of distinguishing nouns and adjectives; such a claim would be

if Socrates had said "Now What-Is-Equal-Itself—or Equal-ness, as we philosophers like to say—has it ever appeared to be other-than-what-it-is?"⁵³

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patently absurd. The point is merely that the Greek substantivized (or substantivizable) adjective is inherently ambiguous with respect to these categories (cf. Snell [1953] 233 and cf. the dual nature of the participle). And if (αὐτὰ τὰ) ίσα as subject is a substantive, why not understand its corresponding α-privative compound as a substantive too—or as near as makes no difference? Cf. Rosenmeyer 94 on ὁ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιο, *Parm.* 128e7: "we have here a case where predication and identification are practically indistinguishable; 'an opposite which is dissimilar' or 'an opposite, the dissimilar'? This indeterminacy as between predicate and subject status is, of course, not infrequent in Plato's discussion of ideas." (For a further ambiguity in Greek see Rosenmeyer on Plato's use of mass-words with a range of function "more comprehensive than modern meticulousness would allow," namely, to embrace "both class and member, both entity and group, both thing and mass, both concrete act and abstraction" (94); in short, they incorporate that lack of separation between property and instantiation found in Greek thought to which I refer above, p. 394. For the collocation of substantivized adjective and abstract noun cf. *Phil.* 25a7; τὸ ίσον καὶ ίσότητα; *Euthy.* 14c5, τὸ ίσιον καὶ τὴν ίσοτητα.)

⁵³I am most grateful to Professor Mohan Matthen, first for bringing the issue of αὐτὰ τὰ ίσα to my attention and then for honing my early efforts with pointed and relentless criticism. I would also like to thank Professor Gregory Vlastos for his kind encouragement and advice as well as the editor and reader for *AJP* for their helpful comments. Needless to say, any errors of either fact or judgment are my responsibility alone.

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BEES WITHOUT HONEY, AND CALLIMACHEAN TASTE

Δηοῖ δ' οὐκ ἀπὸ παντὸς ὅδωρ φορέουσι μέλισσαι,
ἀλλ' ἡτις καθαρή τε καὶ ἀχράντος ἀνέρπει
πίδακος ἐξ ιερῆς ὄλιγη λιβὰς ἄκρον ἄωτον.

Callimachus, *Hymn to Apollo* 110-12

In his edition of Callimachus, Pfeiffer accepted the *communis opinio* (then almost three centuries old) and understood the "bees" here as

priestesses of Demeter,¹ but almost twenty years later, "with some regret," he recanted this belief.² A parallel in Aristotle had induced him to change his mind, and interpret the bees in a new way—as bees. Some insects feed on blood, others on vegetable matter, but, as far as diet goes, bees are unique:

Ἡ δὲ μέλιττα μόνον πρὸς οὐδὲν σαπρὸν προσίζει, οὐδὲ χρῆται τροφὴ οὐδεμιᾶ ἄλλη ἢ τῇ γλυκὺν ἔχούσῃ χυμόν· καὶ ὑδωρ δ' ἥδιστα εἰς ἑαυτὰς λαμβάνουσιν, ὅπου ἀν καθαρὸν ἀναπηδᾷ.

Aristotle, *HA* 596b

The resemblance between this scientific passage and the end of the Hymn is striking: we find the same emphatic association between bees and pure water. Williams, the most recent commentator, goes even further than Pfeiffer, and assumes that the wording of this passage influenced Callimachus.³

The Aristotle represents, at best, a source, not an allusion, and the dramatic nature in which the parallel struck Pfeiffer has distorted our subsequent view of the passage. In fact, Callimachus is varying a conventional pattern: bees do not normally bring water, but honey, and honey, by its sweetness, binds poetry and bees together, because poetry is conventionally sweet.

Thus, already at Theogony 83–84, we hear of the Muses: τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ γλυκερὴν χείουσιν ἔέρσην, / τοῦ δ' ἐπε' ἐκ στόματος ρέει μείλιχα. If the Muses pour "sweet dew" on someone's tongue, ἐπεα

¹See Rudolf Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* (1972) 1.284, where he traces this opinion back to Anna Fabri's edition in 1675. We hear that the priestesses of Kore and Demeter are called μέλισσαι at Schol. ad Theoc. Id. 15.94/95a; according to the Schol. ad Pindar, *Pyth.* 4.106a, which quotes Pindar (*fr.* 158Sn-M), Demeter "ταῖς ἵεραῖς(ι) μελίσσαις τέρπεται; Apollodorus of Athens, in his Περὶ θεῶν (*FGrH* 244 F 89 = *P. Oxy.* 15 (1922) 1802 col. 2.29), refers to Parian θεσμοφοριάζουσαι as μέλισσαι; in *Suppl. Hell.* 990 (an anonymous hymn to Demeter), the phrase δεῦτε μέλιςσαι shows up (v. 2); Hesych. μέλισσαι· αἱ τῆς Δήμητρος μυστίδες.

²See Rudolf Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* (1972) 284.

³This is a curious conclusion, since, on a lexical level, the only significant words that *H. Apoll* 110–12 shares with the Aristotle are μέλισσα, ὑδωρ and καθαρὸν—hardly striking, given the content. Williams offers no positive evidence that directly connects these two passages; he simply assumes the connection, and then tells us how Callimachus has varied the wording in Aristotle: ὑδωρ . . . λαμβάνουσιν becomes ὑδωρ φορέουσι, ἀναπηδᾷ becomes ἀνέρπει. Nor does Callimachus tell us that his bees live on water: they bring water to Demeter, which is not quite the same thing.

μείλιχα subsequently flow from his mouth. The Greek word ἔέρση, translated as “dew,” does not simply designate water, but any liquid distilled from the heavens. Here, in fact, ἔέρση probably does designate honey, which was thought to be a kind of dew.⁴ According to the Suda, Simonides was called Μελικέρτης on account of his sweetness.⁵ Aristophanes, we learn, licked up the honey smeared around Sophocles’ mouth just as if he were licking the mouth of a jar covered with honey.⁶ Bees built a honeycomb in the sleeping Pindar’s mouth, and this explains the sweetness of his poetry.⁷ In the seventh *Idyll*, when an evil king had trapped Comatas in a chest, bees fed him honey, (82) οὐνεκά οἱ γλυκὺ Μοῖσα κατὰ στόματος χέε νέκταρ. The poet with a mouth full of honey became a *topos*, to which the unnamed goatherd of Theocritus’ first *Idyll* can allude when he commends Thysoris’ song with the following prayer: (146–47) πλῆρες τοι μέλιτος τὸ καλὸν στόμα, Θύρσι, ἐνοιτο, / πλῆρες δὲ σχαδόνων.

Bacchylides uses “a clear sounding bee” (10.10: λιγύφθογγον μέλισσαν) to describe his poetry, and thus focuses upon the sound of the bee, but, more than anything else, the sweetness of honey made the bee a suitable image for the poet. Thus, we hear that Sophocles was called μέλιττα specifically διὰ τὸ ἡδύ (Test. 109 Radt). According to one passage in Pindar, encomiastic poetry moves, like a bee, from one topic to

⁴On the connections between honey, bees and poetry, see J. H. Waszink, *Biene und Honig als Symbol des Dichters und der Dichtung in der griechisch-römischen Antike* (Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vorträge G 196, Opladen 1974) *passim*; Susan Scheinberg, “The Bee Maidens of the Homeric Hymn to Hermes,” *HSCP* 83 (1979) 21ff. On honey as a kind of dew, see Waszink, pp. 6–7; also, West on ἔέρση in *Theog.* 83; a sweet substance, for example, collected from trees is understood to be honey distilled from dew or air: Galen, *De alimentorum facultatibus* 6.6.739: ἐκπετανύντες ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς δέρματα καὶ σείοντες τὰ δένδρα δέχονται τὸ ἀπορρέον ἐπ’ αὐτὰ καὶ χύτρας καὶ κεράμια πληροῦσι τοῦ μέλιτος ὄνομάζοντες αὐτὸ δροσόμελι τε καὶ ἀερόμελι.

⁵Simonides (Suda, Σιμωνίδης) ἐπεκλήθη Μελικέρτης διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.

⁶Sophocles, *Test.* 108 Radt (Aristophanes, *fr.* 581K) ὁ δ' αὖ Σοφοκλέους τοῦ μέλιτι κεχρισμένου / ὥσπερ καδίσκου περιέλειχε τὸ στόμα.

⁷See two slightly different versions in the *Vita Pindari* (1.6–9 Dr.): a) (it actually happened) παῖς δὲ ὁ Πίνδαρος, ὡς Χαμαιλέων καὶ Ἰστρος φασὶ, περὶ δὲ τὸν Ἐλικῶνα θηρῶντα αὐτὸν ὑπὸ πολλοῦ καμάτου εἰς ὑπὸν κατενεχθῆναι, κοιμωμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ μέλισσαν τῷ στόματι προσκαθίσας τηρία ποιῆσαι; b) (it was a dream vision) 9–11: οἱ δέ φασιν ὅτι ὅναρ εἰδεν ὡς μέλιτος καὶ κηροῦ πλῆρες είναι αὐτοῦ τὸ στόμα, καὶ ἐπὶ ποιητικὴν ἐτράπη. On stories of honey and the lives of poets, see Mary R. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (1981) 59, 80.

another,⁸ and sweetness does not play a role in the likeness,⁹ but Pindar commonly links honey with poetry.¹⁰ Simonides may have been more typical: (*PMG* 593=Plut. 79c) ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθεσιν ὄσμιλεῖν ὁ Σιμωνίδης φησὶ τὴν μέλιτταν “ξανθὸν μέλι μηδομέναν.” In Aristophanes' *Birds*, Phrynicus is pictured as a bee: (748–50) ἐνθεν ὥσπερ μέλιττα / Φρύνιχος ἀμβροσίων μελέων ἀπεβόσκετο καρπὸν ἀεὶ φέρων γλυκεῖαν ὡδάν. The poet feeds off the fruit of ambrosial songs as he carries his sweet burden of song, like a bee carrying honey from flower to flower.¹¹ The association of μέλος/μέλι is more explicit in Plato's *Ion*, where we find an even clearer picture of the poet as honey-carrying bee:

λέγουσι γὰρ δήπουθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἱ ποιηταὶ ὅτι (534b) ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω πετόμενοι.

Ion 534ab

The poets themselves claim, we are told, to cull their songs from fountains that flow with honey and that belong in the gardens and vales of the Muses.

The association of bees with poetry is therefore traditional and a commonplace, but Callimachus, typically, has not followed the traditional path. Where bees normally bring honey, Callimachus' bees bring

⁸Pindar, *Pyth.* 10.53–54: ἐγκωμίων γὰρ ἄωτος ὅμνων / ἐπ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλον ὥτε μέλισσα θύνει λόγον.

⁹Though some have felt that we must introduce the idea of sweetness if we are to fully understand the passage; see Waszink (n. 14 above) 15; Herwig Maehler, “Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im frühen Griechentum bis zur Zeit Pindars,” *Hypomnemata* 3 (1963) 91.

¹⁰See Dornseiff (*Pindars Stil* [Berlin 1921] 61); Waszink (n. 14 above) 8–9: (literal) *fr.* 152: μελισσοτεύκτων κηρίων ἐμὰ γλυκερώτερος ὄμφά: (metaph.) *Ol.* 10.98–99: μέλιτι / εύάνορα πόλιν καταβρέχων; *Nem.* 3.76–80: ἐγὼ τόδε τοι / πέμπω μεμιγμένον μέλι λευκῷ / σὺν γάλακτι, κιρναμένα δ' ἔερο' ἀμφέπει, / πόμ' ἀοίδιμον Αἰολίσσον ἐν πνοαῖσιν αὐλῶν, / ὁψέ περ. See also, the various adjectives that contain μελ-: μελίγαρυς (*Ol.* 9.4); μελίγδουπος (*Nem.* 9.17); μελίκομπος (*Isthm.* 2.30); see, also, Susan Scheinberg, “The Bee Maidens of the Homeric Hymn to Hermes,” *HSCP* 83 (1979) 23; recall also the connection between dew and honey (n. 14 above), in connection with *Isthm.* 63–64 (τὰν Ψαλχιαδᾶν δὲ πάτρον Χαρίτων / ἄρδοντι καλλίστα δρόσω) and *Pyth.* 5.98–100 (μεγαλᾶν δ' ἀρετᾶν / δρόσω μαλθακῆ / ρανθεισᾶν κώμων {θ'} ὑπὸ χεύμασιν).

¹¹See also, at Aristoph., *Vespae* 219–20, the μέλη / ἀρχαιομελισιδωνοφρυνιχήρατα, the “ancient-honey-Sidon-Phrynicus-lovely songs.”

simple, clear water. As usual, Callimachus varies an established pattern in order to make a point. He does not focus upon sweetness, but upon purity—emphatically: almost everything in *vv.* 111f. reinforces this.¹² We also find other characteristics that Callimachus elsewhere singles out: the small, fine spray following the large, dirty river recalls the contrast between quantitative and qualitative value that we find also in the prologue to the *Aetia*; the spring is sacred (112, *ἱερή*), presumably set off from general consumption, while the river is public and vulgar—therefore it flows with garbage.¹³ Substituting water for the honey that bees would normally bring, Callimachus obliquely alters and augments the customary symbolism. Sweetness yields to purity—a fitting decision, for Callimachean poetry is calculatedly lean and austere. The substitution quietly reinforces the message, and the poet's silent nod to his reader puts an appropriate seal on this programmatic passage.¹⁴

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¹²See the adjectives *καθαρή* and *ἀράντος* in *v.* 111. *H. Apoll.* 112 falls into three sections (1: *πίδακος ἐξ ιερῆς*; 2: *οὐλγη λιβάς*; 3: *ἄκρον ἄωτον*), each of which emphasizes how precious this water is, thus indirectly supporting the idea of purity introduced in the previous line.

¹³See Call. *Epigr.* 28 Pf., with the imagery of the *περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος* (*v.* 3) and the *κρήνη* (*vv.* 3f.); note especially *v.* 4: *σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια*. On this, see Albert Henrichs, "Callimachus *Epigram* 28: A Fastidious Priamel," *HSCP* 83 (1979) 207–12; Richard F. Thomas, "New Comedy, Callimachus, and Roman Poetry," *HSCP* 83 (1979) 179–206.

¹⁴In Callimachean poetry, the unspoken often has the loudest voice. Thus Horace in the famous *recusatio* that rejects and praises Pindaric poetry (*Odes* 4.2.), borrows the image of a bee from the *Hymn to Apollo* (*vv.* 27ff.), but, despite naming Pindar in the first word of poem, leaves the reader to draw the connection to Callimachus.



SOUND AND SENSE IN OX. PAP. XXII 2322

Criticism of Oxyrhynchos-Papyri XXII 2322 has focussed on the question of authorship and on whether the fragment contains one or two poems. I believe that an examination of the sound patterns in the first ten lines shows that these are a separate poem and reveals a new level of meaning in what has seemed to be a straightforward lament.

καὶ κόμης, ἡ τοι κατ' ἀβρὸν
ἐσκιάζεν αὐχένα.
νῦν δὲ δὴ σὺ μὲν στολοκρός,
ἡ δ' εἰς αὐχμηρὰς πεσοῦσα
5 χεῖρας ἀθρόη μέλαιναν
έεις κόνιν κατερρύη
τλημόνως τομῆι σιδήρου
περιπεσοῦσ' ἐγώ δ' ἄσητοι
τείρομαι τί γάρ τις ἔρεξη
10 μήδ' ὑπὲρ Θρήικης τυχών;

There is too much alliteration in these lines to be accidental. The kappas of line 1 and line 6, the sigmas of line 3 and the taus of line 7 and line 9 are proof enough that the poet is choosing his words for their sound as well as for their meaning. But the main purpose of this alliteration is to prepare the listener for the last two lines of the poem. The τ, ρ, and ξ of τις ἔρεξη, the Θ, ρ, κ and ζ of Θρήικης and the τ and χ of τυχών call to mind the consonants of θρίξ, τριχός. The implicit contrast between κόμη in line 1, which suggests something like 'coiffure', and θρίξ which is a much more prosaic word, provides an ironic twist at the end of a lament on a commonplace theme; the poet says, in effect, "After all, it's only hair."

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LUCILIUS AND ARCHILOCHUS:
FRAGMENT 698 (MARX)

In spite of Quintilian's assertion that *satira quidem tota nostra est* (*Inst. Orat.* 10.1.93), scholars have persisted in seeking Greek models for the genre.¹ Among the sources proposed have been Attic Old Comedy, the Hellenistic diatribe, the *Iambi* of Callimachus, and the earlier *Iambi* of Archilochus.² In his important study *Lucilius und Kallimachos*, M. Puelma Piwonka argues that Callimachus' *Iambi* served as Lucilius' primary model, but that Archilochus was also an important "Vorgänger" of Lucilian, if not earlier Roman *satira*.³ Puelma's view has been reasserted in more detail by M. Coffey, who argues that "Archilochus had much to offer Lucilius."⁴

The idea of Archilochus as a model for Lucilius is based chiefly on the fact that, in two fragments (698, 699 Marx) Lucilius appears to allude to surviving verses of Archilochus. It is also based on what are perceived as similarities between the invective subject matter and personal stances of the two poets. The similarities, however, are superficial, and the argument really rests on the assumption that Lucilius' two allusions

¹ On Quintilian's assertion, see *inter alios*, C. A. Van Rooy, *Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory* (Leiden 1965) 117-23; M. Coffey, *Roman Satire* (London 1976) 3-8; and U. Knoche, *Die Römische Satire* (4th ed. Göttingen 1981) 3-5.

Fragments of Lucilius are cited according to F. Marx, *C. Lucili Carminum Reliquiae I-II* (Leipzig 1904-1905), those of Archilochus, according to M. L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci I* (Oxford 1971).

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² Van Rooy (n. 1 above) 90-116, gives a full discussion and surveys earlier studies. See also Coffey (n. 1 above) 54-58, and J. Christes "Lucilius: ein Bericht über die Forschung seit F. Marx (1904/5)" *ANRW* I.2 (1972) 1232-33.

³ M. Puelma Piwonka, *Lucilius und Kallimachos* (Frankfurt am Main 1949) 64, 131, 179, 202. According to Van Rooy, (n. 1 above) 138, "the theory of a parallelism between Archilochus and Lucilius" dates to antiquity, but F. Marx, (n. 1 above) seems to have first postulated a direct influence. He has been followed by, among others, A. Kurfess, "Die Anfänge der Invektive in Rom," *Sokrates* 69 (1915) 103-112; G. Fiske, *Lucilius and Horace* (Madison 1920) 201; R. Narducci, "Inspirazione archiliochea nelle satire luciliane," *Il Mondo Classico* (1934) 77-79; Knoche (n. 1 above) 23; and M. Morford, *Persius* (Boston 1984) 17 and 25. More sceptical are P. Lejay, *Q. Horati Flacci Satirae* (Paris 1911) lix; F. Leo, *Geschichte der Römischen Literatur* (Berlin 1913) 410; and C. Witke, *Latin Satire* (Leiden 1970) 25.

⁴ Coffey (n. 1 above) 8, 42, 56-67. The quote is from 56.

prove that he was intimately acquainted with the *Iambi* of Archilochus.⁵ In this paper I shall argue that the wording of one of the allusions suggests that Lucilius' knowledge of Archilochus was in fact scanty, and probably derived wholly from an anthology which contained excerpts of the Parian poet quoted for their gnomic import.

In fr. 698, Lucilius tells someone: "I fear it cannot happen; therefore I disagree with old Archilochus." The allusion is to a poem preserved for us by the anthologist Stobaeus (4.46 = Arch. fr. 122.1-9 West) in which the belief is expressed that "nothing can be unexpected or declared impossible on oath or wondered at" (1-2).⁶ Whatever Lucilius' addressee has suggested, the poet finds it so preposterous that he cannot agree with Archilochus' assertion that "anything can happen."⁷

As quoted by Stobaeus, the Archilochus poem forms a self-contained gnomic utterance; nothing in the text suggests either that there was more to it or that the speaker was anyone except Archilochus himself. We know, however, from Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.17) that Archilochus was not, in fact, the speaker of these words, but placed them in the mouth of a character, "the father talking about his daughter."⁸ Moreover, a papyrus has added a few fragmentary lines to Stobaeus' version; somewhere, as Aristotle's notice shows, there must have been a clear indication of the identity of the speaker.⁹

In alluding to the poem, Lucilius does not mention "the father," but "disagrees" with "old Archilochus" himself: *ergo antiquo ab Arciloco excido*. Although the evidence is scanty, it appears that when Lucilius referred to mimetic poetry or prose he generally distinguished between what the author spoke in his own person and what was put in the mouth of a character. Thus, in criticizing some verses of Euripides, he seems to have indicated their context and speaker rather than, as so

⁵ Of the critics cited in n. 3 above, only Lejay and Leo express doubts as to how much of Archilochus' poetry Lucilius could have known. On knowledge of Archilochus at Rome, see A. Von Blumenthal, *Die Schätzung des Archilochos im Altertum* (Stuttgart 1922) 33-39.

⁶ This was first recognized by J. Dousa, cited by Marx, (n. 1 above) 2.258.

⁷ For this interpretation of fr. 698, see E. H. Warmington, *Remains of Old Latin* III (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 253.

⁸ See K. J. Dover, "The Poetry of Archilochus," in *Archiloque* (Entretiens Hardt X, Vandoevres-Genève 1964) 206-208.

⁹ *Pap. Oxy.* 2313 fr. 1(a). See West (n. 1 above) 47-48. Van Rooy (n. 1 above) 143, n. 61, observes that Archilochus "does not speak in his own person," but seems unaware of the possible implications as regards Lucilius.

often in Aristophanes, simply attacking Euripides himself (fr. 1169).¹⁰ In another fragment (875), his target is Pacuvius, but he again indicates the context of whatever it was that offended him: it occurred in a "Pacuvian prologue" (*Pacuviano exordio*).¹¹ Finally, in citing a sentiment expressed in Plato's *Charmides* (154b), Lucilius attributes it, not to the author, but to the character who says it: *sic Socrates in amore et in adolescentulis / meliore paulo facie signat nil quem amat* (832-33).¹² In light of these examples, Lucilius' failure to indicate the dramatic context of the Archilochus poem suggests that he was unaware of it and believed that the poet was speaking *in propria persona*.¹³

If this is the case, then Lucilius must have seen a version of the poem similar to that in Stobaeus, where the identification of the speaker as "the father" had been omitted. There would be no reason for such an omission in a complete edition of Archilochus' works; in anthologies, however, where the purpose was to provide statements of general import, the common practice, as we can see from surviving examples, was to remove details which would tie a statement to a particular situation or occasion.¹⁴ I suggest, therefore, that Lucilius' ignorance of the identity of the speaker of the verses to which he alludes shows that he knew them from an anthology in which they were quoted out of context as a gnomic utterance.

Fragments of such anthologies from the time of Lucilius and even earlier have been discovered in Egypt, and there is no reason to think that they would not have been available at Rome.¹⁵ Lucilius' other allu-

¹⁰Fr. 1160 (= Aulus Gellius 6.3.28) is, unfortunately, problematic, since it is not clear how much of it comes from Lucilius, rather than Tiro or Gellius. See Marx (n. 1 above) 2. 369-70, who argues that all but the "last words" (*at . . . uelis.*) derive from Lucilius; this includes the indications of the context and speaker of Euripides' lines. For another view, see W. Krenkel, *Lucilius Satiren* (Leiden 1970) 631.

¹¹This fragment also suggests that Lucilius would not have used Archilochus' name as the equivalent of "a work of Archilochus." See also fr. 480-83, where he refers to an incident as occurring, not "in Homer," but *in Homeris uersibus*.

¹²See Krenkel (n. 10 above) 459.

¹³It may be significant that other Roman satirists seem, on the whole, to distinguish between author and character. See, e.g., Horace *Serm.* 1.2.20-21 and *Epist.* 1.7.40-43, and Juvenal *Sat.* 15.13-26. A full study of Roman methods of citation is a desideratum.

¹⁴See J. Barns, "A New Gnomologium: With Some Remarks on Gnomic Anthologies," 1 and 2, *CQ* 44 (1950) 126-37 and *CQ* 45 (1951) 1-19; G. Kirkwood, "The Author of the Strasbourg Epodes," *TAPA* 92 (1961) 267-82; M. L. West, *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus* (Berlin 1974) 40-61.

¹⁵For early anthologies, see the studies cited in n. 14 above.

sion to Archilochus (in fr. 699) is also to verses which are preserved by Stobaeus (fr. 128 West; Lucilius echoes lines 6-7).¹⁶ The fact that our source for these verses, as well as the ones echoed in fr. 698, is an anthology is not in itself evidence that Lucilius knew them from a similar collection, but his ignorance of the context of Archilochus fr. 122 makes this a strong possibility. At any rate, it casts doubt on the assertion that Lucilius knew Archilochus well enough to model aspects of his *satira* on Archilochean *Iambus*.¹⁷

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¹⁶ See Marx (n. 1 above) 2. 254.

¹⁷ A further argument against full-scale Lucilian imitation of Archilochus is the fact that Horace, who knew both poets better than we do, nowhere associates them and, indeed, clearly distinguishes *satira*, in which his chief model was Lucilius (*Serm.* 2.1.34), from *Iambus*, in which he followed Archilochus (*Epist.* 1.19.23-25) as literary genres (see especially *Epist.* 2.2.58-62 and C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry* III [Cambridge 1982] 299-302).



PETRONIUS AND THE UNDERWORLD

Averil Cameron (*Latomus* 29 [1970] 405-406) has pointed out how the theme of trickery and deceit which pervades the *Satyricon* finds one focus in the figure of Daedalus, one of whose activities was the creation of the labyrinth; her analysis of these topics in relation to this work has been followed up by Fedeli, *Materiali e Discussioni* 6 (1981) 113-15 and Newton *CJ* 77, 1981-82, 315-19. The labyrinth has funereal associations; see R. J. Clark *Catabasis* (1979) 148-50 and the commentators on the passages of Vergil to be adduced. Vergil's *labor ille domus et inextricabilis error* (*Aen.* 6.27; portrayed on the doors at Cumae) combines with the reminiscence of Varro's description of the tomb of Lars Porsena as *labyrinthus inextricabilis* (ap. Pliny *NH* 36.91) to foreshadow Aeneas' descent into the underworld, from which, as from a

labyrinth, it is difficult to emerge again (128–29 *sed revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras, / hoc opus, hic labor est*); in the end of course Aeneas emerges from the ivory gate of sleep, which is not that by which he entered.

Now at the end of the *Cena Trimalchionis*, when the companions try to escape, the porter tells them (72.10) *erras si putas te exire hac (sc. ianua) posse qua venisti. nemo umquam convivarum per eandem ianuam emissus est; alia intrant, alia exeunt*. And this is followed by these words (73.1), *quid faciamus homines miserrimi et novi generis labyrintho inclusi?* Just before this (72.7–9), when they had come to the door by which they had entered, the chained dog which they had been warned about in 29.1 had barked so fiercely that Ascyltos and Encolpius had fallen into the pool, and in order to quieten the dog Giton had thrown to it some morsels preserved from the feast—a sop to Cerberus (*Aen.* 6.419–23)!

From all this it follows that Trimalchio's house is to some degree a hell-hole, or perhaps one should rather say an abode of shadows, part of a world which, as it is portrayed by Petronius, lacks a sense of reality. The Vergilian allusions are clear; did Petronius himself evolve the idea of using reminiscences of a classical epic description of the underworld to convey his implication? I think not. I believe that he got the suggestion from Plato, whose *Symposion* contributed so much to the structure of the *Cena* (see another article by Cameron, *CQ* 19 [1969] 367); this time however not from the *Symposion*, but from the *Protagoras*. For in this dialogue when Socrates and Hippocrates arrive at the house of Callias, they see first Protagoras and his companions walking around, then τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα, ἔφη "Ομηρος, Hippias (315b). The quotation is from the Νεκυία, *Od.* 11.601 τὸν (Sisyphus) δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακληίην. And next (315c) καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάνταλόν γε εἰσεῖδον, i.e., Prodicus; this is *Od.* 11.582 καὶ μὴν Τάνταλον εἰσεῖδον. Platonic scholars ought to be more interested in the implications of these quotations than they seem to be (I have found no comment at all on the matter in my certainly incomplete investigation of the literature); they constitute one of Plato's subtle methods of disparaging the sophists (including Protagoras, who is obliquely related to Sisyphus) and what they have been about in the house of Callias-Hades before the arrival of Socrates-Odysseus. There seems to be a clear analogy between this and the condemnation of the life-style prevailing in Trimalchio's house which is inherent in Petronius' narrative, and it is no surprise to find close acquaintance with Plato in Petronius, who recommended that one

should emerge from education *Socratico plenus grege* (5.13) and who had, if ever anyone did, a *mens ingenti flumine litterarum inundata* (118.3).

140.14 runs thus: *Socrates, deorum hominumque <iudicio vir optimus sapientissimusque>, gloriari solebat quod numquam neque in tabernam conspicerat nec ullius turbae frequentioris concilio oculos suos crediderat* (I have presented the passage with a variation of the supplement of Rutgersius which will give palaeographical cause for omission). If the source of this is in Plato, I have not succeeded in discovering it; my colleague Michael Wigodsky suggests that it may originate in a garbling of the anecdote reported in Diog. Laert. 2.25.

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